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In this thesis, we propose a panoply of tools and techniques to manage inter-agent
dependencies in open, distributed multi-agent systems that have signi¯cant degrees of
uncertainty. In particular, we focus on situations in which agents are involved in repeated
interactions where they need to negotiate to resolve con°icts that may arise between
them. To this end, we endow agents with decision making models that exploit the
notion of trust and use persuasive techniques during the negotiation process to reduce
the level of uncertainty and achieve better deals in the long run.
Firstly, we develop and evaluate a new trust model (called CREDIT) that allows agents
to measure the degree of trust they should place in their opponents. This model re-
duces the uncertainty that agents have about their opponents' reliability. Thus, over
repeated interactions, CREDIT enables agents to model their opponents' reliability using
probabilistic techniques and a fuzzy reasoning mechanism that allows the combination
of measures based on reputation (indirect interactions) and con¯dence (direct interac-
tions). In so doing, CREDIT takes a wider range of behaviour-in°uencing factors into
account than existing models, including the norms of the agents and the institution
within which transactions occur. We then explore a novel application of trust models by
showing how the measures developed in CREDIT ca be applied negotiations in multiple
encounters. Speci¯cally we show that agents that use CREDIT are able to avoid unreli-
able agents, both during the selection of interaction partners and during the negotiation
process itself by using trust to adjust their negotiation stance. Also, we empirically show
that agents are able to reach good deals with agents that are unreliable to some degree
(rather than completely unreliable) and with those that try to strategically exploit their
opponent.
Secondly, having applied CREDIT to negotiations, we further extend the application of
trust to reduce uncertainty about the reliability of agents in mechanism design (where the
honesty of agents is elicited by the protocol). Thus, we develop Trust-Based Mechanism
Design (TBMD) that allows agents using a trust model (such as CREDIT) to reach
e±cient agreements that choose the most reliable agents in the long run. In particular,
we show that our mechanism enforces truth-telling from the agents (i.e. it is incentiveiv
compatible), both about their perceived reliability of their opponent and their valuations
for the goods to be traded. In proving the latter properties, our trust-based mechanism
is shown to be the ¯rst reputation mechanism that implements individual rationality,
incentive compatibility, and e±ciency. Our trust-based mechanism is also empirically
evaluated and shown to be better than other comparable models in reaching the outcome
that maximises all the negotiating agents' utilities and in choosing the most reliable
agents in the long run.
Thirdly, having explored ways to reduce uncertainties about reliability and honesty, we
use persuasive negotiation techniques to tackle issues associated with uncertainties that
agents have about the preferences and the space of possible agreements. To this end,
we propose a novel protocol and reasoning mechanism that agents can use to generate
and evaluate persuasive elements, such as promises of future rewards, to support the
o®ers they make during negotiation. These persuasive elements aim to make o®ers
more attractive over multiple encounters given the absence of information about an
opponent's discount factors or exact payo®s. Speci¯cally, we empirically demonstrate
that agents are able to achieve a larger number of agreements and a higher expected
utility over repeated encounters when they are given the capability to give or ask for
rewards. Moreover, we develop a novel strategy using this protocol and show that it
outperforms existing state of the art heuristic negotiation models.
Finally, the applicability of persuasive negotiation and CREDIT is exempli¯ed through
a practical implementation in a pervasive computing environment. In this context, the
negotiation mechanism is implemented in an instant messaging platform (JABBER) and
used to resolve con°icts between group and individual preferences that arise in a meeting
room scenario. In particular, we show how persuasive negotiation and trust permit a
°exible management of interruptions by allowing intrusions to happen at appropriate
times during the meeting while still managing to satisfy the preferences of all parties
present.Contents
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Introduction
Open distributed computing applications are becoming increasingly commonplace in our
society. In most cases, these applications are composed of multiple actors or agents, each
with its own aims and objectives. In such complex systems, dependencies between these
multiple agents are inevitable, and generally speaking, they cannot all be predicted in
advance. Therefore a runtime mechanism is needed to manage them and to resolve
any con°icts that might ensue in a context-dependent manner. We believe the de facto
mechanism for achieving this is automated negotiation and this is the area explored in
this thesis.
However, designing e®ective negotiation mechanisms for open distributed applications
is a major research challenge. Speci¯cally, there is a high degree of uncertainty in
the variables that impact on negotiations. This is because the actions of the actors
(i.e. what they are able to achieve), their preferences (i.e. what outcomes they deem
possible and would prefer), their honesty (i.e. to what extent they want to reveal private
information truthfully), and their reliability (i.e. how good they are at what they say
they can do) are not public knowledge. This uncertainty may, in turn, prevent the agents
from reaching good agreements during negotiations (because they are not able to make
decisions with full knowledge of the e®ects of their actions). Given this, the underlying
motivation of this thesis is to devise techniques to reduce this uncertainty so that agents
can reach better agreements through automated negotiation. In particular, this involves
modelling the variables that are prone to uncertainty using decision theoretic techniques
(e.g. statistics and/or fuzzy reasoning), determining ways in which the output of such
techniques can be used in automated negotiation, and detailing how this output can
be re¯ned over multiple encounters between the agents in order to make the search for
the best agreement quicker. Against this background, we develop three general classes
of techniques that aim to enhance the outcome of such repeated encounters. First, we
propose that agents model their opponents' reliability through the notion of trust. To
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this end, we develop the CREDIT1 trust model. Using CREDIT, agents are able to
adapt their negotiation stance in bargaining encounters according to how trustworthy
(reliable and honest) they believe their opponent to be in enacting the contents of a
contract. Second, we develop the notion of Trust-Based Mechanism Design (TBMD)
that uses game theoretic techniques to select the most reliable agents in the system
by incentivizing them to honestly reveal their preferences and their trustworthiness.
Third, we develop a novel mechanism for Persuasive Negotiation (PN) for reducing the
uncertainty in repeated encounters by allowing agents to constrain the space of outcomes
that they need to search in order to ¯nd an agreement. Thus, in persuasive negotiation,
agents can ask for or give rewards, which constrain future encounters, in an attempt to
make an o®er in the current negotiation more acceptable.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 maps out the general need
for automated negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In section 1.2 we discuss
the techniques that are used in negotiation and identify those attributes of negotiation
encounters that can be uncertain. In section 1.3, we then discuss the issue of trust as
a means to reduce the uncertainty about the honesty or reliability of agents. Then, in
section 1.4 we discuss how uncertainties about the action set and preferences of agents
can be dealt with in persuasive negotiation. The aims and objectives, as well as the
main contributions of the thesis, are outlined in section 1.5 and the structure of the
remainder of this thesis is given in section 1.6.
1.1 Motivation for Research
Many computer applications are open distributed systems in which the (very many) con-
stituent components are spread throughout a network, in a decentralised control regime,
and are subject to constant change throughout the system's lifetime. Examples include
the Grid (Foster and Kesselman, 1998), peer-to-peer computing (Ripeanu et al., 2002),
the semantic web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001), web services (Seth, 2003), e-business (Ker-
sten and Lo, 2001), m-commerce (Tveit, 2001; Vulkan, 1999), autonomic computing
(Kephart and Chess, 2003), and pervasive computing environments (Satyanarayanan,
2001). Such open distributed systems are typically composed of various stakeholders,
each with their own, possibly con°icting, interests. Therefore, there is a need to have au-
tonomous components, that represent these stakeholders, and act and interact in °exible
ways in order to achieve their design objectives in uncertain and dynamic environments
(Simon, 1996). Given this, agent based computing has been advocated as the natural
computation model for such systems (Jennings, 2001).
More speci¯cally, the agent paradigm allows the decomposition of large, complex, and
distributed systems into a number of autonomous entities that can interact with each
1Con¯dence and REputation De¯ning Interaction-based Trust (CREDIT).Chapter 1 Introduction 3
other in order to achieve their individual objectives (Jennings, 2000). To be even more
precise, the following de¯nition of an agent will be used throughout this work:
De¯nition 1.1. An agent is a computer system situated in an environment, and capable
of °exible autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives
(adapted from Wooldridge and Jennings (1995)).
This de¯nition highlights the fact that an agent must have the following properties:
² Reactivity | the ability to respond to changes to its perceived environment in-
cluding those changes that result from the actions of other agents.
² Proactiveness | the ability to exploit opportunities to satisfy its goals, rather
than constraining itself to prede¯ned rules.
² Social ability | the ability to interact with other agents in its environment to
satisfy its goals.
The last of these properties is probably the main de¯ning characteristics of agents that
are situated in MAS. In this work, agents within such systems are assured to interact
with one another according to some interaction mechanism that guides the participants
to a particular outcome:
De¯nition 1.2. An interaction mechanism is a means by which agents are able to
achieve one or more of the following: (i) exchange information, (ii) coordinate their
actions and (iii) resolve their con°icts.
Given this, open distributed systems can be modelled as open multi-agent systems that
are composed of autonomous agents that interact with one another using particular
interaction mechanisms. Obviously, depending on the nature of the interaction, di®erent
types of interaction mechanisms will be used. Broadly speaking, we can characterise the
nature of interactions in the following ways:
² Competitive interactions | agents interact to satisfy their own preferences. These
preferences are usually captured through their utility function which assigns a score
(usually a real value) to particular outcomes in the interaction. In such competitive
interactions, agents try to maximise their utility function and are hence termed
sel¯sh or self-interested. Speci¯cally, the agents try to deduce the course of action
that maximises their utility given their knowledge of their environment and the
possible actions of other agents. This may involve hiding their preferences since
doing otherwise might lead to a low utility deal being achieved.2 Given this, MAS
2Such decision making based on the computation of the utility maximising action relative to other
agents' actions is normally termed strategic decision making (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994).4 Chapter 1 Introduction
designers have to engineer the system that guides such competitive interactions
through protocols so that agents do not unduly exploit one another or the overall
system in seeking to maximise their individual utility. In so doing, the designer can
ensure that the system is fair and incentivises individual stakeholders to participate
in it. Generally speaking, these protocols dictate the range of actions that agents
can perform (i.e. their action set), the sequence of actions that are permissible
(e.g. each agent performing only one action concurrently with others or a number
of actions sequentially with others' actions), and how the agents' actions translate
into an outcome (Dash et al., 2003; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm,
1999). Given the system's protocols, the agents' owners need to de¯ne the strategy
of the agents that can achieve their goals (i.e. given the history of actions, what
an agent is supposed to do next).
² Cooperative interactions | agents interact in order to try and maximise the sum
of all their utilities (also termed the social welfare (Mas-Colell et al., 1995)) (as
opposed to their individual utility in the competitive case). In these interactions,
agents totally devote themselves to the group's cause even at the expense of their
individual goals (Pynadath and Tambe, 2002) (i.e. even if their individual utility
is low in the chosen outcome). In this context, the main problem of the MAS
designer is that of devising algorithms (i.e. covering both the protocol used and
the strategy of the individual agents) that can ¯nd a globally optimum set of
actions that still manage to satisfy each agent's constraints (Yokoo and Hirayama,
2000; Becker et al., 2003). The problem of ¯nding the optimum set of actions
is usually exacerbated in this case by uncertainties in the knowledge agents have
about each other's actions and the number of constraints (or variables) that exist
for each agent.
In this thesis we focus on interaction mechanisms that deal with competitive interactions
since this represents the most general class of interactions (i.e. a competitive interaction
can be reduced to a cooperative one by changing the nature of the utility function of
each agent). In particular, as stated earlier, agents, while having sel¯sh interests, may
need to collaborate to achieve their goals. In such contexts, agents usually aim to ¯nd an
agreement that determines a course of action that maximises their individual utilities.
To this end, a number of techniques have been devised, forming the general class of
negotiation mechanisms, more commonly known as automated negotiation mechanisms
in the MAS literature.
1.2 Automated Negotiation Mechanisms
Negotiation has been de¯ned in many di®erent ways (see (Walton and Krabbe, 1995;
Fisher and Ury, 1983; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Jennings et al., 2000)). However,Chapter 1 Introduction 5
fundamentally, its main goal is to achieve an agreement over some issue(s) of contention.
In this thesis we adopt the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 1.3. Negotiation is an interaction mechanism that aims to resolve a con°ict
of interest between two or more parties through the use of a de¯ned protocol and the
strategies of the agents (adapted from (Jennings et al., 2001)).
The protocol usually determines the sequence of steps agents need to follow during
negotiation, while the agents' strategies are part of their reasoning mechanism (which
also involves information gathering and analysis, and o®er generation components). As
can be deduced from the above de¯nition, the aim of negotiation is to ¯nd an agreement
that satis¯es the agents' preferences or constraints, but such encounters do not always
end up in an agreement (and agents may gain zero or negative utility from this). Non-
agreement can happen as a result of a lack of time, an unavailability of viable options
for the participants (that could result from a lack of knowledge about the participants'
preferences), or an incompatibility between the strategies used by the agents (Fisher
and Ury, 1983; Rai®a, 1982). However, if an agreement is feasible and the agents are
actually able to achieve it, all parties are normally committed to enacting the contents
of the agreement (Jennings, 1993). In this work, we de¯ne a commitment as follows:
De¯nition 1.4. A commitment is a pledge by an agent to ensure that the contents of
the commitments are achieved through some actions (adapted from (Jennings, 1993)).
The properties of the agreement reached (i.e. the type of actions agents commit them-
selves to) are dictated by the negotiation mechanism used (i.e. the protocol and strate-
gies of agents). For example, if the mechanism allows agents to exhaustively explore the
space of all possible agreements, the agreement chosen should be one that maximises
all negotiating agents' utilities. In contrast, if the negotiation mechanism only allows
an agent to accept or reject only one o®er (e.g. in take it or leave it negotiation), the
agreement may not be the most e±cient one that could be obtained. Moreover, the
type of mechanism chosen by the system designer may, in turn, depend on a number of
factors, among which we note the following:
² The context of application | while some applications give an upper hand to the
system designer to formulate a protocol that meets certain criteria (wanted by
the designer), other applications may give more control to the individual agents'
owners. For example, in selling licenses for bandwidth to telecommunication com-
panies, a government agency (the system designer) may decide on a particular
protocol that the companies need to comply with in placing their o®ers and, in
so doing, elicits their true preferences and maximises the agency's pro¯t (Krishna,
2002). On the other hand, traders in a stock market have to decide on their own
(negotiation) strategies in order to get the best pro¯t in the system given the rules
that are in place.6 Chapter 1 Introduction
² The uncertainty prevailing in the application | in most applications negotiations
have to take place in an environment where there is a degree of uncertainty. In this
context, uncertainty about a particular property or attribute means that there is
a lack of information about that property or attribute and there is no statistical
model for this. For example, agents may be uncertain about their exact preferences
or about the actions they can perform in the environment. Agents may also be
uncertain about their opponents' reliability (i.e. how good they are at doing what
they say they can do) and their honesty (i.e. whether they tell the truth about
the information have). In such cases, the protocol and the agents' strategies used
for the negotiation will have to take these into account if the agents are to come
to acceptable outcomes. Such uncertainties can be reduced in a number of ways
including, but not limited to:
{ Developing decision making models that allow agents to model those at-
tributes or properties liable to uncertainty. In such contexts, we expect agents
to use decision theoretic techniques such as statistics (Savage, 1954) or fuzzy
reasoning (Zadeh, 1965; Mamdani, 1977) that permit such a modelling.
{ Adapting the protocol to permit agents to reduce the number of variables over
which the uncertainty applies. This may involve using a protocol that forces
the agents to reveal all the information available to each of them (Krishna,
2002) or constraining the number of actions that they may perform (Hovi,
1998; Mas-Colell et al., 1995),.
Given this, a number of automated negotiation mechanisms have been devised to cater
for di®erent contexts and uncertainties. We can broadly classify these into following
categories (see ¯gure 1.1):
² Bargaining | this typically involves the exchange of o®ers between the interacting
agents until an agreement is reached (this is often termed `negotiation' in some
cases (Jennings, 2001; Faratin et al., 1998)). In this context, each o®er implies a
conditional commitment on the part of the sending agent that it will enact the
contents of the o®er if and only if the recipient sends an `agree' message. The
contents of the o®er or the negotiation object can vary from the very simple (e.g.
based on price or quality only) to the extremely complex (e.g. involving trade-
o®s between price and quality) (Klein et al., 2003; Faratin et al., 2002). The
negotiation object may also be dynamically changed by adding other issues during
the negotiation process or by constraints imposed during other (concurrent or
previous) negotiation encounters (games).
Bargaining is appealing in situations where it is not possible to have a central
authority that can generate an outcome that maximises the utility of all interact-
ing agents. Also, bargaining protocols do not usually assume known preferences,Chapter 1 Introduction 7
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Figure 1.1: Approaches to negotiation in multi-agent systems and the cloud of un-
certainty covering various aspects of the interaction.
reliability levels, action sets, or degree of honesty of the agents. Typically they
only impose the sequence of exchange of o®ers (e.g. alternating o®ers or `take it
or leave it') or the participation rules that determine when agents are allowed to
leave the negotiation or send o®ers for example. In such cases, these uncertain-
ties are left mostly to the agent designers to model and use in their bargaining
strategy (Faratin et al., 1998; Jennings et al., 2001) (i.e. in this case a strategy is
a mapping from the history of o®ers to the next o®er to be generated). To this
end, the agents' owners may use some form of heuristic that provide general rules
on how to add issues to the negotiation object, the type of o®er to be sent, or
the trade-o®s that can be made between di®erent issues. The way these di®erent8 Chapter 1 Introduction
functions are performed de¯ne the agent's negotiation stance (i.e. how it shapes
the negotiation encounter to its advantage). Heuristics generally try to reach good
outcomes (i.e. those that give a high positive utility to the participating agents)
rather than optimal ones (Jennings et al., 2001). In contrast, optimal outcomes
that maximise the sum of the utility of participating agents are usually sought by
game-theoretic techniques (Nash, 1953; Muthoo, 1999). In this context, optimal
outcomes are those that maximise the sum of the utility of participating agents.
To achieve this outcome, the agents' preferences and all their possible actions are
usually assumed to be known. However, as can be seen, such approaches often
make overly strong assumptions about the availability of information about the
agents' private preferences and action set.
² Mechanism Design (MD) | this involves the development of a protocol specifying
an exact sequence (and number) of actions (imposed by the system designer) to
ensure that agents act in such a way that the resulting behaviour satis¯es certain
properties sought for by the system designer (Dash et al., 2003). To this end, the
system designer assumes that the agents present in the system interact in a game-
theoretic way (meaning that each agent models the e®ect of its actions on other
agents' actions). The mechanism thus devised is to ensure that, at equilibrium,
the intended properties are satis¯ed. The equilibrium here determines the state
reached when all agents choose their utility maximising course of action and the
main properties sought for by such mechanisms include: (i) pareto e±ciency (i.e.
maximising the sum of the utility of all agents in such a way that no other alloca-
tion exists where an agent gains more utility and no other agent is worse o®); (ii)
incentive compatibility (i.e. enforcing truthful revelation about the agents' pref-
erences or other attributes); and (iii) individual rationality (i.e. agents are better
o® participating in the mechanism than opting out). To achieve such properties,
game-theoretic mechanisms generally assume a completely known action set and
that each agent knows its preferences perfectly (but not those of its opponent).
To achieve such outcomes, the system designer provides incentives to agents to
behave in a certain way through the speci¯cation of a payment scheme (i.e. how
payments are made to agents which sell goods) and an allocation scheme (i.e. how
goods are allocated to agents which pay for them) that takes into account the
utility-maximising nature of agents. Usually, the protocols used in mechanism de-
sign imply a centralised authority that regiments the interactions (i.e. decides the
agreements for the agents after knowing their preferences).
In general, both bargaining and mechanism design are subject to some uncertainty
regarding similar or di®erent attributes. For example, mechanism design reduces the
uncertainty about the agents' preferences by enforcing a protocol which elicits these
preferences. In contrast, bargaining seeks to elicit these preferences through an iterative
exchange of o®ers which is not guaranteed to ¯nd an agreement that satis¯es the agents'Chapter 1 Introduction 9
preferences. Therefore, as shown in ¯gure 1.1, there exists a number of attributes that are
subject to uncertainty and we view these as a cloud that envelops the negotiation process.
Here we will concentrate on the attributes that most obviously a®ect negotiations such
as:3
² Honesty | in competitive interactions agents may lie about their preferences or
reliability in order to maximise their utility and this may, in turn, lead to ine±-
ciency in the system. In such cases, the system designer needs to provide the right
incentives to elicit truthful revelation of such information. This is usually achieved
through engineering the protocol using some form of game theoretic analysis (i.e.
mechanism design). In cases where this is not possible, agents may analyse the
honesty of their opponents over multiple encounters and avoid those that are most
dishonest in the long run.
² Reliability | in cases where a negotiation opponent's reliability of performing a
particular task is not perfect, an agent might want to add some more stringent
conditions to the agreement reached between them (e.g. specify a quality standard
to be met or a compensation to be paid if expectations not met). This aims to
make sure that the enactment of the agreement by the opponent is in line with
what the agent expects. In such cases, in order to be able to analyse the reliability
of an opponent, the agent may need to model this attribute statistically over
multiple encounters and elicit a decision from that model at negotiation time. In
this context, the reliability and honesty of agents is captured through the concept
of trust (see chapter 3 for more details).
De¯nition 1.5. Trust is a belief an agent has that the other party will do what
it says it will (being honest and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocative for
the common good of both), given an opportunity to defect to get higher payo®s
(adapted from (Dasgupta, 1998)).
Thus, through a trust model, it is possible to capture the probability of losing
utility in an interaction with a particular agent by virtue of its trustworthiness
(i.e. its reliability and honesty). Hence, through the use of a trust model, the risk4
that agents incur in interactions can be signi¯cantly reduced.
² Preferences | when each agent in a negotiation encounter knows its opponents
preferences, the outcome is usually easy to predict according to game theory (Mas-
Colell et al., 1995). In mechanism design, the protocol is usually devised in such a
3Other attributes, such as the communication mechanism used or the computational capability of
the agents, are also subject to uncertainty, but in this thesis we will assume these are already factored
into the decision making models of the agents.
4We conceive of an environment as being prone to uncertainty, when every possible event in the
environment has an equal chance of happening. Risk, instead, arises when there is a probability that an
event causing some utility loss will happen (Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1990). These probabilities can be
hard to estimate especially in the types of open distributed systems in which we are interested.10 Chapter 1 Introduction
way that these preferences are elicited. However, when preferences are not known
and agents are in a bargaining encounter, they have to use e±cient techniques to
search the space of o®ers that meets their opponent's preferences. To assist in
this process, the agents could also exchange more information (on top of an o®er)
which gives partial information about their preferences (i.e. without completely
revealing them).
² Environment (action set) | when agents do not know each other's possible ac-
tions, it is hard to act strategically (as per game theory) to ¯nd an agreement
(which dictates a set of actions to the participants) that maximises the utility of
participating agents. Moreover, if the space of all possible actions is very large,
negotiating agents may ¯nd it computationally hard to ¯nd a solution in a nego-
tiation encounter. In such cases, the system designer might need to formulate a
protocol that reduces the space of actions that agents need to search to ¯nd an
agreement.
Against this background, in this thesis we aim to develop models that can reduce the
impact of the above uncertainties on the e®ectiveness of bargaining and mechanism
design techniques. In general, this can be achieved either by engineering new protocols
or enriching the strategy of an agent in order to make the system, as a whole, more
robust to uncertainty.
In more detail, in bargaining models in multi-agent systems, the uncertainty about
preferences and the environment are increasingly being researched using a new class of
techniques, here termed argumentation-based negotiation techniques, of which persua-
sive negotiation is a special category (see chapter 2). These models attempt, in various
ways, an exploration of agents' preferences and actions. Currently, such models limit
themselves to very abstract implementations (i.e. make no connection to a real applica-
tion). Moreover, no existing agent-based bargaining model deals with the uncertainties
underlying the reliability of agents or the honesty of agents. Similarly, in mechanism
design where action sets are assumed to be known and honesty is elicited, some atten-
tion has been given to the uncertainty with respect to preferences of agents (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995). However, there is a dearth of mechanisms that deal with uncertainty about
the reliability of agents.
Given these lacunae, we aim to develop a new persuasive negotiation mechanism that
aims to achieve better outcomes in less time than current bargaining techniques. To
this end, we will clearly specify both the protocol and the strategies of the participating
agents in such a way that the uncertainty about the agents' action sets and preferences
is reduced. We also aim to develop modelling techniques, based on the concept of trust,
that can be used by agents to reduce the uncertainty they have about their counterparts'
reliability and honesty both in bargaining and mechanism design. In so doing, we will
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with uncertainty. Finally, we aim to show the applicability of our models by providing
an example application where our persuasive negotiation mechanism and trust model
can be used.
In the following sections we outline the landscape within which we develop our models.
We will therefore describe issues that need to be dealt with in the area of trust and
argumentation-based negotiation respectively.
1.3 Trust in Multi-Agent Systems
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to trust in multi-agent systems which
we will focus on in this thesis. Firstly, to allow agents to trust each other, there is a
need to endow them with the ability to reason about the reciprocative nature, reliability
or honesty of their counterparts. This ability is captured through trust models. Such
models aim to enable agents to calculate the amount of trust they can place in their
interaction partners. A high degree of trust in an agent would mean it is likely to be
chosen as an interaction partner and (possibly) a reciprocative strategy used towards it
over multiple interactions in order to elicit the best pay-o® in the long run (Axelrod,
1984). Conversely, a low degree of trust in an agent would result in it not being selected
(if other, more trusted, interaction partners are available) or a non-reciprocative strategy
adopted against it over multiple interactions (if there is no better alternative). In this
way, trust models aim to guide an agent's decision making in deciding on how, when, and
who to interact with. However, in order to achieve this, trust models initially require
agents to gather some knowledge about their counterparts' characteristics. This can
be achieved in a number of di®erent ways including: (i) through inferences drawn from
the outcomes of multiple direct interactions with these partners forming the agent's
con¯dence in them or (ii) through indirect information provided by others forming the
reputation of these partners. The combination of an agent's con¯dence and reputation
measures (through some decision mechanism) can then be used to derive a general notion
of trust that the agent has in its counterparts.
Secondly, while trust models pertain to the reasoning and information gathering ability
of agents, the other main approach to trust concerns the design of protocols of interac-
tions (i.e. through mechanism design techniques). As stated in section 1.2, one of the
main aims of MD is to devise systems that are incentive compatible. This is normally
achieved by providing the right incentives in the form of payments that are made from
the mechanism to the agents involved in it. Thus, agents are compelled to be honest by
the system.
From these two perspectives, it can be seen that trust pervades multi-agent interactions
at all levels (i.e. at the protocol level and at the agent's reasoning level). With respect12 Chapter 1 Introduction
to designing agents and open multi-agent systems we therefore conceptualise trust in
the following ways:
² individual-level trust, whereby an agent has some beliefs about the honesty,
reliability, or reciprocative nature of its interaction partners.
² system-level trust, whereby the actors in the system are forced to be honest by
the rules of encounter (i.e. protocols and mechanisms) that regulate the system.
The above approaches can be seen as being complementary to each other since they suit
di®erent contexts. Thus, while protocols aim to ensure the honesty of agents at the sys-
tem level, they are limited in that they require a central authority (to compute outcomes
or receive private information) and assume agents are completely reliable. In contrast,
where the system cannot be completely centralised and agents cannot be assumed to be
completely reliable, trust models at the individual level provide an alternative approach
to measuring trust in a distributed fashion and are only limited by the agents' own
sensing and reasoning capability (see chapter 3 for more details).
As can be seen from ¯gure 1.2, while the individual level trust models enable an agent
to reason about its level of trust in its opponents, the system level mechanisms aim to
ensure that these opponents' actions can actually be trusted. In more detail, using their
trust models, agents can:
² reason about strategies to be used towards trustworthy and untrustworthy interac-
tion partners (e.g. being reciprocative or sel¯sh towards them) given a calculation
of payo®s over future interactions (i.e. using learning and evolutionary models).
² reason about the information gathered through various means (e.g. either directly
or through reputation models) about potential interaction partners (i.e. using
reputation models).
² reason about the motivations and capabilities of these interaction partners to de-
cide whether to believe in their trustworthiness (i.e. using socio-cognitive models).
In contrast, the mechanisms and protocols described (i.e. enforcing system-level trust)
aim to force agents to act and interact truthfully by:
² imposing conditions that would cause them to lose utility if they did not abide by
them (i.e. using trustworthy interaction mechanisms).
² using their reputation to promote their future interactions with other agents in
the community or demote future interactions whenever they do not behave well
(i.e. using reputation mechansims).Chapter 1 Introduction 13
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Figure 1.2: A classi¯cation of approaches to trust in multi-agent systems.
² imposing speci¯ed standards of good conduct that they need to satisfy and main-
tain in order to be allowed in the system (i.e. using security mechanisms).
In general, these two approaches to trust have, however, rarely been used to deal with
the uncertainties that arise in negotiation (except in the process of partner selection, see
chapter 3 for more details). For example, in bargaining no trust modelling technique has
been devised to allow agents to in°uence agreements according to the believed reliability
or honesty of their counterparts. In mechanism design, on the other hand, while most
models have focused on incentive compatibility (honesty) as a means of eliciting trust,
very few models deal with the varying reliability of agents (see chapter 6 for more
details).
Given these observations, the ¯rst main aim of this thesis is to devise a trust model that
captures both the reliability and honesty of agents, and can be used in both bargaining
strategies and mechanism design. Obviously, the reliability or honesty of agents cannot
easily be measured unless the agents observe each other's behaviour over a number of
interactions or share information about their observations with other agents. A trust
model therefore needs to build its measures of trust over multiple interactions to ob-
tain a more precise impression of an opponent. Given this, an agent using such a trust
model in a bargaining encounter would need to adjust its strategy over multiple encoun-
ters. Moreover, using a trust model in a mechanism would mean re¯ning the computed
outcome to choose those agents that are most reliable and honest in the long run.
The second main aim of this thesis is to deal with uncertainties concerning the pref-14 Chapter 1 Introduction
erences and actions of the agents. While mechanism design tends to assume known
action sets and uses the protocol to elicit preferences in a mostly centralised fashion,
bargaining approaches do not assume anything about action sets and do not specify a
rigid protocol to elicit the true preferences of the agents. Rather, agents are left to use
their own strategy in bargaining to ¯nd an agreement that maximises their utility. Bar-
gaining is therefore very appropriate for distributed applications and is less restrictive
than centralised mechanisms. However, bargaining in the simple form of exchange of
o®ers and counter-o®ers does not allow an e±cient exploration of preferences or action
sets. In the next section we therefore explore a new bargaining approach that aims to
make this exploration more e±cient.
1.4 Argumentation-Based Negotiation
In section 1.3 we proposed to deal with uncertainties regarding the honesty and reliability
of agents in bargaining encounters through the use of trust models. However, trust
models do not cater for uncertainties about the preferences of the agents and the action
sets. While in mechanism design these attributes are assumed to be available or are
elicited through the protocol, in bargaining encounters these uncertainties are not usually
taken into account and may lead to an ine±cient outcome in the following ways:
² Uncertainty about preferences | the o®ers made during a bargaining encounter
determine the values that one or multiple issues in the negotiation object must
take in a possible agreement (e.g. price, quality, quantity). The domain of these
values may be very large (because the agents may accept many di®erent values for
the same issues or trade-o® the utility they obtain from the value of a particular
issue for more utility for a value of another issue). During bargaining, the exchange
of o®ers equates to searching through this large, and possibly multi-dimensional,
space for an agreement. This may, therefore, prove to be a time-consuming and
computationally expensive process. Also, the smaller the space of agreements that
may satisfy all the negotiating agents' preferences, the harder it is to ¯nd the
agreement in that large space of all o®ers. In such cases, agents are less likely
to reach an agreement if they have short time deadlines or incur some costs in
communicating their o®ers for example.
² Uncertainty about the action set | only involving a restricted number of issues in
the negotiation object (e.g. price, quality, quantity) ignores the fact that the agents
may have preferences about other resources or issues (upon which they can act)
which may be negotiated. For example, a router agent might propose to give free
access to some ¯les to a client agent (which the client might be interested in and
which do not cost anything to the router agent) if it accepts to pay a high price for
bandwidth to access the internet. To ignore these issues in the negotiation processChapter 1 Introduction 15
may reduce the possibility of ¯nding common interests between agents which could,
in turn, lead to an agreement that satis¯es all the agents' preferences (Fisher and
Ury, 1983). However, enlarging the space of issues needs to be undertaken carefully
since this equates to an increase in uncertainty about the preferences of the agents
over these issues.
The ideal negotiation procedure would therefore enable agents to quickly identify a small
space of issues that they all value most. Given this, a new approach to bargaining has
been growing in the past few years in the MAS community known as Argumentation-
Based Negotiation (ABN). This approach involves the use of additional constructs in
o®ers exchanged so as to make these o®ers more attractive to an opponent and therefore
reach an agreement faster. These constructs aim to provide additional information about
the agents' properties, resources, or attributes or about the o®er made, that can reduce
the uncertainty about their action set and preferences (without revealing their exact
preferences). In so doing, this information reduces the time to ¯nd an agreement by
allowing the agents to search a small number of issues they value most. ABN is based
on constructs called arguments which we de¯ne as follows:
De¯nition 1.6. An argument is an illocution (a speech act (Searle, 1969; Austin, 1975))
that contains a justi¯cation for an o®er or a commitment to some course of action
conditional on whether the o®er is accepted or not.
The above de¯nition captures the two general strands of current research in ABN namely
those that deal with justi¯cations (or information) and those that deal with commitments
to actions. These two types of arguments aim to achieve the similar objectives. In
more detail, these two types of arguments make the search for an agreement between
negotiating agents more e±cient in the following ways:
² Justi¯cation-based ABN | justi¯cations usually expose more information about
an agent's preferences. These justi¯cations either give more details about why
an o®er is rejected or what changes would be needed to make an o®er acceptable
(Fisher and Ury, 1983; Rahwan et al., 2003d). For example, if a seller o®ers a blue
car for ¯ve hundred dollars, it may additionally argue that the car has a very good
engine and that the blue colour is very trendy. These may, in turn, in°uence the
buyer to increase its preference for that colour (since an agent's preferences may
be partially determined by what other agents consider to be trendy). Moreover,
such justi¯cations can expose additional issues of common interest for the agents
concerned (i.e. here the type of the engine or the colour).
² Persuasion-based ABN | commitments to actions conditional on the answer of
the recipient (i.e. whether the agent accepts or rejects) determine the persua-
sive tactics that can be used in negotiation (Schelling, 1963). Such conditional16 Chapter 1 Introduction
commitments provide an agent with a means to in°uence its opponent through
persuasive arguments such as threats (which are enacted if an o®er is rejected) or
rewards (which are enacted if an o®er is accepted) in order to get an agreement
faster. Their in°uence is captured by the constraints they impose on the domain
of values an opponent may o®er (or counter-o®er) and on the space of issues that
need to be considered in a given interaction. For example, a seller may promise to
reward a buyer agent with a discount on its next purchase if it accepts to buy a
car for six hundred pounds. Thus, the price of the next purchase is already biased
in favour of the buyer and makes the search for an agreement faster (since values
of the next negotiation object may be bounded by the reward). If a seller instead
threatened to increase the price of future car services if its negotiation opponent
did not accept a current o®er about the price of the car being proposed, the oppo-
nent may be forced to accept the o®er (if the threat is credible), since refusing may
result in constraining the outcome of future negotiations about the car services to
its detriment (and reducing the search for an agreement in the next encounter).
Both classes of arguments have their own merits but in this thesis we focus on persua-
sion based ABN, more commonly known as Persuasive Negotiation (PN), because we
believe that using justi¯cations is overly restrictive since this requires the same deduc-
tive mechanism for all negotiating agents. Also, each agent would need to believe what
its opponent provides as a belief as completely true (i.e. they are trustworthy) (Amgoud
et al., 2002; Parsons et al., 1998; Sadri et al., 2002). In comparison, PN provides a more
established and less restrictive framework based on the use of commitments to actions
which makes them more appealing in the following ways. First, PN does not impose any
restriction on the deductive machinery used by negotiating agents. This means that the
actions committed to in an argument can be evaluated through a preference structure
such as a utility function. Second, PN does not assume that the agents are completely
trustworthy and is therefore more applicable to competitive interactions where agents
may lie about their preferences or reliability.
In general, a PN mechanism requires all of the following (Jennings et al., 2001):
1. Mechanisms must exist for passing proposals and their supporting arguments in
a way that all agents involved understand them. This implies that the protocol
needs to specify illocutions for agents to express the nature of the argument they
need to send (e.g. whether they want to ask for a reward or give one).
2. Techniques must exist for generating proposals and for providing the supporting
arguments. This implies that an agent must have a means to construct proposals
given its own goals and the issues that are to be negotiated. It should also be
able to devise a supporting argument about issues or actions that an opponent is
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3. Techniques must exist for assessing proposals and their associated supporting ar-
guments. This usually involves evaluating the proposals and arguments according
to the agent's preferences (i.e. utility function).
4. Techniques must exist for responding to proposals and their associated supporting
arguments. This implies that an agent must have a strategy to generate o®ers and
arguments. In particular, this involves measuring the utility that is likely to be
obtained from a given combination of a received o®er and argument and to give a
best response that seeks to meet the opponent's preferences while still maximising
the agent's utility.
In most existing PN mechanisms, however, arguments such as threats or rewards are
usually given very abstract de¯nitions that cannot readily be used in real applications
(see chapter 2 for more details). Speci¯cally, rewards or threats are generally de¯ned
as those actions that aim to increase or reduce the utility of an opponent, respectively,
at a later point in time (after a negotiation encounter is terminated and an agreement
is enacted or not). In such cases, those actions that are deemed credible rewards or
threats represent yet another space the agents need to search in order to ¯nd the most
appropriate one to send. To reduce the size of this space, in this thesis we decided to
impose a protocol or a strategy that constrains the set of actions that can be considered
rewards and threats. It therefore follows that the protocol and the rewards (or threats)
need to be de¯ned in such a way that they have clear semantics to be used in a realistic
application.
Against this background, we believe PN is a natural ¯t for repeated negotiation encoun-
ters (or long-term relationships) for a number of reasons. First, arguments that apply to
actions at a later point in time can easily be construed as constraints that apply over ne-
gotiations in future encounters (hence giving clear semantics to arguments). In this way,
arguments can reduce the space of actions that needs to be searched for an agreement
in future encounters (thus reducing uncertainty about the action set) and in°uence an
agent to accept an o®er in a present encounter (thus reducing the time to ¯nd an agree-
ment that matches the agents' preferences). Second, by constraining future encounters
through arguments, agents can ensure that they obtain a positive utility in the present
encounter or future ones whenever they have an amount of resources or capabilities that
can predictably vary over time. This can be achieved by applying constraints to future
encounters that guarantee certain outcomes that ¯t the agents' dynamic constraints.
By applying PN to repeated encounters we therefore de¯ne the common thread that
links this mechanism with our use of trust models in negotiation to reduce uncertainty
about the reliability and honesty of agents. In e®ect, these models of PN and trust
aim to provide an agent with a reasoning mechanism robust to the uncertainties which
are endemic to repeated negotiations in open distributed systems. Moreover, we aim to
show through example applications how they would each work in practice.18 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.5 Research Contributions
In this section we summarize the aims and objectives of this thesis and the contributions
to the state of the art that were made to achieve them. Our general aim is to develop
techniques that help to reduce the uncertainty in repeated multi-agent negotiations in
open distributed systems. To this end, we set out to achieve the following particular
objectives:
² Develop a comprehensive trust model for multi-agent systems that can evaluate
the reliability or honesty of agents.
² Use trust in bargaining encounters and mechanism design in order to reduce the
uncertainty agents have about their negotiation opponents' reliability and hon-
esty. This involves using the trust measure developed by our trust model in an
agent's reasoning mechanism (i.e. in its bargaining strategy) and developing the
protocol for an interaction mechanism that caters for the uncertainty regarding
the reliability of agents.
² Develop a comprehensive model of persuasive negotiation that comprises: (i) a pro-
tocol that incorporates the use of arguments and determines what commitments
hold whenever agents make o®ers or issue arguments and (ii) a reasoning mech-
anism that can generate o®ers and arguments and can evaluate and respond to
these during a negotiation encounter. This requires developing both an argument
generation and evaluation component, as well as the strategies for PN.
² Demonstrate the bene¯t of using arguments in automated negotiation and show
that they enable agents to reach agreements more e±ciently (i.e. better and faster)
than using normal negotiation protocols that only allow an exchange of o®ers.
² Implement PN in a realistic context in order to demonstrate its applicability and
e®ectiveness in managing inter-agent dependencies.
To achieve these objectives, a number of contributions were made to the state of the art:
² In (Rahwan et al., 2003b), we provided the ¯rst survey of the state of the art in
the area of ABN and identi¯ed the main trends and challenges that pervade the
¯eld. This survey set the landscape within which we develop our model of PN and
appears as chapter 2 in this thesis.
² In (Ramchurn et al., 2004b), we provided a critical analysis of the trust issues that
arise in MAS. In particular, we showed how various models developed in MAS
form a coherent approach towards resolving uncertainties about the reliability and
honesty of agents. Thus, we also identify the current challenges in the ¯eld which
we aim to meet in our model. This review appears in chapter 3 in this thesis.Chapter 1 Introduction 19
² Based on our preliminary work in (Ramchurn et al., 2004d) and the requirements
presented in chapter 3, we describe a novel trust model (called CREDIT) that
enables an agent to measure its opponents' trustworthiness (honesty or reliabil-
ity) over multiple encounters (Ramchurn et al., 2004c). The model is shown to
be e®ective and e±cient at preventing exploitation by opponents by allowing the
agent to adjust its negotiation stance in repeated bargaining encounters accord-
ing to its trust in its opponents (hence reducing uncertainty). Moreover, using
CREDIT's trust measure, an agent is also able to select its interaction partners
more e®ectively. CREDIT is presented in chapter 5.
² Given our work on CREDIT, we then introduced the use of trust modelling to
the area of mechanism design by developing the notion of Trust-Based Mechanism
Design (TBMD) to reduce uncertainty about the reliability of agents (Dash et al.,
2003). In so doing, we created the ¯rst e±cient, individually rational, and incen-
tive compatible mechanism that takes into account the trust agents have in each
other. This is, in e®ect, the ¯rst e±cient reputation mechanism that incentivises
agents to reveal their impressions of others truthfully. Speci¯cally, our Trust-Based
Mechanism combines these measures into an overall trust measure (using a trust
model such as CREDIT) to select those agents that are best at doing certain tasks.
This work is presented in chapter 6.
² While CREDIT and TBMD are concerned with uncertainties about reliability and
honesty, in (Ramchurn et al., 2003a) we provided a preliminary model of Persuasive
Negotiation whereby agents can use threats and rewards to elicit better agreements
by reducing uncertainties about preferences and action sets. This model describes
the general concepts that are used to develop our new PN mechanism that can
allows agents to reach better agreements faster than standard bargaining mech-
anisms. In particular, we develop a new protocol and reasoning mechanism for
agents to use to give or ask for rewards in repeated encounters. We also show, em-
pirically, that agents are able to engage in more e±cient and e®ective agreements
using this protocol and reasoning mechanism than only bargaining with o®ers. We
also develop a novel strategy for PN and show that it enables agents to achieve
even better agreements than current negotiation strategies. The complete model
is given in chapter 7.
² Given our model of PN, we then apply it, together with CREDIT, in a pervasive
computing environment (Ramchurn et al., 2004a). In so doing, we are able to show,
for the ¯rst time, how a PN and trust model can be used in practice to allow agents
to resolve their con°icts e®ectively. In particular, in this work we show how PN can
be used by agents to negotiate about the usefulness of interruptions in a meeting
room scenario. In so doing, negotiating agents provide an e®ective way to reduce
the intrusions caused by interruptions and help their human owners to focus on
the main task undertaken during the meeting. This work appears as chapter 8.20 Chapter 1 Introduction
Drawing all these together, the application of the various models we develop to cater
for uncertainties in negotiation is graphically expressed in ¯gure 1.3. As can be seen,
CREDIT and TBMD overlap in that they deal with the uncertainty regarding the re-
liability and honesty of agents. In CREDIT, we show how to develop and use trust in
bargaining encounters, while in TBMD we show how to use the core concepts of CREDIT
in mechanism design. Given this, CREDIT also overlaps with persuasive negotiation as
they both apply to bargaining encounters and both try to reduce uncertainty about the
action set of agents. They do this by either adjusting the negotiation stance of an agent
(i.e. the selection of values for issues in this context) or by using arguments to con-
strain the action set. In addition to this, PN overlaps with TBMD since PN also aims
to explore preferences more e±ciently than standard bargaining techniques through the
use of arguments while TBMD aims to elicit these preferences through the protocol it
enforces upon the agents together with the trust model it uses.
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Figure 1.3: Applying CREDIT, TBMD, and PN to reduce the uncertainty underlying
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1.6 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured in the following way:
Chapter 2 : surveys the literature on ABN. The main models in the literature are
analysed and their prominent characteristics de¯ned. We identify the particular
components of an ABN protocol and strategy and discuss the main challenges
that still exist in this area. We then de¯ne the requirements of the protocol and
reasoning mechanism that are to be developed for our persuasive negotiation model
which we describe in chapter 7.
Chapter 3 : details the background on trust for MAS. Here we justify the need for trust
to be acquired through an agents' modelling capabilities and through constraints
imposed by the interaction mechanism. Thus, di®erent types of trust mechanisms
are surveyed and a general typology of trust is derived. Following this, we de¯ne
the main requirements for the CREDIT trust model and TBMD which we develop
in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
Chapter 4 : formalises the basic notions of agreements and preferences. These for-
malisms de¯ne the common thread that underpins the settings used in the empir-
ical evaluation of CREDIT and PN.
Chapter 5 : details the CREDIT trust model. The model is based on the notions
of con¯dence and reputation and can be used to in°uence an agent's negotiation
stance. The computational complexity of the algorithm underlying the model is
shown to be linear in the number of negotiated issues and quadratic with respect
to the number of decision variables (here these are fuzzy sets) used to capture
the particular behaviour of opponents. The model is shown to be e®ective and
e±cient at enabling an agent to avoid interacting with agents that are unreliable
or dishonest. Moreover, CREDIT allows an agent to adapt its negotiation stance
so as to elicit pro¯table outcomes when it deals with those agents that are reliable
to some degree.
Chapter 6 : applies the basic notions of trust from CREDIT to design a centralised
mechanism using game theoretic principles in order to elicit e±ciency in the system.
Thus, in this chapter, we develop TBMD as a novel method to deal with the
variable reliability of agents. Speci¯cally, we prove that the trust-based mechanism
we develop is incentive compatible, individually rational, and e±cient. Then we
empirically show that our mechanism enables the most reliable agents to be chosen
in the long run and that it performs better than other comparable models.
Chapter 7 : presents our novel model of PN based on the exchange of rewards (asked
for or given). This involves detailing a protocol that guides the use of arguments in
negotiation and manages the commitments that agents make through their o®ers22 Chapter 1 Introduction
and arguments. In particular, we use dynamic logic to build such a framework and
we provide the reasoning mechanism that agents can use to generate o®ers and
arguments (i.e. we de¯ne strategies for PN). Then, we empirically evaluate the
model and show that it enables agents to achieve better agreements (i.e. higher
utility) faster (i.e. in less negotiation rounds) than current bargaining protocols
and strategies.
Chapter 8 : describes an application of our PN and trust models. In particular,
through PN and CREDIT, we resolve the con°icting preferences agents have about
the interruptions received on devices in a pervasive computing environment. The
particular scenario chosen is that of a meeting room which contains devices (built
into the room and those that each participant owns) on which noti¯cations are
received. In such a context, we therefore show how PN can be used to °exibly
manage these noti¯cations so as to minimise their intrusiveness while the meeting
takes place.
Chapter 9 : summarizes and discusses the main achievements of this thesis. We
analyse the extent to which the models therein meet the objectives set in chapter
1. Finally, we discuss future avenues of work that we have identi¯ed in the domains
of trust and PN.Chapter 2
Argumentation-Based
Approaches to Negotiation
In chapter 1 we justi¯ed the need to build an ABN mechanism in general, and a PN
mechanism in particular, to reduce the uncertainty that agents have about each other's
preferences and action sets. Before doing so, however, in this chapter we ¯rst survey the
state of the art in the area of ABN to determine the main issues that arise in designing
such mechanisms. In particular, we analyse the impact of augmenting bargaining mech-
anisms with arguments. We do this both from the perspective of the system (comprising
the negotiation object and the protocol) within which agents interact and the agent's
decision making model. In so doing, we also de¯ne the main requirements of our PN
mechanism and identify those elements of existing ABN mechanisms we can exploit in
developing our model.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1 we discus the main
components of the framework that is needed to implement an ABN mechanism. Given
this, in section 2.2 we elaborate on the general requirements of ABN agents. Finally,
section 2.3 summarises our ¯ndings and outlines the main challenges that exist in de¯ning
our PN mechanism.
2.1 External Elements of ABN Frameworks
As described in ¯gure 1.1, in order to allow agents to resolve their con°icts, bargaining
mechanisms require di®erent elements in the agent's reasoning mechanism (i.e. its strat-
egy) and in the system within which these agents interact (i.e. the protocol). Moreover,
bargaining mechanisms require that agents are also able to understand the di®erent op-
erations that are possible on the negotiation object and are able to communicate these
operations to their counterparts. To this end, agents also need a language to understand
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and communicate their di®erent manipulations of the object. In this context, therefore,
the de¯nition of the language and the protocol constitute the framework of what we
consider to be a bargaining mechanism.
We will deal with approaches to the agents' decision making models (capturing their
strategy and assessment of the negotiation object) in section 2.2 while in this section
we will focus on the protocol and the language that allows an agent to manipulate the
negotiation object. Considering the language ¯rst, this primarily involves de¯ning di®er-
ent aspects of the domain that are necessary to describe the content of the negotiation
object (e.g. what are the issues involved in the object or what are the agents that are
to bene¯t from an agreement). Moreover, the language may also need to de¯ne those
elements that allow agents to communicate their intended actions on the negotiation ob-
ject (e.g. whether they are retracting their o®er or requesting more information about
the object). Turning now to the protocol, this can generally be divided into two main
parts (as shown in ¯gure 1.1); namely managing participation rules and managing the
commitments agents make and the information they exchange during bargaining. In
this context, the participation rules determine when and what particular actions can
be carried out. This includes actions such as making an o®er or withdrawing from the
negotiation. The management of commitments requires that the system keeps track
of what commitments agents make and what commitments are ful¯lled (as a result of
what they say or do). The management of these commitments or any information that
is passed between the agents is usually captured by an information storage component.
Given these di®erent aspects of the system, in the following subsections we detail the
di®erent approaches to de¯ning the language for bargaining, the participation rules, and
the information stores.
2.1.1 The Language for Bargaining
A negotiation framework requires a language that facilitates communication between
the agents (Labrou et al., 1999). Elements of the communication language are usually
referred to as locutions or utterances or speech acts (Searle, 1969; Traum, 1999). Tradi-
tional automated negotiation mechanisms normally include the basic locutions such as
propose for making proposals, accept for accepting proposals, and reject for rejecting
proposals.
In addition to the communication language, agents often need a common domain lan-
guage for referring to concepts of the environment, the di®erent agents, time, proposals,
and so on.1 When a statement in the domain language is exchanged between agents,
it is given particular meaning by the communication language utterance that encap-
1Note that this language may be di®erent from the language used internally by an agent. In such
cases, the agent needs to perform some type of translation into the common language in order for
communication to work (Sierra et al., 1998).Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 25
sulates it. For example, in the PN framework presented by (Sierra et al., 1998), the
locution offer(a;b;Price = $200 ^ Item = palm130;t1), means that agent a proposes
to agent b, at time t1 the sale of item palm130 for the price of $200. On the other
hand, the reject locution gives the same content a di®erent meaning. The locution
reject(b;a;Price = $200 ^ Item = palm130;t2) means that agent b rejects such a pro-
posal made by agent a.
In ABN frameworks, agents need richer communication and domain languages to be
able to exchange meta-level information (i.e., information other than that describing
outcomes). Therefore, a major distinguishing factor of ABN frameworks is in the type
of information that can be expressed and exchanged between agents, and consequently,
in the speci¯cations of the agents that generate and evaluate this information. As we
pointed out in section 1.4 chapter 1, such information are intended to allow a better
reduction of uncertainties that surround agents' action sets and preferences. Table 2.1
shows the main distinguishing features between ABN and non-ABN frameworks as they
relate to the communication and domain languages.
Non-ABN Frameworks ABN Frameworks
Domain Language Expresses proposals only
(e.g., by describing prod-
ucts available for sale).
Expresses proposals as well
as meta-information about the
world, agent's beliefs, prefer-
ences, goals, etc.
Communication
Language
Locutions allow agents to
pass calls for bids, propos-
als, acceptance and rejec-
tion, etc.
In addition, locutions al-
low agents to pass meta-
information either separately
or in conjunction with other
locutions.
Table 2.1: Di®erences between ABN and Non-ABN w.r.t Domain and Communication
Languages
2.1.1.1 State of the Art
In existing ABN frameworks, various domain and communication languages have been
proposed. They range from those designed as simplistic domain speci¯c languages to
more complex languages grounded in rich logical models of agency.
In multi-agent systems, two major proposals for agent communication languages have
been advanced, namely the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML)
(May¯eld et al., 1996) and the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents' Agent Com-
munication Language (FIPA ACL) (FIPA, 2001). FIPA ACL, for example, o®ers 22
locutions. The contents of the messages can be in any domain language. The locution
inform(a;b;';lan), for example, allows agent a to inform another agent b of statement26 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
' which is in language lan. Other locutions exist allowing agents to express propos-
als for action, acceptance and rejection of proposals, make various queries about time
and place, and so on. FIPA ACL has been given semantics in the form of pre- and
post-conditions of each locution (Searle, 1969; Austin, 1975).
While FIPA ACL o®ers the bene¯ts of being a more or less standard agent communi-
cation language, it fails to capture all utterances needed in a negotiation interaction.
For example, FIPA ACL does not have locutions expressing the desire to enter or leave
a negotiation interaction, to provide an explicit critique to a proposal or to request an
argument for a claim. While such locutions may be constructed by injecting particular
domain language statements within locutions similar to those of FIPA ACL, the se-
mantics of these statements fall outside the boundaries of the communication language.
Consider the following locution from the framework presented by (Kraus et al., 1998):
Request(j;i;Do(i;®);Do(i;®) ! Do(j;¯))
In this locution, agent j requests that agent i performs action ® and supports that
request with an argument stating that if i accepts, j will perform action ¯ in return.
For the locution to properly express a promise, action ¯ must actually be desired by
agent i. If, on the contrary, ¯ is undesirable to i, the same locution becomes a threat,
and might deter i from executing ®. The locution Request, however, does not include
information that conveys this distinction.
In order to deal with the above problem, ABN framework designers often choose to
provide their own negotiation-speci¯c locutions which hold, within them, the appropriate
semantics of the message. For example, (Sierra et al., 1998) provides explicit locutions
for expressing threats and rewards (e.g., threaten(i;j;®;¯) and promise(i;j;®;¯)).
Having discussed some issues relating to the communication languages in ABN, let us
now discuss the domain languages. In negotiation, the domain language must, at least,
be capable of expressing the object of negotiation. In Sierra et al.'s model (Sierra et al.,
1998), the domain language can express variables representing negotiation issues (or
attributes), constants representing values for the negotiation issues (including a special
constant `?' denoting the absence of value), as well as equality and conjunction. This
enables them to express full or partial multiple-attribute proposals. For example the
sentence
(Price = $10) ^ (Quality = high) ^ (Penalty =?)
expresses a proposal to agree on a high-quality product or service for the price of
$10, and with a cancellation penalty yet to be agreed upon. There is also a meta-
language for explicitly expressing preferences. For example, the statement Pref([Price =
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In addition, ABN frameworks may need some way to express plans and resources needed
for di®erent plans. This is because agents participating in negotiation may be doing so
in order to obtain resources needed for executing their plans. This means that an agent
may be able to inform another agent of (parts of) its plans in order to justify its request
for particular resources. (Sadri et al., 2002), for example, express plans using the plan(:)
predicate. The following formula:
plan(hhit(nail);hang(picture)i;fpicture;nail;hammerg)
denotes a plan (or intention) to hit a nail and hang a picture. The resources this plan
requires are a picture, a nail and a hammer.
Some ABN frameworks also explicitly express information about agents' mental atti-
tudes. The ABN frameworks presented by (Kraus et al., 1998) and by (Parsons et al.,
1998), for example, allow an agent to represent beliefs about other agents' beliefs, de-
sires, intentions, capabilities, and so on, and are based on logics of Belief, Desire, and
Intention (BDI) (Rao and George®, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002). An agent can use this
information not only in its internal reasoning processes, but also in its interaction with
other agents.
The usefulness of the domain language in the context of ABN becomes particularly
apparent when agents provide arguments for requesting certain resources, for rejecting
certain requests, and so on. The richer the domain language, the richer the arguments
that can be exchanged between agents. This will become more evident when we discuss
argument generation and evaluation in the following sections.
2.1.1.2 Challenges
There are a number of challenges in the design of domain and communication languages
for ABN. First, there is a need to provide rich communication languages with clear
semantics. For example, McBurney et al. (2003) speci¯ed a set of locutions as part of a
dialogue game2 for purchase negotiation among multiple agents. The authors provided a
public axiomatic semantics to their locutions by stating each locution's externally observ-
able preconditions, the possible response, and the updates to the information stores.3
Moreover, the framework presents an operational semantics of the whole framework,
connecting locutions with each other via the agents' decision mechanisms. However,
this framework does not cover the whole spectrum of ABN situations. For example,
2Dialogue games are interactions between two or more players, where each player makes a move by
making some utterance in a common communication language, and according to some pre-de¯ned rules.
Dialogue games have their roots in the philosophy of argumentation (Aristotle, 1928; Hamblin, 1970).
In multi-agent systems, dialogue games have been used to specify dialogue protocols for persuasion
(Amgoud et al., 2000a), negotiation (Amgoud and Parsons, 2001), and team formation (Dignum et al.,
2000).
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there are no locutions for explicitly requesting, providing and challenging arguments, or
for supporting argumentation over preference criteria. Locutions facilitating argument
exchange have been proposed in other frameworks (e.g., Sadri et al., 2001a; Torroni
and Toni, 2001; Sadri et al., 2002; Amgoud et al., 2000b; Amgoud and Parsons, 2001).
There are opportunities for extending the model of (McBurney et al., 2003) with a richer
argumentation system. Moreover, there is also a need to extend the semantics of the
language to cover other actions (e.g. the enactment of an agreement or a reward) apart
from illocutions. This may require the use of an action-based logic (as opposed to ¯rst
order logic which is commonly used) such as dynamic logic (Harel, 1984).
2.1.2 Participation Rules
As discussed in chapter 1, a bargaining framework should also specify a participation
rules in order to constrain the use of the language and other the actions of the partic-
ipants (i.e. what the agents can say or do at what point in time). Thus, participation
rules reduce uncertainty about the actions of the agents. Here we view the participation
rules as a formal set of conventions governing the interaction among participants (Jen-
nings et al., 2001). This includes the dialogue rules as well as other rules governing the
actions of the agents.
The dialogue rules specify, at each stage of the negotiation process, who is allowed to
say what. For example, after one agent makes a proposal, the other agent may be able
to accept it, reject it or criticise it, but might not be allowed to ignore it by making a
counterproposal. The rules might be based solely on the last utterance made, or might
depend on a more complex history of messages between agents.
The other rules that form part of the participation rules may address the following issues
(Jennings et al., 2001; Esteva et al., 2001):
- Rules for admission: specify when an agent can participate in a negotiation
dialogue and under what conditions.
- Rules for participant withdrawal: specify when a participant may withdraw
from the negotiation.
- Termination rules: specify when an encounter must end (e.g. if one agent utters
an acceptance locution).
- Rules for proposal validity: specify when a proposal is compliant with some
conditions (e.g., an agent may not be allowed to make a proposal that has already
been rejected).
- Rules for outcome determination: specify the outcome of the interaction. In
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(Sandholm, 2002). In argumentation-based frameworks, these rules might enforce
some outcome based on the underlying theory of argumentation (e.g., if an agent
cannot construct an argument against a request, it accepts it (Parsons et al.,
1998)).
- Commitment rules: specify how agents' commitments should be managed,
whether and when an agent can withdraw a commitment made previously in the
dialogue, how inconsistencies between an utterance and a previous commitment
are accounted for, and so on. These rules make the connection between information
stores (which we discuss in the next section) and the dialogue rules.
In ABN, the participation rules are usually more complex than those in non-ABN. By
\more complex", we mean that the participation rules may have to consider a larger
number of locutions, and, hence consist of a larger number of rules. This leads to
computational complexity arising from processes such as checking the locutions for con-
formance with the protocol given the history of locutions.
2.1.2.1 State of the Art
With respect to the dialogue rules, a variety of trends can be found in the ABN literature.
Dialogue rules can be either speci¯ed in an explicit accessible format, or be only implicit
and hardwired into the agents' speci¯cation.
Explicit speci¯cation of dialogue rules may be represented by ¯nite state machines (e.g.,
Sierra et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998). In this way, each state has a set of outgoing and
incoming transition lines that represent illocutions that bring the agents and take the
agents away from that state. Thus, a propose illocution in (Sierra et al., 1998) brings
an agent from one state where the only other possible illocution is withdraw to one
where it is additionally possible to say accept (and propose). Another representation of
this state machine can be achieved by expressing dialogue rules explicitly as in dialogue
games (e.g., as in Amgoud et al., 2000b; Amgoud and Parsons, 2001; McBurney et al.,
2003) by stating the pre- and post-conditions of each locution as well as its e®ects on
agents' commitments. The following is the speci¯cation of a locution from the protocol
presented by (McBurney et al., 2003). This locution allows a seller (or advisor) agent
to announce that it (or another seller) is willing to sell a particular option:4
Locution: willing to sell(P1;T;P2;V ), where P1 is either an advisor or
a seller, T is the set of participants, P2 is a seller and V is a set of sales
options.
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Preconditions: Some participant P3 must have previously uttered a locu-
tion seek info(P3;S;p) where P1 2 S (the set of sellers), and the options
in V satisfy constraint p.
Meaning: The speaker P1 indicates to audience T that agent P2 is willing
to supply the ¯nite set V = f¹ a;¹ b;:::g of purchase-options to any buyer
in set T. Each of these options satisfy constraint p uttered as part of the
prior seek info(:) locution.
Response: None required.
Information Store Updates: For each ¹ a 2 V , the 3-tuple (T;P2;¹ a) is
inserted into IS(P1), the information store for agent P1.
Commitment Store Updates: No e®ects.
One advantage of dialogue game protocols is that they have public axiomatic semantics.
This is because they refer only to observable pre-conditions and e®ects, rather than to
the agents' internal mental attitudes. This makes it easier to verify whether agents are
conforming to the protocol.
Other frameworks implicitly hardwire the dialogue rules in the agents' internal spec-
i¯cation (e.g., Kraus et al., 1998; Sadri et al., 2001a; Torroni and Toni, 2001; Sadri
et al., 2001b, 2002). In these frameworks, the dialogue rules are speci¯ed using logical
constraints expressed in the form of if-then rules. Since these frameworks describe a
logic-based approach to agent speci¯cation ((Kraus et al., 1998) implement their agents
using Logic Programs, while (Sadri et al., 2001b) use Abductive Logic Programs), the
participation rules are coded as part of the agent's program. These rules take the form
P(t) ^ C(t) ) P0(t + 1), meaning that if the agent received performative (i.e. locution)
P at time t, and condition C was satis¯ed at that time, then the agent must use the
performative P0 at the next time point. The condition C describes the rationality pre-
condition in the agent's mental state. For example, one rule might state that if an agent
received a performative which includes a request for a resource and it does not have that
resource, then it must refuse the request. Note that this constitutes a private semantics
of the protocol, and is hence harder to enforce by an external regulator (which might be
needed to ensure the predictability of the system).
The termination rules in negotiation protocols speci¯ed as ¯nite state machines are de-
¯ned as a set of links to a ¯nal state. This is usually the case when one agent utters a
withdraw(:) or an accept(:) locution. In the framework of (McBurney et al., 2003), a
rule speci¯es that the dialogue ends after an agent utters the locution withdraw dialogue(:)
causing either no remaining sellers or no remaining buyers in the dialogue. In some
frameworks, however, no termination rules have been de¯ned, and hence the dialogue
remains open even after agreement or failure.
In relation to outcome determination rules, some frameworks determine outcomes based
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(Parsons et al., 1998) and (Amgoud et al., 2000b), a rule speci¯es that an agent must
accept a request if it fails to produce an argument against that request. A similar case
occurs when agents argue about their beliefs | an agent must accept a proposition if it
fails to provide an argument for the negation of the proposition. In this sense, outcome
determination is implicit in the underlying argumentation logic. In other frameworks,
such as those of (Kraus et al., 1998), outcomes are reached through uttering a speci¯c
locution explicitly (e.g., by uttering accept(:)). Agents may utter such a locution based
on some internal utility evaluation.
We shall leave the discussion of commitment rules to section 2.1.3, where we discuss
information stores.
2.1.2.2 Challenges
Participation rules for ABN share the challenges faced in the design of argumentation
protocols in general. For example, there is a need for qualities such as fairness, clarity
of the underlying argumentation theory, discouragement of disruption by participants,
rule consistency, and so on.5
One particularly important property is that of termination. To this end, some rules
for preventing certain causes of in¯nite dialogues have been proposed. For example,
the protocol of (Amgoud and Parsons, 2001) does not allow agents to repeat the exact
same locutions over and over again. The intuition is that this would prevent the agent
from, say, repeating the same question over and over again. In subsequent papers,
the authors present further analysis of the outcomes of various argumentation-based
dialogues (Parsons et al., 2002, 2003).
Torroni (2002) study termination and success in an ABN framework presented earlier
(see Sadri et al., 2001b). Since the ABN framework is grounded in an operationally
de¯ned agent architecture based on abductive logic programming, it has been possible
to study some properties by referring to the machinery of abduction. In particular, the
author determined an upper limit to the maximum length of a dialogue, measured in
the number of exchanged messages. Since these results are strongly dependent on the
underlying logical system, it is not clear whether these results can be generalised to a
variety of protocols without regard to the internal agent architecture.
Another important desired property in ABN paricipation rules is that of guaranteed
success. Wooldridge and Parsons (2000) investigate the conditions under which partic-
ular logic-based negotiation protocols terminate with agreement. They provide results
showing the complexity of solving this problem with negotiation frameworks using dif-
ferent domain languages. Most interestingly, they show that the problem of determining
5For a more elaborate discussion of the properties desired in argumentation protocols, refer to
(McBurney et al., 2002).32 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
whether a given protocol can be guaranteed to succeed, when used with a FIPA-like
communication language, is provably intractable.
An important problem related to participation rules in general is that of conformance
checking. This problem is concerned with answering the question of whether a particular
utterance is acceptable, given the history and context of interaction. Conformance
checking is one of the sources of complexity in dialogue systems; however, to date, it has
received little attention in the ABN literature.
Another avenue of future research is in the design of admission rules in negotiation
protocols. While some frameworks (e.g., McBurney et al., 2003) require that agents
explicitly request to enter a negotiation dialogue no ABN framework includes external
rules that govern admission to the negotiation dialogue. One may envisage situations
where only agents with particular credentials, such as reputation or performance history,
may be admitted to a negotiation. For example, a malicious agent may attempt to
disrupt the interaction among other participants, and hence should not be admitted.
Moreover, in repeated encounters, agents usually continue to interact only if they come
to a fruitful outcome in the previous interactions (e.g. in making short term contracts
for a long-term project or buyers choosing those sellers repeatedly only if their services
prove to be of a good quality each time). More work needs to be done on investigating
the e®ect of di®erent admission rules on the outcome of negotiation.
2.1.3 Information Stores
In some ABN frameworks, there is no explicit centralised information store available. In-
stead, agents internally keep track of past utterances (e.g., Kraus et al., 1998). However,
in many negotiation frameworks there is a need to keep externally accessible information
during interaction. For example, we might need to store the history of utterances for
future reference or to store information about the reputation of participants (Yu and
Singh, 2002a; Rubiera et al., 2001). Moreover, having external information stores makes
it possible to perform some kind of enforcement of protocol-related behaviours. For
example, we may be able to prevent an agent from denying a promise it has previously
made.
2.1.3.1 State of the Art
One type of information store that is common in the argumentation literature is the
commitment store.6 Commitment stores were initially conceived by (Hamblin, 1970) as
a way of tracking the claims made by participants in dialogue games. Hamblin studied
6For a more detailed discussion of commitments in multi-agent dialogues, see (Maudet and Chaib-
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dialogues over beliefs, although he was at pains to state that commitments made in di-
alogue games should not be construed as necessarily representing the real beliefs of the
respective participants (Hamblin, 1970, p. 257). Hamblin's notion of commitment store
has been in°uential in later work on dialogue games, both in philosophy and in MAS, al-
though the notions of commitment used sometimes di®er. In the work on the philosophy
of dialogue (e.g., Walton and Krabbe, 1995) the focus is on action commitments, i.e.,
promises to initiate, execute or maintain an action or course of actions. Commitments
to defend a claim if questioned, called propositional commitments, are viewed as special
cases of such action commitments by these authors. In the MAS literature the concern
is usually with action commitments, where the associated actions are assumed to take
place outside the agent dialogue. For example, one agent may commit to providing a
speci¯ed product or service to another agent.
Note that commitment stores should not be confused with the interaction history, which
only records the sequence of utterances during the whole interaction.7 While the latter
only form a passive storage of \unprocessed" utterances, commitments in commitment
stores have more elaborate consequences. For example, when an agent asserts a propo-
sition p, it may not only be committed to believe that p holds, but also to defending
that p (if challenged), not denying that p, giving evidence that p, and so on (Walton
and Krabbe, 1995). In the MAS literature, (Singh, 2000) gave \social" semantics for
commitments using modal operators in branching-time logic. This semantics is public
(i.e., is based on external observations of utterances as opposed to agents' internal men-
tal states) and hence can be used for specifying, and checking for conformance with, the
interaction protocols. Amgoud et al. (2002) also present a social semantics of communi-
cation based on argumentation. Another di®erence of commitment stores in comparison
with interaction histories is that commitment stores have speci¯c commitment rules gov-
erning the addition and removal of statements the agent is committed to. One rule may
specify, for example, that if the agent retracted a previously asserted claim, it must also
retract every claim based on the former via logical deduction. Another relevant concept
is that of pre-commitment proposed by (Colombetti, 2000). A request pre-commits the
utterer in the sense that the utterer will be committed in case the hearer accepts the
request. Commitment stores enable us to capture such pre-commitments.
In the ABN literature, (Amgoud and Parsons, 2001) de¯ne for each agent a publicly
accessible commitment store. Adding statements to the commitment store is governed
by the dialogue-game rules. For example, when an agent accepts a request for ac-
tion p, then p is added to its commitment store. Agents may also be allowed to re-
tract commitments under certain conditions. In the context of purchase negotiations,
(McBurney et al., 2003) dealt with the issue of retraction di®erently. For example, the
framework involves two locutions: agree to buy(:) and agree to sell(:), for commit-
ting to certain resource exchanges. Instead of providing explicit locutions for retracting
7Sierra et al. (1998) use the term negotiation thread, while (Sadri et al., 2001b) use the term dialogue
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these commitments, the authors provide additional locutions: willing to buy(:) and
willing to sell(:), which are softened versions of the former locutions, however, with
no commitments incurred (i.e., they are free to refuse to sell or buy something they have
previously agreed upon). This way, agents may usefully provide information without
necessarily committing to it or having to explicitly retract it.
Finally, Bentahar et al. (2004) have recently proposed a dynamic logic approach to
capturing commitments in argumentation. Their model explicitly relates the di®erent
actions of the agents to the commitments that ensue. Thus, as a result of di®erent
actions, the commitments reach di®erent states (e.g. active, withdrawn, satis¯ed) in a
way similar to (Fornara and Colombetti, 2003). Hereunder we provide an example from
(Bentahar et al., 2004) of an illocution creating a particular commitment:
M;Pa;si j= Accept-content(Ag2;SC(Id0;Ag1;Ag2;')) i®
M;Pa;si j= Active(SC(Id0;Ag1;Ag2;')) ^ Create(Ag2;SC(Id1;Ag2;Ag1;'))
where M is the Kripke model which structures the states of the world, Pa is the in¯nite
sequence of states of the world, si is the given state of the world, Id0 and Id1 are
identi¯ers for the di®erent commitments captured by the predicate SC.
The above formula indicates that the acceptance of the content ' of the commitment by
agent Ag2 is allowed i®: (i) the SC is active (i.e. the agent has made a commitment to
' conditional upon the reception of an accept) because we cannot act on a SC content
if the SC is not active and (ii) agent Ag2 creates a SC whose content is '. Therefore,
Ag2 becomes committed towards the content ' (which could be the result of enacting
the contents of an agreement or the truth value of a particular information).
Bentahar's model forms a good basis for building practical systems for ABN agents
since it connects the illocutionary contents to actual actions and the result of actions
(i.e. here '). However, their approach is limited to only considering propositions that
can be attacked or challenged (in the argumentation sense) as the object of their com-
mitments. A more expressive notion of these propositions would be needed to allow the
representation of real o®ers that agents pass to each other during negotiation.
2.1.3.2 Challenges
The representation and manipulation of information stores is not a trivial task, and
has signi¯cant e®ects on both the performance and outcomes of negotiation dialogues.
In particular, information store manipulation rules have a direct e®ect on the types
of utterances agents can make given their previous utterances (i.e., the protocol), the
properties of the dialogues (e.g., termination), and the ¯nal outcome (e.g., the ability
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Some of the key questions that need to be addressed in an ABN framework are: Un-
der what conditions should an agent be allowed to retract its commitments and how
would this a®ect the properties of dialogues? Under what conditions should an agent be
forced to retract its commitments to maintain consistency? While many of these ques-
tions are being investigated in the multi-agent dialogue literature in general (Maudet
and Chaib-draa, 2003), there are issues speci¯c to negotiation dialogues. In particular,
commitments to providing, requesting, and exchanging resources may require a di®erent
treatment from commitments in other types of dialogues, such as persuasion or informa-
tion seeking. This is because negotiation dialogues involve sel¯sh agents for whom the
only goal is to come to an agreement that maximises their individual utility while agents
in the persuasion or information exchange dialogue are more interested in ensuring con-
sistency in the beliefs agents share in the dialogue. Thus, agents in negotiation dialogues
are more likely to make commitments conditional upon the acceptance of an o®er while
agents in persuasion or information dialogues will mostly make commitments to the
truth of statements they make. How these conditional commitments can be managed
has received relatively less attention in the community than the commitments agents
make in persuasion or information dialogues.
2.2 Elements of ABN Agents
In the previous section, we discussed the di®erent elements of an ABN framework that
are external to the participating agents. Issues such as the protocol and languages help
to de¯ne the system in which agents operate, but often these say little about how agents
are speci¯ed, or how they reason about the interaction.
Before we get into a discussion of the general features of an ABN agent, we shall describe
what constitutes (at an abstract level) the decision making model (see ¯gure 1.1 in
chapter 1) of a basic, non-ABN-based bargaining agent. This will allow us to clearly
contrast the ABN agent from other negotiators, making our analysis more focused.
Therefore, we begin by presenting a conceptual model of a simple negotiator in ¯gure
2.1. This captures, on a very abstract level, the main components needed by an agent
in order to be capable of engaging in bargaining.8 This model is not meant to be an
idealisation of all existing models in the literature, but rather a useful starting point for
illustrating how ABN agents are di®erent from other types of agent.
We refer to an agent involved in bargains which largely depend on exchanging propos-
als as a classical bargaining agent. This agent needs to have a locution interpretation
component, which parses incoming messages. These locutions usually contain a pro-
posal, or an acceptance or rejection message of a previous proposal. They might also
8For a more detailed discussion of the conceptual architectures for negotiating agents, refer to (Ashri
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contain other information about the interaction, such as the identity of the sender (es-
pecially in the case of multi-party encounters). Acceptance messages usually terminate
the encounter with a deal. A proposal may be stored in a proposal database for future
reference. Proposals (or rejections) feed into a proposal evaluation and generation com-
ponent, which ultimately makes a decision about whether to accept, reject or generate a
counterproposal, or even terminate the negotiation. This ¯nally feeds into the locution
generation component which sends the response to the relevant party or parties. A more
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Elements of a Classical Bargaining Agent
sophisticated classical bargaining agent may maintain a knowledge base of its mental at-
titudes (such as beliefs, desires, preferences, and so on (Wooldridge, 2002)), as well as
models of the environment and the negotiation counterpart(s). This knowledge may be
used in the evaluation and generation of proposals by judging the validity and worth of
proposals made (for example, by verifying whether proposals are actually feasible and do
not con°ict with the current observations of the environment). Moreover, the knowledge
base may be updated in the light of new information. However, the updates that can be
made are somewhat limited because the only information usually available to the agent
during the interaction is:
1. Proposals (or bids) from the counterpart or a competitor.
2. A message rejecting a proposal initially made by the agent.
3. Other observations from the environment (e.g., a manufacturing plant agent bid-
ding for raw material may monitor customer demand changes and bid accordingly).
The agent may be able to infer certain things from this information. For example, by
receiving a rejection the agent may infer that the counterpart does not rate certainChapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 37
attribute/value assignments highly. Similarly, by receiving a proposal (or by observing
the proposal of another competing bidder) the agent might infer attribute values that
appeal to the counterpart (or competitor), which can then guide his own bargaining or
bidding strategy.9
In contrast with a classical negotiating agent, more sophisticated meta-level information
can be explicitly exchanged between the ABN agents (see ¯gure 2.2).10 This, in turn,
can have a direct e®ect on the agent's knowledge base. Therefore, in addition to eval-
uating and generating proposals, an agent capable of participating in argument-based
negotiation must be equipped with mechanisms for evaluating arguments (and updat-
ing the mental state accordingly) and for generating and selecting arguments. If the
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual Elements of an ABN Agent (the dashed lined boxes represent
the additional components necessary for ABN agents).
locution contains an argument, an argument evaluation or interpretation mechanism is
invoked which updates the agent's mental state accordingly. This may involve updating
the agent's mental attitudes about itself and/or about the environment and its counter-
parts. Now, the agent can enter the proposal evaluation stage in the light of this new
information. Note that at this stage, not only does the agent evaluate the most recent
proposal, but it can also re-evaluate previous proposals made by its counterparts; these
proposals are stored in the proposal database. This is important since the agent might
(intentionally or otherwise) be persuaded to accept a proposal it has previously rejected.
As a result of evaluating proposals, the agent may generate a counterproposal, a rejec-
9Similar issues have been investigated in the study of signalling in game-theory (Spence, 1974).
10Note that the actual way in which ABN agents are designed or implemented may di®er from the
above. For example, the agent might perform certain operations in a di®erent order, or might combine
or further decompose certain functionalities. Therefore, our conceptual model is to be taken in the
abstract sense and should not be seen as a prescriptive account of how ABN agents must precisely look
like. Instead, it provides a useful point of departure for beginning an analysis of the generic features of
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tion, or an acceptance. In addition, however, a ¯nal argument generation mechanism is
responsible for deciding what response to actually send to the counterpart, and what (if
any) arguments should accompany the response. For example, the proposal evaluation
and generation component might decide that a proposal is not acceptable, and the ar-
gument generation mechanism might accompany the rejection with a critique describing
the reasons behind the rejection. Such arguments might also be explicitly requested by
the other party or even enforced by the protocol. Note that an agent may also choose
to send a stand-alone argument (i.e., not necessarily in conjunction with a proposal,
acceptance or rejection).
At times, there might be a number of potential arguments that the agent can send. For
example, in order to exert pressure on a counterpart, an agent might be able to either
make a threat or present a logical argument supporting some action. Deciding on which
argument to actually send is the responsibility of an argument selection mechanism.
Finally, this information is given to the locution generation mechanism which places
this information in the proper message format and utters it.
In summary, negotiating agents must, at least, be able to:
1. interpret incoming locutions
2. evaluate incoming proposals
3. generate outgoing proposals
4. generate outgoing locutions
An ABN agent needs, in addition, to be able to:
1. evaluate incoming arguments and update its mental state accordingly
2. generate candidate outgoing arguments
3. select an argument from the set of available arguments
Now that we have given an overview of the features of an ABN agent, we consider each
of these features in more detail. In the course of doing so, we evaluate the state of the
art and outline major challenges and opportunities.
2.2.1 Argument and Proposal Evaluation
Recall that an ABN agent needs to evaluate potential agreements proposed by its coun-
terpart(s). The agent also needs to be able to evaluate arguments intended at in°uenc-
ing its mental state. While proposals may be evaluated more straightforwardly through
comparison with some subjective preference criteria, argument evaluation is less trivial.Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 39
Argument evaluation is a central topic in the study of argumentation, and has been
studied extensively by philosophers at least from the days of Aristotle (Aristotle, 1928;
Hitchcock, 2002). In Arti¯cial Intelligence, argument evaluation and comparison has
been applied, for example, in internal agent deliberation (Kakas and Moraitis, 2003),
in legal argumentation (Prakken and Sartor, 2001), and in medical diagnosis (Krause
et al., 1995; Fox and Parsons, 1998).
Here, however, we ¯nd it useful to distinguish between two types of considerations in
argument evaluation:
1. Objective Considerations: An argument may be seen as a tentative proof for
some conclusion. Hence, an agent, or a set of agents, may evaluate an argument
based on some objective convention that de¯nes how the quality of that proof is
established. This may be done, for example, by investigating the correctness of its
inference steps, or by examining the validity of its underlying assumptions. For
example, (Elvang-G¿ransson et al., 1993b) propose a classi¯cation of arguments
into acceptability classes based on the strength of their construction. Arguments
may also be evaluated based on their relationships with other arguments. For
(Dung, 1995), for instance, an argument is said to be acceptable with respect to a
set S of arguments if every argument attacking it is itself attacked by an argument
from that set. The set S is said to be admissible if it is con°ict free and all its
arguments are acceptable with respect to S.
2. Subjective Considerations: Instead of applying an objective, agent-independent
convention for evaluating arguments, an agent may choose to consider its own pref-
erences and motivations in making that judgement, or those of the intended audi-
ence. In the framework presented by (Bench-Capon, 2001), for example, di®erent
participants in a persuasion dialogue have di®erent preferences over the \values"
of arguments. Argument assessment and comparison would then take place in
accordance with the preferences of the dialogue participants. This means that
the participants may in°uence the outcome of the argument evaluation process by
having di®erent subjective preferences.
Let us now examine the usage of the above considerations in di®erent types of argumen-
tation dialogues. If two agents are reasoning about what is true in the world (i.e., if
they are conducting theoretical reasoning), then it makes sense for them to adopt an ob-
jective convention that is not in°uenced by their individual biases and motivations. For
example, whether it is sunny outside should not be in°uenced by whether participants
want it to be sunny, but rather only by the material evidence available.
If, on the other hand, two participants are engaged in a dialogue for deciding what course
of action to take (i.e., if they are conducting practical reasoning), or what division
of scarce resources to agree upon, or what goals to adopt, then it would make more40 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
sense for them to consider their subjective, internal motivations and perceptions, as
well as the objective truth about their environment.11 Even objective facts may be
perceived di®erently by di®erent participants, and such di®erences in perception may
play a crucial role in whether or not participants are able to reach agreement. For
example, a potential airline traveller may perceive a particular airline as unsafe, while
the sta® of the airline itself may consider it to be safe. Presumably such a di®erence in
perceptions may be resolved with recourse to objective criteria (if any can be agreed)
regarding relative crash statistics, deaths-per-mile-°own on di®erent airlines, etc. But
if, for example, potential travellers perceive a particular airline as unsafe compared to
other airlines, despite objective evidence showing the airline to be safer than others, this
perception may inhibit them from °ying the airline anyway. The marketing team of the
airline concerned, in trying to persuade potential travellers to °y with it, will have to
engage in dialogue with potential customers on the basis of those customers' subjective
perceptions, even though such perception may be false. For the marketers to ignore such
mis-perceptions risks the dialogue terminating without the potential customers °ying the
airline.
In summary, agents participating in negotiation are not concerned with establishing the
truth per se, but rather with the satisfaction of their needs. Hence, negotiation dialogues
require agents to perform argument evaluation based on objective as well as subjective
criteria.12 In other words, agents need to perform argument evaluation as part of, or in
relation to, proposal evaluation.
2.2.1.1 State of the Art
As we argued above, argument evaluation in negotiation must involve both objective as
well as subjective considerations, and hence must involve some subjective assessment of
proposals put forward by negotiation counterparts. In this subsection, we show some
approaches to proposal and argument evaluation in the existing ABN literature.
One approach to proposal and argument evaluation is to assume agents are benevolent,
using the following simple normative rule: If I do not need a resource, I should give it
away when asked. This approach can be found in a number of frameworks (e.g., Parsons
et al., 1998; Amgoud et al., 2000b; Sadri et al., 2001b).
Consider the following example from (Parsons et al., 1998). An agent a intending to hang
a picture would produce, after executing its planning procedure, intentions to acquire a
nail, a hammer and a picture. Interactions with other agents are only motivated in case
11Refer to (Rahwan et al., 2003d) for a related comparison between argumentation over goals and
beliefs.
12Note that objective argument evaluation may also take into account certain \preferences", such
as the trust the evaluator has in the agent proposing the argument. However, this remains aimed at
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the agent is not able to ful¯ll its intentions on its own. Suppose the agent does not have
a nail. This leads the agent to adopt a new intention (we can call that a sub-intention)
to acquire a nail, which may be written Ia(Have(a;nail)). If a believes that another
agent b has a nail, it would generate another sub-sub-intention that b gives the nail to
it, written Ia(Give(b;a;nail)). This triggers a request to be made to agent b in the form
H1 ` Ia(Give(b;a;nail), where the argument H1 constitutes the sequence of deductive
steps taken to reach the request.13 In general, agent b accepts the request unless it has a
con°ict with it. There are two types of con°icts that would cause b to reject the request:
1. Agent b has a con°icting intention. In argumentation terms, the agent refuses the
proposal if it can build an argument that rebuts it.
2. Agent b rejects one of the elements of the argument supporting the intention
that denotes the request. In argumentation terms, the agent refuses the proposal
because it can build an argument that undercuts it.
We shall explain the above two cases using the same picture-hanging example. An exam-
ple of the ¯rst case is if agent b rejects the proposal because it also needs the nail, say to
hang a mirror; i.e., it can build an argument for the intention Ib(:Give(b;a;nail)). This
argument is based on (among other things) the intention Ib(Can(b;hang(mirror))). An
example of the second case is if, in the plan supporting the intention Ia(Give(b;a;nail)),
agent a made the false assumption that b possesses a nail, written Ba(Have(b;nail)). If b
actually does not have a nail, then it would adopt the intention of modifying that belief,
i.e. Ib(:Ba(Have(b;nail))). Agents continue through a process of argument exchange,
which may involve recursively undercutting each other's arguments until a resolution is
reached.
In order for argumentation to work, agents must be able to compare arguments. This
is needed, for example, in order to be able to reject \weak" arguments. Parsons et al.
(Parsons et al., 1998) compare arguments by classifying them into acceptability classes
based on the strength of their construction (Elvang-G¿ransson et al., 1993b). If two
con°icting arguments belong to the same class, the authors assume the agent has some
capability to perform comparisons based on utility analysis. However, they do not specify
how this decision procedure is actually undertaken, nor do they specify the conditions
it needs to satisfy.
A similar approach is taken by (Sadri et al., 2001b). This framework, however, does
not involve arguing about beliefs. If an agent a receives a request for a resource, and
needs that resource for achieving some goal ga, the agent rejects the request, unless an
alternative acceptable plan for achieving ga can be produced by the counterpart, with
13Note that the argument (or plan) may not contain intentions only, but also belief and desire formulae
about the agent and its environment. For example, in the argument H1, agent a may state the assumption
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a promise to provide any missing resources for that plan to a. Agents are also assumed
to have some ordering over plans that allows them to choose between alternative plans.
In the frameworks of (Parsons et al., 1998) and (Sadri et al., 2001b) described above,
argument and proposal evaluation take into account a very simplistic subjective rule;
that is to give any resource requested that the agent does not currently need. While this
may be useful for facilitating cooperative behaviour and making sure agents preserve
their current subjective interests, it may not be suitable in open agent systems where
agents may be purely self-interested and may refuse to provide any resources without
something in return.
An alternative trend in proposal and argument evaluation in PN agents is to explicitly
take into account the utility of the agent. The basic idea is that the agent would calculate
the expected utility in the cases where it accepts and rejects a particular proposal. And by
comparing the expected utilities in these two cases (i.e., in the resulting states), the agent
would be able to make a decision about whether to accept or reject the proposal. In the
framework of (Kraus et al., 1998), the agent makes a decision about whether to accept a
request by evaluating three factors: (i) the Collision Flag, which ¯res if the requested
action con°icts with one of the agent's intentions; (ii) the Convincing Factor, which
is a value between 0 and 1 assigned to the argument using some ad hoc rule (e.g., an
appeal to past promise is assigned value 1 if the agent believes it has actually made such
promise, and assigned 0 otherwise); and (iii) the Acceptability Value, which involves
a numerical calculation of utility tradeo®s in the case of accepting the request versus
rejecting it. However, it is not clear, from the paper, how these factors are combined to
produce a ¯nal decision.
Sierra et al. (1998) introduce authority as a criteria for evaluating arguments. They
present an authority graph imposed by a relation over agent roles. This graph can be
used to specify, for each pair of agents, which agent has higher authority. The authors
also propose a way of comparing authority levels of sets of agents. This can be used
to compare arguments involving statements made by multiple agents. An argument H1
is preferred to another H2 if and only if the authority level of agents involved in H1 is
higher than those in H2. As an example, the authors de¯ne a conciliatory agent, which
accepts appeal-to-authority arguments regardless of the content of the justi¯cation of
the appeal. This means that there would be no di®erence between a strong appeal
and a weak (or even meaningless) one. While authority seems to be a useful factor
in evaluating arguments in an organisation, it seems unreasonable to rely solely on
it. There are, therefore, opportunities for combining authority with other argument
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2.2.1.2 Challenges
The discussion above shows that the nature of argument evaluation depends largely
on the object of negotiation and the way agents represent and update their internal
mental states. For example, in the framework presented by (Parsons et al., 1998),
agents are able to perform some objective argumentation over their beliefs about the
availability of resources, the achievability of intentions, and so on. This allows agents to
potentially modify each other's mental attitudes, which may in°uence their preferences.
In frameworks such as those of (Ramchurn et al., 2003a) and (Kraus et al., 1998), on
the other hand, evaluation is based solely on the direct comparison of expected utilities.
Agents do not in°uence each other's beliefs, but rather exert pressure on each other by
exercising their ability to in°uence the outcomes (for example, by making a promise
or a threat). In other words, an agent would not voluntarily modify its position as
a result of correcting its perceptions of the environment, but rather forcedly concede
on its position as a result of pressure from its counterpart. Many opportunities exist
for combining the objective (belief-based) and subjective (value-based) approaches to
argument evaluation. For example, how can we combine the objective evaluation of the
logical form of an argument with a subjective evaluation of its consequences based on
utility, trust, authority, etc.?
Another challenge is that of providing uni¯ed argumentation frameworks that facilitate
negotiation dialogues involving notions of goals, beliefs, plans, etc. (Rahwan et al.,
2003d) argue that systems of argumentation designed for arguing about beliefs are not
readily suitable for allowing for argumentation over goals, particularly due to the di®er-
ent ways con°ict resolution among arguments must be dealt with. For example, there
is a di®erence between attacking a goal by demonstrating that it is not achievable and
attacking it by demonstrating that it is not useful.
Rahwan et al. demonstrate di®erent ways in which goals may relate to their sub-goals,
their super-goals and the agent's beliefs Rahwan et al. (2003c,d). This allows one to
characterise di®erent types of arguments that may be provided against a particular goal,
and how they can, if successful, a®ect the agents' mental states. Rahwan et al. discuss
other types of possible attacks, as a preliminary step to understanding the space of
possible in°uences ABN agents may (or must be able to) exert in the course of dialogue.
The above approach has recently been taken up by Amgoud and Kaci (Amgoud and
Kaci, 2004) where the goals are attributed a bipolar nature. This means that the agent
may have some goals that it deems will bring about a positive outcome for itself while
there are goals that bring a negative outcome. Those that are neither of the two types
are termed goals in abeyance. The authors thus provide a reasoning mechanism that
allows an agent to de¯ne acceptable arguments in terms of attack relations as in Rahwan
et al.. Moreover, arguments are given a strength according to either the certainty with
which the goal supported by the argument will be achieved or the weight the goal has44 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
in achieving the purpose of the agent. In this way, agents can determine which are the
arguments that need to be used to evaluate or make an o®er. However, it is not very
clear how certainty and weight are determined, nor how agents are to share their goals
without revealing their preferences in a bargaining context.
2.2.2 Argument and Proposal Generation
Another central problem in the study of argumentation is that of argument generation.
This problem is concerned with generating candidate arguments14 to present to a dia-
logue counterpart. These arguments are usually sent in order to entice the counterpart
to accept some proposed agreement. Hence, in negotiation, argument and proposal
generation are closely related processes.
2.2.2.1 State of the Art
In existing ABN frameworks, proposal generation is usually made as a result of some
utility evaluation or planning process (Sierra et al., 1998). Sierra et al. assume agents
have a means of generating proposals that increase (or maximise) their utilities. For
(Kraus et al., 1998), (Parsons et al., 1998), and (Sadri et al., 2001b), an underlying
planner generates a set of actions or resources needed to achieve some intention. Agents
then request the actions or resources they cannot achieve or obtain on their own, from
other agents. If they fail to obtain immediate acceptance, they may propose to perform
an action (or set of actions) or to provide resources in return for acceptance. This may
be done by just giving away what they do not need, or by measuring the utilities they
lose in the exchange.
Proposals may be accompanied by arguments. In the framework of (Kraus et al., 1998),
for example, agents may choose to accompany proposals with arguments generated using
explicit rules. By means of an illustration, what follows is an informal description of the
threat-generation rule for agent i:
IF
A request has been sent to agent j to perform action ® &
j rejected this request &
j has goals g1 and g2 &
j prefers g2 to g1 &
doing ® achieves :g1 &
doing ¯ achieves :g2 &
i believes doing ¯ is credible and appropriate
THEN
14We leave the discussion of selecting the best argument to section 2.2.3 below.Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 45
i requests ® again with the following threat:
if you don't do ®, I will do ¯
If the rule body is satis¯ed, the corresponding threat will become a candidate argument.
The agent may generate other candidate arguments, such as promises or appeals, using
other rules.
As mentioned above, the frameworks of (Parsons et al., 1998), (Sadri et al., 2001b) and
(Amgoud et al., 2000b) take a planning approach to proposal generation. Arguments
are in fact generated in the process of proposal generation itself. In other words, an
agent justi¯es a request by simply stating the truth about its needs, plans, underlying
assumptions, and so on, which ultimately caused the need to arise. This is di®erent from
other utility-based approaches described above, where agents can, in a sense, create
arguments, such as threats and rewards, by exploiting their abilities to in°uence the
outcomes. Of course, there is nothing that directly prevents agents from combining the
two.
As described earlier, (Rahwan et al., 2003c) provide a characterisation of the types
of arguments an agent can make in relation to the goal and belief structures of its
counterpart. This provides a more ¯ne-grained portfolio of candidate arguments than
those of (Parsons et al., 1998), (Sadri et al., 2001b) and (Amgoud et al., 2000b) (where
only plans or promises can be put forward as arguments).
And ¯nally, authority could also be used in argument generation. Sierra et al. (1998),
for example, de¯ne a simple authoritarian agent, which always exploits its social power
by threatening whenever possible. Boella et al. (2004) further this approach by de¯ning
di®erent persuasive arguments that exploit norms of the environment. They outline three
ways in which norms can be used to formulate persuasive arguments such as `command',
`convince', and `suggest'. For a command to be issued, an authority relationship must
exist while for a `convince', the agents must share a certain level of trust. For a suggestion
to be made, the agents must only make sure that they trust the information shared rather
that their opponent. This work is, however, very preliminary.
2.2.2.2 Challenges
More work needs to be done in order to provide a uni¯ed way of generating arguments
by considering both objective and subjective criteria. Moreover, there is a need for a
complete characterisation of the space of possible arguments. This is not necessarily a
trivial task since in some frameworks the number of possible arguments may be in¯nite
(say, if the framework allows for nested arguments about what may happen in the future,
or nested dialogues).46 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
More work is also needed to understand the in°uence of di®erent factors, such as the
bargaining protocol, authority, expected utility, honesty, etc. on argument generation.
Speci¯cally, how can authority be used in constructing an argument? Should an agent
believe in an argument in order to present it? Can agents blu®? These are few of the
questions that need to be answered before a complete framework for argument generation
is achieved.
2.2.3 Argument Selection
Related to the problem of argument generation is that of argument selection. The
question of argument selection is as follows: given a number of candidate arguments an
agent may utter to its counterpart, which one is the \best" argument from the point of
view of the speaker?
Note that argument selection may take place in conjunction with argument generation.
An agent need not generate all possible arguments before it makes a selection of the
most suitable one. Instead, the agent may only concern itself with the generation of
the most suitable argument itself. In other words, the agent might prune the set of
candidate arguments during the process of argument generation. Whether or not this is
possible, of course, depends on the nature of the argumentation framework underlying
the agent's decision making.
2.2.3.1 State of the Art
In the work of (Kraus et al., 1998), arguments are selected according to the following
argument strength order, with threats being the strongest arguments:
1. Appeal to prevailing practice.
2. A counter example.
3. An appeal to past promise.
4. An appeal to self-interest.
5. A promise of future reward.
6. A threat.
The intuition is that a negotiator would progress from weak arguments up to the
strongest ones. For example, there is no need to threaten the counterpart if an appeal is
su±cient to persuade him/her to accept a request. The authors argue that generatingChapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 47
appeals is less costly to the persuader than threats or rewards since the latter involve
possible negative side-e®ects.
In other frameworks, argument generation is based on the relationships between argu-
ments. Agents in the framework presented by (Parsons et al., 1998) provide the strongest
argument possible based on the acceptability classes (e.g., a tautological argument, if
possible). For (Amgoud et al., 2000b), agents compare arguments based on preferential
ordering over their constituent propositions in a similar manner to that in argument
evaluation (i.e., based on the argumentation system of (Dung, 1995)). In Kakas and
Moraitis (2003), given a particular argumentation framework, they provide tactics to
argue. These tactics tell agents how to choose responses to requests by either accepting
or challenging or even refusing. Finally, for (Sadri et al., 2001b), agents may compare
the costs of di®erent alternative plans to present to the counterpart.
2.2.3.2 Challenges
The problem of argument selection can be considered the essence of strategy in ABN
dialogues in general (provided the candidate arguments contain all possible arguments).
However, there is very little existing work on strategies in multi-agent dialogues. Some
work is emerging that investigates strategic move selection in persuasion dialogues (Am-
goud and Maudet, 2002), as well as in inquiry and information seeking dialogues (Parsons
et al., 2002, 2003). Similar work needs to be done on ABN dialogues in order to pro-
vide a sound theoretical base for potential applications. (Rahwan et al., 2003a) provide
a preliminary, informal attempt at charactarising strategic factors in negotiation dia-
logues. In this work, strategies depend on various factors, such as the agents' goals, the
interaction protocol, the agents' capabilities, the resources available to participants, and
so on.
Suitable argument selection in a bargaining context must take into account information
about the negotiation counterpart. In game theory, this information about the opponent
is modelled by a probability distribution modelling the uncertainty of the ¯rst party
regarding the counterparts' preferences which, in turn, determine its strategy. In cases
where such a modelling is possible, learning techniques can be used to ¯nd patterns
in the counterpart's behaviour and use these ¯ndings in future bargaining encounters
with the same (or similar) counterpart(s). Thus, while PN as discussed in chapter 1
aims to reduce uncertainty in the actions of the agents, this learning mechanism could
reduce uncertainty about the preferences of the agents (if preferences stay the same
over multiple encounters). An example of the application of such learning techniques
on repeated encounters include (Sandholm and Crites, 1995) who apply reinforcement
learning in the context of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game to allow agents to
better predict the patterns of behaviour of their opponents. Learning in less restricted
negotiation protocols has also been investigated by (Zeng and Sycara, 1997).48 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
In ABN, more sophisticated models of the negotiation counterparts are needed, and ap-
propriate methods of updating these models are essential for understanding the dynamics
of opponents' strategies, preferences, beliefs, etc. This is a particularly challenging task
for ABN since agents may not only model the observed `behaviour' of one another, but
also the `mental attitudes' motivating that behaviour. Another important question is
whether and how such learning agents converge to better and quicker deals in multiple
negotiation encounters.
2.3 Summary
Having analysed the various existing frameworks in detail in the previous sections, we
now proceed to present a high-level view of what has been achieved in the ¯eld of ABN
as a whole. In this way, we aim to identify those areas that we will try to tackle given
our intention to design decision making models and protocols for PN agents.
To this end, in table 2.2, we compare the di®erent existing frameworks in terms of their
main characteristics.15 Speci¯cally, the ¯rst column describes the style of argumentation
underlying the ABN framework. This covers the informal literature that motivates and
provides intuitive backing of the research, as well as the formal theories underlying the
speci¯cation of the framework (e.g., decision theory, argumentation theory, dialogue
games, etc.). When taken together this provides an idea of the starting point of each
framework. As can be seen, frameworks such as those of (Amgoud et al., 2000b) and
(Sadri et al., 2001b) start from a single-agent proof procedure and try to split it into
multiple disjoint agents while preserving the correctness of the proof theory.
In contrast, frameworks such as those presented by (McBurney et al., 2003) and (Rahwan
et al., 2003c) start by discussing the di®erent types of interaction patterns needed among
agents, and from there attempt to create a dialogue system. In comparison to these logic
or mentalistic based ABN mechanisms, relatively little work has been carried out on PN
mechanisms to the exception of (Kraus et al., 1998) and (Sierra et al., 1998).
The next column describes the protocol. It is clear that some ABN frameworks have
not yet addressed the protocol de¯nition, while in others it is the mainstay of their
contribution. Moreover, the frameworks can di®er in the way they specify the protocols,
by making them implicit or explicit, de¯ning them as ¯nite state machines, as dialogue
games, and so on. As can be seen, only (Sierra et al., 1998) de¯nes a protocol for PN,
but their approach is only limited to de¯ning the participation rules and does not de¯ne
what commitments agents make during a dialogue. The third column describes some
of the important assumptions that each framework makes. In some frameworks, for
instance, the agents must be cooperative for ABN to work. Frameworks can also vary
15Wherever the framework in question has not addressed the particular attribute of the table (e.g.
Protocol) signi¯cantly, we note this as N/A.Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation 49
in their assumptions about agents' utilities and preferences. Finally, we have speci¯ed
whether the framework has been implemented and, if so, what form this takes.
In table 2.3, we outline the various frameworks in terms of whether and how each
framework addresses the problems of argument generation, selection, and evaluation.
One important observation from this is that argument selection has had very little
attention in the ABN community. This is, we believe, partly because e®ective strategies
for deciding what arguments to utter are likely to be protocol-dependent. Consequently,
there is still no formal theory of bargaining protocols covering all types of mechanisms.
As can be seen, there is a clear contrast in the way the three main mechanisms are
conceived by the di®erent frameworks. We contend that this is mainly due to the
di®erences in the underlying style of argumentation. However, despite these di®erences,
their contributions are broadly complementary.
In light of these comparisons, we have identi¯ed a number of problems that pervade the
particular area of PN. Speci¯cally, one of the main problems is that the semantics and
constructs of arguments (i.e. what is contained in an argument) are not clearly de¯ned.
Given this, we aim to develop a precise de¯nition of arguments (rewards in particular)
in repeated encounters. Moreover, as per our stated objectives in chapter 1, we also aim
to develop a complete protocol for PN, as well as the decision making model that ¯ts
competitive settings. To this end, we will extend those participation rules de¯ned by
Sierra et al. (discussed in section 2.1.2.1) and build upon the speci¯cation of commit-
ments by Bentahar et al. to encompass PN o®ers and arguments (described in section
2.1.3.1). Moreover, given the lack of implemented models and empirical evaluation in
this area, we propose to implement our PN mechanism and determine the negotiating
agents' performance given di®erent strategies in generating o®ers and arguments. In
so doing, we aim to provide the ¯rst objective assessment of the role of arguments in
enhancing bargaining.50 Chapter 2 Argumentation-Based Approaches to Negotiation
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Trust in Multi-Agent Systems
In the previous chapter we surveyed the ABN literature and determined the particular
requirements of our PN mechanism. In this chapter, we turn to the issue of trust in order
to determine the requirements of our trust model. More speci¯cally, we evaluate the most
prominent trust models from the literature at the individual level in order to determine
which components of our trust model we need to develop afresh and which parts we
can exploit from existing models. This analysis is carried out with particular respect
to making the model applicable to both bargaining and mechanism design. Moreover,
we identify those system level mechanisms that aim to elicit trust. In so doing we also
lay the foundations for creating a protocol (through mechanism design techniques) that
selects the most trustworthy agents in resolving con°icts.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 analyses trust models at
the individual level while section 3.2 surveys existing system level trust models. Finally
section 3.3 summarises the main ¯ndings and discusses the main requirements of our
trust model and their relationship to mechanism design and bargaining.
3.1 Individual-Level Trust
Here we take the viewpoint of an agent situated in an open environment trying to choose
the most reliable interaction partner from a pool of potential agents and deciding on
how to interact with it. As we mentioned earlier (section 1.3), there are a number of
ways the agent can go about doing this:
² it could interact with each of them and learn their behaviour over a number of
encounters. Eventually, it should be able to select the most reliable or honest
agents from the pool or devise an appropriate strategy to deal with the less (or
more) reliable ones. In this case, the agent reasons about the outcome of the direct
interactions with others.
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² the agent could ask other agents about their perception of the potential partners. If
su±cient information is obtained and if this information can be trusted, the agent
can reliably choose its interaction partners. In this case, the agent reasons about
interactions that others have had with its potential partners (indirect interactions).
² the agent could characterise the known motivations of the other agents. This
involves forming coherent beliefs about di®erent characteristics of these agents
and reasoning about these beliefs in order to decide how much trust should be put
in them.
Given the above, we can classify trust models at the individual level as either learning
(and evolution) based, reputation based, or socio-cognitive based. While the learning
and evolutionary models, which we consider in section 3.1.1, aim to endow agents with
strategies that can cope with lying and non-reciprocative agents, reputation models,
which we describe in section 3.1.2, enable agents to gather information in richer forms
from their environment and make rational inferences from the information obtained
about their counterparts. Finally, in section 3.1.3 we describe socio-cognitive models
which adopt a rather higher level view of trust that takes the knowledge of motivations
of other agents for granted and proposes ways to reason about these motivations.
3.1.1 Learning and Evolving Trust
In this section we consider trust as an emergent property of direct interactions between
self-interested agents. Here we assume that the agents will interact many times rather
than through one-shot interactions. This tallies with the concept of trust as a social
phenomenon that is inherently based on multiple interactions between two parties (Molm
et al., 2000; Carley, 1991; Prietula, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 1998; Dasgupta, 1998). It is
further assumed that agents have an incentive to defect (Dasgupta, 1998). For example,
defecting in an interaction could mean that the agent does not satisfy the terms of a
contract, sells poor quality goods, delivers late, or does not pay the requested amount
of money to a seller. In these examples, defection could get higher payo®s for the agent
defecting (e.g. the seller gets paid more than the actual value of the goods sold) and
cause some utility loss to the other party (e.g. the buyer loses utility in buying a low
quality product at a high price). However, defection may reduce the possibility of future
interactions since the losing agent would typically attempt to avoid risking future utility
losses. In contrast, if both interaction participants cooperate, we assume that they get
an overall higher payo® in the long run (Axelrod, 1984). For example, a seller delivering
goods on time or selling goods of a high quality may result in future purchases from the
buyer. In all these cases, we are generally assuming that the agents already know the
payo®s associated with each of their actions.
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petitive interactions (discussed in section 1.1), the safest (i.e. minimising possible loss),
and not necessarily the most pro¯table for the interacting agents, move will be chosen
unless there can be some way to ascertain that the other party can be trusted1. Thus,
if an agent believes its counterpart is reciprocative, then the former will never defect,
otherwise it will, and both could end up with lower payo®s than if they trusted each
other or learnt to trust each other. This belief may only be acquired if the game is
repeated a number of times such that there is an opportunity for the agents to learn
their opponent's strategy or adapt to each other's strategy.
To this end we will ¯rst consider models that show how trust, through reciprocation
(of positive deeds), can be learnt or evolved over multiple direct interactions (section
3.1.1.1). These interaction models, however, greatly simplify the interactions to extreme
notions of cooperation and defection. In reality we believe these two extremes can
rather be considered the two ends of an axis measuring the success of the outcome of
the interaction. In this context, cooperation could mean, for example, that a seller
actually delivers some goods (rather than not delivering at all), but some slight delay in
the delivery might still be considered poor cooperation (rather than complete defection).
Hence the perception of an agent of another party's trustworthiness is relative to the
level of satisfaction of the outcome. We therefore consider, in section 3.1.1.2, how the
payo®s in the individual interactions can actually be modelled in realistic applications.
3.1.1.1 Evolving and Learning Strategies
The most common example used to illustrate the evolution of trust or cooperation over
multiple interactions is Axelrod's tournaments revolving around the Prisoner's Dilemma
(Axelrod, 1984). The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game involving two prisoners that have
to decide whether to cooperate by not revealing their accomplice's deeds or to defect
by revealing this information. The dilemma arises as a result of each other having to
separately (in di®erent rooms) decide to cooperate or not, resulting in some years of
imprisonment (5 for one cooperating and 1 for the one defecting, 3 for both if they both
defect and 1 for both if they both cooperate). In the face of such uncertainty the best
strategy proves to be defection even though this does not lead to best outcomes (hence
the dilemma). Within very controlled settings, Axelrod's tournaments have shown that
the tit-for-tat strategy was the most successful (reaping higher average points over all
the encounters) relative to other sel¯sh or nicer (i.e. mostly cooperative) strategies. Tit-
for-tat cooperates on the ¯rst move and imitates the opponent's move in the remaining
interactions. By adopting this strategy, agents are, in fact, trusting each other but
would punish untrustworthy behaviour if it ever happens (and also forgive if trustworthy
behaviour is shown again). If two agents adopt tit-for-tat (or permanently cooperative
1The moves chosen will also be dependent on the risk attitude (risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk
averse) of the agent. In this respect, we conceive of trust as a means to reduce the risk perceived by the
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strategies) it is shown that they end up with the highest payo®s compared to all other
strategies. However, when faced with other sel¯sh strategies, tit-for-tat does not get
the maximum payo®, though it actually gets a higher payo® than most other strategies.
This is because tit-for-tat actually loses on the ¯rst encounter.
It is therefore required that an agent adapts its strategy according to the type of envi-
ronment (agents therein) it encounters in order to minimise loses and foster cooperation.
By allowing agents to adapt, Wu and Sun have shown that trust can actually emerge
between them (Wu and Sun, 2001). This means that the agents evolve a trusting rela-
tionship (i.e. a cooperative stratetgy) by evaluating the bene¯t of each possible strategy
over multiple interactions. A multi-agent bidding context, in which a number of seller
agents bid for contracts in an electronic marketplace, is chosen to exemplify the concept.
It is ¯rst shown that when agents are all nice (always cooperating) to each other, sellers
tend to learn to exploit them. To counter this, the nice agents learn to use tit-for-tat
to minimise their losses. As a result, the nasty sellers (exploitative agents) then learn
to be reciprocative since cooperating would bring them more bene¯t than defecting in
the long run. Thus, trust emerges as a result of the evolution of strategies over multiple
interactions. This example also shows that the evolution of strategies allows nice agents
to beat nasty ones in the long run. However, while strictly applying to the bidding
context, Wu and Sun's model does not take into account the fact that there might be
some utility loss (in the short run) in cooperating with the other party (e.g. giving away
some resources).
In this respect, while acknowledging a cost to cooperation, Sen2 demonstrates how reci-
procity can emerge when the agents learn to predict that they will receive future bene¯ts
if they cooperate (Sen, 1996). In a more recent set of experiments, Sen and Dutta give
clear guidelines about evolutionary stable strategies (Sen and Dutta, 2002) (not neces-
sarily tit-for-tat) in di®erent types of environments (with di®erent sorts of strategies).
They show that collaborative liars (collaborating defectors) perform well whenever the
number of interactions is small and the number of philantropic agents (always cooper-
ating) is large. However, reciprocative strategies perform better in all other scenarios
they tested. Besides proving that reciprocation pays, these results show that the length
and number of interactions matter when it comes to evaluating another agent's trust-
worthiness. If the number of interactions is too low, then trust cannot be built. This
is corroborated by Mui et al. and Wang et al. in their probabilistic trust model which
identi¯es a threshold for the number of encounters needed to achieve a reliable mea-
sure of an opponent's trustworthiness based on performance appraisal (Mui et al., 2002;
Wang and Vassileva, 2003).
In the case where this threshold cannot be reached, other techniques must be used to
elicit trustworthiness. In this respect, Mukherjee et al. have shown how trust can be
2For a wider reading on the problem of learning cooperative strategies in competitive settings, see
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acquired if agents know their opponent's chosen move in advance (Mukherjee et al.,
2001). They show that, in the case where the agents do not reveal or only partially
reveal (only the ¯rst mover does) their actions before their opponent acts, no amount of
trust is built since it is optimal for the opponent to always choose to defect. However,
in the bilateral information revealing scenario (both agents reveal their actions), both
agents trust each other through mutually learning to choose an action that results in
higher outcomes than predicted for the non-learning situation. It is to be noted that
their model (as well as Sen's), besides assuming a static environment, uses an arbitrarily
de¯ned function to calculate the cost of interacting and returns from future actions (the
basis of which might need more investigation but has proven to be quite successful in
the applications that have been simulated).
Up to this point, all the above models deal strictly with the problem of cooperation
between self-interested parties. However, not all multi-agent interactions are strictly
competitive. For example, agents may be self-interested, but still need to achieve a
maximum payo® as a group or society since the latter determines their individual payo®s
(e.g. individuals contributing an unspeci¯ed amount of money to build a road in their
community such that the total amount collected decides whether the road will be built,
giving utility to the individuals, otherwise the money is used for a secondary purpose).
This is the problem tackled by Birk (Birk, 2000, 2001). It is thus shown that trust may
not only emerge from the evolution of strategies (Birk, 2000), but can also arise strictly
out of learning (Birk, 2001). The learning method Birk exposes uses a continuous case
N-prisoner's dilemma as basis for simulation. This involves agents contributing to a
common fund required for the society to achieve its goals, but each agent is tempted to
contribute less than the equal split of the total investment required, in the hope that
others will contribute more. In this context, a cooperative strategy (i.e. contributing
more than the equal split) gradually predominates in an environment where bad agents
(i.e. contributing less) are in the majority. This is because the low investment obtained
by the society impacts negatively on the utility of each individual member as well,
forcing the latter to learn to cooperate to get higher payo®s. However, as the number of
cooperative agents increases, the agents learn to defect again to get better payo®s (this
is similar to what Wu and Sun's model predicts). Birk's results additionally show that
the society reaches an equilibrium with a high level of trust (or cooperation) among its
members.
The above learning and evolutionary models of multi-agent strategic interactions assume
complete information (e.g. strategies, payo® matrix) for the multi-agent learning algo-
rithms to work. These results have typically been obtained through simulations using
very strict assumptions and static settings (as opposed to learning in dynamic settings as
in Banerjee and Peng (2004)) rather than real life scenarios where the main assumption
of complete information about payo®s simply does not hold. Also, most of the learning
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or cooperation. To be more realistic, we believe agents need to infer, from the informa-
tion gathered through their direct interactions, how their opponents are performing and
how their performance is a®ecting their goals. This leads on to devising realistic trust
metrics.
3.1.1.2 Trust metrics
For an agent to computationally model its trust in its opponent, it is ¯rst required that
the former can ascribe a rating to the level of performance of its opponent. The latter's
performance over multiple interactions can then be assessed to check how good and
consistent it is at doing what it says it will. Therefore, in addition to a performance
rating, an agent also needs a means of keeping track of the performance of an agent
(in its direct interactions with it). Marsh was the ¯rst to model trust computationally.
His ideas on trust had their roots mostly in sociology and economics (Marsh, 1994).
He modelled trust according to the subjective perception of one agent about another.
Speci¯cally, he views trust as a `situational' concept whereby an agent would trust
another di®erently in di®erent situations (given by the risk and the importance of an
issue that an agent is to be trusted about). In his model, trust is a value between -1
and 1 and for each variable the agnt is to be trusted upon, the trust value is weighted
by variable's importance. This, in turn, means that the trust value is not signi¯cantly
altered whenever the agent defects, and could lead the latter to exploit its opponent
over more interactions (see chapter 5 for more details).
More recently, Witkowski et al. proposed a model whereby the trust in an agent is calcu-
lated based on its performance in past interactions (Witkowski et al., 2001) (the context
is a trading scenario for an intelligent telecommunications network where bandwidth is
traded, the quality and quantity of which is varied depending on the trust suppliers and
buyers have in each other). The update to the trust value is di®erent for the di®erent
types of agents de¯ned in the system. Speci¯cally, consumers update their trust value
according to the di®erence between their bids and the received goods (bandwidth in this
case). The better the quality (size) of the goods the higher the increase in trust and
conversely for low quality goods. A higher trust in a seller would then result in it being
chosen for future purchases (conversely for low trust). In contrast, the supplier agents
update their trust in the consumers according to the extent to which the quality (size)
of the goods (bandwidth) supplied has been exploited. If the quality o®ered was not
fully used, then the trust goes down since it implies that the consumer has dishonestly
asked for more than it actually needed. If the quality is fully exploited, the trust goes
up. Results of the experiments show how trust (of consumers in suppliers) is e®ectively
strongly dependent on the ability of suppliers to cope with the demand.3
3It is to be noted, however, that their model increases an agent's trust even if the performance of
its opponent has not been faultless (e.g. a buyer not using the bandwidth completely but partially).
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The model used by Witkowski et al. simpli¯es the calculation of trust through equa-
tions that deal with measurable quantities of bandwidth allocation and bandwidth use.
Other models such as (Mui et al., 2002; Sen and Sajja, 2002; Schillo et al., 2000) con-
sider the performance of an agent to be simply a bistable value (good or bad). While
these models achieve the objectives of the agents for the speci¯c simulation settings
studied, they cannot generally be used more widely because realistic interactions in an
open distributed system involve richer outcomes (e.g. quality of goods traded, e±ciency
of task handling, duration of task). To overcome this, we need more generic means of
assessing performance over time. To this end, Sabater et al. (through the REGRET
system) do not just limit the overall performance to a bistable value or to an e±ciency
measure (as per Witkowski et al.), but rather attribute some fuzziness to the notion of
performance (Sabater and Sierra, 2002). Thus, depending on the context, the perfor-
mance of an agent can be subjectively judged on a given scale where -1 represents very
poor performance, 0 represents neutral, and +1 represents being very good. REGRET
actually gives richer semantics to ratings (or impressions) by de¯ning their particular
characteristics. For example, an agent can express a satisfaction -0.5 for the delivery
date of some goods and +1 for the price of the same goods. These impressions are then
analysed and aggregated using fuzzy reasoning techniques to elicit a representative value
for the overall impression (or trust) of one agent on another.
In contrast to Witkowski et al.'s model, REGRET's evaluation of trust is not only
based on an agent's direct perception of its opponent's reliability, but it also evaluates
its behaviour with other agents in the system. This is carried out because only perceiving
direct interactions can pose a number of problems. For example, in an open system,
it would be very di±cult for an autonomous agent to select an interaction partner
if the agent itself had never interacted with another party (i.e. it has no history to
analyse). Moreover, the method opens itself to attack by strategic liars which, knowing
how they are rated by the other side, can adapt their behaviour (e.g. clients overloading
their channels) to make the other party believe it is trustworthy (i.e. fully using its
bandwidth). In such cases an agent could be better o® evaluating other environmental
parameters (such as asking other agents about their impressions on each other) in an
attempt to get a more reliable rating of its opponents. However, a number of problems
arise in doing this. For example, information gathered from other agents could be wrong
or incomplete. Such problems are exempli¯ed and studied in section 3.1.2.
3.1.2 Reputation Models
Reputation can be de¯ned as the opinion or view on someone about something (Sabater
and Sierra, 2002). Here we consider that this view can be mainly derived from an
While this property of the model may not harm the system analysed by the authors, it seems to be
counterintuitive to the ideal attributes of a trust model which should prevent the agent implementing it
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aggregation of opinions of members of the community about one of them4. In multi-agent
systems, reputation can be useful when there are a large number of agents interacting
(e.g. online auctions, stock-trading). Reputation should, for example, enable buyers
to choose the best sellers in the system (e.g. on eBay, the buyers rate the sellers they
interact with and this rating is provided to future buyers for them to choose the most
reliable seller(s)). Moreover, reputation can induce sellers to behave well if they know
they are going to be avoided by future buyers as a result of their reputation going down
due to bad behaviour. These di®erent aspects of reputation divide the ¯eld into the
following lines of research:
² devising methods to gather ratings that de¯ne the trustworthiness of an agent,
using relationships existing between members of the community.
² devising reliable reasoning methods to gather as much information from the ag-
gregation of ratings retrieved from the community.
² devising mechanisms to promote ratings that truly describe the trustworthiness of
an agent.
The last of the above items is dealt with in section 3.2.2 (since it falls within the realm
of system-level trust). For now we will be concerned with the ¯rst two items because
these are at the level of individual agents.
In order to organise the retrieval and aggregation of ratings from other agents, most
reputation models borrow the concept of a social network from sociology (Burt, 1982;
Buskens, 1998). Similar to human societies, this assumes that agents are related to
each other whenever they have roles that interconnect them or whenever they have
communication links (e.g. by observation, direct communication, or as information
sources) established between one another. Through this network of social relationships,
it is assumed that agents, acting as witnesses of interactions, can transmit information
about each other (Panzarasa et al., 2001). Information takes the form of a performance
rating (e.g. good or bad, seller delivers late, buyer never paid) as explained in the section
3.1.1.2. Such a rating could then be shared by the di®erent nodes of the social network,
thus giving rise to the concept of reputation.
3.1.2.1 Retrieving Ratings from the Social Network
Yu and Singh tackle the problem of retrieving ratings from a social network through the
use of referrals (Yu and Singh, 2002a). In this context, referrals are pointers to other
4We here distinguish between trust and reputation in the sense that the former is derived from direct
interactions while the latter is mainly acquired (by an agent about another) from the environment or
other agents and ultimately leads to trust. This distinction is only made to facilitate the study of
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sources of information similar to links that a search engine would plough through to
obtain a web page or url. Through referrals, an agent can provide another agent with
alternative sources of information about a potential interaction partner (particularly if
the former cannot handle the latter's request itself). Yu and Singh propose a method of
representing a social network (based on a referral network (Singh et al., 2001)) and then
provide techniques to gather information through the network (Yu and Singh, 2003).
Speci¯cally, they show how agents can explore a network by contacting their neighbours
and can use referrals gathered from the latter to gradually build up a model of the
social network. Furthermore, Schillo et al. enrich the representation of an existing social
network by annotating nodes of the network to represent their particular characteristics
(Schillo et al., 2000). Thus each node of the network holds two values: (i) the trust value
which describes the degree of honesty of the agent represented by the node, and (ii) the
degree of altruism (i.e. being good to others even at the expense of one's own utility).
Both of these values are used to deduce the trustworthiness of witnesses queried at the
time of calculating the reputation of potential interaction partners (see section 3.1.2.2).
From an established social network it is then possible to derive higher level concepts.
For example, Sabater and Sierra (Sabater and Sierra, 2002) and Yu and Singh (Yu and
Singh, 2002a) derive the concept of a group or neighbours from the social network by
identifying those nodes (agents) that are close together (linked together). Thus, having
a social network represented allows an agent to select and contact those agents it needs
in order to get a proper measure of the reputation of another agent. For example, Yu
and Singh's model takes into account ratings from those agents that are close (by virtue
of the number of links separating them with a potential interaction partner) to choose
witnesses for a particular agent. Underlying this is the assumption that closer witnesses
will return more reliable ratings.
It is further assumed, in all of the above models, that witnesses share ratings freely (i.e.
without any pro¯t). This is a relatively strong assumption which can be removed if
proper mechanisms are implemented (as will be seen in section 3.2.2). Therefore, given
that agents have represented their social network and properly extracted the ratings of
their counterparts from the network, they then need to aggregate these ratings so as to
form a coherent impression of their potential interaction partners.
3.1.2.2 Aggregating Ratings
Several means of aggregating ratings in online communities already exist. For example,
in eBay (eBay, 2003), ratings are +1 or -1 values (in addition to textual information)
that are summed up to give an overall rating. Such simplistic aggregation of ratings can
be unreliable, particularly when some buyers do not return ratings (see (Kollock, 1999;
Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002) for a complete account of online reputation systems). For
example, a sum of ratings is biased positively when there are less people not reporting
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not considered as a bad rating, nor as a good rating and is simply discarded from
the aggregation. Moreover, ratings are open to manipulation by sellers trying to build
their reputation. While the latter problem can be dealt with by designing sophisticated
reputation mechanisms (see section 3.2.2), the former problem can be solved at the level
of the agent's reasoning mechanism.
To this end, Yu and Singh deal with absence of information in their reputation model (Yu
and Singh, 2002b). The main contribution of their work is in aggregating information
obtained from referrals while coping with the lack of information. More speci¯cally,
they use the Dempster Shafter theory of evidence to model information retrieved (Yager
et al., 1994). The context is the following: an agent may receive good or bad ratings (+1
or -1) about another agent. When an agent receives no rating (good or bad), how should
it classify this case? In Yu and Singh's model, a lack of belief (or disbelief) can only be
considered as a state of uncertainty (where all beliefs have an equal probability of being
true). Dempster's rule allows the combination of beliefs obtained from various sources
(saying an agent is trustworthy, untrustworthy, or unknown to be trustworthy or not)
to be combined so as to support the evidence that a particular agent is trustworthy or
not. Moreover, together with a belief derived from ratings obtained, an agent may hold
a belief locally about the trustworthiness of another due to its direct interaction with it.
However, in such cases, the ratings obtained from witnesses are neglected. Nevertheless,
their measure of reputation does not discredit nor gives credit unnecessarily to agents
(as eBay does) in the absence of information. Another recent approach taken by Wang
et al. (Wang and Vassileva, 2003) is to capture the performance of agents interacting in
peer-to-peer systems according to a Bayesian network. In such a network it is possible to
attribute di®erent levels of reputation in each particular aspect of an agent's capabilities
(e.g. an agent might be good in delivering ¯les at a high speed while being very bad
at delivering good quality ¯les). In this paper it is shown how agents can better their
performance by inferring information from all other agents' Bayesian networks. However,
the percentage improvement in using such a probabilistic approach is not very high given
the number of interactions it takes to build the bayesian network accurately.
As can be seen, Yu and Singh and Wang et al. do not deal with the possibility that an
agent may lie about its rating of another agent. They assume all witnesses are totally
trustworthy. However, an agent could obtain some bene¯t by lying about its rating of
an opponent if it is able to discredit others such that it appears to be more reliable than
them. In this respect, Schillo et al. deal with the problem of lying witnesses (Schillo
et al., 2000). They ¯rst decompose the rating into social metrics of trust and altruism
(see section 3.1.2.1). The latter metrics are used in a recursive aggregation over the
network taking into consideration the probability that the witnesses queried may lie to
(or betray) the querying agent. In this way, the value obtained for the trust in an agent
is more reliable than fully trusting witnesses as in the case of Yu and Singh's model
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agent is actually learnt over multiple interactions in Schillo et al.'s model. Similarly,
Sen et al. extend this work and demonstrate how agents can cope with lying witnesses
in their environment through learning rather than attributing subjective probabilities
to the event of a witness lying (Sen and Sajja, 2002; Sen et al., 2000). Speci¯cally, they
develop a reputation model which makes the same simplifying assumptions as those
illustrated in section 3.1.1. Their approach shows how the sharing of trust values (or
reputation) can bene¯t reciprocative agents in the long run. In the short run though,
sel¯sh and lying agents still bene¯t from totally reciprocative agents. Furthermore, it is
shown that, over time, colluding agents cannot exploit reciprocative agents if these learn
the behaviour of the former and share their experience with others of a similar type.
The reciprocative agents then become sel¯sh towards these lying and completely sel¯sh
agents so as to minimise utility loss in interacting with them. Their model, however,
fails when the number of witnesses in the environment falls below a given threshold.
This is because a su±ciently high number of witnesses is needed to report ratings about
most lying agents in population. If this is not the case, there is a higher probability
of a reciprocative agent interacting with a lying one which has not previously been
encountered by the witnesses.
While Yu and Singh's model demonstrates the power of referrals and the e®ectiveness of
Dempster Shafter's theory of evidence in modelling reputation, Schillo et al.'s, and Sen
and et al.'s models show how witness information can be reliably used to reason e®ec-
tively against lying agents. These models, however, greatly simplify direct interactions
and fail to frame such interactions within the social setting (i.e. relative to the type of
relationships that exist between the witnesses and the potential interaction partners).
To overcome this limitation, Sabater and Sierra adopt an (sociological) approach closer
to real life settings (Sabater and Sierra, 2002). Thus their reputation value, which is
representative of the trust to be placed in the opponent, is a weighted sum of subjective
impressions derived from direct interactions (the individual dimension of reputation),
the group impression of the opponent, the group impression on the opponent's group and
the agent's impression on the opponent's group (together, all of these compose the social
dimension of reputation). Now, the weights on each term allow the agent to variably
adjust the importance given to ratings obtained in these diverse ways. Moreover, older
ratings, devised as shown in section 3.1.2.1, are given less importance relative to new
ones. The strong realism of REGRET also lies in its de¯nition of an ontological dimen-
sion that agents can share to understand each other's ratings (e.g. a travel agent being
good might imply low price for one agent, but may imply good quality seats reserved
for another). However, REGRET does not handle the problem of lying (strategically)
among agents. Ratings are obtained in a cooperative manner (from an altruistic group)
rather than in a competitive setting (where witnesses are sel¯sh). Moreover, the aggre-
gation method REGRET uses can be sensitive to noise since ratings are simply summed
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Some recent work in tackling noisy ratings has been proposed by Whitby et al. (Whitby
et al., 2004). In this paper, it is shown how noise, in the form of unfair ratings, can
be ¯ltered out from the reputation system. Thus it is shown that by excluding the
percentage of reports that fall out of the general characterisation of a particular agent,
a more accurate measure of the agent's reputation can be obtained. Note that this
system is based on Bayesian networks which captures the ratings of each agent about
each other. Other approaches in a similar vein include (Josang and Ismail, 2002) and
(Wang and Vassileva, 2003).
3.1.3 Socio-Cognitive Models of Trust
The approaches to modelling trust at the individual level that we have considered in
the previous sections are all based on an assessment of the outcomes of interactions.
For example, learning models consider the payo®s of each individual strategy, while
reputation models assess outcomes of both direct and indirect interactions (i.e. third-
party assessments). However, in assessing the trustworthiness of an opponent, it may
also be important to consider the subjective perception5 on the latter since it enables
a more comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the opponent (Dasgupta, 1998;
Gambetta, 1998). For example, the tools and abilities available to that opponent could
be (subjectively) assessed to check whether or not the agent can indeed use these to
carry out an agreed task. Such beliefs or notions are normally stored in an agent's
mental state and are essential in assessing an agent's reliability in doing what it says it
will (i.e. being capable), or its willingness to do what it says it will (i.e. being honest).
In this respect, we report the line of work initiated by Castelfranchi and Falcone (Castel-
franchi and Falcone, 1998, 2000b,a). In particular, they highlight the importance of
a cognitive view of trust (particularly for Belief-Desire-Intention agents (Wooldridge,
2002)) in contrast to a mere quantitative view of trust (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).
The context they choose is that of task delegation where an agent x wishes to delegate
a task to agent y. In so doing agent x needs to evaluate the trust it can place in y by
considering the di®erent beliefs it has about the motivations of agent y. They claim the
following beliefs are essential (in x's mental state) to determine the amount of trust to
be put in agent y by agent x (these have been adapted and summarised):
² competence belief: a positive evaluation of y by x saying that y is capable of
carrying out the delegated task as expected. If agent y is not capable, there is no
point in trusting it to accomplish the task fully.
² willingness6 belief: x believes that y has decided and intends to do what it has
5By subjective, we mean that these beliefs are formed according to the assessment of the environment
and the opponent's characteristics which could also include an analysis of past interactions.
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proposed to do. If agent y is not believed to be willing to do the task, it might be
lying if it says it wants to do so. This would then decrease x's trust in y.
² persistence6 belief: x believes that y is stable enough about its intention to do
what it has proposed to do. If y is known to be unstable, then there is added risk
in interacting with y, hence a low trust would be put in y even though it might be
willing to do the task at the point the task is delegated.
² motivation belief: x believes that y has some motives to help x, and that these
motives will probably prevail over other motives negative to x in case of con°ict.
This highlights the possibility for y to defect as argued in section 3.1.1. The
motives mentioned here are the same as the long term gains obtainable in helping
x achieve its goals. If y is believed to be motivated (to be helpful or positively
reciprocative as in section 3.1.1), then x will tend to trust it.
To devise the level of trust agent x can place in agent y, agent x would need to consider
each of the above beliefs (and possibly others). These beliefs actually impact on trust,
each in a di®erent way, and these need to be taken into account in a comprehensive
evaluation of all beliefs concerned. For example, the competence belief is a pre-requisite
to trust another agent, while the motivation belief would vary according to the calcula-
tion of the future payo®s to the agents over multiple interactions. This kind of strategic
consideration becomes even more important when such beliefs are known to all actors
(i.e. the preferences of agents are public). For example, what could happen if agent y
knows that x trusts it, or relies on it? The authors claim that this may increase the
trustworthiness of x in y's mind, the self-con¯dence of y, or its willingness to serve x,
which in turn change the trustworthiness of y. Agent x can then take into account the
possible e®ects of its trust in y (even before performing the delegation) to support its
decision of delegating. However, Castelfranchi and Falcone's approach is strongly moti-
vated from humans which are not always rational beings (as opposed to what we expect
agents to be).7
As opposed to the cognitive approach of Casltefranchi and Falcone, Brainov and Sand-
holm support the need to model an opponent's trust (as described above) with a ra-
tional approach (Brainov and Sandholm, 1999) (they speci¯cally target the context of
non-enforceable contracts). They do so by showing that if an agent has a precise es-
timation of its opponent's trust (in the former), this leads to maximum payo®s and
trade between the two agents. However, if trust is not properly estimated, it leads to
an ine±cient allocation of resources between the agents involved (hence a loss in utility)
since both under-estimate or over-estimate their o®ers on exchanged contracts. It is also
shown that it is in the best interests of the agents, given some reasonable assumptions,
7Castelfranchi and Falcone do not show what agent y would gain in trusting x in the case presented
here. If we consider rational agents to be utility maximising with respect to the goals set by their human
designers, then agent y has no apparent reason to trust x more than it should if there is no gain in doing
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to actually reveal their trustworthiness in their interaction partner (to e±ciently allocate
resources)!
While still in its infancy, the socio-cognitive approach to modelling trust takes a high
level view of the subject. However, it lacks the rational grounding (as shown by Brainov
and Sandholm) in rational mechanisms which learning and reputation models (and mech-
anisms) provide. In e®ect, the socio-cognitive approach could exploit the assessment
performed by these models to form the core beliefs illustrated above. Thus, speaking
generally, all the individual models of trust could contribute to a comprehensive evalua-
tion of trust at the individual level. This would take into account strategies learnt over
multiple interactions, the reputation of potential interaction partners, and ¯nally the
latter's believed motivations and abilities regarding the interaction. However, it can be
computationally expensive for an agent to reason about all the di®erent factors a®ecting
its trust in its opponents. Moreover, as highlighted earlier, agents are limited in their
capacity to gather information from various sources that populate their environment.
Given these limitations, instead of imposing the need to devise trust at the individual
level, it can be more appropriate to shift the focus to the rules of encounter so that these
ensure that interaction partners are forced to be trustworthy. In this way, these rules
of encounter can, at times, compensate for limited applicability of individual-level trust
models (conversely, whenever the rules of encounter cannot guarantee interacting agents
will be trustworthy, we might need to resort to individual-level trust models to do so).
3.2 System-Level Trust
As we mentioned earlier in section 1.2 in chapter 1, system designers usually engineer
negotiation mechanisms with the intended properties of individual rationality, e±ciency,
and incentive compatibility. The last of these properties is the most important one with
regards to trust as it implies that the system can incentivise honest behaviour from
the agents. Apart from negotiation mechanisms, the system may also impose certain
requirements on the behaviour of the agents or gather information about these in order
to determine their level of reliability, hence their trustworthiness. Generally speaking,
such requirements impose some rigidity on the system. However, these rules imposed by
the system enable an agent to trust other agents by virtue of these di®erent constraints.
These constraints can be applied in a number of ways. Firstly, it is sometimes possible to
engineer the negotiation protocol (as in mechanism design) such that the participating
agents ¯nd no gain in utility by lying or colluding (or ¯nd a better gain in being honest).
Secondly, an agent's reputation as being a liar (or truthful) can be spread by the system.
Thus, knowing that their future interactions will be compromised if they are reputed to
be liars (i.e. the shadow of the future in Axelrod's terms (Axelrod, 1984)), agents can be
forced to act well (up to the point they leave a system). Thirdly, agents can be screened
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references of a trusted third party.
Against this background, we subdivide system-level trust8 in terms of (i) devising incen-
tive compatible protocols, (ii) developing incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
(incentivise truthful revelation of reputation) that foster the selection of most reliable
agents, and (iii) developing security mechanisms that ensure new entrants can be trusted
(both honest and reliable). This is the structure that we adopt in the following subsec-
tions.
3.2.1 Truth Eliciting Interaction Protocols
In order to ensure truth-telling on the part of agents involved in an interaction, a number
of protocols and mechanisms have been devised in recent years (see (Sandholm, 1999)
for an overview). These protocols aim to prevent agents from lying or speculating while
interacting (e.g lying about the quality of goods sold or proposing a higher price than
one's true valuation for goods to be bought). They do so by imposing rules dictating
the individual steps in the interaction and the information revealed by the agents during
the interaction. Thus, by adhering to such protocols it is expected that agents should
¯nd no better option than telling the truth. Given the aim of this thesis, we do not wish
to delve into a detailed explanation of all available protocols (i.e. the Vickrey-Clarkes-
Groves or VCG class of mechanisms) that enforce truth telling and enforce them to a
certain degree (see (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Dash et al., 2003) for such a wider analysis).
Rather we will focus on one such protocol (namely auctions, since these are the most
widely used mechanism in multi-agent system applications).
There are four main types of single-sided auctions, namely the English, Dutch, First-
price-sealed-bid, and Vickrey. In the English auction, each bidder is free to raise his
bid until no bidder is willing to raise any further, thus ending the auction. The Dutch
auction instead starts with a very high ask price and reduces it in steps until one of
the bidders bids for the item and wins the auction. The ¯rst price sealed bid involves
agents submitting their bids without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins the
auction. In the Vickrey auction, the bids are sealed but the winner pays the price of the
second highest bid.
In this context, the Dutch and English auctions enforce truth-telling on the part of the
auctioneer (e.g. the winner and the winning price cannot be faked) since bids are made
publicly (as opposed to Vickrey and First-price-sealed-bid auctions where the bids are
8In what follows, we distinguish system-level trust borne out of strategic considerations in building
mechanisms (without necessary contractual commitments) from the control-trust mentioned in (Tan and
Thoen, 2000). The latter is more concerned with the level control exercised by transaction procedures
without any consideration for the particular strategic behaviour of agents in the system. We believe
this is an important distinction since system-level trust is not only concerned with agents performing
correctly, as in the case of control-trust, but also with incentivising them to provide information truthfully
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hidden). However, the Dutch, English, and First-price-sealed-bid auctions do not ensure
that the bidders reveal their true valuation of the goods at stake. This is because the
dominant strategy in these auctions is to reveal either a lower valuation (in the case of
Dutch and First-price-sealed-bid) or to bid only a smaller amount more than the current
highest bid up to one's true valuation (in the case of the English auction). In contrast,
the Vickrey auction does enforce truth-telling by bidders and is a common example of
the class of VCG mechanisms. Here, a bidder's dominant strategy is to bid its true
valuation since doing otherwise, given uncertainty about other bids and the ¯nal price
to be paid, would result in some loss in utility. Bidding higher than its true valuation
could end up with the agent paying more than its valuation and bidding lower than its
true valuation could make it lose the auction altogether.
As pointed out above, one of the main weakness of the Vickrey mechanism is that it does
not ensure truth-telling on the part of the auctioneer. The latter could still lie about the
winning bid since bids are private and known only to the auctioneer (and obviously to
each of the bidders in private, unless there is some amount of collusion). The auctioneer
could thus ask for a higher price than the second highest bid (just below the highest
bid) to the highest bidder. In so doing, the auctioneer reaps a higher bene¯t than it
should without the bidders knowing. In this respect, Hsu and Soo have implemented
a secure (i.e. ensuring the privacy of bids and the allocation of the goods to the true
winner) multi-agent Vickrey auction scheme (Hsu and Soo, 2002). The scheme di®ers
from the original Vickrey auction in that it involves an additional step of choosing the
auctioneer from among the bidders (advertised on a blackboard). The bidders submit
their encrypted bids to a blackboard. The auctioneer is selected at random from the
bidders and it is given a key to access all sealed bids. Using this key, it can only compare
the bids' values. Thus, the auctioneer can only determine the order of bids and allocate
the second highest bid to the winner. This scheme also allows the auctioneer (also a
bidder), the winner, and the second highest bidder to verify the result by using their
keys to check the bids shown on the blackboard.
However, the Vickrey auction, and the other main ones stated above, are not collusion
proof. This means that agents can collaborate to cheat the mechanism by sharing
information about their bids. Collusion would ¯rst necessitate that the agents know
each other before they place their bids and therefore arrange to place bids that do not
reveal their true preferences (e.g. agents withholding their bids in a Dutch auction
until the ask price has gone very low, or some bidders colluding with the auctioneer to
arti¯cially raise the ask price in an English auction to force others to pay a very high
price, or bidders colluding to beat competitors in a Vickrey auction). To prevent the
latter from happening, Brandt extends the work of Hsu and Soo by devising a collusion
proof auction mechanism that ensures the privacy and correctness of any (M+1)st-price
auction (Brandt, 2001, 2002) (i.e. an auction where the highest M bidders win and pay a
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and the highest bid wins the auction but pays a price determined by the auctioneer
(e.g. in the Vickrey auction the second highest price is paid). Only the auctioneer
and the bidder know the highest bid. To allow bidders to verify whether the winning
bid is actually the highest (hence checking the honesty of the winner and auctioneer)
the protocol devised by Brandt distributes the calculation of the selling price between
the individual buyers using some cryptographic techniques. However, the only other
agent, apart from the seller, able to calculate the exact value of the selling price is the
winner of the auction. The protocol also ensures that bids are binding. These conditions,
combined with the fact that the protocol can be publicly veri¯ed, allow the identi¯cation
of malicious bidders which would have tampered with the bids and prevent collusion from
a®ecting a single bidder. While being very powerful, the protocol is computationally
expensive for a large number of agents but works well for small numbers.
As can be seen above, most auctions are not robust to lying and collusion unless some
security mechanism is added into them (i.e. using cryptographic techniques). The
protocols mentioned above, besides constraining interactions, neglect the fact that the
agents in an open distributed system might want to interact more than once. As was
shown in section 3.1.1, reciprocative or trustworthy behaviour can be elicited if agents
can be punished in future interactions or strictly prevented from engaging in future
interactions if they do not interact honestly. For example, if a winning bidder in an
auction has been found to have lied about its preferences, it could be prevented from
accessing future runs of the auction (Brandt, 2002). If an agent knows it will lose utility
in the future due to bad behaviour in the present, it will ¯nd no better option but to
act in a trustworthy way. In this respect, earlier in the paper (see section 3.1.1) we have
shown how agents could learn to actually adapt their strategy (reciprocative or not) in
order to maximise their long term payo®s against di®erent strategies over multiple runs
of an auction.
However, as pointed out in section 1.3, open multi-agent systems allow agents to interact
with any other agent in the environment. This could allow malicious agents to move
from group to group whenever they are detected by a given group of agents and therefore
exploit trustworthy agents as they move around. Also, note that the Vickrey auction
(and the whole class of VCG mechanisms) does not aim to select or determine the
most reliable agents that should be involved in a given interaction. Rather, agents are
assumed to be completely reliable and this could lead unreliable agents, though honest,
to be selected. In order to prevent this from happening, agents can be made to share
their ratings of their opponent with other agents in the environment once they have
interacted with them. Techniques to allow agents to gather ratings and aggregate those
in a sensible way were presented in section 3.1.2. However, it was shown that these
techniques do not consider the fact that we expect agents to share (true) ratings only if
it brings them some utility. In open multi-agent systems, this can be achieved through
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3.2.2 Reputation Mechanisms
As was seen in section 3.1.2, the reputation models described do not take into account
the fact that the agents are sel¯sh and therefore will not share information unless some
bene¯t can be derived from doing so. Furthermore, these reputation models (e.g. RE-
GRET or Yu and Singh's model) do not motivate the use of reputation by some agents
to elicit good behaviour from other agents. These models aim to endow agents with
a better perception of their opponent and do not consider the e®ect of doing so on
an opponent when the latter is aware of it! Given these shortcomings of reputation
models, reputation mechanisms consider the problem of inducing trustworthy behaviour
and modelling the reputation of agents at the system level. Reputation mechanisms can
operate through centralised or distributed entities that store ratings provided by agents
about their interaction partners and then publicise these ratings, such that all agents in
the environment have access to them. In this case, it is the system that manages the
aggregation and retrieval of ratings as opposed to reputation models which leave the
task to the agents themselves. In so doing, reputation mechanisms can be used to deter
lying and bad behaviour on the part of the agents. Moreover, reputation mechanisms
aim to induce truthful ratings from witnesses and actually make it rational for agents
to give ratings about each other to the system (i.e. individually rationality).
More speci¯cally, Zacharia and Maes have outlined the desiderata for reputation mecha-
nisms particularly with regards to how ratings are aggregated and how these impact on
the behaviour of the actors in the system (Zacharia and Maes, 2000). They do not pro-
pose such requirements for agent-based reputation systems per se, but as we move into
agent-mediated electronic commerce (He et al., 2003), it is obvious that such mechanisms
will guide agent-based reputation systems. These desiderata are listed below:
1. it should be costly to change identities in the community. This should prevent
agents from entering the system, behaving badly, and coming out of the system
without any loss of utility or future punishment bearing upon them.
2. new entrants should not be penalised by initially having low reputation values at-
tributed to them. If new entrants have low reputation they are less favoured though
they might be totally trustworthy. This actually makes the system less appealing
to agents (with bad reputation) intending to (re-)enter the system.
3. agents with low ratings should be allowed to build up reputation similar to a new
entrant. This allows an agent to correct its behaviour if it has been shown to be
badly behaving in the past.
4. the overhead of performing fake transactions should be high. This prevents agents
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5. agents having a high reputation should have higher baring than others on repu-
tation values they attribute to an agent. This presupposes that agents with high
reputation will give truthful ratings to others. However, this can be contentious if
reputation determines the level of pro¯t the agent acquires since it could lead to
the creation of monopolies or cartels in the market.
6. agents should be able to provide personalised evaluations. This involves giving more
than just a simple rating of +1 to -1 to allow a better evaluation of the reputation
of another agent. For example, the REGRET system implements richer ratings
that can be shared using the ontological dimension (see section 3.1.2.2).
7. agents should keep a memory of reputation values and give more importance to the
latest ones obtained. This is needed to keep the reputation measure as up to date
as possible and helps prevent an agent from building up positive reputation by
interacting well and then start defecting (the last defection having a greater e®ect
than its past good behaviour).
With respect to the above requirements, Zacharia and Maes present two reputation sys-
tems (targetted at chatrooms, auctions, and newsletters): SPORAS and HISTOS. While
these are not strictly multi-agent systems, they present techniques to aggregate ratings
intelligently and re°ect the real performance of human users in an online community.
In both cases, the aggregation method allows newer ratings to count more than older
ones. SPORAS, however, gives new entrants low initial reputation values and therefore
reduces their chance of being selected as possible interaction partners. This is a trade-o®
a®orded to prevent identity switching. This is because an agent having low reputation
would not be any better o® by re-entering the system with a new identity. HISTOS is
an enhancement to SPORAS which takes into account the group dynamics as in RE-
GRET. In particular, HISTOS looks at the links between users to deduce personalised
reputation values (i.e. taking into account the social network). This enables an agent
to assemble ratings from those it trusts already rather than those it does not know.
Moreover, both HISTOS and SPORAS have been shown to be robust to collusion. This
is because those agents that are badly rated themselves have a diminished e®ect on the
reputation of others and those they might want to protect. However, as the authors
point out themselves, the major drawback is that users are reluctant to give bad ratings
to their trading partners. This is because there is no incentive to give ratings in the ¯rst
place (i.e. it is not incentive compatible).
In an attempt to make the report of agents' reputation truthful, they propose the CON-
FESS reputation mechanism (Jurca and Faltings, 2004). This actually builds up on
their earlier work in (Jurca and Faltings, 2003b,a). In CONFESS, buyers and sellers
pay a certain fee (the seller pays a listing fee while the buyer pays a participation tax)
to engage in a transaction. Agents are incentivised, using these fees, to reveal the true
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than to reveal the true reputation of the seller and that the seller can lie only a limited
number of times. Here, it is the use of these fees after the transactions happens that
allows the system to enforce truthful revelation of the sellers' trustworthiness. However,
their approach has some fundamental problems. Indeed, the way the payo® to agents
is calculated disregards the fact that sellers can exploit buyers simply by keeping the
goods and the payments for the goods while still reporting truthfully. This follows from
a wrong modelling of the game tree in that type of interaction.
A better attempt at modelling a reputation mechanism was proposed by Dellaroccas
(Dellarocas, 2002). He introduced `Goodwill Hunting' (GWH) as a more realistic feed-
back mechanism, for a trading environment. This system:
² induces sellers of variable quality goods to truthfully reveal the quality of their
goods.
² provides incentives to buyers to truthfully reveal their feedback.
The GWH algorithm uses the threat of biased future reporting of quality (of goods to
be sold) in order to induce sellers to truthfully declare the individual qualities of their
items. Speci¯cally, the mechanism keeps track of the seller's `goodwill'. This value
represents the seller's honesty (about revealing its reliability). It is adjusted by the
quality reported by buyers. Good reports bias goodwill positively and bad reports bias
it negatively. To induce sellers to reveal the true quality of their goods, the goodwill
factor is used to adjust the quality they wish to broadcast for the goods they wish to
sell. Thus if the seller has low goodwill, the quality of the goods it tries to publicise will
be actually shown to have a lower quality by the system.
To induce buyers to report their ratings of sellers, they are given rebates on future
transactions in the system. It is then shown that, if buyers report untruthfully, they can
drive out sellers of good quality goods, and therefore lose the opportunity of buying high
quality goods. However, the mechanism makes several somewhat unrealistic assumptions
about online markets. For example, it assumes that sellers are monopolists; that is, they
are the only ones to sell a particular product (of varying quality). Also it assumes that
buyers will interact with sellers only once. These are needed to simplify the analysis
of the model. As the author points out, among other enhancements, it is still to be
shown how the mechanism fares against strategic reporting from buyers whereby they
force a seller to reduce the price of its goods by giving it bad ratings, hence damaging
its reputation.
In a similar vein as GWH (i.e. using mechanism design techniques), Porter et al. (2002)
proposed a mechanism that incentivises agents to reveal their own reliability as opposed
to how they believe others to be reliable. As opposed to GWH, their fault-tolerant mech-
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design sense). However, their approach is limited (as we show in chapter 6) since it does
not consider the impressions other agents might have on those agents which truthfully
reveal their reliability. Thus, an agent may be biased on its impression about its own
reliability (e.g. a seller wrongly its goods to be the best or a mechanic believing its
services to be better than what its clients deem it to be). This may, in turn, lead the
mechanism to choose the unreliable agents (according to the unbiased trust values).
The reputation mechanisms detailed above and the interaction mechanisms discussed
in section 3.2.1 try to enforce trustworthy behaviour by minimising the opportunity
for agents to defect to gain higher payo®s (see our de¯nition of trust in section 1.3).
As has been shown, more of these mechanisms still need to be developed. In the case
where interaction protocols and reputation mechanisms cannot guarantee trustworthy
behaviour, there still exists a need to give agents in an open system the possibility
of proving their trustworthiness and should enable other agents to recognise them as
reliable interaction partners. One way this could proceed is by providing references
from highly recognised sources. This is similar to the case of a job seeker providing its
credentials to its potential new employer. Huynh et al. (2004) recently devised a model
that aims to use references in this way. However, this approach is limited in that it
does not consider sources that can be trusted by all agents. Rather it uses references
from any agent in the environment. This procedure then leads to very high uncertainty
in the reliability of the rating itself. Note that the process of gathering credentials is
not the same as reputation building and acquisition which pertains to the recognition
of an entire community. Rather, credential assessment falls mostly within the realm of
network security which we discuss next.
3.2.3 Security Mechanisms
In the domain of network security9 , trust is used to describe the fact that a user can
prove who it says it is (Mass and Shehory, 2001). This normally entails that it can
be authenticated by trusted third parties (i.e. those that can be relied upon to be
trustworthy and as such are authorities in the system (Grandison and Sloman, 2000)).
At a ¯rst glance, this does not completely ¯t with our initial de¯nition of trust (see
section 1.3), but it is certainly a basic requirement for the trust models and mechanisms
described earlier to work (see sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2). This is because
these models are based on the fact that agents can be recognised by their identity and
would therefore require authentication protocols to be implemented.
To this end, Poslad et al. have recently proposed a number of security requirements
that they claim are essential for agents to trust each other and each other's messages
9We do not wish to give a complete account of network security mechanisms since this is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Rather, we will focus on the main concepts and models that strictly pertain to multi-
agent systems. For a wider reading on network security for open distributed systems see (Grandison
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transmitted across the network linking them (Poslad et al., 2003) (i.e. to ensure messages
are not tampered with by malicious agents):
² identity: the ability to determine the identity of an entity. This may include the
ability to determine the identity of the owner of an agent.
² access permissions: the ability to determine what access rights must be given to
an agent in the system, based on the identity of the agent.
² content integrity: the ability to determine whether a piece of software, a message,
or other data has been modi¯ed since it has been dispatched by its originating
source.
² content privacy: the ability to ensure that only the designated identities can ex-
amine a message or other data. To the others, the information is obscured.
The authors specify these requirements for the FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physi-
cal Agents) abstract architecture (FIPA, 2002). These basic requirements can be imple-
mented by a public key encryption and certi¯cate infrastructure (Grandison and Sloman,
2000). A digital certi¯cate is issued by a certi¯cation authority, or CA, and veri¯es that
a public key is owned by a particular entity. The public key in a certi¯cate is also used
to encrypt and sign a message in a way that only its owner can examine the content
and be assured about its integrity. The two most popular public key models are PGP
(Pretty Good Privacy) and the X.509 trust model (Adams and Farrel, 1999). The for-
mer supports a web of trust in that there is no centralised or hierarchical relationship
between CAs, while the latter is a strictly hierarchical trust model for authentication
(Grandison and Sloman, 2000). However, these authenticating measures do not su±ce
for open multi-agent systems to ensure that agents act and interact honestly and reliably
towards each other. They only represent a barrier against agents that are not allowed
in the system or only permit their identi¯cation in the system. In order to enforce good
behaviour in the system, it is instead possible that certi¯cates are issued to agents if
these meet speci¯c standards that make them trustworthy.
In order to achieve this, trusted third parties are needed to issue certi¯cates to agents
that satisfy the standards of trustworthiness (i.e. being reciprocative, reliable, hon-
est). For example, agents would need to satisfy certain quality standards (e.g. products
stamped with the Kitemark or the `CE' marking are assured to conform to the British
standards and the European community standards respectively) and terms and condi-
tions for the products they sell (e.g. sellers have to abide by a 14-day full-refund return
policy in the UK for any goods they sell). It is only upon compliance with these quality
standards that the agent would be able to sell its products. To this end, Herzberg et al.
present a policy-based and certi¯cate-based mechanism which can assign roles to new
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contains some claims about a subject. There is no restriction on what claims can be.
For example, there may be claims about organization memberships (company employee,
etc.), capabilities of the subject, or even the trustworthiness (or reliability) of the subject
in the view of the issuer.
The mechanism in (Herzberg et al., 2000) also enables a party to de¯ne policies for
mapping new entrants to prede¯ned business roles. Thus an agent can ensure that a
new entrant will act according to the settings de¯ned by its role or access rights. The
role assigned to an agent carries with it a number of duties and policies it needs to abide
by. If the agent undertakes the role, it is forced to abide by the given rules of good
behaviour. The process of role assignment and access provision is performed in a fully
distributed manner, where any party or agent may be a certi¯cate issuer. Moreover, it
is not required that certi¯cate issuers be known in advance. Instead, it is su±cient that,
when requested, an agent that issues certi¯cates provides su±cient certi¯cates from other
issuers to be considered a trusted authority according to the policy of the requesting
party. This allows distributed trust build-up among parties in an open environment
(Mass and Shehory, 2001).
Mass and Shehory extend the work in (Herzberg et al., 2000) to open multi-agent systems
(Mass and Shehory, 2001). Speci¯cally, they take into account the fact that agents with
reasoning or planning components can adapt their strategies rather than sticking to one
strategy while maintaining their role (as discussed in section 3.1.1). This means that
an agent's role does not fully constrain its actions so as to prevent it from reasoning
strategically about its interactions with other agents. An agent could thus learn how to
adapt its strategy according to the role it has. For example, an agent bearing the role
of accountant in a system could report ¯ctitious pro¯ts, thus bene¯ting its company's
share price, while still satisfying its role. To prevent such strategic defection or wrong
doing, the agent assigning the role to the new entrant is allowed to adjust its priorities
or policy based on results from interactions with others dynamically. This presents a
more realistic view of using trust (both at the individual and system level) to decide how
to constrain the actions (or stragegies) of an interaction partner. Recent works on trust
dynamics and formal modelling of trust relationships could also help in this context by
ensuring that certain rules of trust are respected by agents interacting in the system
(Liau, 2003; Marx and Treur, 2001; Gans et al., 2003).
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have systematically analysed the issue of trust in open multi-agent
systems in order to de¯ne the basic requirements of the trust model we intend to develop.
In particular, we have related the di®erent means of devising trust both at the individual
level and at the system level. Given this analysis, we can now de¯ne the more particular76 Chapter 3 Trust in Multi-Agent Systems
requirements for our trust model:
² Our model needs to be able to learn the reliability and honesty of an agent over
repeated encounters (as per the discussion in section 3.1.1). As we have seen in
the latter section, most models use a probability based mechanism. In our model
we intend to use a similar probabilistic approach but, in the case where a dynamic
behaviour is perceived, we will use a window of past interactions in order to adapt
the trust measure over time to the most recent behaviour of an opponent (in a
similar way to (Sabater and Sierra, 2002)). Moreover, our model needs to be able
to de¯ne non-bistable trust values in order to cater for agents that have a given
degree of reliability. This trust value can then be used in a bargaining encounter,
amongst other things, to restrict or enlarge the domain of values of issues that
are negotiated (i.e. adjust the stance of the agent) whenever an opponent is not
deemed completely reliable or honest. In addition, such a continuous measure of
trust can provide a ranking of those agents deemed most reliable or honest. Some
mechanism can then make a selection of the most trusted agents when it comes to
determine the outcome of the negotiation.
² Attributes of the interaction context, such as the institution within which it takse
place or the norms that agents have are not usually incorporated either at the
individual level or the system level in existing models of trust. Nevertheless, we
believe that modelling the context is important since it determines, to some extent,
whether agents can be trusted (e.g. if the institution guarantees good behaviour
or if the norms of the agent foster cooperation). Given this, in our trust model we
aim to model these attributes and use them in determining the trustworthiness of
an agent.
² Many trust models at the individual level already cater for the aggregation and
dissemination of ratings from other agents in a society and we will assume such
techniques can be used to generate reputation measures (see discussion in section
3.1.2). We will therefore focus on de¯ning a component in our model that facilitates
the combination of reputation measures from other agents with trust measures an
agent has privately calculated.
² As we saw in section 3.1.2, individual level trust models, and in particular reputa-
tion models, do not enforce truth-telling on the part of other agents in the society.
Thus when it comes to bargaining, it can only be assumed that the reputation
measures obtained from other agents are reported truthfully. However, in many
cases we believe this is unrealistic and so we endeavour to build our trust model
such that it can be coupled to an interaction mechanism (such as the VCG class
of mechanisms) that enforces truth-telling at the system level (see section 3.2.1).
As discussed in section 3.2.2, existing reputation mechanisms that aim to do so
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trust model with such an incentive compatible mechanism, we intend to build the
¯rst e±cient and individually rational reputation mechanism that is also robust
to biased reports from some agents.
Against the above requirements, in chapter 5 we develop the CREDIT trust model
and show how it can be used to in°uence an agent's negotiation stance in bargaining
encounters to reduce the uncertainty. Moreover, in chapter 6, we propose a Trust-Based
Mechanism (TBM) where we show how CREDIT can be coupled to the interaction
mechanism in order to generate an e±cient outcome with such properties as individual
rationality and incentive compatibility.Chapter 4
Formal De¯nitions
Having identi¯ed the main requirements of our persuasive negotiation (PN) mechanism
and trust model in chapter 2 and chapter 3, we now focus on the basic formal de¯nitions
that we will use in our models. In this chapter we only provide those de¯nitions that
are common to all the models we develop in the rest of this thesis. In particular we
de¯ne the contracts (or o®ers) that agents may devise during (or reach at the end of) a
negotiation encounter and the utility function that is used to evaluate these contracts.
We particularly structure the utility functions of any pair of negotiating agents such
that these agents have payo®s as de¯ned in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) (described
in section 3.1.1).1 We choose this particular game since it provides clear incentives to
agents to defect (i.e. be unreliable or dishonest) to obtain higher payo®s (see section
3.1.1) while also providing incentives to them to cooperate in the long run (i.e. since
both defecting causes both agents to obtain low utilities and both cooperating gives both
the highest utilities in the long run). This aspect of the game is important for our trust
model, since it is then possible to show that our model fosters cooperation from both
interacting agents (as trust dictates how the interaction unfolds) and hence results in
higher utilities as the trustworthiness of the agents is learnt over repeated encounters.
The PD is also important in de¯ning strategies for PN since cooperation and defection
can be clearly ascribed to di®erent types of arguments agents might use in bargaining
(e.g. a reward might be a proposition to cooperate and allow the opponent to defect
in the next game and vice versa for a reward that is asked). Thus, the semantics of
arguments are clearly de¯ned in terms of the action sets of the agents (since cooperation
and defection are di®erent actions agents might perform). Moreover, we believe such
characterisation of the utility functions closely pictures realistic interactions where agents
are normally involved in non-zero sum interactions (i.e. the agents do not necessarily
gain utility at the expense of their opponent). The rest of this chapter is structured as
follows. Section 4.1 provides the basic de¯nitions about the agents and contracts while
1In chapters 6 and 8 we specialise the de¯nition of the utility function according to requirements of
the application.
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section 4.2 provides the characterisation of utility functions which allows us to de¯ne
an extended version of the PD (known as the multi-move prisoners' dilemma (MMPD))
and discusses its use in our PN model and trust model. Finally, section 4.3 summarises
the main concepts de¯ned in this chapter.
4.1 Basic Notions
Let Ag be the society of agents noted as ®;¯;::: 2 Ag. A particular group of agents
is noted as G µ Ag and each agent can only belong to one group.2 We conceive that
agents within each group have a set of similar norms which de¯ne part of the context
of interaction (e.g. all retailers in the UK agree to a 14-day return policy on all items
they sell or all retailers in Spain close on Sunday). The attributes of the context are
particularly useful in developing our trust model in chapter 5 as per the requirements
mentioned in section 3.3. T denotes a totally ordered set of time points (su±ciently
large to account for all agent interactions) noted as t0;t1;:::, such that ti > tj if and
only if i > j. In the following subsections, we de¯ne the main components of the
negotiation object (see section 1.2) that agents use to de¯ne their o®ers particularly in
bargaining encounters. Then we de¯ne the basic utility function used to evaluate these
o®ers. Given these, we then structure the relationship between the negotiating agents'
utility functions such that they play an extended version of the PD (which we de¯ne as
the MMPD) as per the requirements of our trust model and PN model .
4.1.1 Contracts
After negotiation, agents usually come to an agreement that is normally termed a con-
tract (o®ers made while bargaining also represent potential contracts and have the same
structure). In this thesis, contracts are agreements about (commitments to) issues and
the values these issues should have (as per section 1.2). Let X = fx1;x2;:::xng be
the set of potential issues to include in a contract, and the domain of values taken
by an issue x be noted as Dx (for simplicity we assume that all Dx are an interval
of real numbers R). We will note that issue x takes the value v 2 Dx as x = v.
Thus, a particular contract, O, is an arbitrary set of issue-value assignments noted as
O = fx1 = v1;x2 = v2;:::;xn = vng where xi 2 X, vi 2 Dxi, and O 2 O which denotes
the set of potential contracts. We denote by O the set of potential contracts. We will
also note the set of issues involved in a contract O as X(O) µ X. Given an agreed
contract, two or more agents all have a (disjoint) subset of the contract to enact. For
example, a seller has to deliver the goods at a given time while the buyer has to pay
for the goods. Each subset of the contract allocated to an agent is superscripted by
2If G denotes a partition fG1;G2;:::;Glg of the society of agents into non-empty groups, then for
all Gi;Gj 2 G;Gi \ Gj = ;,
S
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the respective agent identi¯er such that, for example, in a contract O between ® and ¯,
O® [ O¯ = O.
4.1.2 Utility Functions
We capture the preferences of an agent through its utility function (von Neuman and
Morgenstern, 1944). This function outputs a measure of how much an agent prefers
a particular outcome. Thus, an agent, ®, has a utility function for contracts, noted as
U® : O ! [0;1], and for each issue x 2 X(O) in a contract noted as U®
x : Dx ! [0;1]. We
will generally assume that the utility functions are linear so as to simplify the analysis of
the properties of the models we study and facilitate the understanding of the strategies
use in both our PN and trust models. In this work, we will de¯ne the utility of a contract,
for an agent, as an aggregation of the weighted utilities of the individual issues as shown
below (note this assumes that issues are independent):
U®(O) =
X
x2X(O)
!x ¢ U®
x (vx) (4.1)
where
P
!x = 1 and vx 2 Dx is the value taken by the issue x 2 X(O). We consider
that agents, whether from the same group or from di®erent groups, invariably interact
within some electronic institution (Esteva et al., 2001) which speci¯es and (or) restricts
(some) issue-value assignments of contracts through a set of norms (see section 3.3). An
electronic institution, as devised by the system designer, dictates what agents are able
to do and say in a given interaction by virtue of their role (e.g. a seller submits asks in
an auction while a buyer bids) and the nature of the interaction (e.g. until a winner has
been identi¯ed, bids are allowed, and then the goods need to be paid for by the winner).
Naturally, each institution may also specify di®erent rules.
In the next section, we further describe how we assign weights to di®erent issues in the
utility function shown in equation 4.1. The relative weights agents place on each issue
of a contract are important in de¯ning what type of game agents play. In particular, we
devise these weights such that the agents play the MMPD which extends the usual PD
based on our requirements.
4.2 The Multi-Move Prisoner's Dilemma
In de¯ning our trust model and PN model it is intended that they can be implemented
in most general applications where agents engage in non-zero sum interactions. In
this context, the PD is a common characterisation of interactions between agents that
aim to closely model realistic interactions (Axelrod, 1984; Tsebelis, 1990). The PD
would, however, limit our models to considering only two types of actions. As per82 Chapter 4 Formal De¯nitions
the requirements de¯ned in section 3.3, our trust model needs to be able to adapt to
di®erent degrees of reliability of agents (i.e. not be a bistable value), hence di®erent
levels of cooperation and defection. Moreover, only de¯ning only two types of actions
that can be used as arguments would strongly limit the applicability and e±ciency of our
PN model in contexts where agents have a large action set to search for an agreement.
Given these constraints, we need a continuous scale of cooperation between the two
extremes that the PD provides us with. To this end, we extend the PD to the MMPD
(Prechelt, 1996; Tsebelis, 1990) as shown on ¯gure 4.1. In the MMPD, actions (or moves)
are considered to be the enactment of the contents of a contract (e.g. paying for goods,
delivering goods). Both the interaction partners have their own actions dictated by the
part of the contract that they have to enact (e.g. seller delivers goods and buyer pays
for the goods at a given time). Agents may also have more than one issue to take care
of (e.g delivery of goods and ensuring they are of a certain quality) and for each issue a
discrete number of possible values can be given (e.g. paying after 3 days, 4 days,... or
delivering after 1 month, 2 months). When agents engage in the MMPD repeatedly, we
term this form of interaction as the Iterated Multi-Move Prisoner's Dilemma (IMMPD).
In the following section, we ¯rst de¯ne the action set (possible moves) of the agents
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Figure 4.1: Transforming the normal Prisoner's Dilemma to the Multi-Move Pris-
oner's Dilemma. The defection degree increases from 0 to 1 along the direction of the
arrows for each agent and the payo®s to each agent is shown in each slot of the game
matrix. The shaded region in the MMPD consists of the payo®s of the agents for each
degree of defection which we aim to de¯ne in terms of the relationship between the
utility functions of the agents. Thus, we aim to make the transition from one end of
the MMPD to the other a continuous one rather than the discrete one.
which will interact via the MMPD. Then, we provide a formal de¯nition of the MMPD
(with respect to multi-issue contracts). The last subsection shows how we can devise
the utility functions of the agents so that they can engage in an MMPD. These utility
functions are then used by the agents in experiments where we evaluate our trust model
and our PN model.Chapter 4 Formal De¯nitions 83
4.2.1 The Action Set
Whenever a contract is signed, each agent is given its part of the contract to enact.
In e®ect, the achievement of the issue-value pairs (xi = vi) in an agent's part of the
contract is its `action' or `move' in the game. Achieving what has been agreed or better
(for an opponent) is termed cooperation, while doing otherwise is considered a defection.
Thus, an agent ® can generate its action set O(O®) for the MMPD by de¯ning all the
possible assignments of the values of the issues that it controls. This is expressed as:
O(O®) =
©
O® = fx1 = v1;:::;xn = vng j xi 2 X(O®
+);vi 2 Dxi
ª
(4.2)
Each agent thus has all its possible actions de¯ned and these actions result in a payo® for
each agent similar to a prisoner's dilemma with a discrete multi-action set (as opposed
to a binary action set).
4.2.2 The Game
The MMPD is represented as a matrix where each row (and column) corresponds to a
particular degree of cooperation from one of the agents (see ¯gure 4.1). Therefore, a
contract O between agents ® and ¯ can be represented as a point in the matrix where
O®
i is ®'s action and O
¯
k is ¯'s action such that O = O®
i [ O
¯
k. The sub-indexes of the
di®erent contracts correspond to a row i and a column k respectively in the matrix. We
assume that a total order applies over all the possible contracts (in the matrix) according
to the utility of each contract to the agent concerned when moving along a single row
or column. This means that for an agent ®, O®
i and O®
j , where j > i, are two possible
executions but O®
j is a defection from the agreed contract O resulting in greater utility
for ® and utility loss for ¯, if ¯ performs O
¯
k (i.e. staying on the same column). Let O®
be the set of contracts handled by ® and O¯ similarly for ¯.
We can then de¯ne the multi-move prisoner's dilemma as follows for O®
j representing a
defection from O®
i by ® and O
¯
l representing a defection from O
¯
k by ¯:
De¯nition 4.1. Two agents ® and ¯ engage in a Multi-Move Prisoner's Dilemma
(MMPD) over the contracts they can execute i®, for any four points in the matrix:
8O®
i ;O®
j 2 O®, where U®(O®
i ) < U®(O®
j ) and 8O
¯
k;O
¯
l 2 O¯ where U¯(O
¯
k) < U¯(O
¯
l ),
the following rules are respected:
1. Defection Rules (an agent can exploit another's cooperation by defecting but ends84 Chapter 4 Formal De¯nitions
up with a lower payo® if the other side also defects):
U®(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) < U®(O®
j [ O
¯
l ) < U®(O®
i [ O
¯
k) < U®(O®
j [ O
¯
k);
U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) > U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
l ) > U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
k) > U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
k);
2. Pareto E±ciency Rules (the sum of the rewards when both cooperate is higher
than the sum obtained if either or both of the agents defect):
U®(O®
i [ O
¯
k) + U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
k) > U®(O®
j [ O
¯
k) + U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
k)
U®(O®
j [ O
¯
k) + U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
k) > U®(O®
j [ O
¯
l ) + U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
l )
U®(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) + U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) > U®(O®
j [ O
¯
l ) + U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
l )
U®(O®
i [ O
¯
k) + U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
k) > U®(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) + U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
l )
From the above rules it is then possible to derive the following payo® matrix for any
pair of possible contracts to be enacted by both agents:
®'s part
O®
i O®
j
¯'s part
O
¯
k U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
k);U®(O®
i [ O
¯
k) U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
k);U®(O®
j [ O
¯
k)
O
¯
l U¯(O®
i [ O
¯
l );U®(O®
i [ O
¯
l ) U¯(O®
j [ O
¯
l );U®(O®
j [ O
¯
l )
Table 4.1: The Multi-Move Prisoner's Dilemma
We next de¯ne the utility functions that do respect the payo® structure of the MMPD.
To this end, we propose the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. Let X be a given set of issues, ® and ¯ be two agents, with X® being
issues under ®'s control and X¯ being issues under ¯'s control (with X = X® [ X¯).
Assume that the utility for ® of a contract O = (x1 = v1;:::;xn = vn) over issues
X(O) µ X is of the form U®(O) =
P
xi2X(O) !®
x ¢ U®
xi(vi) and analogously for agent ¯,
U¯(O) =
P
xi2X(O) !
¯
x ¢U
¯
xi(vi), where U®
xi and U
¯
xi are the utility functions for ® and ¯
of the individual issue xi. Moreover we assume that U®
x (v) and U
¯
y (u) are di®erentiable
(strictly) increasing functions for any x 2 X®(O) and y 2 X¯(O) respectively, and
di®erentiable (strictly) decreasing otherwise.
Then, U® and U¯ respect the aforementioned defection and pareto-e±ciency rules of a
Multi-Move Prisoner's Dilemma (MMPD) if the following conditions are satis¯ed:
(i)
!¯
x ¢ (¡
dU
¯
x
dx
) > !®
x ¢
dU®
x
dx
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for all issues x 2 X®(O).
(ii)
!®
y ¢ (¡
dU®
y
dy
) > !¯
y ¢
dU
¯
y
dy
(4.4)
for all issues y 2 X¯(O)
where the inequalities are point-wise.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume X(O) = fx;yg;X® = fxg and X¯ =
fyg. Let O = (x = v;y = u) be the agreed contract. We begin by considering a defection
by agent ® in an issue x from the value v to a value v0 such that U®(v0) > U®(v) (given
that everything else remains the same). For an easier notation we will write U®(v;u)
to denote the utility of agent ® on a contract (x = v;y = u), similarly for agent ¯, and
U(v;u) for U®(v;u) + U¯(v;u). From the defection and pareto-e±ciency rules of the
MMPD we have the condition
U(v;u) > U(v0;u);
and using our assumptions on the utilities U® and U¯ (from equations 4.3 and 4.4), this
means
!®
xU®
x (v) + !¯
xU¯
x(v) > !®
xU®
x (v0) + !¯
xU¯
x(v0) (4.5)
That is, we have the equivalent condition to be required:
!¯
x(U¯
x(v) ¡ U¯
x(v0)) > !®
x(U®
x (v0) ¡ U®
x (v)): (4.6)
Now, under general assumptions, we have
U®
x (v0) ¡ U®
x (v) =
Z v0
v
dU®
x
dx
¢ dx (4.7)
and
U¯
x(v) ¡ U¯
x(v0) = ¡
Z u0
v
dU
¯
x
dx
¢ dx; (4.8)
Hence, applying the conditions expressed in equations 4.3 of the theorem to equations
4.7 and 4.8 we have equation 4.6 satis¯ed, and hence U(v;u) > U(v0;u) as well (where u0
is a defection by ® from v). Similarly, the same procedure can be applied to equations
4.7 and 4.8 above using equation 4.4 such that a defection by agent ¯ changing the
agreed value y = u to any new value y = u0, with U¯(u0) > U¯(u) (given the opponent
does not defect in each case), yields U(v;u) > U(v;u0).
Finally, if both agents defect to say x = v0 and y = u0, with U®
x (v0) > U®
x (v) and
U
¯
y (u0) > U
¯
y (u) (given all else stays the same), then we obviously have the desired86 Chapter 4 Formal De¯nitions
inequalities which actually express the pareto-e±ciency rules:
U(u;v) > max(U(u;v0);U(u0;v)) ¸ min(U(u;v0);U(u0;v)) > U(u0;v0) (4.9)
while still having the following defection rules satis¯ed: U®
x (v) < U®
x (v0), U
¯
y (u) < U
¯
y (u0)
and U®
y (u) > U®
y (u0), U
¯
x(v) > U
¯
x(v0) (given all else stays the same).
If the utility function of an agent ® for each issue in a contract satis¯es the conditions
expressed in equations 4.3 and 4.4 with respect to its opponent ¯, then the two agents
follow a PD. The transformation of the PD to the MMPD is shown in terms of the game
matrix in ¯gure 4.1. As can be see, the binary action set (i.e. cooperation and defection)
is transformed into a larger set where agents can enact defections in increasing degrees
from 0 to 1.
This characterisation of utility functions is used di®erently in our persuasive negotiation
component and trust model as discussed in the following sections.
4.2.3 Using Persuasive Negotiation in the MMPD
The MMPD can characterise the moves made during negotiations in the form of cooper-
ations and defections. Thus a cooperative move in the MMPD equates to conceding on
one's issues (O® for agent ®) in the negotiation, while a defection in the MMPD equates
to demanding more on one's issues. If the negotiation mechanism seeks to maximise
the social welfare (i.e. the sum of utilities) of the agents in this type of game, each the
outcome of the negotiation should be such that each agent concedes more on the issues it
likes less and exploits its opponent's less preferred issues. These concessions by the pair
of interacting agents has a ¯xed point in the MMPD, which is known in game theory as
the Nash bargaining solution (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) (i.e. where the products
of their utilities is maximised) as shown on ¯gure 4.2.
However, in repeated negotiation games where agents have di®erent discount factors
over repeated games (i.e. the IMMPD), the cooperate-cooperate point in the MMPD
may not represent the pareto-e±cient point any more. Obviously, in this repeated case
the social welfare is higher when agents that have the higher discount factor exploit later
games rather than earlier ones while both agents cooperate on the earlier ones. Note
that for zero-sum games, the best social welfare is achieved if any of the two agents
exploit the ¯rst game (and this is likely to be the one with the high discounting e®ect
trying to trade-o® the second game in favour of its opponent). This is depicted in ¯gure
4.3. For example, if a buyer highly discounts the value of cars to be bought in future
at a low price, the seller (who values future sales more than the buyer) should give a
low price to the buyer in the current sale and may increase its price in later sales so
that the overall utility is maximised. However, common negotiation techniques neglectChapter 4 Formal De¯nitions 87
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Figure 4.2: The social utility (i.e. sum of both agents' utilities) for di®erent negotia-
tion outcomes in the MMPD. C® means that the agent ® cooperates while D® means
that ® defects. A higher level of cooperation equates to a higher level of concession in
negotiation and a defection equates to demanding more (exploiting the opponent).
this aspect of negotiation and seek only to ¯nd the cooperate-cooperate point where no
agent is completely exploited in any game (Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et al., 2004).
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Figure 4.3: Choosing the combination of outcomes that maximises the overall utility
while ensuring agents have non-zero utilities.
In contrast, through persuasive negotiation and, in particular, the use of rewards, agents
may be able to in°uence the negotiation in such a way that the e±cient outcome is
reached in this case (i.e. the outcomes circled in dotted line in ¯gure 4.3). Thus, a
better social welfare is achieved if agent ¯ which has a high discount factor concedes in
earlier games in return for rewards, in the form of concessions by ®, in the second game
as shown on ¯gure 4.3. We elaborate on such a procedure in chapter 7.88 Chapter 4 Formal De¯nitions
4.2.4 Using Trust in the MMPD
A contract is an agreement over the values that issues should take. In the MMPD, this
equates to a slot in the game matrix. After an agreement has been signed, agents enact
the contents of the contract and may do so with varying degrees of success. Given the
structure of the MMPD and the dominant strategy of a PD, the agents will be tempted
to defect by enacting values that are more pro¯table to themselves. This is illustrated
on ¯gure 4.4(a) where agent ® tries to exploit agent ¯ by enacting the contract in such a
way that it obtains a higher utility than what has been agreed in the contract, resulting
in a lower utility for ¯.
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(a) ® defecting after agreeing with ¯.
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(b) ¯ constraining negotiations (the dotted line) such
that agreements are at a higher value and the expected
defection still results in an acceptable contract.
Figure 4.4: Agents can retaliate using their trust model to capture defections by
constraining future agreements.
Agent ¯ may then capture such defections using its trust model and alter its subsequent
behaviour accordingly. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by the agent
bounding the range of slots in the MMPD that are available for the next agreement
(see dotted line in ¯gure 4.4(b)). This may then reduce the amount of loss expected in
the next interaction. As shown in ¯gure 4.4(b), if agent ® indeed defects by the same
degree, the resulting enactment of the contract results in more utility for ¯ than in the
¯rst agreement and this additional utility may compensate to some extent for losses
incurred in the ¯rst game.
Using the formal de¯nitions in this chapter we can now provide a description of this
procedure as follows (the details follow in chapter 5). Assume a trust measure by ¯'s
trust model determines the reliability of ® to be such that for a given value of v 2 Dx
for an issue x, ® will enact values of x lying in the range [ev¡;ev+]. Therefore, given
a negotiation range [vmin;vmax], an agent may restrict the range to [v0
min;v0
max] de¯ned
as follows:
º = fv j [ev¡;ev+] µ [vmin;vmax]g
v0
min = inffv 2 Dx j v 2 ºg
v0
max = supfv 2 Dx j v 2 ºgChapter 4 Formal De¯nitions 89
The above procedure implies restricting the action set of ® and ¯, hence the contract, to
only those values where the enactment of the contract can compensate for an expected
utility loss due to a possible defection by ®. We investigate such a technique as well as
other means of adapting an agent's negotiation behaviour in the IMMPD in chapter 5.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we provided the main formal de¯nitions that are to be used in our trust
and PN models. In particular, we de¯ned contracts which describe what agents can
o®er during negotiation encounters (i.e. the negotiation object) and the utility function
that agents can use to evaluate these contracts. Moreover, we provided a description of
the MMPD that agents play by virtue of the relationship existing between their utility
functions. In so doing, we de¯ne the action set of the negotiating agents. This set can
be used to de¯ne arguments in the PN model and to assess the level of reliability of an
opponent by the agents using the trust model. In the latter case, the trust model can
subsequently be used to adjust the agent's negotiation stance accordingly.
Given these de¯nitions, in the next chapter we describe our CREDIT trust model. This
model allows an agent to determine its level of trust in its opponents based on its own
con¯dence in them and their reputation in the society of agents. Based on CREDIT's
trust measure, we further elaborate on the di®erent means that CREDIT provides to
adjust the negotiation stance.Chapter 5
CREDIT: A Trust Model based
on Con¯dence and Reputation
Having reviewed the state of the art models of trust (in chapter 3) and provided the basic
de¯nitions in the previous chapter, we now describe our trust model. In particular, we
design our trust model as per the general requirements for our negotiation mechanisms
detailed in section 1.2 and the particular requirements discussed in relation to other
trust models in section 3.3.
To this end, in section 5.1 we ¯rst analyse the particular problems that remain with
current individual level trust models described in section 3.1 and discuss the techniques
we use to solve these problems in our model. Building on this, in section 5.2 we then
go on to de¯ne the CREDIT trust model. Thus we provide de¯nitions of the context
within which agents interact and measures of con¯dence and reputation that model trust
in direct and indirect interactions respectively. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to
calculate con¯dence levels and combine these measures with reputation to generate trust
measures. The computational complexity of the algorithm is shown to be linear with
respect to the number of past interactions analysed and quadratic with respect to the
number of decision variables (here these are fuzzy sets) used to characterise particular
levels of reliability. We then show in section 5.3 how CREDIT can be directly used in a
bargaining encounter, as per our objectives set in 1.5, to in°uence agreements reached
according to the trustworthiness of the negotiating agents. Section 5.4 empirically evalu-
ates CREDIT and shows that, by in°uencing the negotiation stance, it is indeed e®ective
and e±cient in preventing an agent from being exploited in the long run and in dealing
with agents which are reliable to a certain degree. Furthermore, in section 5.5 CREDIT
is shown to be better than other comparable models in negotiating fruitful contracts with
partially unreliable agents. Section 5.6 summarizes the main properties of CREDIT and
discusses the main issues arising in integrating it with bargaining mechanisms and the
system-level trust models.
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5.1 Introduction
As we have seen in chapter 3, in general, in a society of agents, trust evolves as a re-
sult of the direct assessment of the performance of contracted agents over a number of
interactions (see section 3.1.1 or from the acquisition of information from the environ-
ment, including other agents (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2). More speci¯cally, obtaining
a useful measure of trust requires assessing an opponent's performance according to the
utility derived from the tasks performed by it (i.e. through direct interactions) and
public knowledge about its e±ciency and e®ectiveness in each of these tasks (i.e. in-
direct interactions). By considering and combining these two sources (of measures) we
believe an agent can better assess the trustworthiness of an opponent, particularly in
circumstances where either the private or the public source is not reliable on its own. For
example, in cases where an agent has interacted a number of times with its opponent, it
will probably rely on1 When an agent decides to do so will depend on the context within
which it ¯nds itself) on its direct measure of its opponent's trustworthiness. However,
in cases where the opponent is previously unknown, the agent will rely on the publicly
available knowledge. In between, the agent may combine both and give more impor-
tance to one or the other depending on the number of interactions it has had with its
opponent (Sabater and Sierra, 2002). Nevertheless, whichever measure of trust is used
the overall aim is the same; namely to provide an indication of how an agent is likely
to perform with respect to a given commitment. Thus, if an agent has been known to
defect very often in the past, it may not prove reliable in the future. Similarly, if an
agent has frequently proven its e®ectiveness in past interactions, it may be regarded as
reliable in future interactions. Naturally, in some cases, both of these assumptions may
turn out to be false.
When measuring trust, it is therefore important to consider the context in which the
interactions take place. Here we view this context as being mainly captured by norms
(Conte and Castelfranchi, 1999; Esteva et al., 2001). Such norms equate to the obliga-
tions imposed on the interactions by the system and they occur as a consequence of the
utterances, roles, and pledges of the interacting agents. For example, it is the norm in
the eBay auction to pay for the goods that one has won before they can be delivered
and it is required by mobile service providers (in Britain) to allow seven days to their
customers to cancel any contract they may have signed. The relationship between trust
and norms is as follows. If it is known that agents act according to certain norms which
guarantee good performance, then there is no point in an agent increasing its trust in
another that performs well since we cannot assume that it would do so without the norm
applying. However, if no norms or rules force agents to behave well (i.e. there exists a
possibility to renege), then trust should be increased in an agent which lives up to its
1The agent may decide to rely on its own measure of trustworthiness depending on the context. For
example, if the agents interact many times in one day and then meet after one month or a year, the direct
measure of trust may have become obsolete if the environment is dynamic, while if the environment is
static, it may still rely on its own measure after a few days or even a month.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 93
commitments (or decreased if it reneges). Thus, the trust value for a speci¯c agent for
a speci¯c task should take into account the potential risk (associated with the task in
question) in a contract given information about the norms within which the contract is
enacted (Marsh, 1994). This follows from the fact that cooperating under high potential
losses (i.e. when no norms enforce good behaviour) shows greater trustworthiness than
otherwise (Yamagishi et al., 1998). For example, if no penalty applied for late delivery
(i.e. there is no norm regarding delivery times), a seller delivering at the agreed time is
deemed more trustworthy than when a harsh penalty applies (i.e. there is a norm that
guarantees delivery times).
In general, extant trust models fail to capture all the above-mentioned basic factors in
deriving trust (see chapter 3 for more details). In particular, while some of these models
devise trust using arbitrary equations that do not take degrees of e±ciency into account
(see section 3.1.1.2), others simply assume that the trust measure is readily available
from the system (see section 3.1.2.1). Moreover, those models which do analyse the
performance of opponents fail to consider the norms of the environment which foster
good behaviour (L¶ opez y L¶ opez et al., 2002; Esteva et al., 2001). Finally, in most
applications, extant trust models only use trust in choosing interaction partners and
neglect the fact that trust can also be used to adapt the behaviour of an agent towards
its opponent at negotiation time (Fisher and Ury, 1983).
Against this background, this chapter develops and evaluates a novel computational trust
model (called CREDIT - Con¯dence and REputation De¯ning Interaction-based Trust)
that recti¯es these shortcomings. Speci¯cally, we show that by taking into account its
past experience (from direct interactions) and information gathered from other agents
(indirect interactions), an agent can build up beliefs about how trustworthy a contracted
agent is likely to be in meeting the expected outcomes of particular contract issues (e.g.
delivering goods on time or delivering high quality goods). In this respect, we conceive
of two ways of assessing trustworthiness: (i) Con¯dence derived (mainly) from analysing
the result of previous interactions with that agent, and (ii) Reputation acquired from
the experiences of other agents in the community through gossip or by analysing signals
sent by an agent. Both measure the same property; that is, the opponent's believed
reliability in doing what it says it will regarding particular issues of a contract. In
CREDIT both measures rely on (probabilistic) estimations of utility variation in the
current contract, based on an agent's past experiences as mentioned and experiences of
other agents, which are, in turn, used to evaluate the performance of an opponent by
means of a small number of fuzzy sets de¯ning di®erent typical behaviours (in terms of
utility variations).2 The computational complexity of the model is linear with respect to
2Fuzzy sets are here used to characterise the vague perception of the performance of an opponent and
to provide agents with a high-level of abstraction means of assessing the extent to which an opponent
satis¯es the issues of a contract. Thus an opponent may be characterised as satisfying with a high degree
the (graded/fuzzy) property of `delivering-on-time' and a with a low degree the (graded/fuzzy) property
of `selling-high-quality', to denote that it is expected to deliver on time and sell goods of relatively poor
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the number of past interactions analysed and quadratic in the number of fuzzy sets (in
the worst case) in its incremental complexity (i.e. as new interactions occur). Finally,
we show how CREDIT can be used in an agent's decision making mechanism in order to
minimise risk in interactions by in°uencing the selection of an interaction partner and
the negotiation of contracts.
Set against the requirements of our negotiation mechanisms (which need a technique
to model an agent's reliability and honesty in terms of trust) and the challenges that
arise in developing such a model (see section 3.3), the work described in this chapter
advances the state of the art in the following ways. First, we use the norms of the
environment as a key factor in evaluating the trust of opponents. In so doing, we
prevent agents from trusting those opponents that are only performing well because
of the prevailing norms. Second, we show how fuzzy sets are a very useful tool to
describe an agent's probabilistic estimation of its opponent's e®ectiveness and provides
a common ontological basis that permits a combination of this estimation with other
agents' estimations. Third, we show how both con¯dence and reputation measures can
be used to develop a measure of trust that is adapted to the environment in which the
agents interact and, moreover, how this measure can be adapted over time to become
more accurate as more information becomes available. Fourth, we show how CREDIT
allows interacting agents, with di®erent norms, to negotiate those issues for which they
have di®erent expected values (guided by the norms) and avoid negotiating over those
issues for which they have coherent expectations. This, in turn, minimises losses and
saves negotiation time. Fifth, we show how trust can be used to adjust the stance that
an agent takes during negotiation so as to minimise the utility loss incurred when it
believes its opponent is likely to defect by di®erent degrees from a signed contract.
5.2 The CREDIT Model
In this section we de¯ne the CREDIT trust model which builds upon our previous work in
(Ramchurn et al., 2004d, 2003b). We ¯rst provide some new de¯nitions that complement
those given in chapter 4 and which we will use in the rest of this chapter. Using these
de¯nitions, we model con¯dence, reputation, and norms. We then show how to combine
these measures to compute appropriate trust values according to the environment and
the state of an agent. Finally, we analyse the computational complexity of the model.
5.2.1 Rules Dictating Expected Issue-Value Assignments
The agreed contract provides a clear statement of what is expected with respect to
each issue. However, the social setting in which the interaction takes place may also
give rise to expectations but these are not explicitly stated in the contract itself. ForChapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 95
example, a buyer agent ® from country A might expect seller agent ¯ from country B
to deliver goods nicely wrapped up in gift paper as opposed to in a carton box. This
clause may not have been speci¯ed in the contract as it is a norm in the client's group
that goods must be nicely wrapped up. Thus, at execution time, an agent may fail to
satisfy another's (contracted or not) expectations because (i) it is not able to meet the
expectations, (ii) it is not willing to meet the expectations, or (iii) it is not aware of
the unspeci¯ed expectations. In any case, the satisfaction or not of these expectations
directly impacts on the trust the agent has in its opponent (Molm et al., 2000). If a
satisfactory reason is given for poor performance, the trust value may not be modi¯ed,
but this is not considered here.
Against this background, CREDIT takes into account the three basic sets of norms3 that
can be sources of unspeci¯ed expectations4: (i) Social rules, noted as SocRules, that all
agents in the society Ag possess in common, (ii) Group rules, noted as GroupRules(G),
that all agents within a particular group G µ Ag have in common, and (iii) Institutional
rules, noted as InstRules, that agents ® and ¯ interacting within a particular electronic
institution must abide by. In the case of group rules, there is no guarantee that agents
from di®erent groups, having di®erent norms, will satisfy their interaction partner's
group rules. On the other hand, the conclusions of institutional rules are guaranteed by
the institution (e.g. price c has to be paid, seller has to give goods). This guarantee
is normally speci¯ed through a penalty which must be paid (by the rule breaker) if the
rule is not respected. In more detail, rules of all types allow an agent to infer expected
issue-value assignments from a contract. Here the rules will be written in the following
way:
If x1 = v1 and x2 ¸ v2 and ::: and xm = vm Then x · v
meaning that if (x1 = v1);(x2 ¸ v2);:::;(xm = vm) 2 O, then issue x's value is expected
to be equal to v. We assume that x does not appear in the premise of the rule (otherwise
this could lead to cyclic rules). An example of such a rule would be:
IF price ¸ $100 and qos = 8 Then anti-DoS = 10
which means that if the price of a telecommunication line (bought from some Internet
Service Provider (ISP)) is equal to or greater than a hundred pounds, and the quality of
service guarantee (qos) of the ISP is eight (i.e. high in this context), then it is expected
that the ISP will provide a very high level (on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 representing the
highest level) of anti denial-of-service (DoS) on the line. We note by Rules the set of all
possible rules written using the above syntax5 over the set X of issues and corresponding
3We believe these are the necessary, rather than su±cient, sets of norms that can give rise to unspec-
i¯ed expectations. Other sets of norms could arise from agents creating them or from legal systems for
example.
4Norms can be of a very complex nature. However, in this paper we operationalise norms in the form
of constraints that apply over the values of terms in a contract and foresee using richer representations
of norms in future work.
5Richer syntaxes could also be thought of for premises in these rules, allowing for predicates like96 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
domains of values. The rules an agent abides by will depend on the group it belongs to
and the other rules implied by the institution within which it is interacting with others.
Given a contract O proposed by ® to ¯, where ® 2 G1 and ¯ 2 G2, we can now devise
the set of all of ®'s (or ¯'s) expectations (unspeci¯ed and speci¯ed) about the values
of the issues in the contract. The unspeci¯ed expectations due to the social setting,
O®
exp, of issue-value assignments from O is the set of all conclusions of the rules of agent
®, Rules(®) = SocRules [ GroupRules(G1) and InstRules (that apply to ® and ¯),
that have their premise satis¯ed by the equalities in the contract O. The complete
expanded contract from ®'s point of view is therefore de¯ned as O®
+ = O [ O®
exp (the
latter will be di®erent from ¯'s expanded contract, O
¯
+, if ¯'s group have di®erent rules
GroupRules(G2) that apply to the issues of O).
The issues contained in the expanded contract may vary (for the same contract O)
depending on the group and institutional rules that apply at the time the agents make
an agreement. This is because an agent may interact under di®erent institutions (having
di®erent institutional norms) or an agent may decide to switch groups to one that has
di®erent norms from its original group. Given the expanded contract, an agent may
then decide to trust its opponent depending on its prior knowledge of its opponent's
performance. In the next section, we model this in more detail.
5.2.2 Interaction History and Context
In order to try and predict the future performance of an agent it is important to analyse
its interaction history in terms of both the outcomes of interactions and the norms
that prevailed in each past interaction. In more detail, the interaction history of an
agent ®, intending to interact with an agent ¯, can be viewed as consisting of a list of
elements with four main components: (i) ®'s agreed contract O with ¯ and the outcome
of the enactment of the contract O0 by ¯ and ® (i.e. a list of pairs of (O;O0) form the
contracting history), (ii) Rules(®) that ® had to abide by for the contract (at the time
t the contract was signed), (iii) InstRules that both ® and ¯ had to abide by in a given
institution, and (iv) ®'s utility function (at time t) for the contract issues for which it
hired ¯. Each element in ®'s interaction history §®;¯, is therefore represented as:
c = h®;¯;O;O0;fU®
x gx2X(O);Rules(®);InstRules;ti
and the interaction history as CB = fc1;c2;:::g. We will note by CB®;¯ µ CB, the
subset containing all interactions between ® and ¯.
For each new interaction between ® and ¯, ® will need to consider the interaction history
as well as the currently prevailing rules and its current utility function in order to predict
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the behaviour of ¯ (as will be shown in section 5.2.3.2). Thus we de¯ne as ®'s current
context6 within which a new contract is negotiated with an agent ¯ and executed as the
set:
§®;¯ = hCB®;¯;fU®
x gx2X;Rules(®);tci: (5.1)
where tc represents the current time. We assume that the agents will have agreed
between them (through negotiation or by one partner imposing the institutional rules)
which institution will guide their interactions and this will imply a given set of rules
InstRules applying over the interaction.7
Every time a new contract is agreed and enacted, it is added as a new element to CB
in order to update the context of the agent. Moreover, all the rules, including the
InstRules, will be recorded in the interaction history after the interaction is completed.
Thus, this context can be dynamic for a number of reasons (apart from the history being
updated with new elements). First, an agent may change groups such that its group
rules might change and, consequently, so will its expectations. Second, an agent may
interact with the same partners within di®erent institutions (e.g. buying from a seller
in England and buying from the same seller in Spain where di®erent trade rules or laws
apply). Third, the interacting agents might change their utility functions over time such
that they value an issue di®erently at di®erent points in time (e.g. a travel package may
be worth more in summer than in winter).
By taking into account such a dynamic context in evaluating trust, our model can adapt
to cases where the environment and the agent are not necessarily static. In the following
sections, we use information derived from the context in order to de¯ne and evaluate the
agent's trust in its opponent's enactment of the contractual terms. We will di®erentiate
between the trust derived from personal knowledge about an agent (con¯dence) and
that derived from information about the agent gathered from other agents in the society
(reputation). In the next section we focus on de¯ning con¯dence (i.e. the personal
aspect of trust) and later combine it with reputation (which is based on the con¯dence
of other agents) to get an overall notion of trust.
5.2.3 Con¯dence
We will de¯ne con¯dence as follows:
®'s con¯dence in ¯'s handling an issue x is a measure of certainty (leading to trust),
based on evidence from past direct interactions with ¯, which allows ® to expect a given
6Again, we consider these features as necessary rather than su±cient. More features could be added
(e.g., social relationships existing between agents or reasons given by an agent explaining its poor
performance) and their impact will be investigated in future work.
7We do not specify the institutional rules as part of the context since the decision to choose an
institution is not de¯ned by the context. However, these rules need to be speci¯ed before an agent is
able to calculate its trust in its opponent (as will be shown in section 5.2.3.2, that could lead to the
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set of utility deviation values to be caused by ¯'s handling of x.8
Thus if ® has a high degree of con¯dence with respect to x being well enacted or not by
¯, then the interval of utility deviation values expected by ® from ¯ will be relatively
small (conversely the set is large if con¯dence is low). This set of utility deviation
values may bring either more utility than expected (i.e. a high con¯dence in ¯ being
`good') or less utility than expected (i.e. a high con¯dence in ¯ being `bad'). We
initially consider con¯dence on a per-issue basis given that agents may be more reliable
in satisfying some issues than others. This notion on an opponent's behaviour is not
only probabilistic in nature, since it may involve imprecision as well as a subjective
appreciation of performance as well (e.g. how `Bad' or `Good' the delivery time of goods
is for a buyer might not be precisely de¯ned and this perception might also vary over
time depending on the agent's preferences). Given this, we choose a fuzzy set based
approach to model the meaning of a qualitative term set (e.g. `bad', `average', `good')
for performance evaluations in terms of expected utility deviations (and ultimately to
expected values for issues), and the con¯dence level(s) on an opponent refer to the extent
to which a particular term ¯ts with her performance. In general, the use of fuzzy sets
presents a number of advantages:
1. It allows the modelling of the meaning of imprecise and qualitative terms like
`deliver late' or `sells high quality goods' which are often used to de¯ne the perfor-
mance of an agent. Using fuzzy sets therefore allows an agent designer to specify
the analytical engine of the agent at a higher level of abstraction than using only
probabilities.
2. It does not require agents to hold the same ontology and objective appreciation
of a particular task in order to reliably share information about their opponent's
performance, although they may translate such perceptions over a common scale
(e.g. utility deviations). For example, not all agents may have the same quality
standards for a given product or have the same standards (as a result of di®erent
constraints or utility) to judge how late is a delivery by a given seller. Rather,
the agents can simply say whether they deem the goods to be `good' or the seller
`delivers late' to a certain degree and each agent can privately translate this infor-
mation according to its own notion of `good' or `late' into the measure of e±ciency
all agents use. Thus, agents would only have to share their ontology to understand
each other when there is a need to communicate measures rather than de¯ne their
reasoning mechanism according to exactly the same framework in order to share
ratings.
Using this method goes further towards our aim of reducing the uncertainty surrounding
8Our de¯nition of con¯dence generally caters for a variety of techniques that could be used to derive
con¯dence values (such as probabilistic measures or time-series analysis). In future work, we aim to
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interactions between agents (see section 1.1). In particular, our use of fuzzy sets helps
to reduce the uncertainty about the communication mechanisms that agents use to
communicate their impressions of others.
5.2.3.1 Con¯dence Levels
In this work, the behaviour of an agent regarding the ful¯llment of an issue in a contract
is perceived in terms of the variations on utility between the signed value for the issue
and the enacted one. These utility variations are then sensed over multiple interactions
to build up a picture of the agent's performance over time. In this thesis we take the
stance that fuzzy sets have their domains speci¯ed over `absolute' variations on utility,
rather than on relative variations9 (i.e. relative to the utility of the value signed for
the issue). Thus, we consider that ¢U 2 [¡1;1] (recall that utility values belong to the
interval [0;1]).
Speci¯cally, we assume that agents share a (small) set L = fL1;L2;:::;Lkg of linguistic
labels to qualify the performance of an agent on each issue. In what follows, we will
use the basic set L = fBad;Average;Goodg. We believe these labels encompass the
whole spectrum of characterisations10 that an agent might use to express its view on the
possible (approximate) utility deviations, gains or losses, in the executed contract with
respect to the utility of the contractually signed values. For example, each agent could
understand the labels `Bad', `Average', and `Good' for the issue `delivery' in di®erent
ways according to their ontology (as shown in table 5.1). As this shows, each agent
can have a di®erent ontology to qualify variations between the contracted values and
the executed value. We also assume that the translation between the common and
the speci¯c terms is private. However, we do require that the common terms have
the same agreed upon interpretation among the agents in order to permit a meaningful
communication of con¯dence values among agents (see section 5.2.4).11 This means that
the agents have to share their ontology to perform the translation of terms. Thus, using
table 5.1, agent ® can translate a `Very Late' rating from agent ¯ as Late (since they
both equate to `Bad') and `Right time' from ° as `On time' (since they both equate
to `Average'). In more detail, we model the meaning of a label L by a fuzzy set on
the domain of utility deviations ¢U 2 [¡1;1], speci¯ed by its membership function
¹L(±u) : [¡1;1] ! [0;1]. Examples of membership functions12 for the above set of labels
9This can easily be modi¯ed to take into account relative variations depending on the type of opponent
encountered and is left as future work.
10The sets might be more ¯ne-grained and this will depend on the context of application. The search
for the right sets may also be an iterative process where di®erent sets are tried and tested until the ones
which ¯t the goals of the model are found.
11This does not prevent agents from having di®erent perceptions on the variation. Thus some might
perceive the same variation as signi¯cant while others might not. This may happen when agents have
di®erent preferences or attribute di®erent weights to the concerned issue.
12The shape of the membership function given only serves as an example. Arbitrarily complex func-
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are given in ¯gures 5.1(a), 5.1(b), and 5.1(c).
Agent
Label ® ¯ °
Bad Late Very Late Too late
Average On time Just in time Right time
Good Early Very early Early enough
Table 5.1: Table showing the possible di®erent meanings of the labels for 3 agents
when applied to the issue `delivery'.
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(a) Membership function for label `Bad'.
The thick line from -1 to 1 represents the sup-
port of a con¯dence level of 0.
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(b) Membership function for label `Good'.
The thick line from 0.4 to 1 represents the
support for a con¯dence level of 0.6.
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(c) Membership function for label `Av-
erage'. The thick line from -0.7 to 0.7
represents the support for a con¯dence
level of 0.25.
￿ ￿￿
￿
￿
￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
(d) Intersection of membership functions.
The thick line from 0.4 to 0.7 represents the
intersection of the supports for all fuzzy zets
given their con¯dence levels.
Figure 5.1: Shapes of membership functions in di®erent labels and ranges support-
ing con¯dence levels in `Good' (0.6), `Average' (0.25), and `Bad' (0) as well as the
intersection of the supports of these sets.
Thus, agent ®'s con¯dence level is de¯ned as the membership level to a linguistic term L,
measured over [0;1], of the behaviour of a particular agent ¯, and is noted as C(¯;x;L).
In the rest of this chapter, we will avoid the agent identi¯er wherever this is unambigu-
ously de¯ned by the context. Therefore, the cut of the fuzzy set L de¯ned by C(x;L)
represents a range (on the horizontal axis) of values:
E¢Uc(x;L) = f± 2 [¡1;1] j ¹L(±) ¸ C(x;L)g (5.2)
that is understood as the range of expected utility deviations at execution time on issue
x by agent ¯. For instance, ® may express its belief that ¯ is `Good' to a con¯dence level
0.6 in ful¯lling the contractual values on price, `Average' to a level of 0.25, and `Bad'
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range of values which support the con¯dence level of 0.6 for `Good', 0.25 for `Average',
and 0 for `Bad'. This is shown on ¯gure 5.1.
5.2.3.2 Evaluating Con¯dence
In order to obtain con¯dence levels for di®erent labels we ¯rst need to calculate the
range of utility variations expected for the issue. This expected range can be obtained
by considering the utility changes that have been observed in past interactions. There
are several techniques to model this range using probability distributions given the size
of the sample of ¢Ux that can be obtained from the interaction history (e.g. binomial,
normal, or poisson distributions). While the size of the sample of ¢Ux will naturally
determine the accuracy of the model, the number of elements in the sample taken (i.e.
a window over the latest interactions) will determine how up-to-date the model is in
determining the current nature of the opponent. The behaviour of the agent could also
be modelled as a time-series so as to predict its behaviour over future time points or
analysed using other data-mining techniques (e.g. cluster analysis, neural networks).
However, the more complex the analysis, the more time and memory the algorithm will
need to devise a level of con¯dence. Therefore, here we opt for an approximation to a
normal distribution13 which minimises the complexity of calculating the con¯dence level
(see section 5.2.7) and can be tuned to elicit di®erent con¯dence intervals (e.g. 95%,
99%), for a given sample of ¢Ux.14
Using a probability distribution to model utility variations (as opposed to fuzzy sets)
does not di®er from our initial goal since this probability only models what can be ob-
jectively measured and does not take into account the subjective considerations involved
in evaluating the range of values obtained (e.g. the extent to which the range of utility
variations is detrimental to the agent and the combination of this measure with rep-
utation measures). The subjective perception actually determines which fuzzy set the
agent chooses to represent these variations (see section 5.2.3.1).
Therefore, given a context §®;¯ and a proposed (not yet agreed) contract O, for each
issue x in X(O), we can estimate, from the history of past interactions, a probabilistic
13The type of probability distribution is not central to the trust model we wish to devise, provided it
is continuous and there are techniques to estimate the mean and variance given a small sample of values
(since the agent's interactions will certainly not generate the in¯nite number of samples/points required
to model a distribution accurately).
14Earlier in section 5.2.3 we highlighted the reasons for using fuzzy sets instead of probabilities. In
devising our distribution, we take into consideration all past interactions. This design decision does
not permit the model to keep track of a time-dependent behaviour (i.e to cope with time dependent
behaviour would simply mean windowing the history to take into account past interactions) and makes
the model slow to react to a sudden change in behaviour by the opponent (since the addition of a new
element in a large sample may not change its mean or variance signi¯cantly). However, it allows us
to tune the model to elicit a more precise picture of an opponent when its behaviour does not follow
any particular pattern over time and to keep trust su±ciently high for interactions to take place in case
the opponent su®ers some ine±ciencies only for a small number of interactions (i.e. it can forgive bad
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distribution © of ®'s utility variation ¢Ux 2 [¡1;1] (negative or positive) relative to
issue x (we will avoid the agent identi¯er in the utility function since this is clear from
the context). Values of ¢Ux correspond to the possible di®erences between the utility
U®
x (v0) of the value (x = v0) 2 O and the utility U®
x (v) of the (unknown) ¯nal value
(x = v) in the executed contract O0 (i.e. ¢Ux = U®
x (v) ¡ U®
x (v0)). Then we can say
that the agent ® has a certain risk with issue x when it estimates that q > 0 where q
is the probability that ¢Ux < 0. Of course, the more negative the mean, ¢Ux, of this
probability distribution (i.e. the higher the expected utility loss), the higher the risk,
and the more positive this mean is, the lower the risk (i.e. the lower the expected utility
loss).
Thus, to calculate the con¯dence levels in each of the issues concerned, we ¯rst need to
estimate the probability distribution of ¢Ux. This has to be done both for those issues
x appearing in O and those in the expanded contract O+ = O [ Oexp resulting from
the application of the rules in the current context (see section 5.2.1). We have to do so
analogously with the contracts in the precedent cases of the interaction history CB of the
current context. However, if we assume that the proposed contract is signed such that
the norms of the institution InstRules under which the agents (® and ¯) are operating
are fully enforced (i.e. penalties, matching the utility loss on an issue, have to be paid
by the agent which does not respect the norms which regiment the performance on the
issue), then the risk is zero15 for those (groups of) issue-value assignments insured by
institutional norms. This is the case even though the inference from previous interactions
may suggest that the agent would defect. In such cases, we remove all these insured
issues from the analysis. In the same way, if in an element of the interaction history, an
issue's enactment was guaranteed by the institution under which the agents interacted
at the time, we remove it from the sample of elements being analysed for that issue.
This procedure avoids us incrementing trust when an institution has guaranteed good
behaviour in the past (since risk is zero in such cases).
Now, assume we have a probability distribution © for ¢Ux. In order to determine
con¯dence levels C(x;L) we initially need to determine a signi¯cantly representative
interval [±1;±2] for ¢Ux (e.g. such that the probability that (±1 · ¢Ux · ±2) is equal
to 0:95). This involves ¯rst approximating the distribution to a normal distribution by
calculating the estimated sample variance ^ ¾2 of the distribution as well as the mean.
Then the con¯dence interval can be obtained from the following equation: ¢Ux§
^ ¾¢lconf p
N ,
where lconf = 1:96 for a 95% con¯dence and N is the sample size.
Finally, to calculate con¯dence levels C(x;L) for each label L 2 L, we want the interval
[±1;±2] to coincide as much as possible with the set of expected values E¢Uc(x;L) as
computed in equation 5.2. Since this range is de¯ned by the con¯dence levels of its
limits, the procedure amounts to selecting the minimum con¯dence levels of the two
15This assumes that the institution fully insures against any losses. This assumption could be removed
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limits for that label as shown in equation 5.3.
C(x;L) = min(¹L(±1);¹L(±2)) (5.3)
We will assume that all agents in the society are able to evaluate their con¯dence in
issues handled by their opponents and may transmit these measures to others. The
transmission of such con¯dence then gives rise to the concept of reputation which is
described next and later combined with personal con¯dence measures in section 5.2.5.
5.2.4 Reputation
An agent's reputation is the perception of a group or groups of agents in the society
about its abilities and attributes (see section 3.1.2). Several models of reputation have
been developed to show how an agent can build up its trust in another by retrieving (see
section 3.1.2.1) and aggregating (see section 3.1.2.2) information about the latter from
other agents. Thus, here we do not consider how this reputation information is gathered
(and aggregated) from the other agents16 in the society as there already exists several
techniques to do this e±ciently (Yu and Singh, 2002a; Sabater and Sierra, 2002). Rather,
we assume this information is simply available from a social network that structures the
knowledge that each agent has of its neighbours and keeps track of past interactions (as
per (Sabater and Sierra, 2002)). This allows us to focus on representing reputation and
combining it with con¯dence (as shown in section 5.2.5). In CREDIT, we specialise the
de¯nition of reputation to the following:
®'s estimate of ¯'s reputation in handling an issue x is ®'s measure of certainty (leading
to trust), based on the aggregation of con¯dence measures (for x) provided to it by other
agents which allows ® to expect a given set of values to be achieved by ¯ for x.
These agents may have obtained these con¯dence values from other agents (i.e. gossip-
ing) or by interacting with ¯ (i.e. witnessing as in (Sabater and Sierra, 2002)). Hence,
we assume that an agent ® possesses a function Rep : Ag £ X £ L ! [0;1] where
Rep(¯;x;L) represents the reputation of an agent ¯ in handling issue x with respect to
the qualifying label L (the name of the agent will be omitted when the context unam-
biguously determines it).17 We also assume that the labels L 2 L have their domain
speci¯ed over the same range of utility deviations (i.e. ¢U 2 [¡1;1]) as explained in
section 5.2.3.1.
16In the case where agent receive con°icting beliefs about its opponent, the agent may choose one of
many techniques to tackle this. In REGRET for example, more importance is given to reports from
trusted agents while in eBay positive and negative reports are separately reported than aggregated.
Depending on how aggregation of reports is performed, an agent may wrongly believe that its opponent
is trustworthy. Moreover, in the case where reports do not tally with the behaviour of an opponent, the
agent aggregating those reports may less trust the report providers. The problem of con°icting reports
are discussed in (Ramchurn et al., 2004b) and a possible solution to this proposed in (Dash et al., 2004).
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In general, reputation measures can be particularly useful to an agent that enters a
system for the ¯rst time. This is because the agent would not have interacted with any
other agents in its environment in the past. Therefore, it would not be possible for it to
compute its con¯dence in them. Thus it can only use information that is supplied to it
by other agents in the environment. However, such information may be liable to noise
or may not be true if agents are lying. In such circumstances, the agent can only learn
from its direct interactions with other agents and compute its con¯dence measures from
these interactions.
As can be seen, using just con¯dence or just reputation values to compute the set of
expected values for a given issue is often only useful in extreme situations. Given this,
in the next section we devise a measure that caters for all situations between these
extremes and then in section 5.2.6 derive a trust measure from this.
5.2.5 Combined Con¯dence and Reputation Measures
Generally speaking we consider that both con¯dence and reputation should be taken
into account in order to come up with a set of expected values for an issue. We rely
on a combination of both measures in order to balance both the societal view on an
opponent and the personal view of the agent until the latter can be sure that its own
view is more accurate. We assume in this work that the reputation values expressed
by each agent in the society represent their con¯dence values on the behaviour of a
given agent. In other words a value Rep(x;L) represents an aggregation of di®erent
con¯dence values.18 To come to this conclusion, each agent will have its own threshold
on the number of interactions needed to have this accurate measure. Therefore, given
agent ®'s context §®;¯ = hCB®;¯;fU®
x gx2X;Rules(®);tci, here we propose to de¯ne the
threshold · as · = min(1;jCB®;¯j=µmin), where jCB®;¯j is the number of interactions of
® with ¯ and µmin is the minimum number of interactions (successful negotiations and
completed executions19) above which only the direct interaction is taken into account
(Sabater and Sierra, 2002).
Thus, we capture the combination of con¯dence and reputation measures through the
function CR : Ag £X £L ! [0;1], which is, in the simplest case, a weighted average of
both kinds of degrees (as in the previous cases we omit references to the agent whenever
possible and use CR(x;l) instead):
CR(x;L) = · ¢ C(x;L) + (1 ¡ ·) ¢ Rep(x;L); (5.4)
18We are therefore implicitly assuming that all these measures are commensurate (i.e have the same
meaning and are based on the same scale), and hence their aggregation make sense.
19It is important to specify that only those completed interactions should be taken into account since
only these can give us information about the behaviour of the opponent in its execution of contracts.
Negotiations could end up in no agreements and these should be excluded when counting interactions
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Given CR levels it is then possible to compute the expected values for an issue x and
label L as:
E¢Ucr(x;L) = f± 2 [¡1;1] j ¹x
L(±) ¸ CR(x;L)g (5.5)
and then the intersection of the expected ranges for all the labels L 2 L:
E¢Ucr(x) =
\
L2L
E¢Ucr(x;L) : (5.6)
The assignment of CR values for all labels may not always be consistent (i.e.
E¢Ucr(x;L) = ;). This is because each agent in the environment may have under-
gone di®erent interaction experiences with a particular agent ¯ and each of these agents
will obviously transmit di®erent con¯dence levels for each label. Therefore, in some
cases, these con¯dence levels (when aggregated), may lead to Rep(x;L1) describing a
range of values that does not intersect with that of Rep(x;L2) or Rep(x;L3). One so-
lution could be to take the average of intervals to determine a representative interval.
However, this may result in a large interval of utility deviations synonymous with a large
imprecision in determining the opponent's behaviour. Given this, our straightforward
solution to this problem is the following: whenever the intersection results in an empty
set, we will iteratively not consider the label with the lowest con¯dence level, until a
non-null range of values is obtained. This procedure equates to removing those decision
variables that have the lowest importance in the set under consideration. Our solution
ensures that a consistent intersection can be found in all possible cases and minimises
the imprecision in modelling an opponent's behaviour given con°icting reports.
As can be seen, the above range is de¯ned in terms of the utility deviations rather
than in terms of the values that the issue could take. However, at negotiation time,
for example (as will be seen in section 5.3.2.1), we might need to compute the expected
values an issue could take, after execution of the contract, given an o®ered value v0 for
the issue. This requires transferring the expected utility deviations to the domain of the
issue considered.20 This can be computed in the following way:
EVcr(x;v0) = fv 2 Dx j Ux(v) ¡ Ux(v0) 2 E¢Ucr(x)g (5.7)
5.2.6 Trust
In our trust model we use the combined degrees fCR(¯;x;L)gL2L, as given by equa-
tion 5.4, to de¯ne the interval of expected values E¢Ucr(x), that provides us with a
maximum expected loss in utility ¢cr
loss(x) = inf(E¢Ucr(x)) (when ¢cr
loss(x) < 0 there is
an expected utility loss and when ¢cr
loss(x) > 0 there is an expected utility gain). This
20By using utility variations, rather than value variations, we can use the same membership functions
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maximum expected utility loss represents the risk that is involved in the interaction
given knowledge acquired both from direct interactions and reputation and also from
the norms of the environment. While the risk describes how much we expect to lose at
most from an interaction, trust is the opposite of this given our initial de¯nition (see
section 5.1). Thus we de¯ne ®'s trust as:
T(¯;x) = min(1;1 + ¢cr
loss(x)) (5.8)
where T serves to describe ®'s trust in ¯ for issue x based on both ®'s con¯dence in ¯
and ¯'s reputation with respect to issue x.
Here, we choose to bound trust values21 in the range [0;1] where 0 represents a com-
pletely untrustworthy agent (and corresponds to the maximum possible utility loss) and
1 represents a completely trustworthy agent (and corresponds to zero utility loss).22
In any case, we can now de¯ne the trust T(¯;X(O)) of an agent ® in an agent ¯ over
a particular set X(O) = fx1;:::;xkg of issues appearing in the contract O (or in the
expanded one O+) as an aggregation of the trust in each individual issue (e.g. trust in
delivering on time, paying on time and the product having the quality speci¯ed in the
contract). That is, we postulate:
T(¯;X(O)) = agg(T(¯;x1);:::;T(;¯;xk)) (5.9)
where agg : [0;1]k ! [0;1] is a suitable aggregation function23. If some issues are
considered to be more important than others, the aggregation function should take this
into consideration. This can be achieved by means of di®erent weights24 wi given for
each issue xi 2 X(O) (the higher the weight, the more important the issue). A typical
choice would be to take the aggregation25 function as a weighted mean:
T(¯;X(O)) =
X
xi2X(O)
wi ¢ T(¯;xi) (5.10)
where
P
wi = 1 and 0 · wi · 1.
21We acknowledge that other bounds may be applied in other trust models (e.g. [¡1;1] as in (Marsh,
1994) or [0;1] in eBay). See (Marsh, 1994) for a wider discussion on the meaning of the bounds on the
rating.
22Our choice for the bounds of [0;1] serves to simplify the analysis when normalising all trust ratings
in issues and over contracts.
23Generally, an aggregation function is monotonic such that min(u1;:::;uk) · g(u1;:::;uk) ·
max(u1;:::;uk) (see (Calvo et al., 2002) for a survey).
24Most aggregation operators are de¯ned parametrically with respect to weights assigned to each
component to be aggregated (see (Calvo et al., 2002) for more details).
25More sophisticated aggregation models (based, for example, on di®erent Lebesgue, Choquet, or
Sugeno integrals) could also be used (Calvo et al., 2002).Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 107
5.2.7 Algorithmic Description and Computational Complexity
Here we detail the algorithm used by CREDIT in generating trust values and analyse its
computational complexity. We will assume that reputation information (Rep(¯;x;L) for
all L 2 L) about the opponent ¯ has been retrieved by ®. Furthermore, we assume that
the issues that are guaranteed by the institutional rules, InstRules, that apply in the
current context §®;¯ have been removed from the set under consideration (as discussed
in section 5.2.3.2). As discussed in section 5.3.2.2, those social and group rules for which
their premises have low trust, will introduce more issues to the set under consideration.
Finally, we assume that the list of past contracts ­ with ¯ have been retrieved from the
interaction history CB.
In table 5.2 we present pseudocode of the function FT used to calculate trust values
for a given issue x (according to equation 5.8). As explained in section 5.2.2, the set
of precedent cases where an agent ® 2 G1 has interacted with ¯ 2 G2, will have been
recorded in the interaction history CB®;¯. For each of the elements of CB®;¯, the utility
variation is obtained in step 1. Step 2 generates the probability distribution from the
list of all utility variations, while step 3 computes the 95% con¯dence interval of ¢Ux.
Step 4a generates the con¯dence levels (C(x;L) for all L 2 L) for each issue using the
procedure shown in section 5.2.3.2 while Step 4b combines this measure with reputation
to form CR(x;L) for each label. Step 5 simply creates a new instance of all labels to be
used in the analysis. In case it is ®'s ¯rst interaction we assume C(x;L) = 0 for all L 2 L,
and start from step 5. Step 6 details the procedure to remove inconsistencies arising
out of combining di®erent reputation levels with con¯dence levels (as was discussed in
section 5.2.5, whereby those labels with the lowest con¯dence levels are removed from
the set under consideration). Step 7 checks that inconsistencies have been removed.
Step 8 returns the maximum expected utility loss and step 9 returns the trust value
using the procedure we later describe in section 5.2.6.
In ¯gure 5.2 we show how the above algorithm ¯ts into the general picture of devising
and using trust so as to reduce the uncertainty about the agents' reliability and hon-
esty in interactions and particularly in negotiations (see ¯gure 1.3). As can be seen,
steps 1 to 3 implement function g which de¯nes the range of utility variations [±1;±2].
Function g could also be implemented using neural networks or cluster analysis in order
to elicit the range of utility variations (as discussed in section 5.2.3.2) but here we use
a probabilistic approximation to a normal distribution (for reasons speci¯ed in section
5.2.3.2). Function f is implemented by step 4. The calculation of trust in steps 5 to 9
eventually results in T(®;¯;x) and T(®;¯) while the negotiation range [vmin;vmax] is
speci¯ed using the procedure in section 5.3.2.1.
In order to analyse how e±cient CREDIT is both in one run of the model and in
incremental runs (as more interactions are added to the interaction history), we will
derive the computational complexity of each step of the algorithm. This is shown in108 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
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Figure 5.2: The processes involved in calculating and using trust with an opponent ¯.
Function g generates the interval given the distribution of utility losses over multiple
interactions. Function f evaluates con¯dence levels as in section 5.2.3.2. Reputation
information is assumed to be available.
table 5.3.
As can be seen from table 5.3, the computational complexity of the model when calcu-
lating trust on a per issue and per agent basis, is linear with respect to the number of
cases in the interaction history when we consider one single run of the model. It is also
quadratic with respect to the number of labels (i.e. three in our case - Bad, Average,
Good) when evaluated with a new case. This means that, as more and more cases are
added (as the agents interact and execute more contracts), the model loops b2 times in
the worst case where b is the number of labels (i.e. when all con¯dence levels do not
coincide with each other).
5.3 CREDIT in Practice
Trust models such as CREDIT can help reduce the uncertainty underlying the honesty
and reliability of the interacting agents. However, most trust models are only put to use
in selecting interaction partners (see section 3.3). In addition, however, we use CREDIT
to in°uence the bargain that takes place before an agreement is signed (the next chapter
is devoted to its application in MD). This is achieved by coupling CREDIT to the
decision making model of a agent (see ¯gure 1.3). In this way, CREDIT can directlyChapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 109
function: FT(¯;x;v;­;U®
x ;L;M;R;·)
with
x 2 X; issue under consideration.
v 2 Dx; the value for issue x.
­ = [(O1;O0
1);:::;(On;O0
n)]; the list of past contracts.
L = [L1;:::;Lk];k ¸ 2; fuzzy sets characterising performance.
M = [¹L1;:::;¹Lk]; membership functions for fuzzy sets.
R = fRep(x;L)gL2L; reputation levels of agent ¯ in all labels.
begin
1. ¢U = fU®
x (Oi(x)) ¡ U®
x (O0
i(x))gi=1::n;(Oi;O0
i)2­ ; obtaining utility variations
in past contract executions.
2. P » N(¢Ux;¾¢Ux) ; obtain a Normal probability distribution of
utility variations.
3. ±1 = ¢Ux ¡
^ ¾¢Ux¢lconf p
j­j and ±2 = ¢Ux +
^ ¾¢Ux¢lconf p
j­j determine the 95% con¯dence interval of ©.
with lconf = 1:96;
4. for each L 2 L do
a. C(¯;x;L) = min(¹L(±1);¹L(±2)) ; obtain con¯dence levels for each label
given the con¯dence interval.
b. CR(x;L) = · ¢ C(x;L) + (1 ¡ ·) ¢ Rep(x;L) ; compute combined measure based
on con¯dence and reputation.
5. Laux = L; copying labels.
6. repeat
a. E¢Ucr(x) =
T
L2Lauxfu j ¹x=v
L (u) ¸ CR(x;L)g obtaining range of expected values
given reputation and con¯dence.
b. if (E¢Ucr(x) = ;)
and L = argminL2LauxfRep(x;L)g) correct inconsistency by removing
then Laux = Laux ¡ L; low importance sets using linear search
(could be logarithmic as well).
7. until E¢Ucr(x) 6= ; ; inconsistency removed
8. ¢cr
loss = sup(E¢Ucr(x)) ; calculating maximum possible utility loss .
9. return min(1;1 ¡ ¢cr
loss) ; returning the trust value.
end
Table 5.2: Algorithm used to calculate trust values.
in°uence the quality of agreements reached and the e±ciency of the negotiation. Thus,
in the remainder of this section we examine these two scenarios.
5.3.1 In°uencing an Agent's Choice of Interaction Partners
When an agent, say ®, has a particular task to contract for, it will decide on the issues to
be negotiated and identify possible interaction partners, say f¯1;¯2;:::;¯ng µ Ag. For
each agent in this set, we can calculate the trust value for each issue (as per equation
5.8) and aggregate these to give a general trust value for each agent (using equation 5.9).
That is, T(®;¯1;X0), T(®;¯2;X0), ..., T(®;¯n;X0), where X0 µ X is the set of issues
under consideration. Trust can thus provide an ordering of the agents in terms of their
overall reliability for a proposed contract. Agent ® can then easily choose the preferred110 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
Step Complexity Incremental Complexity
1 O(n) O(k)
2 O(n) O(k)
3 O(k) O(k)
4a O(b) O(b)
4b O(b) O(b)
5 O(k) O(k)
6a O(b) O(b)
6b O(b) O(b)
7 O(k) O(k)
8 O(k) O(k)
9 O(k) O(k)
Overall O(kn) O(kb2)
Table 5.3: Computational complexity of individual steps of the algorithm. Here, n
is the number of cases recorded in the case base, b is the number of labels and k is a
constant.
agent or the set of agents it would want to negotiate with (i.e. by choosing the most
trustworthy one(s)).
5.3.2 In°uencing an Agent's Negotiation Stance
In the next two subsections we detail ways in which CREDIT can be used to change
the negotiation stance. First, we show how CREDIT can be directly used to adapt
negotiation intervals on di®erent issues depending on the con¯dence level for each issue.
Second, we show how issues to be negotiated can be varied according to the level of trust
in the opponent.
5.3.2.1 Rede¯ning Negotiation Intervals
At contracting time, issue-value assignments, xn = vn, are agreed upon. Agents accept
values that lie within a range [vmin;vmax], such that Ux(vmin) > 0 and Ux(vmax) > 0.
This interval is the acceptable range which an agent uses to o®er and counter o®er
(according to a strategy) during negotiation (Jennings et al., 2001). Moreover, given a
potential issue-value assignment x = v in an o®er, an agent can compute an interval of
expected values. Thus, using equation 5.7 we have EVcr(x;v) = [ev¡;ev+] over which
the value v0 actually obtained after execution is likely to vary. This range de¯nes the
uncertainty in the value of the issue and if the acceptable range [ev¡;ev+] does not
¯t within [vmin;vmax], there exists the possibility that the ¯nal value may lie outside
the acceptable region. This, in turn, means that Ux(v0) may be zero which is clearly
undesirable and irrational.
Given this information, there are a number of strategic moves the agent can perform.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 111
First, the agent can restrict the negotiation interval [vmin;vmax] with respect to the set of
expected values [ev¡;ev+] as shown below. To do this, we ¯rst de¯ne the set of possible
contracts, Ox, that are consistent with the expected values of x and its acceptance range,
and then de¯ne the corrected values for vmin and vmax:
Ox = fO j (x = v) 2 O;EVcr(x;v) µ [vmin;vmax]g
v0
min = inffv 2 Dx j (x = v) 2 O;O 2 Oxg
v0
max = supfv 2 Dx j (x = v) 2 O;O 2 Oxg
(5.11)
This will shrink the range of negotiable values for an issue (i.e. from [vmin;vmax] to
[v0
min;v0
max], where either v0
min ¸ vmin or v0
max · vmax depending on which of the two
limits v0
min and v0
max gives higher utility respectively) to ensure that the ¯nal outcome
will ¯t within the range [vmin;vmax]. As well as reducing the possibility that the executed
value will lie outside the acceptable range, reducing the negotiation range can also bring
some other added bene¯ts. It can help the agent reduce the time to negotiate over
the value of each issue (e.g. if the range is smaller, the number of possible o®ers is
also smaller) and it can help the agent to make better decisions that depend on the
negotiation outcome (e.g. if a seller is expected to deliver goods 1 day later than the
agreed 3 days, the buyer can adjust its other tasks to ¯t with delivery in 4 days).
Second, given information about a possible defection on the part of its opponent from
an agreed value x = v0, an agent can also decide to defect from its own issues (by a
given degree) in order to recover the expected utility loss. This means that the agent
will calculate minfUx(ev¡);Ux(ev+)g and then achieve y = u0 instead of y = u0 (which
has been agreed in the contract for issue y which it handles) such that:
Uy(u0) ¡ Uy(u0) = min(0;Ux(v0) ¡ minfUx(ev¡);Ux(ev+)g) (5.12)
However, if the opponent is also ¯tted with a trust model, it will distrust the defecting
agent and this may lead to an arms race (Axelrod, 1984; Fisher and Ury, 1983) until
the agents will distrust each other so much that they avoid each other (or cannot ¯nd a
coinciding negotiation range if they both use the procedure described in equation 5.11)
.
5.3.2.2 Extending the Set of Negotiable Issues
Initially we argued that higher trust could reduce the negotiation dialogue and lower
trust could increase the number of issues negotiated over. In this section we deal with
this particular use of trust in de¯ning the issues that need to be negotiated. To this end,
issues not explicitly included in a contract O® may receive an expected value through
one of the rules in Rules(®) for an agent ®:
r : If x1 = v1 and x2 ¸ v2 and ::: and xm = vm Then x · v (5.13)112 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
Thus, if the premise of such a rule is true in a contract, the issue x is expected to
have the value v. If, however, the trust in the agent ful¯lling the values of the issues
present in the premises is not very high, it means that the agent believes that the values
v1;v2;:::;vn may not be eventually satis¯ed. In such a case, to ensure that the issue x
actually receives value v it should be added to the negotiated terms of the contract. This
means that, when the trust is low in the premises, the unspeci¯ed issues (as discussed
in section 5.2.1) are added to the contracted issues in order to try and ensure that they
will be met (whereas if trust is high the issue is not negotiated). For example, if a buyer
believes that the quality of a product to be delivered (the premise of a rule) will not be
the quality of the product actually delivered, the buyer might request that the product
satis¯es very speci¯c standards (e.g. kitemark or CE), which it privately expected and
would not normally specify in a contract if trust were high.
Formally, this means that if T(®;¯;Xr) · threshold, (where (T(®;¯;Xr) is de¯ned as
per equation 5.9 and Xr is the set of issues in the premise of rule r), then the issue
x in the conclusion of the rule should be added to the set of contract terms. On the
other hand, as an agent becomes more con¯dent that its interaction partner is actually
performing well on the issues in the contract, it might eventually be pointless negotiating
on the issue if the premises of the issue pre-suppose that the value expected will actually
be obtained. Thus, if T(®;¯;Xr) > threshold, then the issue x in the conclusion of the
rule can be removed from the set of contract terms. An example of this would be:
If T(®;¯;price) > 0:8 and T(®;¯;qos) > 0:7 Then avoid negotiating anti-DoS
which means that the if the trust in provider ¯ giving the quoted price a telecommu-
nication line (bought from some Internet Service Provider (ISP)) is above 0.8, and the
trust in its quality of service guarantee (qos) is above 0.7, then the ISP can be trusted
to give an anti denial-of-service (DoS) on the line and this issue can be avoided in the
negotiation process.
The two processes described above serve to expand and shrink the space of negotiation
issues. For a new entrant to the system, for example, the trust value others have in it
are likely to be low and hence the number of issues negotiated over will be large. But,
as it acquires the trust of others, the number of issues it would need to negotiate will
go down. Ultimately, with more trust, the set of negotiable issues can thus be reduced
to a minimal set, a®ording shorter negotiation dialogues. Conversely, with less trust,
the negotiable issues expand, trading o® the length of dialogues with higher expected
utility.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 113
5.4 Evaluating the CREDIT Model
This section empirically evaluates the performance of CREDIT. Here we concentrate on
the properties of CREDIT (i.e. in in°uencing negotiation as shown in section 5.3.2) in
two main contexts; namely, in facing normal defectors and those that defect by degrees.
We choose these two contexts since these are representative of the behaviours we can
reasonably expect agents to exhibit in interactions. Moreover, we use the MMPD to
characterise the utility functions as proposed in chapter 4. In this respect, we can
describe the three types of agent behaviours as the di®erent ways an agent would enact
an agreement as shown in ¯gure 5.3. We build agents that implement such behaviours
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Figure 5.3: The di®erent types of behaviours considered in evaluating CREDIT
in their strategy and evaluate CREDIT accordingly. Building on these results, section
5.5 compares the preformance of CREDIT with the main other comparable trust models
that have been proposed in the literature.
5.4.1 Bandwidth Trading Scenario
In order to test CREDIT we need a scenario where agents at both ends of the interaction
need to trust their interaction partner in negotiating and enacting contracts. These
contracts should consist of a number of issues, parts of which are handled by each agent.
The agents should also ¯nd it pro¯table to defect on the issues under their control.114 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
While this description ¯ts many scenarios, we speci¯cally wanted to choose one that
was not developed by us so there is no bias towards the features of our model. As
yet, there is no common benchmark test in this area and so we chose the scenario of
(Witkowski et al., 2001). The latter model has the advantage of providing both agents
(e.g. the buyer and the seller) involved in an interaction to defect for a number of reasons
which we elaborate upon and augment. Here, a number of service provider agents are
interacting with a number of users buying telecommunication bandwidth over a given
channel. As an example, the service providers could be Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
selling connection on an Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) link to individual
home users who use the link to browse the internet or download movies. Thus, service
provider agents (SP) provide bandwidth for telecommunication for a price c 2 [30;100],
and of size s 2 [2Mbits=s;4Mbits=s]. Service users (SU) buy the service through a
negotiated agreement to pay for the service at time tc (normally between 10 days and 30
days) after the contract is made. The agents also negotiate the security level, l 2 [1;6]
(where l = 1 is the lowest security level and l = 6 is the highest security level), that the
channel users will respect (e.g. a channel of l = 6 will prevent denial of service attacks or
use a ¯rewall to prevent worms in¯ltrating, but might also block common user programs
such as instant messengers). SU agents will negotiate for lower security levels so as to be
able to use the bandwidth for various types of programs, while SP agents will negotiate
for higher security requirements to keep its services robust against attacks. We assume
that users and providers belong to di®erent groups (e.g. SU can be Academic users,
Home users and Business users, while SP can be International ISPs, Local ISPs, Home
ISPs) and therefore have di®erent social rules and norms but interact within the same
institution (e.g. the British trade laws).
5.4.1.1 Speci¯ed and Unspeci¯ed Issues
Generally speaking, agents agree on the price, size of the bandwidth, the time of pay-
ment, and security level. Other issues that may get included in a contract include (i)
the quality of service level, qos 2 [1;8] (where qos = 1 is the lowest quality and qos = 8
is the highest quality, each specifying error rates or download speed for example), and
(ii) the connection usage of the SU agent, usage 2 [5;100] (i.e. in terms of the number
of http requests per minute). The addition of such issues will depend on the social rules
and norms that pervade the interaction.
While the SP agents might believe that a size and price of bandwidth equates to a
certain level of qos (i.e. through a rule If c · 35 and s = 4Mbits=s Then qos ·
6), the SU agents might believe other values for the qos (i.e. If c ¸ 32 and s =
4Mbits=s Then qos ¸ 4). Moreover, SU agents may have di®erent norms regarding
the expected bandwidth usage of the service given the time of payment and security
level agreed for the bandwidth (i.e. If l · 5 and tc = 15 Then usage ¸ 60) as
compared to the SP agent (i.e. If l ¸ 5 and tc = 15 Then usage · 75). Thus, if anChapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 115
agent cannot be trusted on the issues (it handles) that form the premises of such rules,
the issue involved in the conclusion of the rule gets added to the contract as shown
in section 5.3.2.2. Finally, all agents have the same institutional rule concerning the
method of payment; cash if below a certain value and credit card if above a certain
value (i.e. If p > 50 Then creditcard and IF p < 50 Then cash). This means that
the institution guarantees that the payments will be made by the appropriate method,
otherwise penalties are paid by the defector such that the other agent loses nothing (e.g.
using a credit card to pay for very low amounts of money causes an additional commission
to be charged by the credit card company). Adding new issues to the negotiation equates
to expanding the negotiation object (see section 1.2). In terms of the MMPD which
agents are playing, this procedure equates to scaling up the game matrix to consider a
larger space of possible degrees of defections from a given agreement. This is because
an additional issue in a contract increases the range of possible enactments of a contract
and therefore increases the range of possible defections. The rules are summarised in
tables 5.4 and 5.5.
Agent GroupRules 1 GroupRules 2
SP If p · 35 and s = 4Mbits=s Then qos · 6 If l ¸ 5 and tc = 15 Then usage · 75
SU If p ¸ 35 and s = 4Mbits=s Then qos ¸ 4 If l · 5 and tc = 15 Then usage ¸ 60
Table 5.4: Group Rules that apply to quality of service and usage.
Agent Institutional Rule 1 Institutional Rule 2
SP and SU IF p < 50 Then cash IF p ¸ 50 Then creditcard
Table 5.5: Institutional rules that apply to the payment method.
5.4.1.2 Defections and Cooperation
The opportunities for defection or cooperation are identi¯ed for both agents regarding
the main issues as shown below. Here we assume that ¯ is the SP agent and ® is the
SU agent.
1. Speci¯ed Issues (forming O constituting of issues that are always negotiated upon,
as explained in section 5.2.1).
(a) Price c { SP agents can defect after reaching an agreement by subsequently
asking for a higher price than c or cooperate by asking for an equal (or lower)
price than c. In the MMPD, this means that p 2 X(O¯) and a higher price
demanded equates to a higher level of defection.
(b) Time of payment tc { SU agents can defect by paying later than tc or cooperate
by paying at time tc or earlier (paying later allows them to manage their funds
better { hence higher utility). In the MMPD, this means that tc 2 X(O®)
and a later price means a higher degree of defection by ®.116 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
(c) Size s { SP agents can defect by providing a lower bandwidth (using the
bandwidth elsewhere brings them higher utility) or cooperate by providing
the required size or more. Depending on the institution, the size may or may
not be changed at execution time. In the MMPD, this means that s 2 X(O¯)
and a lower bandwidth equates to a higher level of defection.
(d) Security level l { SU agents can defect on this issue by using the bandwidth to
transmit spam and viruses in order to gain some economic bene¯t by sending
mass advertising email or to attack other users and damage their system so as
to get a larger share of the market they might be trading in. In the MMPD,
this means that l 2 X(O®) and abusing the bandwidth means a higher degree
of defection by ®.
2. Optional Issues (forming Oexp constituting of those issues that are negotiated only
if trust is low in the speci¯ed issues above as explained in sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.2.2).
(a) Quality of service, qos - the qos is only added to the set of negotiable issues
by an SU agent if the SP agent it wishes to contract cannot be trusted on
the price and the size to be provided (see table 5.4). If the qos is added to
the contract, an SP agent could defect from the agreed value since providing
a service of low quality results in a higher payo® for the SP agent and lower
payo®s for the user agents. In the MMPD, adding this issue equates to
extending the game matrix (shown in ¯gure 5.3) horizontally since this issue
provides ¯ with a larger range of issues to defect on.
(b) Connection usage, usage - the usage is only added to the set of negotiable
issues by an SP agent if the SU agent wishing to contract it cannot be trusted
on the time of payment and the security restrictions it should normally respect
(see table 5.4). SU agents can additionally defect from an agreed usage by
loading the bandwidth more than agreed causing a loss in e±ciency in the
SP's servers managing the channel. In the MMPD, adding this issue equates
to extending the game matrix (shown in ¯gure 5.3) vertically since this issue
provides ® with a larger range of issues to defect on.
Prior to contract execution, the agents engage in negotiations to reach an agreement over
the above-named issues. Once a contract is signed, the agents commit themselves to the
values agreed upon. Di®erent values for the above issues result in di®erent executions
of the contract, each with a di®erent utility to both agents. Defections result from
achieving the values which give a utility gain to one agent (SP or SU) and a utility loss
to the other (SU or SP). A walk through the use of CREDIT, taking into consideration
all the above factors, is given in appendix B. The experimental setup is described in the
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5.4.2 Experimental Setup
There are two aspects of CREDIT to be tested (as discussed in section 5.3): (i) de¯ning
issues to be negotiated upon; and (ii) de¯ning negotiation intervals. As was pointed
out in section 5.3, CREDIT also performs partner selection based on trust. However,
the behaviour of the model in this respect follows from the results of the other two
mentioned above since these will also show how well CREDIT detects defectors and how
fast the trust value changes accordingly. Therefore, to evaluate whether the CREDIT
model does indeed bring added value to the agents, it is necessary to show how agents
using the model can identify and cope with agents of di®erent execution strategies26
with respect to enacting the contents of a contract.
In more detail, we will show how the trust model helps agents cope with other agents
which (i) either defect (i.e. achieve the worst possible values for issues for their opponent)
or cooperate (i.e. enact the contract) completely, and (ii) defect in degrees (i.e defecting
from the values agreed to a limited extent). These execution strategies exploit the basic
moves we described in the MMPD in ¯gure 5.3 (see beginning of section 5.4). To this
end we devise two sets of experiments with execution strategies as de¯ned below27:
1. Experimental set 1 deals with extreme defection or cooperative execution strategies
(i.e. with maximum defection or cooperation degrees or both):
(a) philanthropic (P) { never defects, and always delivers what has been agreed
in the contract.
(b) nasty (N) { always defects maximally and achieves whatever brings it maxi-
mum expected utility.
(c) tit-for-tat (TFT) { defects when the opponent defects but cooperates fully
on the ¯rst contract.
(d) strategic defector (STDefect) { defects and cooperates alternatively in an
attempt to keep up its opponent's trust on it, thus exploiting the latter.
2. Experimental set 2 deals with agents that have ¯xed degrees of defection. To this
end we de¯ne the degree defector (DDd) as a defector which defects from an agreed
value by a degree d in the range d 2 [0;1]. The value d represents the maximum
fraction (of the range of values that the issue can take) that the agent will defect
by.
These two experimental sets generally cater for behaviours commonly encountered in
e-commerce. For example, degree defectors could represent ine±cient companies, com-
26Here we distinguish an execution strategy as being the behaviour an agent adopts when enacting
the contents of a contract from a negotiation strategy that is used in negotiating the contract.
27We exploit those strategies commonly used in assessing trust models (since Axelrod's experiments
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plete defectors represent hackers or spammers while philanthropic and tit-for-tat agents
represent well established companies or sellers (e.g. on eBay or Amazon).
In the remainder of the chapter, we will denote the strategy used by an agent by tag-
ging the strategy identi¯er with the role of the agent. For example, P-SP denotes a
philanthropic SP agent and N-SU denotes a nasty SU agent. Wherever we will need to
test our results for statistical signi¯cance we will use ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance
between groups) to analyse the means of samples of di®erent sizes to ensure that our
means indeed exhibit the properties we seek, and as a result to prove or disprove our
hypotheses.
The same fuzzy sets applying over utility deviations are given to each agent to charac-
terise the performance of an opponent's issues of a contract.28 Speci¯cally, the three
fuzzy sets Bad, Medium, and Good are de¯ned using linear functions based on ¯gure
5.1. The basic settings for these experiments are summarised in table 5.6 and the utility
functions together with the weight each issue has in the overall utility of each type of
agent are given in table 5.7.
µmin 50
No. of speci¯ed issues 4
No. of unspeci¯ed issues 2
Institution Rules de¯ned as per table 5.5
Fuzzy Sets Bad, Average, Good
Level of Con¯dence of Risk 95%
Table 5.6: Basic settings of the experiments for sets 1, 2 and 3.
Uc;!c Us;!s Ul;!l Utc;!tc Uqos;!qos Uusage;!usage
SP c
200;0:05 1 ¡ s
12;0:05 l
6;0:1 1 ¡ tc;0:1 1 ¡
q
16;0:5 1 ¡
usage
100 ;0:2
SU 1 ¡ c
100;0:5 s
4;0:2 1 ¡ l
10;0:1 tc
90;0:1
q
8;0:05
usage
200 ;0:05
Table 5.7: Utility functions used in the experiments for SP and SU agents. Note
that all agents of each type (SU or SP) have the same utility functions but may have
di®erent execution strategies.
These weights were chosen such that the agents play the MMPD (see section 4.2).
Moreover, more weight is given to `speci¯ed' issues than to `unspeci¯ed' ones given
that we expect an agent to consider those speci¯ed issues as more important than the
unspeci¯ed ones (since the former are always negotiated). Finally, the calculation of the
overall trust value for each type of agent is given in table 5.8. As can be seen, the SU
agent weighs its trust in each issue respecting the order of the weight each issue has in
28We expect these fuzzy sets to be di®erent for each agent in realistic applications. This di®erence
in perception (which fuzzy sets express) will matter whenever agents are meant to exchange reputation
values. However, this is a feature which we do not use here since the reputation values are assumed to
be available from the society and we wish to keep a focus on the analysis of direct interactions rather
than delve into the topic of aggregation of reputation values. See (Ramchurn et al., 2004b) for a wider
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its utility function (and similarly for the SP agent). This assumes the agent will choose
an opponent it trusts most on those issues it considers most important. In remaining
T(®;¯) = 0:5 £ T(®;¯;c) + 0:4 £ T(®;¯;s) + 0:1 £ T(®;¯;qos)
T(¯;®) = 0:5 £ T(¯;®;tc) + 0:4 £ T(¯;®;l) + 0:1 £ T(¯;®;usage)
Table 5.8: Calculation of trust values for an SU agent ® and an SP agent ¯.
subsections we detail the di®erent experiments performed to test CREDIT when used
by agents with di®erent strategies. The behaviour of CREDIT is not speci¯cally tested
for one shot interactions. In such cases, we expect CREDIT to use the reputation
model connected to it (e.g. REGRET, SPORAS or HISTOS) to dictate what should
the behaviour be (Ramchurn et al., 2004d). Moreover, in the one-shot interaction case
where the only interaction partner available has a low reputation, an agent might choose
to interact within the framework of an institution which guarantees all or most of the
terms of contracts they make.
5.4.3 Experimental Set 1: Facing Extreme Strategies
In this set of experiments, pairs of agents with extreme execution strategies 1 to 4 (as
per section 5.4.2) negotiate contracts with each other and enact them after coming to
an agreement.
5.4.3.1 Using Norms and Trust in Negotiation
Having proposed to use a combination of norms and trust at negotiation time in section
5.3.2.2, here we test CREDIT to see whether this combination can actually enhance
negotiation encounters. Speci¯cally, we applied the following rules to the issues (based
on those rules explained in section 5.3.2.2):
² Rule 1 : If T(SU;SP;c) ¸ 0:9 and T(SU;SP;s) > 0:95 Then avoid negotiating
qos.29
This rule means that the SU agent will avoid negotiating the quality of service if
it trusts that the SP agent will not defect on the price and the size of bandwidth.
This is based on a norm in SU's group which says that qos is normally understood
to be of a given type if the price and size of bandwith are of a certain value (see
table 5.4). The same norm might not apply in the SP's group.
29We use thresholds above or equal to 0:9 to indicate a high threshold on trust. This imposes stringent
conditions on the trustworthiness of the opponent for the issues the proponent values most. Lower
thresholds could be imposed to compensate for any noise in perceiving the performance of the opponent,
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² Rule 2 : If T(SP;SU;tc) ¸ 0:99 and T(SP;SU;l) > 0:9 Then avoid negotiating
usage.
This rule means that the SP agent will avoid negotiating bandwidth usage if it
trusts the SU agent will honour its payment in time and if it satis¯es the security
level (see table 5.4).
Given our expectations regarding the e®ect of norms and trust on the negotiation process
and in particular on the number of o®ers exchanged in the process (i.e. the negotiation
thread) which may determine the time taken to come to an agreement, we postulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The more issues negotiated due to trust being low, the lengthier will be
the negotiation thread using standard negotiation strategies.
In order to test this hypothesis, we set a P-SU agent to negotiate with a P-SP agent given
the rules set above.30 For this experiment, the two agents use o®-the-shelf negotiation
strategies such as Relative and Absolute tit-for-tat.31 In order to vary the number of
issues to be considered at negotiation time, we reduced each agent's trust in the premises
of the norms accordingly and then kept the trust values ¯xed for each subset of these
experiments. For example, one subset of the experiments would involve only Rule 1
above not ¯ring given that trust in price or size would be high (i.e. T(SU;SP;c) > 0:99).
In order to keep all other variables constant, CREDIT was prevented from modifying the
negotiation ranges at runtime as well (as per section 5.3.2.1) since changing negotiation
ranges changes the number of possible agreements and the value of those agreements to
the agents.
Rule 2
Rule 1 Fires Does not Fire
Fires 3.084 3.286
Does not Fire 3.308 3.47
Table 5.9: The e®ect of norms on the average length of the negotiation thread needed
to reach an agreement (results from P-SU v/s P-SP with rules 1 and 2 ¯ring alterna-
tively and together)
Table 5.9 outlines the e®ect of these rules on the negotiation encounters. As can be seen,
our hypothesis is validated since agents can reduce the length of negotiation threads (by
11% in the best case) needed on average to reach an agreement whenever they trust
30In this experiment, we disconnect the trust evaluation (used in changing negotiation ranges) com-
ponent of CREDIT in order to specify conditions where trust is low independent of the strategy and
thus simplify the analysis we wish to make here.
31Other negotiation strategies could be used but the variable we study here is not strictly dependent
on the negotiation strategy and it is only our intention to show that a di®erence in the number of issues
considered will a®ect the negotiation e±ciency. We therefore use those simple negotiation strategies that
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No. of issues 4 5a 5b 6
Average Utility 0.465 0.4640 0.4645 0.4647
Table 5.10: The e®ect of the number of issues negotiated on the average utility of
agreements for a P-SU agent (results from P-SU v/s P-SP). 5a and 5b represent the
¯ve issues that are negotiated given that only one rule ¯res for either the SP or SU
respectively.
their counterparts.32 While this enables agents to achieve agreements faster (i.e. they
might take less time to negotiate), it is questionable whether the conclusion of the rules
(i.e. qos and usage) should be negotiated at all.33 This is because, even though these
issues are given acceptable values according to the norms, it cannot be guaranteed that
these values are the best that could be achieved given the preferences of both agents
negotiating. In fact, we might expect a trade-o® between accelerating negotiation based
on norms and making better agreements (i.e. achieving higher utility). However, from
the above experiments it was also found that the gain (or loss) in average utility achieved
was not substantial when more issues were negotiated as can be seen in table 5.10 (in this
case the agent lost utility when more issues were negotiated since the newly negotiated
issues are assigned lower values than those they usually get when trust is high and the
issue is not negotiated).34 This is because the issues, only negotiated due to rules not
¯ring, do not have substantial weight in the utility function of the agent. Otherwise,
we would expect these issues to form part of the initial negotiable set (e.g. price and
size are important issues that need to be negotiated since they contribute signi¯cantly
to the utility of the agent).
In summary, the above results tell us that CREDIT will cause fewer issues to be nego-
tiated when trust is high and more issues to be negotiated when trust is low. Moreover,
CREDIT has been shown not to signi¯cantly reduce the maximum achievable utility
in negotiated contracts by applying norms (when the issues added do not signi¯cantly
impact on the utility of agents). Therefore, we decided to keep the rules above in future
negotiations in the following experiments in order to speed up negotiations.
32These results were tested for statistical signi¯cance using ANOVA (single factor) and the null hy-
pothesis (i.e. that the means of the groups are the same) was invalidated. This follows from the fact
that F = 9:07 > Fcrit = 3:5 > 1, with p = 5:8 £ 10
¡6,® = 0:01, and a sample size of 500. This result
proves that each rule indeed has an e®ect on the outcome. To further investigate the interaction between
di®erent rules, we used ANOVA on the results for rule 1 and rule 2 alone ¯ring. The results are as follows
for ® = 0:025 and a sample size of 500: F = 5:004 < Fcrit = 5:006, and p = 0:0258 > ®. As can be seen,
the means do not signi¯cantly di®er in this context (i.e. since F < Fcrit). This is because these two
samples actually test the negotiation length using the same number of issues where these issues have
been obtained from di®erent rules ¯ring. The low value of m = 3:084 can be explained by the fact that
less issues have to be negotiated (i.e. four issues as compared to ¯ve or six in the other cases).
33In our experiments, when the issues are not negotiated, we choose the value lying in the middle of
the intersection of the agents' acceptable ranges for these issues.
34These results were checked for statistical signi¯cance using ANOVA (single factor) which tries to
identify signi¯cant di®erences between means of di®erent samples (of 500 elements) of utility of contracts.
Thus, the means obtained were found not to be signi¯cantly di®erent (i.e. the null hypothesis that the
means are the same is validated) given F = 0:08 < Fcrit = 3:6 with ® = 0:12. This means that the
di®erence in means is more due to chance than the number of issues' in°uence.122 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
5.4.3.2 Trust and Negotiation Intervals
Here, we aim to assess how well CREDIT can recognize defectors and adjust its negoti-
ation intervals accordingly. We therefore tested CREDIT on pairs of agents with each
combination of strategies (we consider all strategies except degree defectors) in sequence
and recorded the number of contracts agreed upon, the trust values throughout the
experiments, the utility of contracts achieved and executed, and the number of issues
negotiated.35
There are four experimental variables that we will vary in order to see their impact on
the behaviour of the agents (note that agents cannot change their trust value during
negotiations): (i) the execution (as opposed to the negotiation) strategies used by pairs
of agents, (ii) the reputation of the interacting agents, (iii) the point at which the
agreement is made, and (iv) the extent to which the negotiation ranges of pairs of
agents coincide. The ¯rst two variables can be preset by simply pairing agents with
di®erent (or same) execution strategies (e.g. TFT v/s N or P v/s P) and hardwiring
the reputation levels on each fuzzy set at di®erent levels (and elicit di®erent initial
trust values). The agreement point could be set by the agents' negotiation strategies.
However, using such strategies results in a di®erent agreement point for each negotiation
such that it is di±cult to extract the general trend and analyse it. Therefore we set the
agreeement points as follows.
From ¯gure 5.4, we can set the degree of alignment between negotiation ranges, ¸, as:
¸ =
w
z
(5.14)
where z is the whole range covered by the negotiation ranges and w is the range of values
describing the intersection of the negotiation ranges.
Given that the negotiation range of agent ® is noted as [v®
min;v®
max], and that of agent
¯ is noted as [v
¯
min;v
¯
max], and assuming that v®
min and v
¯
max are ¯xed, v®
max and v
¯
min
can easily be adjusted to give di®erent degrees of alignment (i.e. by changing w).
On the other hand, the negotiation power36 of agent ®, Á is set as follows:
Á = 1 ¡
w0
w
(5.15)
where w0 is the distance of the agreement from the lower bound of the intersection (here
the lower bound is of higher utility to agent ®), and w is the range of values describing
35In our case, the one-shot interaction case is experienced when · = 0 where the agents can only rely
on reputation information. Thus, the e®ect of CREDIT on outcomes of one shot interactions can also
be viewed as every point in ¯gures 5.5 or 5.6 for example.
36The negotiation power is here de¯ned as the ability of an agent to shift the agreement to a given
point in the intersection of the negotiation ranges. The higher its negotiation power, the higher is the
utility of the agreement for the agent (and conversely for lower power).Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 123
the intersection of the negotiation ranges. Therefore, given a known v
¯
min and v®
max, the
agreement (i.e. v
¯
min + w0) can be obtained.
The negotiation power tries to capture di®erent bargaining behaviours that agents may
have. Thus, here we do not de¯ne what strategies agents may use to in°uence and reach
the agreement but only specify where this agreement will lie (i.e. what utility they
will bring) for agents with di®erent (or same) negotiation power resulting from their
negotiation strategy (e.g. Boulware and Conceder strategies will concede less and more
respectively in a negotiation encounter and hence, have di®erent negotiation powers).
In so doing, we focus the analysis on the impact of trust on the agreements agents reach
rather than on the bargaining strategies agents might use alongside CREDIT.
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Figure 5.4: Deriving the degree of alignment ¸ and negotiation power Á from the
negotiation ranges of the agents ® and ¯ with ranges [v®
min;v®
max] and [v
¯
min;v¯
max]
respectively.
Given the above de¯nitions we start by testing the model with extreme strategies: P
v/s P and N v/s P, since these are the basic behaviours that TFT and STDefect
implement in di®erent ways to adapt to and exploit their opponent respectively. In so
doing, we aim to show that CREDIT can indeed distinguish between trustworthy (i.e.
P) and untrustworthy agents (i.e. N) and that it will adapt the agents' negotiation
strategies accordingly. In this experiment, the initial trust (based on reputation) of
the pairs of agents was varied between 0 and 1. This was achieved by setting di®erent
reputation levels on each fuzzy set (i.e. Bad, Average, and Good) for each issue (e.g. for
T = 0:96, Rep(s;Bad) = 0:01;Rep(s;Average) = 0:96;Rep(s;Good) = 0)). µmin was
set at 50. The negotiation power was kept at Á = 0:5, while the degree of alignment was
set at ¸ = 0:5 as well. Thus, by ¯xing the negotiation power and degree of alignment, we
determine a ¯xed point of agreement between two agents. However, if the negotiation
ranges of the agents is modi¯ed by CREDIT (see section 5.3.2.1), this point of agreement
changes for subsequent negotiation encounters.
With these settings and using equations to derive the trust value and utilities in tables
5.7 and 5.8 and equations 5.7 and 5.11, the agents can reach agreements until the P
agent's trust reaches 0.83. At this point, the P agent's negotiation ranges are shifted
by the maximum possible for all issues and therefore no agreements are then possible.
This is because, the expected utility deviations are such that they extend the (expected)
enacted range of values beyond the acceptable range of values (see procedure in equation124 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
5.11). In what follows, we discuss the observations made using these settings.
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Figure 5.5: Trust and Utility of a P-SP faced with a P-SU agent (the baseline at
Utility = 0.45 represents the utility of a contract signed when trust = 1).
First, when a P-SU and a P-SP agent are made to negotiate and execute contracts with
each other, it was seen that the agents would come to agree on all negotiated contracts.
The trust held by the two agents settled at 1.0 throughout the experiment for di®erent
starting values of reputation as shown in ¯gure 5.5. As expected, below a trust of 0.83
(i.e. the equivalent con¯dence level set for all the labels of each issue handled by the SP
agent), there is no possible agreement. Moreover, the high trust reached in the long run,
enlarges negotiation ranges up to their maximum (with respect to the alignment) and
reduces the number of issues to be negotiated down to 4. These factors make way for
more agreements. However, with high trust, the agents do not shrink their negotiation
ranges such that agreements are made in more relaxed negotiation ranges (given Á = 0:5).
This is why the utility of contracts made by the P-SP agent decreases as trust increases.
Also, the gradient of the di®erent trust lines are dependent on the di®erence between
con¯dence levels and reputation levels. Hence, the larger the di®erence (i.e. the lower
the reputation), the larger is the gradient (see equation 5.4).
We then set an N-SU agent against a P-SP agent.37 The impact of trust on the agree-
ments reached is shown in ¯gure 5.6. As can be seen, if the agent has an initial trust
of 1.0 (i.e. all issues have high con¯dence levels based on reputation), the cut-o® trust
value of 0.83 is reached as the e®ect of reputation tails o® (given µmin = 50). At
37Similar results were observed when the roles of the agents were reversed and it is only as a matter
of convenience and succintness that we choose to mention SU v/s SP interactions.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 125
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Figure 5.6: Trust and Utility of a P-SP faced with a N-SU agent with di®erent
starting trust values.
this value of trust, no more interactions are possible between the two agents. More-
over, the value of deals made for the P-SP agent increases as trust decreases. This
is because the P-SP agent negotiates for higher prices and shorter time of payment,
for example, as trust decreases (i.e. as the con¯dence levels settle at low values). In
so doing, it is decreasing the negotiation range until no further agreements can be
reached. This is why all interactions stop after the 39th;32nd and 11th interaction when
the initial trust is 1.0, 0.957, and 0.91 respectively. These initial trust values are ob-
tained by setting the reputation on the issues handled by the opponent at di®erent
values. Thus for a trust of 1.0, a high level of reputation is set for all issues (i.e.
Rep(x;Average) = 1;Rep(x;Bad) = 0;Rep(x;Good) = 0 where x 2 fc;s;qosg). For
T = 0:95, the reputation levels are the same for all issues as well and are set such that
Rep(x;Bad) = 0:05;Rep(x;Average) = 0:99;Rep(x;Good) = 0 and the trust value is
calculated as per equation 5.8 and table 5.8. On the other hand, for T = 0:91, the
following values are given to each issue in order to simulate the fact that least important
issues (in the trust function) have lower reputation levels (i.e. an opponent defects most
of the time on the least important issues): Rep(c;Bad) = 0:07;Rep(c;Average) =
0:99;Rep(c;Good) = 0:1, used for the most weighted issue c in the trust function,
while Rep(s;Bad) = 0:1;Rep(s;Average) = 0:95;Rep(s;Good = 0) for the second most
weighted issue s and Rep(qos;Bad) = 0:15;Rep(qos;Average) = 0:94;Rep(qos;Good) =
0 for the least weighted issue qos.
The number of agreements reached also depends on the reputation based trust (or initial126 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
trust) since it determines what the initial negotiation ranges are. Thus, the lower the
initial trust, the smaller the negotiation ranges will be (i.e. the negotiation range is
shrunk so as to lead to more pro¯table contracts as described in section 5.3.2.1). This
leads to higher utility agreements (for the P-SP) agent being achieved. A defection by
an opponent therefore causes a higher utility loss when the trust in it is initially low than
the utility loss we obtain when trust is initially high (i.e. when contracts may be of lower
utility). Thus, the P-SP agent shrinks its negotiation ranges faster when the initial trust
is low than when it is high and therefore comes to less agreements. Moreover, depending
on the weighting of the issue on which an opponent is less trustworthy (see table 5.8),
the defections on di®erent issues will cause an equivalently weighted change to the trust
value. Thus, even if trust starts at 0.91, those issues which have a low weight in the
trust function will already have low con¯dence levels such that many agreements are not
possible and the cut-o® trust value only reaches 0.87. Thus, defections on less important
issues cause negotiations to end in disagreements even though the overall trust value
might still be high.
The above results lead us to expect that, in any case, nasty agents will be avoided in the
long run by all other types of agents which negotiate with them. The avoidance is made
at negotiation time rather than when selecting the agent for an interaction (i.e. before
negotiation). If the agent is avoided at selection time (i.e. another agent is selected
instead), then it is not given any opportunity to prove its trustworthiness. Selection
at negotiation time actually gives a chance to a nasty agent to be trustworthy (i.e. by
changing its execution strategy) in order to be accepted in the future (here its execution
strategy is ¯xed to be nasty). As a result, we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Untrustworthy agents (i.e. those attracting low trust) achieve fewer agree-
ments than trustworthy ones.
In order to test this hypothesis, we analysed the number of agreements reached by pairs
of SU and SP agents using di®erent strategies and for di®erent degrees of alignment
between the negotiation ranges of the two parties. Here, we alter the alignment between
the negotiation ranges since this alignment is modi¯ed whenever agents are deemed
untrustworthy and this can, in turn, in°uence the number of successful agreements
achieved. The negotiation power was set at Á = 0:5 and the initial trust based on
reputation was set to be 1.0 by ¯xing the con¯dence level on each issue to 1 for the
set `Average' and zero for the others (we discuss how altering these values can change
the results later). It is to be noted that with the initial trust set at 1.0, agents will be
bound to make a number of interactions before their personal measures of trust take
over. Using a high initial level of trust also allows us to study the worst case scenario
where an agent has a wrong perception of its opponent given the information it gets
from society and then uses CREDIT to learn the real behaviour of its opponents.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 127
Alignment (¸)
Pairing 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
NSU-NSP 8 21 39 80 494
NSU-PSP 8 21 39 80 494
NSU-STDefectSP 8 21 39 80 494
NSU-TFTSP 8 21 39 80 494
PSU-NSP 8 21 39 80 494
PSU-PSP all all all all all
PSU-TFTSP all all all all all
TFTSU-TFTSP all all all all all
TFTSU-PSP all all all all all
PSU-STDefectSP 16 40 all all all
STDefectSU-NSP 8 21 39 80 494
STDefectSU-PSP 16 40 all all all
STDefectSU-STDefectSP 16 40 all all all
STDefectSU-TFTSP 16 40 all all all
TFTSU-NSP 8 21 39 80 494
TFTSU-STDefectSP 16 40 all all all
Table 5.11: Number of successful negotiations achieved given a varying degree of
alignment ¸. ¸ = 0 means that the negotiation ranges of the two agents have no
intersection (i.e. no agreement possible) and ¸ = 1 means that they always have an
intersection (i.e. all agreements possible). The word `all' means that the pair of agents
concerned can ¯nd an agreement for any number of interactions simulated (in practice,
however, they may not reach an agreement due to imperfections in the negotiation
strategies).
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Figure 5.7: Number of agreements reached by N faced with P (similar results are
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The results of the experiments are shown in table 5.11 and the main observations are as
follows:
² Whenever the alignment of negotiation ranges ¸ · 0:5, pairs of P agents and TFT
agents still manage to reach agreements. This is because these pairs maintain high
trust and always ¯nd a coinciding point to agree upon (TFT behaves the same as
P if faced with P and TFT). When TFT is faced with N or STDefect in any
pairing of SU and SP, the TFT will react in the same way as the N strategy after
the ¯rst interaction, resulting in the agents achieving fewer agreements.
² Whenever N or STDefect agents are interacting with other or same agents, the
number of agreements reached increases with the degree of alignment. This is
because, given maximal defections by strategies such as N, STDefect, and TFT,
the rate of reduction of the negotiation range by CREDIT changes with respect to
the size of the alignment. Thus, the higher the alignment, the higher the rate of re-
duction. This is because the defection sensed is dependent on the agreement point
chosen in the intersection which, in turn, depends on the size of the alignment (as
determined in equation 5.14 and explained in section 5.4.3.2) . However, this rate
of reduction is always less than the rate of increase in the intersection of negoti-
ation ranges (since the agreement point lies midway due to Á = 0:5). Therefore,
agents will negotiate with defectors more when the alignment is increased.
² When an N agent interacts with P, STDefect, or TFT agents, the increase in the
number of agreements is quadratic with respect to the alignment degree as shown
on ¯gure 5.7. The relationship is quadratic since the calculation of the negotiation
ranges is dependent on the calculation of the con¯dence interval which is itself
quadratic with respect to the intersection of negotiation ranges.38
² For values of ¸ > 0:25, STDefect agents are always interacted with since the trust
level in that type of agent remains su±ciently high, at 0.88, (since it defects and
cooperates alternatingly) to keep negotiation ranges intersecting when the degree of
alignment is moderately large. While this allows the STDefect agent to exploit its
opponent when it defects, it also allows other agents to make pro¯table contracts
with it whenever it cooperates (rather than completely avoiding it). Moreover,
given that the contracts agreed upon have a higher value for STDefect's opponent
(given negotiation ranges are shrunk because of an expected defection), the latter
is able to make an additional pro¯t with expected value (0:58¡0:45)£0:5 = 0:065
(where 0.58 and 0.45 are the values of the contract when trust is 0.88 and 1
38The calculation of the con¯dence interval involves using the square root of the number of samples
under consideration (in approximating to a normal distribution as described in section 5.2.3.2). Increas-
ing the range of samples (or degree of alignment) means that to achieve an equivalent con¯dence interval,
which closes the intersection for a smaller degree of alignment, would require squaring the number of
agreements. Hence the relationship is quadratic.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 129
Negotiation Power (Á)
Pairing 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0
NSU-NSP 19 20 21 20 19
NSU-PSP 24 23 21 20 19
NSU-STDefectSP 24 23 21 20 19
NSU-TFTSP 19 20 21 20 19
PSU-NSP 24 23 21 20 19
PSU-PSP all all all all all
PSU-TFTSP all all all all all
TFTSU-TFTSP all all all all all
TFTSU-PSP all all all all all
PSU-STDefectSP 36 38 40 42 46
STDefectSU-NSP 19 20 21 23 24
STDefectSU-PSP 46 42 40 38 36
STDefectSU-STDefectSP 36 38 40 38 36
STDefectSU-TFTSP 36 38 40 38 36
TFTSU-NSP 19 20 21 20 19
TFTSU-STDefectSP 36 38 40 38 36
Table 5.12: Number of successful negotiations achieved when varying the negotiation
power. Á = 0 means that the SU agent has no power at all and 1 means that the SU
agent is always able to achieve the most pro¯table values for its issues.
respectively and 0.5 captures the fact that STDefect cooperates half of the time)
since the STDefect always achieves the agreed value whenever it cooperates!39
Given that the utility loss detected is dependent on the value of the initial agreement,
we would expect it to change according to the negotiation power the agents have. Given
this, and the above observations regarding defectors and the number of agreements
reached, we postulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. When a high negotiation power agent is faced with an untrustworthy one,
the pair of agents will come to fewer agreements than when the negotiation power is
low.
To test this hypothesis, we ¯x the degree of alignment of negotiation ranges to 0.25
(to observe the e®ect on STDefect and other strategies) and see whether varying the
negotiation power alters the number of agreements reached. As can be seen in table 5.12,
the negotiation power directly a®ects the number of agreements achieved particularly
39CREDIT is slower to react to defections that occur after a past number of cooperative interactions.
Such an event may happen when the opponent knows that it is the last time it is going to interact (i.e.
the endgame). The slowness of CREDIT is due to the positive utility loss element being added to an
already long list of non-positive utility loss elements of a sample of utility deviations. As a result, the
mean of the sample will not be very much a®ected. Thus, the larger the number of non-positive utility
loss elements in the sample the less will be the change in the sample mean when a positive utility loss
element is added. Moreover, the behaviour of CREDIT could be made more sensitive to variations over
time by tightening the window over the history of interactions is analysed and giving more importance
to latest interactions than older ones as in the REGRET system.130 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
when agents are faced with N, STDefect or TFT. Thus, the higher the negotiation
power of a trustworthy agent when faced with an untrustworthy one, the lower the
number of agreements reached. This is because the higher negotiation power of the
trustworthy agent causes the agreement to settle at a higher utility for the trustworthy
agent than when its power is lower. Thus, a defection from its opponent is sensed as
a stronger defection than when its negotiation power is lower. This leads to a faster
reduction of trust and negotiation ranges and fewer agreements.
To understand how both the alignment of negotiation ranges ¸ and the negotiation power
Á can a®ect the number of agreements reached, Á and ¸ were varied in an experiment
involving a N-SU v/s P-SP agent40 and the results plotted in ¯gure 5.8. The reputation
of both agents was initially set to be 1. As can be seen, there exists a quadratic relation-
ship between the number of agreements and both the negotiation power and alignment
when low values of trust exist in the interaction partners. For very high alignments and
low negotiation power, the trustworthy side will take more interactions to see that its
opponent is untrustworthy while if the alignment is small and the negotiation power is
high, it will take less interactions to do so. This is because the larger the alignment and
smaller the negotiation power, the smaller are the defections sensed. This is because
contracts made under such conditions will already be of low value to the trustworthy
agent (since the opponent has a higher negotiation power). Thus, when the opponent
defects, the utility loss sensed is not high enough to signi¯cantly a®ect the trust value.
On the other hand, the larger the negotiation power of the trustworthy agent the more
utility the contracts will have for the latter. Consequently, defections by its opponent
will result in signi¯cant utility losses (such that trust is signi¯cantly a®ected). In this
case, the smaller the degree of alignment of negotiation ranges, the quicker will be the
reduction of the negotiation ranges. Moreover, it is noted that the degree of alignment
has a greater importance in determining the number of agreements reached than the
negotiation power. This is because the alignment of negotiation ranges determines the
space of possible agreements while the negotiation power only changes the point at which
the agreement is made in that space (as seen from equations 5.14 and 5.15). Thus, when
negotiation ranges are shrunk due to low trust, the negotiation power barely changes
the value of agreement (particularly when Á is high) while the alignment, which itself
determines by how much negotiation ranges can be shrunk, signi¯cantly a®ects the point
at which the agreement is made.
5.4.4 Experimental Set 2: Facing Degree Defectors
Having investigated CREDIT's behaviour with di®erent opponents with extreme strate-
gies in the previous section, we now aim to test how CREDIT can manage with oppo-
40The choice of these strategies for the experiment is only made to simplify the analysis. We expect
the same properties to be exhibited with other pairings since the shape of the curves are independent
of the strategies, although the actual intercepts may not be the same.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 131
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Figure 5.8: Number of agreements reached between a N v/s P for various alignment
degrees and negotiation power.
nents which do not always defect maximally, but rather defect by a given degree. This
is important because agents may not always be faced with opponents that always coop-
erate or defect. Indeed, the performance of the opponent might lie in-between these two
extreme strategies. For example, an SP agent may defect to some degreee by uncondi-
tionally charging a transaction fee for supplying bandwidth even though this may not
be included in the contract. Thus the SU agents could ¯nd themselves paying a price
that lies outside their set of acceptable prices. An SU agent might also be paying for
the bandwidth by posting a cheque such that it always adds two more days to tc. The
SP agent may therefore ¯nd itself getting the money after its acceptable deadline. In
general, we believe a trust model should be able to adjust the behaviour of an agent
such that it is still able to come to some form of agreement with such defectors. Thus, it
should allow the agent to still make pro¯table contracts (e.g. by specifying more strin-
gent conditions or penalties that cover the losses) when evolving in environments where
not all agents perform contracts perfectly (or are perceived as doing so).41
We focus on experiments where only one of the two agents defect.42 This allows us to
focus on the in°uence of CREDIT on the negotiation and rule out other possibilities
for the observations made. First we test to see if CREDIT is able to recognise such de-
fectors with varying degrees of alignment of the interacting agents' negotiation ranges.
The agents are ¯rst given high reputation (i.e. trust value 1.0) and the agents have
41Generally current trust models, such as (Sen et al., 2000; Birk, 2001) or (Yu and Singh, 2002b), do
not cater for this type of defection. Those models which do (e.g. REGRET (Sabater and Sierra, 2002),
Schillo et al. (Schillo et al., 2000)) do not use the information about degree defectors in any signi¯cant
way apart from partner selection.
42We report experiments where the SU agents are defectors. However, the behaviour of CREDIT does
not change if we reverse the roles.132 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
Degree of Alignment(¸)
Defection 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
0.2 all all all all all
0.4 11 30 all all all
0.6 8 21 42 all all
0.8 8 21 39 118 all
0.9 8 21 39 80 all
Table 5.13: Number of agreements reached with degree defectors with di®erent de-
grees of alignment of negotiation ranges.
equal negotiation power. Thus, initially agents are expected to negotiate with relaxed
negotiation ranges until they assimilate the trustworthiness of their opponent. In so
doing, we see whether the agents will avoid a degree defector if the degree of defection
is too high for the negotiation ranges a®orded by the trustworthy agent. To this end,
table 5.13 records the number of agreements reached for di®erent degrees of alignment.
As can be seen, the number of agreements reached by the defectors increases with in-
creasing degrees of alignment. This is because the agents have larger negotiation ranges
and therefore they are able to adjust them su±ciently such that the higher degrees of
defection still end up being pro¯table. Given this, we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. For di®erent degrees of alignment of negotiation ranges, an agent using
CREDIT is able to adjust its negotiation ranges to prevent defections by its opponent
lying outside its acceptable regions.
To check if CREDIT is always able to pro¯tably adjust negotiation ranges, we recorded
the di®erence between the utility of the executed contract and the value of the contract
for minimum acceptable values of the issues the opponent handles in the contract. If
the result is negative, the enacted values lie outside the acceptable ranges and if it is
positive or zero, then the enacted values lie within the acceptable ranges. We study a pair
consisting of a P-SP agent and a DD0:2-SU agent with di®erent degrees of alignment.43
The graphs obtained for other degrees of defection were found to be similar in nature
for various degrees of alignment.
As can be seen, when the alignment is low (0.1 and 0.25), the P agent su®ers some
utility loss for some part of the deals (i.e. 23 and 35 deals respectively). During these
interactions, the high reputation contributes to the high trust in the defector (since
43DD0:2 means that the agent defects by a degree of defection of 0.2 on all issues it handles. This
means that the agent always pays at most 4 days late (i.e 0:2 £ (30 ¡ 10)), abides by a security level
which is at most 1 level lower (i.e 0:2£(6¡1)), and uses the connection at a rate of 19 connections/min
at most (i.e. 0:2 £ (100 ¡ 5)) more than agreed (where the multipliers represent the range of values for
the issues concerned). We choose a degree of defection of 0:2 to provide a better analysis of the e®ect of
the degree of alignment on the behaviour of CREDIT when faced with degree defectors (since CREDIT
achieves all possible agreements with DD0:2 as seen in table 5.13).Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 133
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Figure 5.9: Utility change for P-SP agent (v/s DD0:2-SU) after execution of contracts
relative to acceptable contracts for di®erent levels of alignment.
jCB®;¯j < µmin = 50) and this causes negotiation ranges to be relaxed for some in-
teractions. However, after having adjusted its negotiation ranges according to its own
con¯dence levels in the defector (i.e. jCB®;¯j > µmin), the P agent su®ers no more utility
losses. Moreover, the utility of signed contracts is seen to rise with a larger alignment
of the negotiation ranges, such that the P agent is able to increase its utility gain. This
leads us to postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. When facing increasing degrees of defection, an agent using CREDIT is
able to adjust the negotiation ranges so as to engage in pro¯table interactions.
Having tested how CREDIT fares with di®erent degrees of alignment in the previous set
of experiments, we now wish to see how it is able to cope with increasing degrees of de-
fection for a given ¯xed degree of alignment. From table 5.13 we can see that for degrees
of alignment below 0.75, the number of agreements reached by high degree defectors
(i.e. 0.8 or 0.9) is less than for low degree defectors. While this provides evidence that
high degree defectors will be avoided in the long run, for higher degrees of alignment it
is not apparent that CREDIT still manages to enforce pro¯table interactions. To test
for this property, we recorded the utility gain with respect to acceptable contracts (as
in the previous experiment) for di®erent degrees of defection (see ¯gure 5.10). Here,
the agents are all assumed to have high reputation and the degree of alignment is set
to 0.75. As can be seen, CREDIT is indeed able to pro¯tably adjust negotiation ranges
against low degree defectors or else it shrinks the negotiation ranges su±ciently so as to
prevent agreements from being reached with high degree defectors. This validates our
hypothesis.44 Moreover, note that given our de¯nition of degree of defection (see section
44It is also to be noted that all the models su®er a jump in utility losses on the ¯rst few interactions.134 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
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Figure 5.10: Utility change for P-SP agent (v/s DDn-SU), for n =
f0:2;0:4;0:6;0:8;0:9g, after execution of contracts relative to acceptable contracts for
di®erent levels of alignment.
5.4.2), if values of a contract are close to the edges of the negotiation range, the degree
defectors cannot be easily di®erentiated from each other.
It should also be noted that the utility gain for the 0.9 defector stays at -0.1 for all deals
made. This is because this agent defects so as to achieve a contract that is at most equal
to 90% of the maximum defection possible on a given issue and is therefore avoided after
a small number of interactions (80 as in the case of nasty agents in table 5.11). Thus for
values contracted that lie closer to the maximum degree of defection, the 0.9 defector
will act in the same way as a nasty agent. For example, a 0.9 defector SU agent will
defect to the latest possible time of payment (i.e. 30 days) if tc has been contracted for
29 days. Otherwise, if tc has been agreed for 30 days, a 0.9 defector SU agent will only
defect to 30 days (i.e. 90% of the interval). Thus for a high degree of alignment such
as ¸ = 0:9 (when the 0.9 defector achieves all contracts), we expect CREDIT to force
the enacted contract to lie as close as possible to the range of acceptable values in the
long run. This should make the utility losses with respect to acceptable contracts tend
to zero. This is con¯rmed by the graph in ¯gure 5.11.
This is due to the rule of the P-SU agent ¯ring (see table 5.4) such that the qos is added to the set of
negotiation issues. Thus a defection on the qos causes the utility losses experience to start at an even
lower value.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 135
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Figure 5.11: Utility change for P-SP agent (v/s DD0:9-SU), after execution of con-
tracts relative to acceptable contracts for ¸ = 0:9.
5.5 Benchmarking CREDIT
Having analysed its performance in isolation, the next step is to put CREDIT's into
context. To this end, we compare CREDIT's e®ectiveness against other comparable
models that are available in the literature. The most relevant models are those by
Witkowski et al. and Marsh (see section 3.1 for more details). We will refer to
Witkowski's model as WT and Marsh's model as MT from now on. In general, these
two models calculate trust by analysing an opponent's behaviour during interactions in
a similar manner to CREDIT (others base trust on reputation and assume an analysis
of interactions (Sabater and Sierra, 2002; Yu and Singh, 2002a; Mui et al., 2002)). Even
though these models do not speci¯cally use trust to in°uence negotiations (which we
will apply them to in our benchmarks), we use them as representative of two classes
of models each having their own merits (as we will see later in this section): (i) those
models that change trust values by arbitrarily set values; (ii) those that are based on
a di®erent model of risk. The formulae used to calculate trust in WT and MT are as
follows:
WT:
Twt(®;¯;x) =
8
> <
> :
Twt(®;¯;x) ¡ ½ £ Twt(®;¯;x) defect
Twt(®;¯;x) + ' £ (1 ¡ Twt(®;¯;x)) cooperate
Twt(®;¯;x) + n £ (1 ¡ Twt(®;¯;x)) faced with DDn
9
> =
> ;
(5.16)
where Twt(®;¯;x) is the trust of ® in ¯ over issue x, ½ weighs the impact of a defection
on the trust value, ' weighs the impact of a cooperation on the trust value and n 2 [0;1]
is a defection degree perceived (i.e. when the defector does not completely cooperate nor
completely defect). WT updates the trust value after each interaction depending on the
behaviour of the opponent. A defection is equivalent to the opponent achieving a less136 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
pro¯table value for an issue such that it causes a utility loss to the agent. Cooperation
is equivalent to enacting the exact values of the issues speci¯ed in a contract. As can be
seen from the above formulae, a given degree of defection is considered as cooperation
rather than defection. Therefore an agent defecting by a given degree will increase its
opponent's trust in it. While we recognise that this equation ¯ts the purpose of the
experiments by Witkowski et al., we consider it counterintuitive to the notion of trust
(and irrational). Therefore, we adopt only the ¯rst two equations in order to capture
cooperations and defections.
MT:
Tmt(®;¯;x) = U®
x (v) £ b Tmt(®;¯;x) (5.17)
where U®
x (v) is the utility of issue x with value v for ® (including its weight in ®'s
utility of a set of issues including x), Tmt(®;¯;x) is the trust of ® in ¯ over issue x.
MT updates the trust in a similar manner to our model by considering the risk involved
in the interaction given the subjective perception on the opponent. b Tmt is actually an
estimation of trust in the opponent given the risk incurred by an agent. While Marsh in
(Marsh, 1994) does not give a concrete implementation for this value in his model, we
calculated it through our probabilistic modelling of the opponent as described in section
5.2.3.2. This method respects the reasoning behind the meaning of b Tmt.
WT and MT do not speci¯cally associate trust with negotiation ranges. Therefore,
we map the trust values obtained from the above equations to the probabilistic model
of utility loss which CREDIT uses to shrink the negotiation ranges. This is achieved
by inverting equation 5.8 and applying the multiplying factors (' and ½ for WT and
U®(x) for MT). For WT we also set ½ = ' = 0:25 (as used in Witkowki's experiments).
Moreover, Twt and Tmt were used in the norms to specify issues that were to be negotiated
or not as speci¯ed in section 5.3.2.2.
With the above settings implemented, the models were tested in a similar manner to
our model as in section 5.4.2. However, here we focus on those aspects where the trust
can directly in°uence the interaction between two agents.45 Therefore, we choose the
following measures to see how well the models are able to elicit and use trust in order
to:
1. Prevent exploitation by a (extreme) defector (e.g. N or STDefect)
2. Allow agents to negotiate contracts with agents which defect by degrees (e.g.
DD0:2 or DD0:4).
45We do not test how agents will choose their interaction partners using trust derived from di®erent
models since this behaviour can be inferred from the results of other experiments which test the model
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Each of these is now detailed in turn.
5.5.1 Experimental Set 1: Facing Extreme Strategies
Here, we base our experiments on the best execution strategy to be used against a
defecting agent irrespective of the trust model. In so doing, we avoid relating the
strategy to the variables to be measured (e.g. a philanthropic agent might do better
with CREDIT but a nasty agent could do better with another trust model). Therefore,
based on Axelrod's experiments, we choose to use the TFT strategy as the execution
strategy of one agent which interacts against a nasty agent or a strategic defector. TFT
was then shown to be better than any other strategy at preventing exploitation (but
never obtained the highest reward itself).
Given this, our ¯rst set of experiments aims to show how well an agent can adapt to a
defecting agent. This aims to show how the agent can detect bad behaviour using its
trust model and alter its own behaviour at negotiation time. To this end, we plot the
trust value of the TFT agent against the number of negotiations the agents go through.
The initial level of trust was set at 1 as in the previous experiments by setting the
reputation values of the fuzzy set `Average' to 1 for all issues and 0 for the other sets.
The results are shown in ¯gure 5.12.
As can be seen, the fastest to react to defections by a nasty agent is WT. Trust goes
down within the ¯rst few interactions settling at 0.83 for a nasty agent and oscillating
until it reaches 0.867 for a strategic defector. CREDIT gradually settles at a value of
0.83 for a nasty agent (after which the agents do not interact) and a value of 0.88 for a
strategic defector. This occurs after around 40 interactions for the nasty agent and 60
interactions for the STDefect agent. MT, which reacts slower than CREDIT, decreases
the trust to a value of 0.952 for the nasty agent and 0.98 for the STDefect agent after
the ¯rst 50 interactions over which the defectors' high reputation prevails.
These results are explained by the formulae used to calculate trust values. According to
equation 5.16, WT decreases or increases trust from 1 by a factor of 0.25. This is an ad-
hoc method of manipulating the trust value. This simple heuristic is based on applying
punitive action for bad behaviour and rewarding for good behaviour (good meaning
cooperation). It e®ectively reduces trust by a relatively large amount (asymptotically
reaching 0 or 1) compared to the other models. Moreover, the values of trust in strategic
defectors and nasty agents are lower than those reached in CREDIT and MT. The latter
models also react more slowly (i.e. they need more interactions to get a reliable rating)
to bad behaviour. This is because they are both based upon a statistical analysis of
the behaviour of an opponent which takes a larger number of interactions to be precise,
while it takes only 20 interactions for WT (60 for CREDIT and MT).
It is to be noted that MT never stops negotiating with both the nasty agent and the138 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
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Figure 5.12: Plots showing trust values of a TFT-SU agent v/s STDefect-SP and
N-SP agents for CREDIT, WT, and MT respectively. For MT, each negotiation it un-
dertakes reaches an agreement meaning that it never stops negotiating with a defector.
strategic defector and always settles on an agreement with them. Therefore, we can
infer that multiplying the utility (or weight) with the trust value (as in equation 5.17)
reduces the e®ect of defections on the trust value, allowing better exploitation by an
opponent (i.e. the nasty agent). Moreover, the weights reduce the in°uence of trust on
negotiations since the loss in con¯dence is reduced whenever a defection occurs.
Instead, CREDIT gives equal importance to all issues at negotiation time. Thus,
CREDIT is able to avoid a nasty agent while still engaging in interactions with the
strategic defector (for a degree of alignment of 0.5). In so doing, CREDIT is still able
to make pro¯table contracts in the long run while WT is not able to do so with the
STDefect agent (at least for the interactions where the latter cooperates). Given that
the strategic defector defects half of the time, the expected utility in any one interaction
with it is half the utility of the issue-value pairs agreed upon. Independent of trust mod-Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 139
els, this expected utility when facing an STDefect agent is 0:5 £ 0:45 = 0:225 (where
0.45 is the value of a contract when trust is 1). However, CREDIT shrinks negotiation
issues since it expects a given `degree' of defection from the STDefect agent. Thus,
when STDefect cooperates, it actually enacts a contract which has a higher value than
the expected degree of defection. Therefore, CREDIT induces an expected utility of
0:5 £ 0:58 = 0:29 (where 0.58 is the utility of the contract for the P agent when nego-
tiation ranges are shrunk when trust is 0.88) and is able to gain more utility than both
WT and MT in the long run (for MT, the expected values is 0:5 £ 0:48 = 0:24).
5.5.2 Experimental Set 2: Facing Degree Defectors
In this set of experiments we aim to compare the performance of the trust models when
the latter are used by agents facing opponents which defect by degrees. Here a P agent
was made to interact with the defectors with negotiation power of 0.5 and degree of
alignment between negotiation ranges of 0.5. The agents using WT and MT were faced
with agents defecting with degrees of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9. Given the properties
we have identi¯ed in the previous section, we can expect that WT will reduce trust
drastically no matter what the degree of defection of its opponent is. As for MT, we
expect it to react to degree defectors more slowly than CREDIT given that it will weigh
defections by the utility of the issues it has contracted. To this end table 5.14 shows the
results of the experiments carried out.
Degree of Trust Model
Defection MT WT CREDIT
0.2 all 13 all
0.4 all 13 all
0.6 all 13 42
0.8 all 13 39
0.9 all 13 39
Table 5.14: Number of agreements reached by pairs of P and DDn agents.
As can be seen, MT actually continues negotiations with all defectors while WT considers
all degree defectors to be the same as nasty agents. CREDIT instead considers each
degree of defection di®erently. In order to see how well the agents are able to adapt
their negotiation ranges so as to minimise utility losses, we plot the utility gain of the P
agent with respect to acceptable contracts (i.e. those for which the minimum acceptable
values are achieved by the opponent). Here we show the utility gains of the P agents
when faced with a DD0:4.
As can be seen, WT shrinks its negotiation ranges too much to allow possible negotiations
with degree defectors (for ¸ = 0:5 and ½ = 0:5). This is because WT detects a given
degree of defection as a full defection even for very low degrees of defection. This is
explained by its ad-hoc method of calculating the trust value. Indeed, the trust value140 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
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Figure 5.13: Plots showing utility gain w.r.t an acceptable contract of P agents v/s
DD0:4 for MT, CREDIT, and WT.
is not calibrated according to the value achieved by the opponent, but only based on
the action of defecting. MT does not perform any better in this sense even for very low
degrees of defections since it is unable to su±ciently adjust the negotiation ranges so as
to have executed contracts fall within the acceptable range. This is due to the model
giving low importance to defections by considering the weights of issues in considering
its trust (see equation 5.17. CREDIT shows the best performance overall by achieving
pro¯table deals even with some degree of defection from its opponent (see section 5.4.4
for more details).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we have detailed a novel trust model called CREDIT and shown it to
be both e±cient and e®ective at guiding agents in their interactions given uncertainty
about the honesty and reliability of their opponents. Thus, CREDIT meets the initial
objectives described in section 1.5. Speci¯cally, we have shown how trust can be related
to the expected utility loss in interactions. Here, the combination of con¯dence levels
and reputation using fuzzy sets provides a robust way of combining societal measures
with individual measures of trust. Fuzzy sets also take into account the ontological
dimension of trust measures that agents may share with each other. Using the trust
measures thus devised, we have described an algorithm to calculate trust that is linear
with respect to the number of past interactions and incrementally quadratic with respect
to the number of fuzzy sets used. Finally, having tested and benchmarked CREDIT we
here summarise the conclusions inferred from the observations made.Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation 141
1. By combining norms and trust, CREDIT is able to reduce the length of the nego-
tiation dialogue (analogous to time) required to reach an agreement (see section
5.4.3.1).
2. CREDIT is able to prevent nasty agents from exploiting philanthropic and tit-for-
tat agents by adjusting the agent's negotiation stance. Thus, when nasty agents
are encountered, the agent shrinks its negotiation ranges such that no agreement
is possible (section 5.4.3.2).
3. CREDIT is better able to engage in pro¯table contracts with strategic defectors
than other trust models (see section 5.5.1). This shows that the model is able to
adapt to agents with varying reliability.
4. CREDIT is able to cope with degree defectors better than other trust models. It
does so by eliciting pro¯table contracts in the long run or by avoiding high degree
defectors (section 5.4.4).
Thus we have shown how the outcomes reached in bargaining can be signi¯cantly im-
proved when CREDIT is used to model the reliability and honesty of interacting agents.
In this respect, CREDIT clearly di®erentiates itself from current work in the area of
trust which has, up to now, only considered using trust to select the most reliable or
honest partner. Moreover, CREDIT is the only model to provide a comprehensive analy-
sis of the context in which agents interact by considering norms and by using such norms
during the bargaining process. Finally, in benchmarking CREDIT, we have provided the
¯rst set of guidelines against which future trust models can be benchmarked (in terms
of the experiments carried out to di®erentiate CREDIT from WT and MT).
Through CREDIT we have shown how bargaining agents can use trust to reduce un-
certainty about the reliability and honesty of agents. CREDIT also reduces, to some
extent, uncertainty about the actions of the agents by shrinking negotiation ranges when
defectors are detected. However, CREDIT neglects the uncertainty about the prefer-
ences of the agents and usually expands the action set when trustworthy agents are
interacted with. To remedy this, we develop the PN model (in chapter 7) that enables
agent to further reduce uncertainty about the action set and preferences through the
use of arguments. Given this, with the combined use of PN and CREDIT, agents can
substantially reduce uncertainty in most aspects of their bargaining encounters. Given
this, the (combined) use of these models in a practical application is described in chapter
8.
Furthermore, in the next chapter, we show how a trust model, such as CREDIT, can be
integrated into negotiations based on MD techniques. In so doing, we aim to show how
trust at the individual level (i.e. CREDIT) can be combined with trust at the system
level (as per the requirements described in section 3.3) to elicit e±cient outcomes (which142 Chapter 5 CREDIT: A Trust Model based on Con¯dence and Reputation
bargaining techniques cannot guarantee) while ensuring that the most reliable agents
are chosen as per the objective set in section 1.5.Chapter 6
Trust-Based Mechanism Design
Having demonstrated the signi¯cant improvement that CREDIT brings to the utilities
that agents gain in bargaining encounters, this chapter focuses on using trust in mech-
anisms or protocols in order to obtain an e±cient partitioning of the resources that
agents negotiate. As we have seen in chapter 3, there are a number of system-level
trust mechanisms that already enforce some level of honesty (about their costs or valu-
ations) among the participating agents so as to reach e±ciency. However, none of these
mechanisms e®ectively select the most reliable agents in determining the partition of
resources. To this end, in this chapter we propose the area of TBMD as an extension
of traditional MD, where trust is used to select the most reliable agents in determining
the outcome of the mechanism as per our objectives. In this way, TBMD e®ectively
reduces the uncertainty surrounding both the reliability and honesty of agents (as per
objectives set in section 1.5). In particular, we develop the TBM, as an extension of the
Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves (VCG) class of mechanisms, that is incentive compatible, indi-
vidually rational, and e±cient. Thus, in our TBM agents are incentivised to honestly
reveal their valuations (or cost) as well as their trustworthiness and the reputation of
other agents. Moreover, we show how our TBM is more robust than other comparable
mechanisms at dealing with biased ratings from some of the agents (see section 3.3).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.1, we justify the need
to extend traditional MD to consider trust. Section 6.2 describes related work in the
area of mechanism design. Section 6.3 shows how a standard VCG mechanism usually
determines the outcomes in a task allocation scenario. This serves as the basis for
describing TBMD in section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes our TBM and demonstrates
how the TBM generalises the standard VCG mechanism to consider trust. Section
6.6 empirically evaluates our TBM and shows how it is indeed e®ective and e±cient
at choosing the most reliable agents over repeated encounters (as trust models build
clearer trust measures), and that it is more robust than comparable mechanisms against
biased ratings. Finally, section 6.7 summarizes the main achievements of this chapter
and discusses their relationship to other models we provide in this thesis.
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6.1 Introduction
As discussed in section 1.2, MD is the ¯eld of microeconomics that studies how to
devise systems such that the interactions between strategic, autonomous and rational
agents lead to outcomes that have socially-desirable global properties. Given that the
designer of MAS typically has many of the same aims, there is a growing body of work
that seeks to exploit the tools and concepts of MD to this end (Dash et al., 2003).
However, an important facet of MAS that is rarely considered in MD is that agents
do not always complete their tasks as planned or promised (this means they are not
always sucessful). Thus, for example, an agent may not always complete every task
it starts or it may default on payment for a good. Furthermore, in traditional MD an
agent chooses to interact with partners based on their costs or valuations only. However,
cheapest is not always best and these agents may ultimately not be the most successful.
Thus, in many practical situations the choice of interaction partners is motivated by an
agent's individual model of its counterparts, as well as by information gathered from
its environment about them. For example, on eBay buyers determine the credibility of
particular sellers by considering their own interaction experiences with them (if they have
any) and by referring to the historic evaluated information provided by other buyers.
To capture this phenomenon, we exploit the notion of trust used in the CREDIT (where
trust results from the combination of con¯dence and reputation) to represent an agent's
perception of other agents' reliability. In this chapter, we refer to an agent's reliability
as its probability of success (POS) in completing its task. This, in turn, leads us to
propose the area of TBMD as an extension of traditional MD that adds trust as an
additional factor to costs and valuations in decision making.
As we argue in earlier in the thesis (see section 1.3), the trust in an agent is generally
de¯ned as the expectation that it will ful¯ll what it agrees to do, given its observable
actions and information gathered from other agents about it (see section 1.3). By their
very nature, di®erent agents are likely to hold di®erent opinions about the trust of a
particular agent depending on their experiences and the speci¯cs of the trust model they
use (see section 3.1). As a result, we cannot simply extend traditional MD (e.g. the VCG
mechanism) to encompass the notion of trust because such work is predicated on the
fact that agents have private and independent information which determines their choice
over outcomes. Trust, on the other hand, implies public and interdependent information
(see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2).
In this work, we speci¯cally consider MD in the context of task allocation (where it
has often been applied Sandholm (2003)). In our scenario, agents may have di®erent
probabilities of success in completing a task assigned to them (e.g. it may be believed
that a particular builder has a 95% chance of making a roof in ¯ve days, while another
builder may be believed to have a 75% chance of doing so). Moreover, an agent may
assign di®erent weights to the reports of other agents depending on the similarity ofChapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 145
their types. For example, consider a \repair engine" task assigned to a garage. In this
case, two agents owning a Ferrari would assign higher weights to each other's report
about the POS of the garage than they would to the report of another agent which owns
a Robin Reliant.
Against this background, this chapter develops and evaluates the notion of trust-based
mechanism design. We also de¯ne the general properties that trust models must ex-
hibit to allow a trust-based mechanism to generate an optimal allocation of tasks. In
particular, we advance the state of the art in the following ways:
1. We specify the properties that trust models must satisfy to be incorporated in
mechanisms that permit e±cient allocations.
2. We generalise the standard VCG mechanism to incorporate the notion of trust.
3. We prove that the trust-based mechanism we develop is e±cient, individually
rational, and incentive compatible.1
4. We empirically show that our trust-based mechanism leads to the most successful
and cheapest agents being selected to ful¯ll an allocation in the long run and that
it performs better than comparable mechanisms when agents' reports of POS are
biased.
6.2 Related Work
In associating trust to mechanism design, we build upon work in both areas. In the area
of trust and reputation, a number of computational models have been developed (see
chapter 3 for a review). While these models can help in choosing the most successful
agents, they are not shown to generate e±cient outcomes in any given mechanism. An
exception to this is the work on reputation mechanisms (see section 3.2.2). However, as
it was shown in section 3.2.2, these mechanisms only produce e±cient outcomes in very
constrained scenarios and under strict assumptions (e.g. in (Dellarocas, 2002) sellers
are monopolists and each buyer interacts at most once with a seller and in (Jurca and
Faltings, 2003a) the majority of agents must already be truthful for the mechanism to
work).
In the case of MD, there has been comparatively little work on achieving e±cient,
incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanisms that take into account uncer-
tainty in general. An exception to this rule is the dAGVA mechanism (Mas-Colell et al.,
1The mechanism we develop also forms the only class of mechanisms that have these properties
under a Nash equilibrium strategy when factoring trust into the decision making process. Intuitively,
this follows from the uniqueness of the VCG which charges agents their marginal contribution to the
system. Since we use a similar technique to develop our mechanism we believe the same result will ensue
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1995) which considers the case when the types of agents are unknown to themselves
but are drawn from a probability distribution of types which is common knowledge to
all agents. However, in our case, the agents know their types and these incorporates
their uncertainty related to ful¯lling a task. Porter et al. (Porter et al., 2002) have
also considered this case and their mechanism is the one that is most closely related
to ours. However, they limit themselves to the case where agents can only report on
their own POS. This is a drawback because it assumes the agents can measure their own
POS accurately and it does not consider the case where this measure may be biased (i.e.
di®erent agents perceive the success of the same event di®erently). Thus our mechanism
is a generalisation of theirs (see section 6.5.2 for the formal proof).
Finally, our work may also seem to be a case of interdependent, multidimensional allo-
cation schemes (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) where there is an important impossibility
result of not being able to achieve e±ciency when considering interdependent, multi-
dimensional signals (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). However, we circumvent this by
relating the trust values to a probability that an allocation is completed, rather than to
an absolute valuation or cost signal.
6.3 A Standard VCG Task Allocation Scheme
In the rest of this chapter, we use a di®erent notation from that presented in chapter 4
so as to conform to the usual notation used in the domain of mechanism design. Given
this, we consider a set of agents I, where I = f1;:::;Ig, and a set of possible tasks
T . Each agent i 2 I has a particular value, vi(¿;µi), for having a task (completed by
another agent), ¿ 2 T , which is dependent on its type µi drawn from a possible set of
types, £i. An agent i also has a cost, ci(¿;µi), of attempting to complete a task. Given
a vector of values, v(¿;µ), and costs, c(¿;µ), from the set of agents, we can determine
the value of an allocation K 2 K where K is the set of all possible mappings of T to
I. Once a certain allocation K is implemented, an agent i is then asked to pay for
the task(s) it requested or receive payment for the task(s) it performed. The overall
transfer of money to a particular agent i is denoted by ri. As is common in this domain,
we assume that an agent is rational (expected utility maximiser) and has a quasi-linear
utility function (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The following de¯nition of the utility function
re¯nes our earlier de¯nition in chapter 4 to take into account costs as well as valuations
of tasks/issues:
De¯nition 1. A quasi-linear utility function is one that can be expressed as:
ui(K;ri;µi) = vi(K;µi) ¡ ci(K;µi) + ri (6.1)
In devising a mechanism for task allocation, we focus on incentive compatible direct
revelation mechanisms (DRMs) by invoking the revelation principle which states thatChapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 147
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Figure 6.1: Simple task allocation model using the VCG mechanism.
any mechanism can be transformed into a DRM. In this context, \direct revelation"
means the strategy space (i.e. all possible actions) of the agents is restricted to reporting
their types and \incentive compatible" means the equilibrium strategy (i.e best strategy
under a certain equilibrium concept) is truth-telling. Hence, in our allocation scheme,
the agents report their types to a centre which then decides on the allocation K and
the reward vector r and reports these back to the agents. The problem at hand is then
to ¯nd a mechanism M(v(¿;µ);c(¿;µ)) = fK;rg that ful¯lls the following commonly
sought objectives in MD:
² E±ciency: an allocation that maximises the total utility of all the agents in the
system.
² Individual Rationality: an allocation scheme is individually rational if agents are
willing to participate in the scheme rather than opting out of it. It is commonly
assumed that the utility of an agent choosing to opt out of a scheme, ui(:), is 0.
Hence, it is su±cient to ensure that the agents derive a utility ui ¸ 0 by being in
the system.
² Incentive Compatibility: an incentive compatible system is one in which the agents
will ¯nd no better option than to reveal their true type.
Amongst the class of mechanisms that satisfy the above properties, the VCG mechanism
implements an e±cient allocation under dominant strategies (i.e. each agent has a best
strategy no matter what other agents' strategies are) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Using the
VCG mechanism, our task allocation problem is then reduced to the following protocol
which is shown in ¯gure 6.1:
1. The centre receives the set of tasks ¿ to be allocated from the agents (step 1).
2. The centre then posts these tasks in the vector ¿ (step 3). Each agent i then
reports its cost b ci(K;µi) (in the vector b c(K;µ)) for completing a set of tasks in
the set of allocations K along with the reported valuation b vi(K;µi) (in the vector
b v(K;µ)) it derives from having a set of tasks completed (step 4). In the rest of the148 Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
paper, we will superscript with `^' those variables and functions that are reported
to the centre (auctioneer) to di®erentiate from those that are privately known. Of
course, the reported values and costs can be di®erent from the actual values and
costs.
3. The centre then solves the following standard VCG auction equation (step 5):
b K¤ = argmax
K2K
X
i2I
[b vi(K;µi) ¡ b ci(K;µi)] (6.2)
and computes each transfer ri in the vector r as:
ri =
2
4
X
j2¡i
h
b vj( b K¤;µj) ¡ b cj( b K¤;µj)
i
3
5 ¡
2
4max
K2K
X
j2¡i
[b vj(K;µj) ¡ b cj(K;µj)]
3
5 (6.3)
where ¡i ´ I n i.
4. The centre allocates the tasks according to the optimal allocation K¤ and imple-
ments the transfers ri (step 6).
The VCG mechanism results in an alignment of the goal of each agent with that of the
mechanism designer via the use of the transfer part of the mechanism. Basically, each
agent has as its best strategy the social optimum goal, which can only be achieved via
a truthful revelation. That is, for each agent i,
b ci(K;µi) = ci(K;µi) (6.4)
and
b vi(K;µi) = vi(K;µi) (6.5)
Since the agents ¯nd it optimal to report their true valuations and costs, the centre thus
¯nds the e±cient allocation in step 3 (i.e. b K¤ = K¤). The second part of the transfer
ensures that agents have uj ¸ 0 and thereby makes the mechanism incentive compatible.
We have thus presented a standard DRM for our task-allocation problem that achieves
e±ciency, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality under dominant strategy
equilibrium. However, this mechanism only considers the cost and value of the tasks
and disregards the uncertainty about the reliability of the agents in executing their
tasks. Reducing this uncertainty through the use of the concept trust (as calculated in
individual trust models) is one of our main goals (see chapter 1). To this end, in the
next section we introduce trust as another dimension to be used in the computation of
the e±cient allocation and show why the standard VCG is neither incentive compatible
nor e±cient when trust is taken into account.Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 149
6.4 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
To incorporate trust, a further dimension needs to be added to the utility function in
equation 6.1 which, in turn, requires both the allocation and payment schemes in the
VCG mechanism to be modi¯ed to take this additional dimension into account. Having
de¯ned our mechanism (see section 6.5), we prove that it is incentive-compatible, e±cient
and individually-rational (in section 6.5.1). Before doing this, however, we ¯rst need to
specify the generic properties that allow trust to be de¯ned as a measure that can be
used in computing e±cient allocations.
6.4.1 Properties of the Trust Model
As we have seen in chapters 3 and 5, many computational trust models have been devel-
oped to allow agents to choose their most trustworthy interaction partners or negotiate
with them (as discussed in section 6.2). However, at their most fundamental level, these
models can be viewed as alternative approaches for achieving the following properties2:
1. As can be deduced from our discussion in chapter 3, the trust measure of an agent
i in an agent j normally depends both on i's perception of j's POS and on the
perception of other agents on j's POS. This latter point encapsulates the concept
of reputation whereby the society of agents generally attributes some characteristic
to one of its members by aggregating some/all the opinions of its other members
about that member (see section 3.1.2, chapter 3). Thus, each agent considers
this societal view on other members when building up its own measure of trust
in its counterparts (Dasgupta, 1998). The trust of agent i in its counterpart j,
t
j
i 2 [0;1], is given by a function, g : [0;1]jIj ! [0;1], (which, in the simplest case,
is a weighted sum) of all POS measures sent by other agents to agent i about agent
j as shown below:
t
j
i = g(f´
j
1;:::;´
j
i;:::;´
j
Ng) (6.6)
where ´
j
i 2 [0;1] is the POS of agent j as perceived by agent i and g is the
function that combines both personal measures of POS and other agents' measures.
In general, trust models compute the POS measures over multiple interactions.
Thus, as in CREDIT, the level of success recorded in each interaction is normally
averaged to give a representative value (see chapter 3 for a wider discussion). In
our model, we use such a basic model whereby each agent records the success of a
task and averages that with its past impressions (in CREDIT we deduce a model
2Note that we do not focus on a particular trust model. This is because trust models implement
the above properties in their own ways and in di®erent contexts. Therefore, we concentrate on these
abstract properties to keep the focus on the relationship between trust and the design of an e±cient
mechanism. In so doing, we ensure that the properties of our mechanism are independent of any speci¯c
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of the agents' POS through a normal distribution and use a representative value
from the con¯dence interval of that distribution).
2. Trust results from an analysis of an agent's POS in performing a given task. The
more successful, the more trustworthy the agent is. Thus, the models assume that
trust is monotonic increasing with POS. Therefore, the relationship between trust
and POS is expressed as:
@t
j
i
@´
j
i
> 0, where t
j
i is the trust of i in agent j and ´
j
i is the
actual POS of agent j as perceived by i. Though it may seem that this property
is quite rational (in that one does not reward bad behaviour with more trust), as
we have seen in section 5.5, some models do not implement such a property but
these are fairly rare (see discussion on Witkowski et al.'s (Witkowski et al., 2001)
in section 5.5, chapter 5)).
Given the above, agents can update their trust rating for another agent each time they
interact (both by recording their view of the success of their counterpart and by gathering
new reports from other agents about it). Thus, if an agent's POS does not change, the
trust measure in it should become more precise as more observations are made and
received from other agents. Moreover, having the trust monotonic increasing with POS
ensures Mirrlees's condition regarding ¯xed points in allocation schemes (Mirrlees, 1971)
(which is a necessary condition for the mechanism to be e±cient) is satis¯ed.
6.4.2 Augmenting the Task Allocation Scenario
In this section we show how trust is to be calculated and taken into account in the
task allocation example we described in section 6.3. Here, any trust model satisfying
the properties discussed in section 6.4.1 (such as CREDIT) can be used when actually
building the system. The following changes are made (as shown in ¯gure 6.2):
² Each agent i reports to the centre their POS vector:
b ´i = [b ´1
i ::: b ´I
i ]
(step 1). This is the POS that an agent has observed about the other agents. This
vector may not be complete if agents have not experienced any past interactions
with other agents. However, this does not a®ect the properties of the mechanism
since the centre will only pick those POSs that are relevant (and calculate trust
according to these).
² The agents must also submit their respective trust calculation function (equation
6.6) that applies over the vector of all (or part of) other agents' reported POSs (i.e.
b ´), ti = g(b ´), to the centre before the allocation of tasks (step 2). This allows the
centre to compute the trust of agent i in all other agents (given i's own perception,Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 151
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Figure 6.2: Simple task allocation using TBM. The dotted lines represent the mod-
i¯cations we make to the mechanism when using trust in the feedback loop. The gI
functions represent the trust functions that are used to aggregate all POS values from
other agents into a common measure of trust.
as well as other agents' perceptions of the task performer's POS). Given that the
trust ti only a®ects the allocation of tasks originating from agent i, the latter has
no incentive to lie about its trust function to the centre (otherwise it could result
in i's task not being allocated to the agent deemed most trustworthy by i).
The trust function g(:) may assign di®erent weights to the reports of di®erent agents de-
pending on the level of similarity between the types of agents i and ¡i (where ¡i ´ Ini).
Thus, given the trust functions and reports of POS of each agent, we now require
the centre to maximise the overall expected valuation of the allocation (in step 5), as
opposed to the valuation of the allocation independent of trust (i.e. which the stan-
dard VCG does). This is because an agent has a certain probability of completing
the task to a degree of success which may be less than one. We denote as ° the
completion vector of an allocation K which measures the level to which each task in
an allocation is deemed completed. Thus, the expected value of an allocation is then ³
E[°jK;ti]
£P
i2I b vi(K;µi)
¤
¡
P
i2I b ci(K;µi)
´
given the trust vector ti. This captures the
fact that the agent i, that allocated the task, determines the value of °. Moreover, agent
j, to which the task has been allocated, incurs a cost independent of how agent i eval-
uates the task. This e®ectively means that the valuations are non-deterministic while
the costs are deterministic. The centre thus determines the e±cient allocation K¤ (step
7) such that the value of the e±cient allocation is maximised.
Having shown how to ¯t trust into the process of determining the value of allocations,
in the next subsection we provide a simple example to show why the standard VCG
solution of section 6.3 is not incentive compatible (and thus not e±cient). This then
motivates the search for a mechanism that is.152 Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
Table 6.1: A set of four agents in which agent 4 has proposed a task.
Agent i ci ´1
i ´2
i ´3
i ti
4
1 40 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.5
2 80 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0
3 50 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.86
4 1 0.525 1.0 0.95 na
6.4.3 Failure of the VCG Solution
Consider a system of four agents where agent 4 has asked for a task ¿ to be allocated
and its valuation of this task is v4(¿;µ4) = 210. Each agent i has a cost ci to perform the
task proposed by 4 (agent 4 has in¯nite cost to perform the task by itself) and does not
derive any value from the task being performed. Now, suppose that the trust function
of agent 4 is a weighed sum of the POS reports by the agents (i.e. ti
4 = ® ¦ b ´i where
® = [0:3 0:2 0:1 0:4]). Note that we do not concern ourselves with the reports ´4
i
since the task is proposed by agent 4 itself. Table 6.1 shows the cost ci of attempting
the task, and the observed POS value of each agent, ´i, as well as the trust computed
by agent 4, ti
4, if each agent reports truthfully on its ´i.
The VCG solution of section 6.3 determines the allocation and payments based only
on cost and valuations. However, this would clearly fail to ¯nd an e±cient allocation
since agent 1 would be allocated the task despite being the least trusted and hence
most likely to fail. If we instead implemented the VCG mechanism with the expected
valuations (taking into account the trust and POS reports), we then have K¤ = [0010]
(i.e agent 3 is allocated the task), r1 = r2 = 0 and r3 = 210° ¡ 130. Thus, agent 3
will then derive an average payment of 0:87 £ 210 ¡ 130 = 52:7. However, this scheme
is not incentive-compatible because agent 2 can lie about ´3
2 by reporting b ´3
2 · 0:7357
which will then lead to agent 2 being allocated the task and deriving a positive utility
from this allocation. Note that this scheme is exactly that of (Porter et al., 2002) for
a single-task scenario (with the modi¯cation that we use ° as a level of success rather
than a binary indicator function of success or failure).
As can be seen, the VCG mechanism needs to be extended to circumvent this problem.
Speci¯cally, we require a mechanism that is e±cient given the reports of the agents on
their costs and valuations of allocations, as well as their observed POS vector (since
the VCG is a®ected by false reports of POS). In e®ect, we need to change the payment
scheme so as to make the truthful-reporting of POSs an optimal strategy for the agent
again. Once this is achieved, the centre can then choose the e±cient allocation based
on expected utilities. The di±culty with designing such a mechanism is that the centre
cannot check on the validity of POS reports of agents because it is based on a private
observation carried out by the agent. Thus two agents may legitimately di®er in their
observed POS of another agent due to their di®erent interaction histories with thatChapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 153
agent.
6.5 The Trust-Based Mechanism
Before presenting our trust-based mechanism (TBM), we ¯rst introduce some new no-
tation. Let the sum of utilities of all agents in a system given an allocation K and a
completion vector ° be denoted as U(K;µ;°) =
P
i2I vi(K;µi;°)¡
P
i2I ci(K;µi). Then
the expected utility U(K;µ;°) before the allocation is carried out is E[°jK;ti] [U(K;µ;°)]
where µ is the vector containing all agent types. We also denote the marginal con-
tribution of the agent i to the system given an e±cient allocation b K¤ as mci =
U¡i( b K¤;µ;°)¡maxK2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
where maxK2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
is the overall
expected utility of the e±cient allocation that would have resulted if agent i were not
present in the system. Now, we can detail TBM:
1. Find the e±cient allocation b K¤ such that:
b K¤ = argmax
K2K
U(K;µ;°) (6.7)
This ¯nds the best allocation; that is, the one that maximises the sum of expected
utilities of the agents, conditional on the reports of the agents. We note here
that we do not take into consideration the reward functions of the agents when
calculating the overall utility since these rewards are from one agent to another
and therefore do not make a di®erence when calculating the overall utility of the
agents.
2. We now calculate the e±cient allocation that would have resulted if an agent i's
report taken out:
K¤
¡i = argmax
K2K
E[°jK;t0
i] [U(K;µ;°)] (6.8)
, where t0
i = g(b ´ n b ´i). This computes how b ´i a®ects which allocation is deemed
e±cient.
3. We now ¯nd the e®ect that an agent's b ´i has had on its marginal contribution.
Thus, ¯nd
Di = U( b K¤;:) ¡ U(K¤
¡i;:) (6.9)
This distils the e®ect of an agent's b ´i reports.
4. Given K¤, the payment ri made to the agent i is then:
ri = mci ¡ Di (6.10)
Naturally, if ri is negative it implies that i makes a payment to the centre. The
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has had on overall expected utility of the system. We also subtract Di to take into
account the e®ect that an agent's POS report has on the chosen allocation. This
is in line with the intuition behind VCG mechanisms in which an agent's report
a®ects the allocation but not the payment it receives or gives.
We will now prove each of the properties of TBM in turn whilst intuitively explaining
why the mechanism has the aforementioned properties.
6.5.1 Properties of our Trust Based Mechanism
Given the mechanism presented in the previous section, we now prove its main properties
in the following order: incentive compatibility, e±ciency, and individual rationality.
Proposition 1. TBM is incentive-compatible in ex-ante Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. We ¯rst need to calculate the expected utility, E[°jK;ti] [ui(K;µi;°)], that an
agent derives from TBM because the goal of a rational agent is to maximise its expected
utility. We note here that we are assuming that the agent is myopic in that it is only
concerned with its current expected utility given the cost vector, c(K;µ), the value
vector, v(K;µ), and the trust vector t. The expected utility that an agent, ui( b K¤;µi;°),
derives from an e±cient allocation, as calculated from equation 6.7, given the reports of
all agents in the system is:
ui( b K¤;µi;°) = E[°j b K¤;ti]
£
vi( b K¤;µi;°)
¤
¡ ci( b K¤;µi)
+ mci( b K¤;µi;°) ¡ Di
= E[°j b K¤;ti]
£
vi( b K¤;µi;°) ¡ b vi( b K¤;µi;°)
¤
¡
³
ci( b K¤;µi) ¡ b ci( b K¤;µi)
´
+
U(K¤
¡i;µ;°) ¡ max
K2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
(6.11)
>From 6.11 we will ¯rstly prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. An agent has an equilibrium strategy to reveal its observed POS values.
Proof. We consider how b ´i a®ects ui( b K¤;µi;°). From equation 6.11 we observe that
b ´i cannot a®ect U(K¡i;µ;°) ¡ maxK2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
. Thus, an agent only has an
incentive to lie so that b K¤ is selected such that:
E[°j b K¤;ti]
£
vi( b K¤;µi;°) ¡ b vi( b K¤;µi;°)
¤
¡
³
ci( b K¤;µi) ¡ b ci( b K¤;µi)
´
is maximised. If an agent reveals its cost and valuation truthfully i.e. b v(:) = v(:) and
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reporting of b ´i. If however, an agent is to gain from such an untruthful reporting, it
needs to set either b v(:) < v(:) and b c(:) > c or both. However, doing so would decrease
the chance of i successfully allocating a task or winning an allocation. Therefore, i would
not reveal untruthful values for b c(:) and b v(:). Moreover, i will actually report truthfully
its b ´i since this allows the centre to choose those agents that i deems to have a high
POS (as well as helping other agents choose i as having a perception close to theirs).
Thus, reporting b ´i = ´i is an ex-ante Nash equilibrium strategy.
Given lemma 1, we can now show that TBM is incentive compatible. Suppose an agent
is truthful about b v(:) and b c(:). Then it derives as utility:
U(K¤
¡i;µ;°) ¡ max
K2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
Now assume that the agent lies about b v(:) and b c(:) so as to increase its utility. This then
means that:
E[°j b K¤;ti]
£
vi( b K¤;µi;°)¡b vi( b K¤;µi;°)
¤
¡
³
ci( b K¤;µi) ¡ b ci( b K¤;µi)
´
+U(K0
¡i;µ;°) > U(K¤
¡i;µ;°)
(6.12)
where K0
¡i is the e±cient allocation found with b c(:) and b v(:) without the report of ´i.
However, as argued earlier, an agent would not report a lower value or a higher cost.
Thus
E[°jK;ti]
£
vi( b K¤;µi;°) ¡ b vi( b K¤;µi;°)
¤
¡
³
ci( b K¤;µi) ¡ b ci( b K¤;µi)
´
· 0 (6.13)
Furthermore, by the maximisation of step 2 of TBM:
U(K0
¡i;µ;°) < U(K¤
¡i;µ;°) (6.14)
if all other agents report truthfully. Thus, TBM is incentive-compatible in a Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. TBM is e±cient.
Proof. Given that the agents are incentivised to report truthfully (proposition 1), the
centre will calculate the e±cient allocation according to equation 6.7 (i.e. b K¤ = K¤).
Proposition 3. TBM is individually-rational (in expected utility).
Proof. We need to show that the expected utility of any agent from an e±cient allocation
K¤ is greater than if the agent were not in the scheme (i.e. ui(K¤;µi;°) ¸ 0). As a
result of the inherent uncertainty in the completion of tasks, we cannot guarantee that
the mechanism will be ex-post individually-rational for an agent. Rather, we prove
that the mechanism is individually-rational for an agent if we consider expected utility.156 Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
Given truthful reports, the utility of an agent from equation 6.11 is U(K¤
¡i;µ;°) ¡
maxK2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
. The ¯rst maximisation is carried out without the reports
´
¡i
i ,whereas the second maximisation is carried out over the set of agents I n i. Thus,
the second maximisation is carried out over a smaller set than the ¯rst one. As a result:
max
K2K
£
U¡i(K;µ¡i;°)
¤
¸ U(K¤
¡i;µ;°) (6.15)
such that ui(K¤;µi;°) ¸ 0.
6.5.2 Instances of TBM
TBM can be viewed as a generalised version of the VCG mechanism in which there exist
uncertainties about whether a set of agents will carry out an allocation and about the
relevance of reports of POS by agents. In this section, we demonstrate its generality by
analysing two speci¯c instances of the mechanism.
6.5.3 Self-POS Reports Only
The non-combinatorial mechanism developed in (Porter et al., 2002) is a special case of
TBM. Speci¯cally, agents only report on their own POS (i.e. b ´i = b ´i
i) and agents assign
a relevance of 1 to reports by all other agents. However, since in their model their is
no notion of varying perceptions of success, we need to introduce the notion of a report
agent that has v(K;:) = 0 and c(K;:) = 1. This acts as a proxy to agents reporting
the ex-post POS to the centre. This also caters for the problem of single POS reports
as there is then no measure of t
j
i once j's report is removed (and hence U(K¤
¡i;:) is
unde¯ned). The centre then calculates the e±cient allocation as:
K¤ = argmax
K2K
h
U( b K¤;µ;°)
i
(6.16)
and the payment to the agent i is ri = mci ¡ Di = mci. The term Di = 0 since, as a
result of the report agent, U( b K¤;:) = U(K¤
¡i;:) (because t is equal in both cases are the
same).
6.5.4 Single-Task Scenario
Consider the single task scenario (as presented in table 6.1) where an agent k proposes
a single task ¿k. Using equation 6.7, the e±cient allocation is then simpli¯ed to:
K¤ = argmax
K2K
h
U( b K¤;µ;°)
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The payment to agent i, from equation 6.10, is then:
ri = E[°jK¤
¡i;tk]
£
vk(K¤
¡i;µk;°)
¤
+ b ci( b K¤;µi;°) ¡
P
i2I b ci(K¤
¡i;µi;°)
¡maxK2K
·
E[°jK;tk] [vk(K;µk;°)] ¡
P
j2¡i b cj(K;µ¡i;°)
¸ (6.17)
Since the above single-task scenario is an instance of the TBM, it is still incentive
compatible. Therefore, when applying the above allocation scheme to the example, we
can take the reported values of the agents as being truthful. Given this, the e±cient
allocation is agent 3 getting to do the task. Then, we need to check whether agent
3's report has made itself more attractive. To do so, we remove the report of agent
3 and end up with agent 4 having a trust vector ti
4 = [0:5 1:0 0:9] which again
leads to agent 3 being allocated the task. Thus agent 3 will get an expected utility of
210¤0:8667 ¡ 50+ 50 ¡130¡50 = 2. Agent 1 and 2 no longer have an incentive to lie
about the POSs since this would not increase their utility. However, suppose that, after
the allocation, every type becomes common knowledge. Then agent 2 can deduce that
lying about its costs and reported POS would allow its utility to increase. This would
have been maximised when agent 2 reports b c2(:) = 110 and b ´3
2 = 0. However, before
the allocation is carried out and payments are made, agent 2 would not know about the
private types of other agents and may reduce its chance of deriving a positive utility by
reporting b c2(:) > c2(:). Furthermore, agent 2 does not report b ´
¡2
2 < ´
¡2
2 since then
u2(:) = 0 even if it wins the allocation. A similar argument applies to agent 1. Thus,
the mechanism has an ex-ante Nash Equilibrium of truthful reporting.
6.6 Experimental Evaluation
Given that our TBM relies on the agents' individual trust model, it is important to show
how the trust models can a®ect the (e±cient) outcome chosen. This is because, trust
models at the individual level need a number of interactions to re¯ne their measures
and may also be a®ected by biased reports (see discussion in sections 3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2
in chapter 3) such that the actual e±cient outcome (i.e. one which maximises the
utility and chooses the most reliable agents) may, at times, not be chosen. Hence we
empirically evaluate TBM by comparing it with the fault tolerant mechanism (FTM)
of (Porter et al., 2002) (this is chosen because it also deals with the POS of agents as
discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.5.2) and the standard VCG. We refer to task performing
agents as contractors in what follows. In our experiments we perform 500 successive
allocations, in the scenario described in section 6.4, with six agents each given one task
to complete. After each allocation, contractors perform tasks and the level of success
is measured and reported to all agents. Each agent can then update its measure of
the contractors' POSs as well as the contractors' trustworthiness as discussed in section
6.4.1. The valuations and POS of each agent are obtained from a uniform distribution158 Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
and the costs are the same for all tasks. We iterate the process and average the results
(here for 200 iterations). Given the properties of TBM and FTM we postulate the
following hypotheses and validate them as shown below:
Hypothesis 6. TBM always chooses the e±cient allocation (K¤) in the long run.
This hypothesis re°ects the fact that we expect agents in TBM to take a number of
interactions to model the true POS of their counterparts, using their individual trust
models. After this time, however, the mechanism can choose those contractors that are
most successful at completing a given task. As can be seen in ¯gure 6.3, the optimal
allocation chosen by TBM, K¤TBM, reaches the e±cient allocation K¤ (given real
POSs) after 116 interactions.3 After 116 interactions, the POS of each contractor is
accurately modelled, as is the trust of agents in their contractors. Thus, the most
trusted and utility maximising allocation is found by the TBM. This result is observed
for all cases where the POSs of contractors are varied.
Hypothesis 7. TBM ¯nds better allocations than FTM when contractors' own reported
POS are biased.
While FTM only takes into account a contractor's own reports, TBM uses the trust
model of the various individual agents (which take into account reports not only from
the contractor) to make an allocation. In the particular trust model (based on CREDIT)
we use in TBM, an agent can give di®erent weights to reports from di®erent agents (as
shown in section 6.4.3). We therefore varied the weight w, assigned to a contractor's
report of its own POS in the trust model of an agent. Here we exemplify the cases where
w = 0:5 (i.e. the contractor's report is given equal weighting to the agent's perceived
POS), w = 0:25 and w = 0 (i.e. no importance is given to the contractor's report).
As can be seen, our hypothesis is validated by the results given in ¯gure 6.3 (with
normalised expected values). Note here that K¤V CG is the allocation independent of
POSs or if POSs of agents are all equal. We note as K¤TBMw the allocation chosen by
TBM with a weight w.
In more detail, TBM0 (i.e. TBM) reaches the optimal allocation K¤ (i.e. equivalent
to zero bias from the seller) after 116 iterations, while TBM0:25 and TBM0:5 settle
around a sub-optimal allocation (the expected value of which decreases with increasing
w). Moreover, FTM is seen to settle at K¤FTM = 0:8 after 82 iterations. In general, it
is noted that FTM always settles at K¤FTM < K¤ (and sometimes even K¤FTM <
K¤V CG as in ¯gure 6.3 depending on the valuations agents have for the tasks). This
result is explained by the fact that the biased reports cause biased trust values to be
obtained by the centre which then chooses a sub-optimal allocation (i.e. less than K¤
which chooses agents according to their `real POSs'). TBM0:25 and TBM0:5 are less
3The results were validated using a student's t-test with two samples of 100 and 200 iterations
assuming equal variances with means ¹1 = 0:99999 and ¹2 = 1:0 and p-value p = 0:778528. This means
that the di®erence between the means is not signi¯cant.Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design 159
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Figure 6.3: Expected value of chosen allocations for TBM and FTM where K¤ = 1,
K¤V CG = 0:909, and at equilibrium, K¤TBM = 1, 0:97 > K¤TBM0:25 > 0:94,
0:86 > K¤TBM0:5 > 0:84, and K¤FTM = 0:8.
a®ected by biased reports since the weighted trust model reduces the e®ect of bias on
the overall trust values (but still a®ects the mechanism). In most trust models, however,
w ¸ 0:5 is never given to the contractors' POS report and here it only represents an
extreme case (Ramchurn et al., 2004b). Moreover, if the bias is removed, then FTM
and the weighted TBMs behave the same as TBM since the agents then perceive the
same POS and all achieve K¤. It was also observed that the speed with which TBM
and FTM achieve K¤ also depends on the di®erence between the optimum allocation
and other allocations. This is because the smaller the di®erences, the harder it becomes
to di®erentiate these allocations given imperfect estimations of POSs (i.e. the larger the
samples, the more accurate the POSs are, hence the longer the learning rate).
6.7 Summary
This chapter concludes our work on trust in general. At the individual level, we ¯rst
developed the CREDIT trust model in chapter 5 and showed how it could be used by
agents in direct negotiations when the agreements reached are prone to uncertainty. In
this chapter, at the system level, we have developed a trust based mechanism that takes
the burden of computation from the agent in order to come to optimal allocations while
being robust to uncertainty. In particular, we have introduced the notion of Trust-Based
Mechanism Design as a generalisation of the VCG mechanism by using the trust model of
individual agents in order to generate e±cient allocations. We have developed a Trust-
Based Mechanism and proved that it is e±cient, individually rational, and incentive
compatible. Moreover, we have empirically evaluated TBM and shown that it always
achieves the optimum allocation in the long run and achieves better allocations than its
closest comparison when contractors provide biased reports of their probability of sucess160 Chapter 6 Trust-Based Mechanism Design
(POS).
Generally speaking, through CREDIT and TBMD, we have achieved our main objectives
(set in chapter 1) with regards to reducing uncertainty about the reliability and honesty
of agents through an agent's reasoning mechanism (i.e. through CREDIT) and through
the protocol (i.e. through TBMD). However, these models do not speci¯cally consider
uncertainties about the action set and preferences of the agents. In the next chapter, we
complement this with a novel PN mechanism that can be used in bargaining encounters
to reduce such uncertainties through the use of arguments. These arguments aim, on
the one hand, to better explore the preferences of the bargaining agents and, on the
other, to reduce the space of o®ers (i.e. the action set) agents need to search to ¯nd an
agreement.Chapter 7
Persuasive Negotiation for
Autonomous Agents
In chapters 5 and 6, we presented CREDIT and TBMD as models that reduce the
uncertainty that arises in negotiations between autonomous agents. While reducing
uncertainty about the reliability or honesty of agents, these models do not consider
uncertainty about the action set and the preferences of agents in bargaining encounters.
However, as stated in chapter 1, techniques that can reduce these uncertainties can help
ensure that agents are able to reach better agreements faster. To this end, in this chapter
we develop a new model of PN that attempts to reduce such uncertainties through the
use of persuasive arguments. These arguments are rewards that are either given or asked
from one agent to another during the bargaining process. In our model, a reward implies
a constraint on the outcomes of future encounters (in favour of one agent or the other)
such that the expected outcome under this constraint entices an opponent to accept an
o®er in the present encounter. Our model of PN consists of both the protocol and the
reasoning mechanism that allows agents to exchange such arguments.
In more detail, we build upon existing protocols (Sierra et al., 1998; Bentahar et al.,
2004) (as discussed in section 2.3) to manage the commitments that arise during PN
using dynamic logic. Given this, we develop a new algorithm that can be used with
the o®ers generated by standard (non-persuasive) negotiation tactics so as to compute
rewards. Thus, we empirically show that the agents generally reach agreements with
higher expected utility when they use our algorithm than when they do not. Moreover,
we develop a new reward-based tactic (RBT) for PN that aims to optimally determine
o®ers and rewards during the negotiation. We empirically evaluate the model and show
that our RBT is able to reach agreements with even higher expected utility than standard
negotiation tactics (with or without the PN component). Finally we evaluate RBT when
the properties of the negotiating agents are varied and therefore identify the main factors
that impact on the e±ciency and e®ectiveness of rewards.
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 details the theory we use
to describe the protocol agents will use to negotiate. Section 7.3 describes the reasoning
mechanism used by agents to specify and evaluate o®ers and counter o®ers as well as
the rewards they may use in a negotiation scenario based on an MMPD. Then the
system is experimentally evaluated in section 7.4. Section 7.5 ¯nally summarises the
main contributions of this work and their implications for practical applications. First,
however, we discuss the main issues that arise when arguments are used in negotiation
in the following section.
7.1 Introduction
As was discussed in chapters 1 and 2, bargaining between autonomous agents normally
proceeds as a series of o®ers and counter o®ers (Fatima et al., 2004; Faratin et al.,
1998). These o®ers generally indicate the preferred outcome for the proponent and the
opponent may either accept or counter-o®er a more viable outcome. Recently, there
have been a number of attempts to enrich this negotiation process by allowing agents
to express di®erent preferences or information during negotiation. These preferences
or information have been generally characterised as arguments (see chapter 2 for more
details) which aim to support a particular o®er and therefore help in persuading an
opponent to accept it. These arguments can either contain some form of justi¯cation or
represent some form of reward, threat, or appeal. These two mechanisms represent the
two main ways of performing ABN, that is justi¯cation based negotiation and persuasive
negotiation (see sections 1.4 and 2.2 respectively). In this work, we are mainly interested
in PN (for reasons discussed in chapter 1) where the rewards or threats have a clearer
impact on an agent's utility.
However, introducing threats or rewards in the negotiation process impacts on many
aspects of an agent's reasoning mechanism and, to this end, various attempts at dealing
with these were discussed in chapter 2. Despite these works, however, much work still
remains to make these approaches provably better than non-PN negotiation mechanisms
(e.g., Faratin et al. (1998); Fatima et al. (2004)). In more detail, even though threats or
rewards imply either a reduction of or an increase in an agent's utility respectively, these
types of arguments have never been given clear semantics in terms of the actions or events
that can be properly assessed to evaluate their impact. This is particularly important
when it comes to implementing such mechanisms and comparing their e±ciency with
other negotiation mechanisms. Moreover, the use of threats raises the issue of non-
credible alternatives (or empty threats) (Hovi, 1998). Indeed, if we take the case of
two agents which do not have any information about their opponent's preferences, it is
nearly impossible for them to make any credible threat, and there might be no purpose
to enact threats if it costs an agent to do so (see (Hovi, 1998) for more details). In
addition to this, the literature on negotiation has shown that, while threats can allowChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 163
good agreements to be reached in speci¯c settings, it is normally not recommended to use
them since they usually cause mutual recriminations and the breakdown of relationships
(repeated encounters) (Rai®a, 1982; Fisher and Ury, 1983; Schelling, 1963).
Given this background, we focus on the use of rewards in our model of persuasive nego-
tiation in repeated encounters. Rewards have the advantage of having a clear economic
bene¯t for the agent receiving it and entail a direct commitment by the agent giving
it to continue a long term relationship which is bene¯cial to both participating agents
(as opposed to threats which break relationships down and are not guaranteed to be
enforced which makes them harder to assess in a negotiation encounter). This aspect of
rewards makes it particularly suited to our objectives of reducing uncertainty over re-
peated encounters as in CREDIT and TBMD (see section 1.5 chapter 1). As discussed in
section 2.2, rewards have mostly been pictured as promises to give a particular resource
or prize at a later point in time. In our work, we propose that agents may also `ask'
for rewards. This is common in negotiations where the negotiators ask for a favour in
future for accepting to concede in the current round of negotiation (Rai®a, 1982; Fisher
and Ury, 1983). The use of such rewards (given or asked) is, however, di®erent from
negotiating multiple issues at the same time (as shown in CREDIT) where the trade-o®
is normally made on the negotiated issues and the agreement is settled then and there
(Fatima et al., 2002, 2004). In contrast, rewards are contingent upon acceptance of an
o®er and there is normally some uncertainty as to whether and to what extent they will
be carried out. This uncertainty exists because agents may not want to clearly de¯ne
the nature of the rewards since they do not know their future costs or the probability of
meeting again (e.g., a seller may not give the full extent of a discount even if it promised
to give it earlier, or a buyer may ask for a low price on a car with a promise to buy
another similar car in future at the same price but the buyer may change her mind and
buy another car at a lower price). Given this, a key issue that arises is that of deter-
mining what actually constitutes a reward in agent based negotiation. To resolve this
issue, we allow rewards to be an endogenous factor a®ecting the negotiation (i.e. built
in operations on the negotiation object) rather than leaving the notion of rewards as an
exogenous aspect of negotiations (i.e. as an external object to be given or asked). In so
doing, it is possible to de¯ne a general decision making model that evaluates rewards
thus de¯ned as well as those that are de¯ned for other application contexts. Moreover,
it is possible to analyse the properties of this mechanism with a relatively small number
of constraints (i.e. the preferences and attributes of the agents) that are general enough
to ¯t any given context. This allows us to formulate a better analysis of the problem and
develop the persuasive negotiation mechanism that has a better grounding than most
models which stand on abstract bases.
In the context of this thesis, we apply the persuasive negotiation to long-term relation-
ships (i.e. repeated encounters) between autonomous agents and devise mechanisms to
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² First, while making o®ers about short term agreements, agents are also allowed to
o®er or ask for rewards in the form of constraints over future agreements. In so
doing, we also tackle the problem of bargaining in long-term relationships (Muthoo,
1999), an aspect that has been overlooked by the agent's community.
² Second, we provide a novel protocol that speci¯es commitments that agents make
to each other in engaging in persuasive negotiations. Speci¯cally, the protocol
aims to show how commitments can be made and retracted by issuing proposals
and rewards or by performing some actions.
² Third, we provide a Reward Generation Mechanism (RWG) that speci¯es when
and what arguments can be sent during a bargain. Moreover, we show these
arguments should be calculated relative to a given o®er as calculated by non-PN
negotiation tactics.
² Fourth, we devise a novel reward based tactic (Reward Based Tactic (RBT)) for
generating o®ers and arguments and show that it can lead to better outcomes than
non-PN tactics (tagged with RWG and without).
² Fifth, we analyse the properties of our RBT under di®erent conditions in order
to deduce which are the most important factors that a®ect the e®ectiveness and
applicability of arguments in bargaining.
7.2 The Negotiation Protocol
Negotiation proceeds via an exchange of o®ers and counter o®ers. In general, the speci-
¯cation of such a protocol is rather simple in that there is only one type of commitment
(see de¯nition 1.4) upheld by each agent at any one time (that is enacting the proposal if
its o®er is accepted). However, extending the protocol to encapsulate arguments means
that other commitments (pertaining to the enactment of the content of arguments) must
be speci¯ed for the agents issuing these arguments (Walton and Krabbe, 1995; McBur-
ney et al., 2003; Bentahar et al., 2004). These commitments can then be checked by an
institution or arbitrator in order to make sure that the agents are doing what they are
supposed to and thus provide guarantees of proper behaviour (as discussed in section
1.2).
As discussed in section 2.1 there are a number of representations, such as Sierra et al.'s
state machines or McBurney's commitment rules, that can be used to specify how these
commitments can be made or retracted by the illocutions (what the agents say) and
the actions (what the agents do). However, given that arguments are likely to result
in a large number of states and state transitions and that the enactment of arguments
requires clear semantics of actions to be performed, we specify our protocol in terms of
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suitable for specifying programs or sets of actions which have start and termination
conditions and constructs similar to a negotiation encounter. For example, as shown
in section 2.1, the work of Bentahar et al. (2004) provides a particular characterisation
of aguments using a combination of dynamic logic and CTL (computation tree logic).
However, as we argue in section 2.3, their work does not deal with promises of future
rewards as arguments and these have a particular meaning that is not captured by the
commitments Bentahar et al.'s use. To remedy this, in our model we extend their work
to cater for rewards that act as arguments. To this end, we ¯rst provide a brief overview
of the constructs of dynamic logic and then specify the protocol in detail.
7.2.1 Background
The main components of DL are described as follows (see (Harel, 1984) for more details).
Agents perform atomic actions a0;a1;:: 2 ¦0. ¦0 represents the set of all atomic actions.
Atomic programs are basic and indivisible; they execute in a single step. They are
called atomic because they cannot be decomposed further. ¡ is the set of formulae. The
formulae in ¡ are true or not in given states and the agents change states according to
the actions they perform.
A program ¦ is generated from ¦0 by composing atomic actions using the following
operators ;;¤ ;?;[. an;am signi¯es that am is performed after an (i.e. sequential com-
position) while a¤
n implies an iteration of an an indeterminate number of times, '? tests
whether ' is satis¯ed in the current state, and an [ am speci¯es a non-deterministic
execution of either a or b. Moreover, [a]' denotes that after program a 2 ¦ is executed,
' 2 ¡ is necessarily true. hai' denotes that after program a 2 ¦ is executed, it is
possible that ' 2 ¡ is true. We also introduce the predicates Do to denote the action of
making a formula true and Done to check whether an action has been executed (then
true) or not (then false). Thus [Do(')]' means that after the execution of Do('), ' is
necessarily true. Similarly, [a]Done(a) means that after executing a, Done(a) is true.
Finally a? denotes that the execution of program a is not possible in any state. The
propositional operators ^;_;:;$, and 1 can be de¯ned from ! and 0 in the usual way.
In DL we ¯rst capture the set of all states of the world through the set S. Then, ½ : ¦0 !
2S£S is a function taking a program and giving the corresponding set of pairs of starting
and end states. In our model, the states of the world are completely represented by the
`social' commitments (`social' since they result from a public expression of a commitment
that can be tracked by everyone in the society). We denote social commitments with the
predicate SC. Agents therefore make social commitments to each other about particular
actions which may involve deals or contracts as de¯ned in chapter 4 (the result of the
negotiation encounter), noted as (xn = vn)^:::^(xm = vm), agents come to during and
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deal takes a value vm (we detail these in the next section).1 The social commitments and
enactment of deals are well formed formulae that can be made true or false according to
the actions agents take. Hence, the function ½ in our model takes an action and returns
formulae that represent the beginning and end state of that action. We will show the
start and end states using the commitments and deals. Thus we give semantics to the
negotiation dialogue in what follows.
7.2.2 The Syntax
Agents negotiate by sending illocutionary particles which contain o®ers and counter-
o®ers. These illocutionary particles are considered to be actions as per speech-act theory
(see section 1.4). Illocutions, from the set I µ ¦0, generally talk about other illocutions
(to be sent at a later time) or about contracts that can be made between the pair of
negotiating agents. The set of contracts to be enacted by a group of agents g 2 G where
G µ Ag, is denoted as OG. In more detail, we re¯ne the de¯nition of a contract from
chapter 4 to mean a composition of a number of actions noted as hDo(x1 = v1 ^ x2 =
v2 ^:::^xn = vn)i 2 Of®g which implies that agent ® is to ensure that (x = v) 2 WFF
(i.e. issue x takes the value v is a well formed formula) such that [Do(x = v)](x = v). A
contract would obviously contain some actions to be performed by the sender and some
by the receiver (as in section 4.1) such that Of®;¯g = Of®g [Of¯g. We require that each
variable x in a deal occurs at most once and that the number of variables and the values
taken by them is ¯nite.
We conceive of two general classes of illocutions that can be used in persuasive nego-
tiation. The ¯rst consists of negotiation illocutions Ineg that are used in negotiation,
while the second contains those illocutions Ipers that are added to form the persua-
sive part of negotiation. Moreover, both these classes of illocutionary acts form the set
I = Inego [ Ipers. In a dialogue between agents ® and ¯ for example, we note I
¯
® µ I
as being those illocutions that are sent by ® to ¯. Finally, the set I® and I¯ denote the
set of all illocutions that ® and ¯ can send respectively. In what follows, we detail the
syntax of each of these illocutions.
7.2.2.1 Negotiation Illocutions
Ineg is the set of the usual negotiation illocutions noted as i(®;¯;p) 2 Ineg where i 2
fpropose;acceptg. These illocutions are described as follows:
² propose(®;¯;p) | denotes that ® sends a proposal to ¯ to accept the deal given
in p 2 Of®;¯g .
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² accept(®;¯;p) | denotes that ® accepts to enact the contents of p 2 Of®;¯g that
it is supposed to perform (i.e. the part Of®g).
7.2.2.2 Persuasive Illocutions
We specify persuasive illocutions as follows: i(®;¯;p;q) 2 Ipers where q 2 Deals [ I
and p 2 Of®;¯g and i 2 faskreward;rewardg. As for negotiation illocutions, we specify
below the type q takes in the illocution.
² reward(®;¯;p;q) | denotes that ® will reward ¯ with q 2 Of®g [ I® if ¯ accepts
the deal proposed in p 2 Of®;¯g. As can be seen, q can either be a deal that
is favourable to ¯ or an illocution that will help ¯ in future (e.g. enhance the
reputation of ¯ or an accept of a deal to be presented at a later time).
² askreward(®;¯;p;q) | denotes that ® asks for a reward q 2 Of¯g [ I¯ from ¯ if
¯ accepts the o®er presented in p 2 Of®;¯g.
Having exposed the syntax of these illocutions, we next describe the components that
allow us to give semantics to these illocutions.
7.2.3 Semantics of Illocutions
As discussed in section 7.2.1, the actions or programs performed by agents result in
changes in the state of the world. In our model, programs consist of a number of
illocutionary acts or the execution of deals. To give semantics to our model we exploit
the theory presented by Bentahar et al. (2004). In their model, the authors prescribe
commitments that hold in di®erent states of the world and agents are able to navigate
between di®erent states through the actions they perform. In short, these actions lead
to some commitments becoming true or false (i.e. commitments are equivalent to well-
formed formulae in our model). We therefore extend the work of Bentahar et al. to
incorporate the notion of persuasive negotiation. To this end, we ¯rst conceive of Comms
as the set of social commitments that can be made in a dialogue as a result of illocutions
being uttered and that can be retracted as other illocutions are uttered or other actions
are executed. At the beginning of a negotiation dialogue (i.e. before any agent says
anything), all the commitments are false. As the negotiation proceeds, some will become
true (active) or false (inactive) according to the illocutions sent. Some commitments
might also become false after some actions are performed after negotiation. In general,
we specify a commitment in the following way:
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which implies a social commitment by ® to ¯ to commit to q if ' is true. By specifying '
in terms of the state resulting from the execution of an illocution or a contract, it is then
possible to de¯ne di®erent commitments that result from issuing propose;accept;reward,
or askreward as we show in the following subsections.
7.2.3.1 Basic Axioms
We start with the basic axioms and explain each of them.
² [propose(®;¯;p)]SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p). This means that ® commits
to enacting p if ¯ accepts the proposal. We deal with semantics of accept in the
next section.
²
h
reward(®;¯;p;q)
i
^
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p)
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q)
.
This means that ® commits to q and its part of the deal p if ¯ accepts the deal p.2
²
h
askreward(®;¯;p;q)
i
^
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p)
SC(¯;®;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q)
. This means that
¯ is committed to giving q to ® if ¯ ever accepts p and p is enacted at a later point
in time. Moreover, ® commits to enacting the proposal if ¯ accepts.
We next outline the axioms that specify the constraints that exist over proposals and
rewards:
² Mutually exclusive proposals
^
®;¯;p;p0;p06=p
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p) ! :SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p0));p0)
This is a basic statement saying that our protocol does not keep previous o®ers
(here p0 2 Of®;¯g) on the negotiation table.
² Mutually exclusive rewards
^
®;¯;p
0
@
^
q;q0;q6=q0
SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q) ! :SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q0)
1
A
where acc = accept(¯;®;p) if q or q0 is a reward o®ered by ®, acc = accept(®;¯;p)
if ® asked for a reward q or q0, and q;q0 2 Of®;¯g [ I®.
This implies that there cannot be two rewards associated with the same deal at
any given time.
2We assume here that the contract p is executed after the accept. In other cases, we might have
intermediate contracts being enacted between the reception of the accept and the enactment of p but
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² Mutually exclusive rewards and proposals
^
®;¯;q;q0
0
@
^
p;p0
:(SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q) ^ SC(¯;®;Done(accept(¯;®;p0);p0);q0))
1
A
where p;p0 2 Of®;¯g.
In essence this means that ®'s commitment to giving a reward q and enacting p
cannot hold together with a commitment by ¯ to give q0 to ® (which would have
asked for it before hand) and enacting p0.
7.2.3.2 Dynamics of Commitments
Here we detail those axioms that illustrate the interaction between di®erent commitment
types.
Accepting Proposals and Rewards
² Accepting a proposal:
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p) ![accept(¯;®;p)]
:SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p)
^ SC(®;¯;true;p0) ^ SC(¯;®;true;p00)
where p0 2 Of®g, p00 2 Of¯g, and p = p0[p00. Here we express that both agents are
committed to enacting the content of the deal if the recipient of the o®er accepts.
² Accepting a reward:
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q) ![accept(¯;®;p)]
:SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q)
^ SC(®;¯;true;p0) ^ SC(¯;®;true;p00)
^ SC(®;¯;Done(p);q)
where p0 2 Of®g, p00 2 Of¯g, and p = p0 [ p00. This signi¯es that ® and ¯ commit
to enacting the proposal if the proposal is ¯rst accepted and ® will give the reward
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² Accepting a request for a reward:
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(®;¯;p);p);q) ![accept(¯;®;p)]
:SC(®;¯;Done(accept(®;¯;p);p);q)
^ SC(®;¯;true;p0) ^ SC(¯;®;true;p00)
^ SC(¯;®;Done(p);q)
where p0 2 Of®g, p00 2 Of¯g, and p = p0 [ p00. This signi¯es that ® and ¯ commit
to enacting the proposal if the proposal is ¯rst accepted and ¯ will give the reward
q 2 Of¯g [ I¯ if the proposal p is enacted.
Changing O®ers or Arguments
² A new proposal after another proposal:
^
®;¯;p;p0;p6=p0
¡
SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p) ! [propose(®;¯;p0)]'
¢
where SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p0));p0) ^ :SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p));p) =
'. Here we show how commitments to a previous proposal p are revoked when a
new o®er p0 is made.
² A new proposal after a reward:
^
®;¯;p;p0;p6=p0
¡
SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q) ! [propose(®;¯;p0)]'
¢
where ' = SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p0));p0)^:SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q), acc =
accept(¯;®;p) if ® has o®ered reward q and acc = accept(®;¯;p) i® ¯ has asked
for reward q. Here we specify that an agent revokes a commitment to p and reward
q (given or asked for) if it proposes a new o®er p0.
² A new reward following another reward:
^
®;¯;p;q;q0;q6=q0
¡
SC(®;¯;acc;q) ! [reward(®;¯;p;q0)]'
¢
where ' = SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q0) ^ :SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q), and
acc = accept(¯;®;p) i® ® o®ers reward q and q0 and acc = accept(®;¯;p) i® ¯
asks for reward q or q0. This speci¯es that ® commits to a new reward q0 and
decommits from a past reward q (given or asked) if it o®ers a new reward given
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² A new proposal and reward following another proposal and reward:
^
®;¯;q;p;p0;p6=p0
¡
SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q) ! [reward(®;¯;p0;q)]'
¢
where ' = SC(®;¯;Done(accept(¯;®;p0);p0);q) ^ :SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q),
and acc = accept(¯;®;p) i® ® gives reward q and acc = accept(®;¯;p) i® ¯ asks
for reward q. This says that ® commits to a new proposal p0 and the same reward q.
² Asking for a reward after another reward:
^
®;¯;p;q;q0;q6=q0
¡
SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q) ! [askreward(®;¯;p;q0)]'
¢
where ' = SC(¯;®;Done(accept(¯;®;p);p);q0) ^ :SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q)),
acc = accept(¯;®;p) i® ® o®ered reward q and acc = accept(®;¯;p) i® ¯ asked for
reward q. This means that ® revokes its commitment to give a di®erent reward q
if it asks for a reward q0 from ¯. This ensures there only exists one o®er and one
reward on the table at any time.
² Asking for a reward after another proposal (with reward):
^
®;¯;q;p;p0;p6=p0
(SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q) ! [askreward(®;¯;p0;q)]')
where ' = SC(¯;®;Done(accept(¯;®;p0));q) ^ :SC(®;¯;Done(acc;p);q)),
acc = accept(¯;®;p) i® ® o®ered reward q and acc = accept(®;¯;p) i® ¯ asked
for reward q. This says that ® commits ¯ to give reward q if it accepts the o®er
in p0 while revoking its commitment to give q if ¯ accepts p.
Enacting Proposals and Rewards
SC(®;¯;true;p) ! [p]:SC(®;¯;true;p)
where p 2 Of®g. This simply means that after the deal p is achieved the commitment is
revoked. When ¯ also ful¯lls its commitment to its part of the contract, we consider the
contract of the agents to terminate at this point. However, in the case where a reward
has been given or o®ered earlier, the enactment of the proposal leads to an unconditional
commitment to enacting the reward as follows:
SC(®;¯;Done(p);q) ! [p]:SC(®;¯;true;p) ^ SC(®;¯;true;q)
The commitment to the reward q is then revoked when the reward is enacted in the
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the appropriate reward (given or asked) that ensues from accepting a particular o®er.
7.3 The Persuasive Negotiation Strategy
Given our protocol for persuasive negotiation, and knowing the e®ects of commitments,
we now deal with the reasoning mechanism that agents must use at negotiation time to
generate and evaluate o®ers and rewards. In particular, we do so with respect to the
requirements identi¯ed by Jennings et al. (1998) (described in section 1.4):
1. Mechanisms must exist for passing proposals and their supporting arguments in a
way that other agents understand | the protocol we have provided in section 7.2.3
accounts for this part of the agent's reasoning mechanism in that the agent only
needs to choose the appropriate illocution to express the meaning of its o®er and
rewards (asked or given). The protocol also clari¯es the meaning of the illocutions
and their content through the commitments they entail.
2. Techniques must exist for generating proposals (counter-proposals) and for pro-
viding the supporting arguments | this demands that agents be endowed with
strategies to generate o®ers. Here we will assume no prior information (except
that of the knowledge of a con°ict of preferences and the domain of discourse)
about the opponent (as is commonly the case in most models (Faratin et al., 2002;
Fatima et al., 2004)). In this case, the heuristic-based approach has a proven track
record of eliciting good outcomes and so this is the approach adopted here (see
section 1.2). Generally, these mechanisms assume no knowledge of the opponent
and decide on o®ers and counter o®ers according to the behaviour of the opponent
(behaviour-dependent tactics), the deadline of the agent (time-dependent tactics),
and the amount of resources available (i.e. resource-dependent tactics) (Faratin
et al., 1998) (see section 7.4.2.1).
3. Techniques must exist for assessing proposals (counter-proposals or critiques) and
their associated supporting arguments | this means that agents need to be able to
evaluate the economic bene¯t of proposals and rewards to them. This is normally
captured by evaluating the incoming o®ers against the agent's preference structure
or utility function. However, as we will see, in repeated encounters, agents do not
know the outcome of future games a priori; that is, there exists some uncertainty
about such outcomes (see section 2.3). This uncertainty needs to be taken into
account in the decision making of the agents in prior games. Currently, however,
there is no negotiation technique that deals with strategies speci¯cally tailored for
such repeated encounters and we aim to use persuasive negotiation to do so by
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4. Techniques must exist for responding to proposals (counter-proposals or critiques)
and their associated supporting arguments | here again the heuristic-based mod-
els can provide good reponses to o®ers and counter o®ers. We will give special
attention to those heuristic-based models that try to achieve pareto-e±ciency (the
Nash solution discussed in chapter 1) in the bargaining encounter such as Faratin
et al.'s model (Faratin et al., 1998). In so doing, we aim to develop a bargaining
mechanism that seeks the most e±cient partitioning of resources.
In general, through persuasive negotiation, we give agents a means of in°uencing future
negotiations through rewards, rather than just exchanging o®ers and counter o®ers that
only impact the outcome of the present encounter. Given that negotiation normally
occurs over the partitioning of some resource, the rewards, in our case, aim to constrain
this partition by imposing bounds on or settling agreements on future negotiations.
Thus, promises of rewards (asked for or given) partially determine the partitioning of
resources to be negotiated at a later time. For example, a seller may reward a buyer
with a discount of at least ¯ve pounds on her next purchase if she agrees to buy some
goods at the price o®ered and the buyer may agree to this if she believes the discount
is worth it. Similarly, a buyer might reward a seller with a guarantee to buy its next
stock of goods from the same seller if a good price is o®ered on the current stock
being negotiated and the seller may agree to this rather than continue negotiations.
Such promises are important because they can result in shorter negotiations (i.e. take
less time) and can lead to a more e±cient partitioning of the resources (we elaborate
on these in the following sections). To this end, we ¯rst develop a Reward Generation
Mechanism (RWG) that generates rewards based on o®ers calculated by other techniques
(such as heuristic-based tactics). Second, we develop a new strategy for persuasive
negotiation that is speci¯cally suited to the repeated encounters we consider. While it
is possible to apply rewards to in¯nitely or ¯nitely repeated games, we focus on the base
case of one repetition which is simpler to analyse in order to understand the impact of
rewards on the encounters. Third, we use the MMPD (as discussed in section 4.2.3) to
clarify the intuition behind the generation of rewards and the selection of the type of
reward to be sent. In the following sections we ¯rst build upon the de¯nitions provided
in chapter 4 to de¯ne the properties of the agents playing the iterated MMPD and o®er
the general intuitions behind the persuasive reasoning model. Then we describe the
details of the reasoning mechanism and how agents evaluate the rewards they might
receive or be asked for.
7.3.1 Properties of the Negotiation Games
We consider two agents ® and ¯ having utility functions designed as per chapter 4. In
short, this means that one agent values some issues more and some issues less than
its opponent. Let us assume each agent values two issues more than its opponent and174 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
two issues less (four issues to be negotiated in all). These agents are made to play two
negotiation games. A negotiation game is one in which an agent (® or ¯) starts by
making an o®er over a set of issues O 2 O and the opponent may then counter-o®er or
accept. The agents may then go on counter-o®ering until an agreement is reached or
the deadline tdead is reached (we superscript it with the agent identi¯er where needed).
If an agreement is reached, the agents are committed to enacting the deal settled on
according to the protocol de¯ned in section 7.2 (if they cannot be forced to enact a deal,
CREDIT can be used to check for this and alter the behaviour of the agent accordingly).
We also constrain the games, and further di®erentiate them from the case where agents
play one game each time independently of the previous one, by allowing the second game
to happen if and only if the ¯rst game has a successful outcome (i.e. an agreement is
reached within the agents' deadlines). In so doing, there is no possibility for agents to
negotiate both outcomes in one negotiation round. This, we believe, more closely models
realistic applications where agents will engage in a long-term relationships only if they
can ¯nd some bene¯t in so doing given the result of their previous agreement (i.e. reach
some agreements prior to continuing their relationship). Such approaches are common
in long-term contracting or relationships as de¯ned in the economic literature (Muthoo,
1999; Busch and Hortsmann, 1999).
The set of outcomes in the ¯rst game is captured by O1 while O2 represents the set of
outcomes in the second game (On in the more general case). During these games, as
time passes when agents exchange o®ers or when there is a delay until the next game,
the value of the outcome decreases for each agent according to their discount factor
(noted as ²® for agent ®).
Assuming that the time between two illocutions is ¿ and the time between two games is
µ, the discount due to time is calculated as exp¡²(µ+t) between two games and exp¡²(¿+t)
between o®ers. Note that we expect µ >> ¿ generally. Obviously, the larger the value
of µ or ¿, the more the outcome is discounted and conversely for small values of µ or ¿,
since the discounting e®ect increases in µ and ¿. The value of ² scales the impact of these
delays, where a higher value of ² means a more signi¯cant discount of an o®er, while a
lower value means a lower discounting e®ect. Each agent is also assumed to have a target
utility to achieve over the two games, noted as L 2 [0;2]. This target can thus be less or
equal to the sum of the maximum achievable utility over the two games (2 in the case
an agent has a ² = 0 and exploits both games completely), that is L · 1 + exp¡²(µ+t),
where 1 is the maximum achievable utility in an undiscounted game (see de¯nitions of
utility functions in section 4). Finally, agents can impose bounds on the range of values
for each issue they negotiate noted as [vmin;vmax].
Given the above characterisation, in the next section we detail our persuasive negotiation
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7.3.2 Applying Persuasive Negotiation
In persuasive negotiation, agents try to give rewards or ask for rewards in order to get
their opponent to accept a particular o®er. Rewards are about giving a higher utility
outcome to an opponent in the second game (when given) or a higher utility to the agent
asking for it. Agents may ¯nd an advantage to accept such rewards in the ¯rst game if it
costs them more to counter-o®er (due to their discount factor) or they risk passing their
deadline (or their opponent's). In more detail, in negotiation a reward can be given or
asked for in the following contexts:
² A reward is proposed when the agent can still manage to achieve its target L
after reaching an agreement and giving the reward. This may happen if agent ®
is asking ¯ to concede in the ¯rst game, giving ® more utility in the ¯rst game.
Agent ® may then a®ord to foresake some utility on the second game (which it
values less due to discounting e®ects). It may do so by conceding in the second
game and this acts as a reward. Note here that the reward may cost the sender
something as well and it therefore needs to estimate the cost of this reward with
respect to L® properly before committing to it.
² A reward can be asked by an agent if it is able to concede in the ¯rst game so as
to catch up in the second game. In this case, the agent asking for the reward has
some costs in conceding in the ¯rst game and entices the opponent to pledge to
something in return (a concession in the second game) for the concession in the
¯rst game. The agent asking for the reward also needs to ask for a reward that is
commensurate with its target and the level of concession it is making.
These rewards do not speci¯cally determine the outcome of the second game but specify
the negotiation ranges that the agents will use to negotiate in the second game in a
similar way to CREDIT. This is shown on ¯gure 7.1. As can be seen in this ¯gure,
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(b) In°uencing the second game
Figure 7.1: Determining the outcome of the second game according to the o®er made
in the ¯rst game.
a reward from agent ® to ¯ would be to propose a negotiation range (i.e. make o®ers176 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
with high utility for ¯) that is more favourable to ¯ in the second game (in CREDIT,
the ranges are larger for more trusted agents). The agreement reached in the ¯rst game
would then be of higher utility for ®. The converse applies when agent ® asks ¯ for a
reward (the ranges are narrowed in CREDIT when the agent is exploited in the ¯rst
game). These procedures can be seen as a trade-o® mechanism often used in negotiation
whereby agents trade-o® gains in the present (or the future) in return for gains in the
future (or in the present) (Rai®a, 1982). In general, there are two main ways agents
stand to gain from using rewards as a trade-o® mechanism:
1. Agents may be able to reach an agreement faster in the ¯rst game by providing
some guarantees over the outcome of the second game. If some level of guarantee
can be obtained for the outcome of the second game through a more favourable
negotiation range, agents may ¯nd the current o®er and the reward worth more
than counter-o®ering. This, in turn, reduces negotiation time and hence the less
discounted is the outcome.
2. The negotiation mechanism can be more e±cient in that the agents which value
future outcomes more than their opponent are able to obtain a higher utility in
future games. This may happen particularly when agents have di®erent discount
factors, such that one agent can trade-o® gains in the second game, which its
opponent values more, against higher pro¯ts in the ¯rst game (see discussion in
section 4.2.3).
In order to allow agents to decide on what to o®er or ask for as a reward, we propose
that agents determine the level to which they concede in the ¯rst game in order to
determine how much they will ask for or give as reward in the second game. The higher
the concession, the higher will be the reward demanded, while the lower the concession,
the higher will be the reward given. This is graphically illustrated in ¯gures 7.2 and 7.3.
As can be seen in ¯gure 7.2, ® exploits ¯ through the o®er p and compensates for that
in its reward q. The reward actually speci¯es a number of slots, one of which will be an
agreement they reach after negotiation in the second game. Conversely in ¯gure 7.3, ®
concedes in the ¯rst game in return for a higher utility agreement in the second game.
In the next section, the exact procedure by which rewards can be calculated given the
payo® structure of the MMPD.
7.3.3 Asking for or Giving a Reward
We now formalise the intuition behind the use of rewards. To this end, we extend the
notation presented in chapter 4. Let O1 2 O1 be an o®er chosen by agent ® to send to ¯
in the ¯rst game. According to the utility functions in the MMPD, an agent values someChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 177
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(a) Exploiting on ¯rst game in the of-
fer p.
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(b) Giving reward q on second game by specifying a
small region over which the agreement will be made.
Figure 7.2: These two ¯gures represent the value of the o®er p and reward q used in
reward(®;¯;p;q). The o®er p by ® intends to exploit the opponent ¯ and the reward
q given by ® to ¯ aims to compensate for that exploitation. While 0 represents no
concession, 1 represents full concession where the agent conceding gets less utility than
its opponent when the latter exploits (i.e. tends to 0).
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(a) Conceding on ¯rst game through o®er p.
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(b) Asking for reward q on second game in the shaded
region speci¯ed.
Figure 7.3: These two ¯gures represent the value of the o®er p and the reward q used
in askreward(®;¯;p;q). Through the o®er p, ® concedes to the opponent ¯ and the
reward q asked by ® aims to compensate for that concession. While 0 represents no
concession, 1 represents full concession, meaning more utility for the opponent and less
for the agent conceding.
issues more than its opponent and some less. Similar to the notation we use in chapter
4, X(O®) denotes those issues ® likes less (have a lower utility gradient than ¯'s) in the
o®er O1 = O®
1 [ O
¯
1 and X(O
¯
1) denotes those issues it likes more (which ¯ likes less).
Given this, if ® concedes on the values of issues in X(O
¯
1), it loses more utility than
if it concedes the same amount on X(O®
1). The same reasoning applies symmetrically
to ¯. Therefore, in order to determine the level of concession in the second game on
these two sets of issues, we need to transpose the level of concession from X(O®) to a
concession on X(O
¯
2) in the next game and from X(O
¯
1) to a concession on X(O®
2) where
O2 = O®
2 [ O
¯
2 and O2 2 O2. In so doing, the agents will be e®ectively giving more
or less utility to their opponent in the next game. Obviously, these decisions must be178 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
made in line with other factors such as the target L and other information or strategy
the agent might employ. We will look at these in the next section. For now, we will aim
to determine the level of concession which dictates whether a reward should be asked or
given.
To this end, let Con : Ag £ Ag £ O1 ! [0;1] be a function that determines how much
an agent concedes on an o®er in the ¯rst game. The higher the value returned by Con
the higher is the concession in the o®er. Assuming vfirst is the value of an issue x in
O1, then the degree of concession of ® on (each) issue x in O1 can be calculated as the
relative concessions on the values taken by the issues:
cx =
(
vmax¡vfirst
vmax¡vmin ; if Ux(v) increasing in v
vfirst¡vmin
vmax¡vmin ; if Ux(v) decreasing in v
(7.1)
where [vmin;vmax] is the negotiation range for issue x for agent ®.
Therefore, ® is able to calculate how much it concedes on issues X(O
¯
1) which it prefers
more than ¯ through the following equation:
Con(®;¯;O¯) =
X
x2X(O
¯
1)
wxcx (7.2)
where wx is the weight of the issue as a level of importance of concession on it and
P
wx = 1.
Now, ® can also calculate how much it concedes on issues it likes less than ¯ by replacing
O¯ with O® in equation 7.2. Hence, the slot chosen in the MMPD payo® matrix is
equivalent to the pair (1 ¡ Con(®;¯;O®
1);1 ¡ Con(®;¯;O
¯
1)) (using the axes shown in
¯gure 7.3 for example). Therefore, the choice to give a reward or to ask a reward is
carried out according to the following rule:
if Con(®;¯;O®
1) ¡ Con(®;¯;O
¯
1) = 0 then % equates full cooperation
propose(®;¯;O1)
else if Con(®;¯;O®
1) ¡ Con(®;¯;O
¯
1) > 0 then % equates to a concession
askreward(®;¯;O1;aw)
else % equates to exploitation
reward(®;¯;O1;rw)
end if
where rw is the reward given and aw is the reward asked for. In the next section we
provide a number of ways of calculating these rewards. It is important to note that the
agents, while knowing the structure of the pay-o®s according to the shape of their utility
functions (as shown in section 4.2), do not know the exact utility their opponent gets in
the payo® matrix by virtue of their private discount factors and gradients of their utility
functions. Thus, agents may know that they are conceding to their opponent without
knowing exactly how much the concession is worth to them.Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 179
7.3.4 Determining the Value of Rewards
Having determined which type of argument should be sent, we can now determine the
value of the reward to be given or asked. Given that an agent aims to maximise its utility
in both games and, in so doing, achieve its target L, the value chosen for a reward will
depend on the following factors:3:
² L, the target of the agent | the higher the value of L, the lower is the likely
reward given and the higher the likely reward asked for (and conversely with a low
value of L).
² (Con(®;¯;O®);Con(®;¯;O¯)), the degrees of concession of the agent | the higher
the degrees of concession, the higher the reward asked for is likely to be and the
lower the reward given (and conversely for lower degrees of concession).
We will consider each of the above points in turn.
Given an o®er, an agent is able to compute the utility l2 2 [¡;1] it needs to get in the
second game as:
l2 = L ¡ U(O1) (7.3)
where O1 is the o®er the agent has computed in the ¯rst game. Given this, we need
to consider the following two cases (remember exp¡²(t+µ) is the maximum that can be
obtained in the second game with discounts):
² l2 < exp¡²(t+µ) | in which case it is possible for an agent to reach its target in
the second game (provided the agents reach an agreement in ¯rst and it can ask
for or give rewards according to the current o®er or shape these to maximise its
utility. As will be seen, the reward asked for or given will be constrained by the
value that needs to be achieved for the target to be met in the second game (note
that if l2 · 0 the agent can a®ord to concede to the maximum in the second game
while still achieving its target). The larger this value is, the more constrained will
the second game be.
² l2 ¸ exp²(t+µ) | in which case it is not possible to give a reward but the agent
might ask for a reward to achieve its target which, in this case, would be asking the
opponent to concede on all issues (when l2 = exp¡²(µ+t) for example). Obviously,
this may not be acceptable to the opponent if the proponent is not conceding
anything in the ¯rst game. The best the agent can do is try to get an agreement
on the ¯rst game to get to play the second game. In this case, the agent will simply
use o®ers and no arguments if it is not warranted to do so.
3We believe these factors to be necessary rather than su±cient ones in the decision making process
in the model we study.180 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
As can be seen, the less possible it is for an agent to achieve its target in the two games,
the more exploitative it may tend to be in the second game to maximise its utility. This
becomes clearer when we come to determining the value of the reward according to the
level of concession.
For now, assuming we know l2 < exp¡²(µ+t), it is possible to determine how much it is
necessary to adjust negotiation ranges for all or some issues in the second game in order
to achieve l2. First, the agent calculates the undiscounted utility l2
exp²(µ+t) it needs to
get in the second game. Then it needs to decide how it is going to adjust the utility
it needs on each issue, hence the value for each issue, in order to achieve the overall
desired target. One approach to this is to try to gain more utility on issues the agent
values more than its opponent. However, exploiting the more preferred issues can reduce
the possibility of reaching an agreement (since the negotiation range would become very
small and may therefore not intersect with that of the opponent). Another approach is
to distribute the utility to be obtained on all issues according to the weight each issue
has in the utility function (i.e. the utility to be obtained per issue is the same as the
value of l2 but is multiplied by the weight of the issue in the utility function described
in equation (4.1) in chapter 4). Therefore, the required outcome vout of an issue in the
second game can be computed as:
vout = U¡1
x
µ
l2
exp¡²(µ+t)
¶
(7.4)
Given the constraint de¯ned by vout (i.e. how much it should get at least to achieve its
target), the agent needs to determine by how much it can reward or ask for a reward.
To this end, the agent computes the contract ¹ O which satis¯es the following properties:
Con(®;¯; ¹ O®
2) = Con(®;¯;O
¯
1) (7.5)
Con(®;¯; ¹ O
¯
2) = Con(®;¯;O®
1) (7.6)
This is equivalent to the procedure described in ¯gures 7.2 and 7.3 where the level
of concession or exploitation in the o®er in the ¯rst game (i.e. here O1 = O®
1 [ O
¯
1)
is mapped to the reward asked or given in the second game (i.e. here ¹ O2 = ¹ O®
2 [
¹ O
¯
2). Assuming linear utility functions and ¯nite domains of values for the issues, the
procedure above is equivalent to re°ecting the level of concession on each issue valued
more by ® onto those valued more by ¯. This is the same as inverting equation 7.2 and
¯nding vfirst given cx for each issue by inverting equation 7.1 (a procedure linear in time
with respect to the number of issues considered). Let us assume that for an issue x this
results in a bound vr (a maximum or minimum according to the type of argument to be
sent).Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 181
Thus, from ¹ O2, ® obtains bounds on the rewards it can ask from or give to ¯. These
bounds are expressed in terms of the minimum or maximum values (depending on which
type of argument is chosen) that each issue would take in the second game. We will
next consider how these bounds must be adjusted to ¯t the targets of the agent.
7.3.4.1 Sending a Reward
Now, given vr and vout for an issue x, assume that ® prefers high values for x and ¯
prefers low values. Also assume that it has been determined that a reward should be
sent. Then ® can determine whether a reward should be given and what is the value of
the reward according to the following constraints:
² vr ¸ vout | ® can o®er a reward implying an upper bound vr on the second game.
This is because the target vout is less than vr and ® can therefore negotiate with a
revised upper bound of v0
max = vr and a lower bound of v0
min = vout. The reward
that can be sent in this case is the upper bound vr implying that ® will not ask
for more than vr.
² vout > vr | ® cannot o®er a reward commensurate with the amount it asks ¯
to concede in the ¯rst game. The best it could o®er as a reward is vout. This
implies that ® revises its negotiation ranges to v0
min = vout (with vmax remaining
the same). In this case, the agent does not send a reward but simply modi¯es its
negotiation ranges.
7.3.4.2 Asking for a Reward
Similar to the case where a reward is asked for, assuming vr and vout have been deter-
mined for an issue x, agent ® has to consider the following constraints in determining
whether a reward should be asked for and the value it should have:
² vr ¸ vout | ® can ask for a reward with lower bound vr. This is because the target
vout is less than vr and ® can therefore negotiate with a revised lower bound of
v0
min = vr and the same upper bound vmax in order to achieve a utility that is well
above its target.
² vout > vr | ® cannot ask for a reward with lower bound vr. This is because it
cannot achieve its target if it asks ¯ for the exact reward it deserves. Therefore, ®
can privately bound its future negotiation to v0
min = vout while keeping its upper
bound at vmax. No argument is sent in this case.
It is straightforward to extend the above reasoning mechanism to cater for ¯'s appre-
ciation of values of vx (i.e. its utility is decreasing in x). Given these constraints on182 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
rewards, in the next section, we bring together the di®erent components of the reward
generation algorithm.
7.3.5 The Reward Generation Algorithm
In this section we capture the reasoning mechanism of an agent trying to give or ask for
a reward. To this end, we devise an algorithm that contains all the di®erent operations
described in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, and 7.3.4. Thus, we aim to clarify the reasoning
process. We explain each signi¯cant step of the algorithm in turn (see algorithm 7.4).
As can be seen in the preconditions of the algorithm, it is required that the current time
t < tdead such that the agent has not reached its deadline. The algorithm also requires
that the agent has generated an o®er O using its negotiation tactic (e.g. behaviour based,
time dependent). Step 1 computes the utility that is needed in the second game l2. Step
2 computes the minimum value vout of each issue that needs to be obtained in the second
game for the agent to achieve its target. Step 3 initialises values that represent outputs
con® and con¯ of functions Con(®;¯;O®) and Con(®;¯;O¯) respectively. These aim
to determine how much the agent concedes in the ¯rst game by virtue of the o®er O.
Steps 4 to 14 calculate con® and con¯. These are calculated as the weighted sums of
concessions on all individual issues (Steps 7, 9, and 11) in the o®er (as in equation (7.2)).
Step 13 actually maps out the concessions to the second game (as in equation (7.6)).
This procedure will vary according to the particular characterisation of the negotiation
game. In a zero sum game, it would simply mean inverting the level of concessions of
the ¯rst game onto the second game. In contrast, in the MMPD, it equates to mapping
the concessions on preferred issues of ® in the ¯rst game onto those of ¯ in the second
game (as shown in equations 7.5 and 7.6). As from Step 15, the agents starts making
a choice about which illocution to send and what type of argument is to be tagged to
it. In case both agents are conceding an equivalent amount, Step 16 sends a proposal
containing the o®er O. Otherwise, it calculates the reward according to the procedure
described in section 7.3.4. Steps 17 to 31 describe how an agent changes its negotiation
ranges and selects a reward to be asked according to the procedure described in section
7.3.4.2. Similarly steps 32 to 46 describe the procedure for giving a reward according to
section 7.3.4.1.
7.3.6 Evaluating O®ers and Rewards
Having discussed how agents would generate rewards, we now describe how an agent
evaluates the o®ers and rewards it receives. Generally, when agents negotiate through
the alternating o®ers protocol (Rubinstein, 1982), they accept an o®er only when the
next o®er they might put forward has a lower (discounted due to time) utility than the
o®er presented to them by their opponent. This is expressed as in ¯gure 7.5.Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 183
Require: O 2 O1;µ;¿;²;L;R;hwxi;t < tdead % O being the o®er calculated according to ®'s
negotiation tactic
1: l2 Ã L ¡ U(O); % utility is required in second game to meet target L
2: For each issue x 2 X(O), calculate vout Ã U¡1
x
³
l2
exp¡²(t+µ)
´
; % values of issues required in
second game
3: set con®;con¯ = 0; % calculate Con(®;¯;O®) and Con(®;¯;O¯)
4: for all x 2 X(O) do
5: get (x = vfirst) 2 O; % extract values of issues in o®er for ¯rst game
6: get range [vmax;vmin] for x; % obtain the range of negotiable values for x
7: cx Ã
vmax¡vfirst
vmax¡vmin ; % assuming U®
x (v) is increasing in v, get concession level
8: if x 2 X(O®) then
9: con® Ã con® + wx ¢ cx; % concessions on issues highly valued by ®,
P
wx = 1
10: else
11: con¯ Ã con¯ + w0
x ¢ cx; % concessions on issues highly valued by ¯,
P
w0
x = 1
12: end if
13: select Or where Con(®;¯;O®
r ) = con¯ and Con(®;¯;O¯
r) = con®; % ¯nd equivalent
concession in second game
14: end for
15: if con® ¡ con¯ == 0 then % equal concessions from ® or ¯
16: send propose(®;¯;O);
17: else if con® ¡ con¯ > 0 then % ® conceding in ¯rst game - ® asks reward
18: for all (x = vr) 2 Or do
19: if vr ¸ vout then % if reward falls within acceptable range
20: set negotiation range in second game to [vr;vmax];% this is the reward asked for.
21: ask-possible = true;
22: else % deserved reward cannot be asked
23: set negotiation range to [vout;vmax];
24: ask-possible = false;
25: end if
26: end for
27: if ask-possible then
28: send askreward(®;¯;O;Or);
29: else
30: send propose(®;¯;O);
31: end if
32: else % ® exploiting in ¯rst game - ® gives reward
33: for all (x = vr) 2 Or do
34: if vr ¸ vout then % if reward falls within acceptable range
35: set negotiation range in second game to [vout;vr];
36: reward-possible = true;
37: else % deserved reward cannot be given
38: set negotiation range in second game to [vout;vmax];% this is the reward given.
39: reward-possible = false;
40: end if
41: end for
42: if reward-possible then
43: send reward(®;¯;O;Or);
44: else
45: send propose(®;¯;O);
46: end if
47: end if
Figure 7.4: Determining the argument type and value to be sent to ¯.184 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
if U(Onext) ¢ exp²(¿+t) · U(Ogiven) then
accept(®;¯;Ogiven)
end if
Figure 7.5: Accepting an o®er in the usual case.
However, agents using persuasive negotiation also have to evaluate the incoming o®er
together with the reward they are being asked for or are being given. From the previous
section, we can generally infer that a reward will imply a value vr for a given issue
which de¯nes either a lower or an upper bound for that issue in the next negotiation
game. For example, a reward to be given by a seller might be a guaranteed discount (i.e.
a lower limit price) on the next purchase by the current buyer which could also have
been a reward requested by the buyer. Therefore, given this bound, the agent may infer
that the outcome of any given issue will lie in [v0
min;v0
max] which might be equivalent to
or di®erent from the agent's normal negotiation ranges [vmin;vmax] and may take into
account the agent's target vout (given its target l2) or the value vr itself.
Generally, we can assume that given a negotiation range [v0
min;v0
max], an agent may
be able to de¯ne an expected outcome of that range using a probability distribution
(e.g. normal, beta) or some (fuzzy) reasoning based on its negotiation strategy (e.g. a
conciliatory strategy would expect a lower utility gain in the second game as compared to
a non-conciliatory one when faced with a non-conciliatory opponent). This probability
distribution may be estimated from previous interactions with the agent or knowing the
behaviour of its bargaining strategy and its relationship with the agent's own bargaining
strategy (i.e. the relative negotiation powers of the agents as de¯ned in CREDIT). Given
this expected outcome for any issue, the agent may then calculate the expected utility
(determined according to the bounds set by the reward) of that reward along with the
utility of the o®er to which it is tagged. Moreover, using the same procedure it can
calculate the expected utility of any reward or o®er that it might want to send next. By
comparing the two sets of utilities, it can then make a decision as to whether to accept
or counter o®er in the next step. We detail such a procedure as follows.
Assume ¯ is the agent that is the recipient of a reward (given or asked for) and that ¯
prefers small values for the issue x being considered. Then, let ¯'s negotiable range be
[vmin;vmax] for the issue x and ¯'s target be l
¯
2 in the second game (which implies that
it needs at least v
¯
out for the issue in the second game).
Now, if ¯ receives reward(®;¯;O;Oa) (or askreward(®;¯;O;O0
a)) for the second game,
Oa implies that v®
r is the upper bound proposed for each each issue x in Oa (v®
r would
be a lower bound in O0
a). In the meantime, ¯ has calculated another o®er Onew with
a reward Ob in which a bound v
¯
r is to be given to each issue x in Ob. Then, for each
issue x, ¯ calculates the negotiable ranges given v®
x as [vmin;v®
x] (or [v®
x;minfvout;vmax]
if O0
a is asked) while it calculates [v
¯
x;minfv
¯
out;vmaxg] given v
¯
x. We assume ¯ can then
calculate (using a probabilistic technique) the expected outcome of each range as ev®
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for [vmin;v®
x] (or [v®
r ;minfvout;vmax] in the case of O0
a) and ev
¯
x for [v
¯
r ;minfv
¯
out;vmax].
Given each of these expected outcomes for each issue, the overall expected outcomes,
EOa and EOb, of the second game can be calculated for each type of reward respectively
as:
U(EOa) =
X
x2X(EOa)
wx ¢ U(ev®
x) (7.7)
U(EOb) =
X
x2X(EOb)
wx ¢ U(ev¯
x) (7.8)
where EOa is the expected outcome of the reward given by ®, EOb is the expected
outcome of the reward given by ¯,
P
wx = 1 and wx is the weight given to each issue
in the utility function (as per equation (4.1)).
Given that the expected outcomes have been calculated, then the agent decides to accept
or counter o®er using the following rule in ¯gure 7.6 which evaluates the o®er generated
against the o®er received to decide whether to accept the o®er received or send the
reward illocution (note the addition of discount factors to re°ect the time till the next
game and between illocutions, that is, sending the counter o®er, receiving an accept,
and sending the ¯rst o®er in the second game).
if U(Onew)¢exp¡²¯(¿+t) +(U(EOb)¢exp¡²¯(µ+¿+t) · U(O)¢exp¡²¯(2¿+t))+(U(EOa)¢
exp¡²¯(µ+3¿+t) then
accept(¯;®;O)
else
reward(¯;®;Onew;Ob)
end if
Figure 7.6: Evaluating a received reward when about to give a reward
If instead, a reward O0
b were to be asked for by ¯ along with an o®er Onew, then ¯ will
apply a similar decision rule as above in ¯gure 7.7 where EO0
b is the expected outcome
¯ calculates for the reward it asks ®. This rule evaluates the received o®er against the
newly generated o®er and reward to decide whether to ask for the reward or accept.
if (U(O0
new)¢exp¡²¯(¿+t) +(U(EO0
b)¢exp¡²¯(µ+¿+t)) · U(O)¢exp¡²¯(2¿+t) +(U(EOa)¢
exp¡²¯(µ+3¿+t) then
accept(¯;®;O)
else
askreward(¯;®;O0
new;O0
b)
end if
Figure 7.7: Evaluating a received reward when about to ask a reward
Finally we consider the case where agent ¯ has received a persuasive o®er and can only
reply with another o®er without any argument. In this case, ¯ calculates the expected
outcome of the second game without any constraints (i.e. using its negotiation range186 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
[vmin;vmax] to elicit EO00
b). The rule given in ¯gure 7.8 therefore compares the utility
of the o®er received against the utility of the o®er generated and the outcome expected
in the next game to decide whether to propose or to accept. Note here that the second
game is left more uncertain in this case since the bounds have not been changed by any
reward. This means that the agent cannot guarantee that it will meet its target and can
also result in the agents taking more time to reach an agreement in the second game (as
in the case of non-persuasive tactics as we show in the next section).
if (U(O0
new)¢exp¡²¯(¿+t))+(U(EO00
b)¢exp¡²¯(µ+¿+t)) · U(O)¢exp¡²¯(2¿+t))+(U(EOa)¢
exp¡²¯(µ+3¿+t)) then
accept(¯;®;O)
else
propose(¯;®;O00
new)
end if
Figure 7.8: Evaluating a received reward when about to send a normal o®er.
Having described our mechanisms for sending and evaluating rewards and o®ers, we next
experimentally evaluate our model of persuasive negotiation and compare it with other
standard mechanisms.
7.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we describe a series of experiments that aim to evaluate the e®ectiveness
and e±ciency of our model of persuasive negotiation in repeated interactions. To this
end, we build pairs of negotiating agents that respect the protocol described in section 7.2
and that use the reasoning mechanism described in section 7.3 to generate and evaluate
arguments. In the following sections, we ¯rst detail the settings of the experiments and
provide the results of the experiments we carry out. We also provide a new algorithm
that speci¯cally takes into account the repetitive nature of the interaction to generate
rewards and o®ers and show how its performance compares with standard negotiation
tactics that take into account one game at a time in making o®ers (and use our reward
generation component to select rewards). Finally, we evaluate the performance of our
algorithm under di®erent conditions in order to determine the main factors that a®ect
the e®ectiveness and applicability of rewards in negotiation.
7.4.1 Experimental Settings
The general settings that apply to the two negotiation games are as follows:
² The pair of negotiating agents have their utility functions shaped by the MMPD in
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obtains for particular values of the issues are not known since utilities are private.
Thus agents ® and ¯ negotiate over 4 issues x1;:::;x4 where x1 and x2 (e.g. price
or bandwidth) are more valued by ® than ¯ while x3 and x4 (e.g. usage of service
or time of payment), are more valued by ¯ than ®.
² the agents have their utility functions U® and U¯ speci¯ed over each issue as well
as the weight of each in table 7.1.
² tmax | The maximum time for a negotiation game to take place is set to 2 seconds
which is equivalent to around 300 illocutions to be exchanged between the two
agents.4 Unless stated otherwise, the agents' deadlines, t®
dead and t
¯
dead, are then
de¯ned according to a uniform distribution between 0 and 2 seconds.
² ²® and ²¯ | the discount factors are set to a value between 0 and 1 drawn from
a uniform distribution (unless stated otherwise).
² L® and L¯ | the targets of the agents are drawn from a uniform distribution
between 0 and 2 (unless stated otherwise).
² µ and ¿ { µ is set to 0.5 seconds while ¿ is set to 0.0001 to simulate instantaneous
replies (unless stated otherwise).
² [vmin;vmax] | the negotiation range for each issue and each agent are de¯ned using
¸, degree of alignment of the negotiation ranges as described in section 5.4.3.2. The
degree of alignment is arbitrarily set (between 0 and 1).
Agent
Utility function and weight of each issue
Ux1, wx1 Ux2, wx2 Ux3, wx3 Ux4, wx4
® 0:4x1, 0.5 0:9x2, 0.2 1 ¡ 0:2x1, 0.2 1 ¡ 0:6x2, 0.1
¯ 1 ¡ 0:2x1, 0.4 1 ¡ 0:6x2, 0.1 0:9x2, 0.3 0:4x1, 0.2
Table 7.1: Utility functions and weights of issues for each agent.
We will further assume that the ¯rst o®er an agent makes in any negotiation is selected
at random (but having a high utility for the agent). Also, the ¯rst agent to start
any bargain is chosen at random. This random choice reduces any possible ¯rst-mover
advantage a strategy may have over another (i.e. which loses less utility due to discount
factors). Moreover, in order to calculate the expected outcome of the second game
(as discussed in section 7.3.6), agents draw the outcome for each issue from a normal
distribution with its mean centred in the middle of the agent's negotiation range for
the second game with a variance equal to 0.5. Finally, in all our experiments we will
use ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) to test for the statistical signi¯cance of the results
obtained.
4Preliminary experiments with the negotiation tactics suggest that if the agents do not come to an
agreement within this time period, they never achieve any agreement even if the maximum negotiation
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7.4.2 Negotiation Tactics
Given that our persuasive negotiation model calculates rewards given an o®er, it is
possible to use standard negotiation tactics to generate the o®ers at negotiation time
and get the corresponding reward from our algorithm (shown in ¯gure 7.4). Here, a tactic
is a mechanism that can be used (sometimes based on prior information) to generate
o®ers or rewards in our case. To this end, we exploit the standard negotiation tactics
presented in (Faratin et al., 1998).
7.4.2.1 The Standard Negotiation Tactics
We select the basic tactics that are most commonly used in the literature (Fatima et al.,
2002; Faratin et al., 1998) to evaluate our model. Using such basic tactics (as opposed
to more complex ones such as (Faratin et al., 2002; Winoto et al., 2004)), allows us to
focus on the main properties of our PN model and to clearly show the added bene¯t of
using rewards on di®erent aspects of the negotiation. The basic negotiation tactics we
use are described as follows:
² Behaviour based tactics (BB) | these calculate a new o®er based on the di®erence
between the opponent's last o®er and its previous o®er. In this way, the agent
imitates its opponent. Thus, the agent calculates changes to the values from its
previous o®er to generate values for its next o®er in the following ways for each
issue:
{ Relative Tit-for-Tat (RTFT) | the change is calculated as a percentage dif-
ference between the value of the last o®er and the one before.
{ Average Relative Tit-for-Tat (ARTFT) | The change is calculated as a per-
centage over a number of previous o®ers and averaged.
{ Absolute Tit-for-Tat (ATFT) | the change is calculated as the absolute
di®erence between the value of the issue in the last o®er and the one before.
In our experiments we will calculate a BB o®er by using the average output of
RTFT, ATFT, and ARTFT.
² Time-based Tactics | these calculate a new o®er by changing a previous o®er
depending on the amount of time elapsed since the beginning of the negotiation
using a polynomial function or an exponential function. Thus, these tactics do not
imitate in any way their opponent. There are two main ways these tactics operate:
{ Boulware (BW) | this only concedes signi¯cantly towards the end of the
negotiation (i.e. as the agent's deadline approaches). Thus, the agent waits
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{ Conceder (CO) | this signi¯cantly changes the previous o®er early during
the negotiation in an attempt to reach an agreement quickly.
As can be seen, these strategies only calculate a new o®er based on the agent's own
previous o®er. Moreover, both behaviour-based and time-based tactics do not take into
account the fact that agents are to meet more than one time and that they can either
ask for or give rewards. Given this, in the next section we present a new reward-based
tactic (RBT) that takes the repeated nature of negotiations into account in generating
o®ers and rewards.
7.4.2.2 The Reward-Based Tactic
The tactics presented in the previous section usually start with an o®er with very high
utility for the proponent. If these tactics generate o®ers that are then used in our
reward generation mechanism (presented in section 7.3.5), the reward generation mech-
anism would also start by giving rewards and end up asking rewards as its deadline
approaches. This is because these tactics generate o®ers that are exploitative at the
beginning of the negotiation. As the agent gradually concedes on its initial o®er during
the negotiation, the reward generation mechanism would ask for rewards instead. Thus,
it is not possible for these tactics to ask for rewards at the beginning of the negotiation.
This can signi¯cantly reduce the e±ciency (in terms of the sum of utilities of the agents)
of the negotiation encounter since one of the agents may be better o® conceding the
second game if it has a low discount factor ² and, in return, exploit the ¯rst game (as
discussed earlier in section 4.2.3). This would mean that the more patient agent (i.e.
the one with a high discount factor ²) could ask for a reward in the second game or the
other agent could o®er a reward in the second game.
Given this background, we provide an algorithm that either asks for or gives a reward at
any point in the negotiation in order to reach an agreement. To do so, the agent needs
to know how to evaluate incoming o®ers and generate counter-o®ers accordingly. We
will consider three main cases in calculating the best response to an o®er and a reward.
These are:
1. An o®er and a reward have been received and it is possible to counter o®er with
a reward.
2. An o®er and a reward have been received and it is not possible to counter o®er
with a reward.
3. An o®er has been received and it is not possible to counter o®er with a reward.
We show how the algorithm deals with each of these cases in turn.190 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
Case 1: An o®er and a reward have been received and it is possible to counter o®er with
a reward.
In this case, an agent ® needs to calculate combinations of rewards asked for or given
with o®ers and choose the combination which it deems most appropriate to send to ¯.
To calculate these combinations, ® ¯rst needs to determine the overall utility each com-
bination should have. To achieve this, we use a hill climbing method similar to Faratin
et al.'s model (Faratin et al., 2002). In this method, the agent tries to ¯nd an o®er that
it believes is most favourable to its opponent while not necessarily conceding too much.
In our case, this procedure equates to the agent trying to move the agreement more
towards the corners (upper or lower depending on the o®er and reward selected) in the
MMPD. In so doing, the strategy can maximise joint gains in the repeated negotiation
encounter.
Therefore, to calculate the best combination of o®er and reward to send in the hill-
climbing approach, the agent ¯rst calculates the utility of the next o®er it intends to
send and then ¯nds the o®er and reward that optimally match this utility value. By
optimality, in this case, we mean that either the o®er or the reward should also be the
most favourable one to the opponent. Thus, the utility of the next o®er is calculated
according to the di®erence that exists between the agent's previous o®er and the last one
sent by its opponent and the step in utility the agent wishes to make from its previous
o®er. The size of this utility step can be arbitrarily set. Given a step of size f, the
utility step is calculated by the function Su : O1 £ O2 £ O1 £ O2 £ [1;1] as follows:
Su(O1;O2;O0
1;O0
2;f) =
U(O1)exp¡t +U(EO2)exp¡(µ+t)
f
¡U(O0
1)exp¡(¿+t) ¡U(EO0
2)exp¡(µ+2¿+t)
f
(7.9)
where O1 and EO2 are the previous o®er and expected outcome in the second game
from ®'s reward O2 respectively, O0
1 and EO0
2 are the current o®er and the expected
outcome of ¯'s argument O0
2 respectively. When a reward is not speci¯ed by the agents,
the utility calculated by the function only considers the o®ers made by each agent (i.e.
remove U(EO0) and U(EO0
2) from its calculation).
Given the utility step Su, it is then possible to calculate the utility Nu of the combination
of the next o®er and reward using the following equation:
Nu = U(O1)exp¡(2¿+t) +U(EO2)exp¡(µ+3¿+t) ¡Su(O1;O2;O0
1;O0
2;f) (7.10)
Given that rewards specify bounds on the negotiation in the second game, each com-
bination that can be o®ered in a step represents a space of possible agreements in the
second game given an o®er in the ¯rst game. Therefore, ¯nding a combination that
more closely matches the opponent's o®er and reward equates to ¯nding another spaceChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 191
of o®ers that is close to the opponent's space that covers its latest o®er and reward.
This procedure is pictured on ¯gure 7.9.
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Figure 7.9: The hill climbing performed by RBT for an agent ® to ¯nd an appropriate
reward and o®er in response to the o®er and reward by agent ¯. The shaded semi circles
represent spaces over which di®erent o®ers and rewards have the same utility for ® (top)
or ¯ (bottom). Each new o®er by ® is made closer to agent ¯'s previous o®er.
As can be seen in this ¯gure, in our tactic, ® calculates the most favourable combination
of o®er and reward for agent ¯ that achieves the utility Nu. In so doing, our tactic aims
to make o®ers that meet the space representing all equivalent outcomes, or the isocurve,
of ¯ in a few steps. In calculating a reward to be given we take into account the fact
that in the MMPD the opponent likes some issues more than others and by maximising
the opponent's gain on these issues we ensure that the reward is more attractive to the
opponent. In the same way, when a reward is asked for, the associated o®er is calculated
such that the values of the issues in the o®er are more favourable to the opponent on those
issues it prefers most according to the MMPD. To calculate these o®ers and rewards,
we use an optimisation function OptComb : O1 £ O2 £ O1 £ O2 ! O1 £ O2, based on
linear programming (LP), that calculates the reward that is either most favourable to ¯
or to ®. OptComb therefore runs through our reward generation mechanism to ¯nd the
best possible rewards and the associated o®ers whose combined utility are equal to Nu.
However, OptComb can also fail to ¯nd an optimal output (as a result of the constraints
being too strong (e.g. the target L being too high) or the optimizer not being able
to ¯nd the solution in the speci¯ed number of steps) and in these cases, we resort to
another procedure described next (i.e. Case 2).
Case 2: An o®er and a reward have been received but it is not possible to counter o®er
with a reward.192 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
In this case, the agent cannot ¯nd a combination of a proposal and a reward that match
Nu. Therefore, the agent calculates an o®er using one of the basic negotiation tactics
presented in section 7.4.2.1. In this case, BB tactics would not be appropriate to generate
an o®er given previous o®ers by the opponent since these o®ers may also be associated
to rewards. This means that the o®ers by themselves (which would be used in BB to
calculate the next o®er) do not exactly depict the concessions that the agent has made
and using BB could lead to an o®er where it concedes more than it should. Therefore,
either BW or CO is used to generate the o®er since these are independent of the previous
o®ers made by the opponent.
Case 3: An o®er and a reward have been received and it is possible to counter o®er with
a reward.
In the event that ¯ only proposes an o®er without any rewards, our tactic needs to be
able to respond by a similar procedure (as in case 1) in order to continue the same step-
wise search for an agreement. In this case, our tactic calculates the o®er whose utility is
equal to Nu (without U(EO0
2) in equation 7.10). Moreover, the o®er calculated is such
that it is the one that is most similar to the o®er by ¯. This is achieved by running an
optimization function OptProp : O1 £ O1 ! O1 which calculates an o®er O1 such that
O1 maximises the level of concession the opponent likes most as in the previous case
while still achieving Nu. In case the issues being negotiated are qualitative in nature,
the similarity based algorithm by Faratin et al. (2002) may be used.
7.4.2.3 The Algorithm for the Reward Based Tactic
In this section we describe our RBT algorithm. The algorithm is provided in ¯gure 7.10.
Here we take the point of view of an agent ® trying to respond to an o®er and a reward
by agent ¯. We describe each important step of the algorithm as follows. In steps 1 to 8,
® calculates the utility step by which it needs to decrement the utility of its current o®er
(and reward) and the value of the new o®er (and reward) it needs to send, depending on
whether a reward has been o®ered (steps 2 to 4) or not (steps 5 to 7). In step 10 ® runs
an optimisation to determine whether an optimal o®er and reward is possible. If it is
not, then in step 12, ® calculates an o®er using either BW or CO, while if it is, ® sends
the o®er and reward. In the case where only an o®er has been made earlier (either by
® or ¯), the new o®er is calculated using OptProp in step 17 and the associated reward
calculated using our reward generation mechanism presented in ¯gure 7.4. The proposal
and the associated reward (if possible) is then sent to ¯ in step 19.
As can be seen from ¯gure 7.10, the algorithm only generates o®ers and rewards in the
¯rst game. In the second game, we use a standard negotiation tactic to calculate o®ers.
While it is possible to generate o®ers using the optimisation function of RBT in the
second game, we do not do so in order to focus our analysis on the e®ect the boundsChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 193
Require: O1;O2;O0
1;O0
2
1: if O2 and O0
2 not null then
2: Use a probabilistic mechanism to calculate EO2;EO0
2 (as discussed in 7.3.6) % ®
calculate the expected outcomes of the arguments.
3: step = Ã Su(O1;O2;O0
1;O0
2) % calculate the step in utility.
4: nu = Ã U(O1)exp¡t +U(EO2)exp¡(µ+2¿+t) ¡ step % calculate the utility of the o®er and
reward to be generated
5: else
6: step = Ã Su(O1;null;O0
1;null) % calculate the step in utility.
7: nu Ã U(O1)exp¡(2¿+t) ¡ step % calculate the utility of the o®er and to be generated
8: end if
9: if O2 and O0
2 is not null then
10: (O00
1;O00
2) Ã OptComb(O1;O2;O0
1;O0
2) s.t. U(O00
1)exp¡t +U(EO00
2)exp¡(µ+2¿+t) =
nu % Here the values in the reward or the o®er are optimised so as to be more favourable to
the ¯.
11: if OptComb fails then
12: use BW or CO to generate O00
1 % Resort to Standard negotiation tactics.
13: else
14: send o®er and reward % the tactic chooses which type of illocution to use depending on
whether the reward is asked from or given to ¯.
15: end if
16: else
17: O00
1 Ã OptProp(O1;O0
1) s.t. U(O00
1) = nu % ¯nd the o®er that is most favourable to ¯
given a constraint on utility.
18: Find O00
2 using algorithm in ¯gure 7.4.
19: Send o®er and reward if any applicable.
20: end if
Figure 7.10: The algorithm used in RBT to generate o®ers and rewards.
imposed by rewards have on the outcome of the second game when agents use basic
tactics. We describe the experiments carried out and the results obtain in the following
section.
7.4.3 E±ciency Metrics
As argued in section 1.5, PN aims to achieve better agreements faster than standard
negotiation mechanisms. To test whether this is indeed the case, we ¯rst devise some
metrics that help us to properly evaluate the results of our experiments as follows:
² Average number of o®ers | this is the average number of o®ers that agents need to
exchange before coming to an agreement. To calculate this, we record the number
of o®ers made each time an agreement is reached and calculate the average of
these. Note that each time an o®er is made a short time ¿ elapses. A lower
average equates to a shorter time before agents come to an agreement (mutatis
mutandis if the average is high). Moreover, the lower this average is the lower is
the loss in utility as a result of the time-dependent discount factors ². Thus we can
de¯ne a time-e±cient tactic as one that takes a relatively small number of o®ers194 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
to reach an agreement.
² Success rate | this is the ratio of agreements to the number of times agents meet
to negotiate. The larger this success rate, the better the negotiation tactic is at
¯nding an attractive o®er for the opponent.
² Average utility per agreement | this is the sum of utility of both negotiating
agents over all agreements divided by the number of agreements reached. The
higher this value, the better is the strategy at ¯nding an outcome that brings
a high utility to both participating agents. Thus we de¯ne a socially e±cient
negotiation tactic as one which brings a high sum of utility in the outcome.
² Expected utility | this is equal to the average utility weighted by the probability
that an agreement is reached. The probability is calculated by dividing the total
number of agreements by the number of encounters agents have. Thus, if the
agents ¯nd an agreement on all encounters, there is a probability of 1 that they
will come to an agreement in a future encounter. A strategy with a high expected
utility is one which is most likely to reach high utility agreements every time it
meets other strategies.
7.4.4 Comparing PN strategies against Non-PN strategies
Having de¯ned the tactics that agents use during negotiation and the metrics used to
evaluated the process and outcomes, we can now detail the experiments carried out in
order to evaluate the bene¯t PN brings to negotiating agents. Given our objectives
set in section 1.5, we aim to show that, by using rewards which constrain the action
set in the future games, agents are able to in°uence the outcome of negotiations and
permit a better appraisal of the preferences of the agents. To this end, we experiment
with the standard negotiation tactics BB, BW, CO, including those that are coupled
to the RWG, as well as RBT. The settings of the strategies (i.e. the combination of
tactics for the two games) for each of games played by the agents is described in table
7.2. Note that when we use the standard tactics connected to our reward generation
mechanism we tag their identi¯ers with P (for persuasive). Thus, in the ¯rst game, NT
Strategies
Non-Persuasive Agents (NT) Persuasive Agents
NT PNT RBT
Game 1 BB, BW, CO PBB, PBW, PCO RBT
Game 2 BB, BW, CO BB, BW, CO BB
Table 7.2: Settings for agents' tactics and acronyms used.
(without the reward generation mechanism) is only able to make o®ers and evaluate
o®ers, while PNT is able to both generate and evaluate o®ers and rewards. Given that
persuasive strategies like PNT and RBT can constrain their rewards according to theirChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 195
target L (as shown in section 7.3.4), we also need to allow other non-persuasive tactics
to constrain their ranges accordingly to ensure a fair comparison. Thus, we allow all
tactics to constrain the ranges of the issues in the second game according to their target
whenever they reach agreements without the use of any arguments (i.e. using only a
propose illocution). The procedure to do so is similar to that described in section 7.3.4
where vout, as calculated in equation (7.4), is used as the bound the negotiation range
of the second game but without the use of rewards.5
Therefore, we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. Negotiation tactics that use the reward generation mechanism are more
time e±cient than those that do not.
This hypothesis follows from the fact that we expect arguments to help agents ¯nd
an agreement faster. To this end, we run a number of experiments with the following
settings:
² We impose the following basic settings on the interactions: L® = 0:8 and L¯ = 0:8,
t®
dead = t
¯
dead = 1s, ²® = ²¯ = 0:1, µ = 1s, and ¸ = 0:8. These settings are
chosen to represent symmetric conditions for both agents and impose relatively
few constraints on the two negotiation games that agents play. The symmetric
nature of the interaction ensures that no tactic is in a more advantageous position
to its opponent.
² We de¯ne di®erent populations of strategies used by agents for the two games as
follows:
{ Both agents use one of BB, BW, and CO in the ¯rst and second game in any
combination. For example, an agent may use BB in the ¯rst game and CO
in the second. We therefore play each combination of strategies against all
other possible combinations. This results in 81 combinations and therefore
81 interactions per combination (one interaction being 2 games, hence an
agent using one combination meets 81 other agents using similar or di®erent
combinations of strategies 162 times). We repeat these 81 interactions at
least 10 times and average the results.
{ Both agents use one of PBB, PBW, and PCO in the ¯rst game and then
both use one of BB, BW, and CO in the second game. This results in the
same number of interactions as in the previous case. The same experimental
procedure as above is repeated in this case.
{ One agent uses RBT in the ¯rst game and BB in the second game while the
other agent uses one of PBB, PBW, and PCO in the ¯rst game and one of
5The di®erence between the constraint applied by the reward and by the target is that the reward
applies the constraint to both agents while the constraint speci¯ed by a target only applies separately
to each agent according to their individual targets.196 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
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Figure 7.11: Average number of o®ers used by agents during negotiation encounters
(2 games)
BB, BW, and CO in the second game. We run 81 interactions between these
agents (i.e. RBT meets a P strategy 3 times) and repeat these at least 10
times and average the results. This population of strategies aims to show
how e®ective RBT and PNT agents are at eliciting better outcomes than
PNT alone.
{ Both agents use RBT in the ¯rst game and BB in the second game. We run
81 interactions (each consisting of 2 games) between these two agents and
average the results.
To test hypothesis 8, we ran the experiments above and recorded the average number of
o®ers made by each population of strategies. The results are shown in ¯gure 7.11. As can
be seen, NT takes an average of 500 o®ers to reach an agreement, while PNT strategies
take 58 and the combined PNT and RBT population takes 56 o®ers per agreement. The
performance of only RBT strategies is signi¯cantly better than the other populations
since they reach agreements within only 26 o®ers.6 These results validate hypothesis 8.
The superior performance of the persuasive strategies show that the reward generation
mechanism helps agents to reach agreements faster. This improvement can be attributed
to the fact that both negotiating agents calculate rewards and o®ers (through the hill-
climbing algorithm) that aim to maximise their opponent's utility (as explained in section
7.4.2.2). Hence, this is faster than in the PNT and RBT case where only one party (the
RBT) performs the hill-climbing properly.
The results above lead us to postulate the following hypothesis based on the fact that
shorter negotiations lead to less discounted outcomes:
6Using ANOVA, it was found that, using a sample size of 15 for each population, and ® = 0:05, that
F = 2210 > Fcrit and p = 8£10
¡74, hence that the results are statistically signi¯cant (i.e. the di®erence
between the means of the distribution are not the same).Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 197
Hypothesis 9. Negotiation strategies that use our reward generation mechanism achieve
a higher expected utility than those that do not.
To test this hypothesis, we run the same experiments as in the previous case and record
the average utility per agreement and the number of agreements reached. Thus, it is
possible to calculate the expected utility, average utility per encounter, and the success
rate per game as explained earlier. The results are shown on ¯gure 7.12.
As can be seen from ¯gure 7.12(c), the success rate of persuasive strategies is generally
much higher than NT strategies (0.87/encounter for non-persuasive strategies, 0.99/en-
counter for PNT strategies only, 1.0/encounter for RBT and PNT, and 1.0/encounter
for RBT only).7 The expected utility shown on ¯gure 7.12(a) followed a similar trend
with NT agents obtaining 1.6/encounter, PNT 1.88/encounter, RBT and PNT 1.95/a-
greement, and 2.02/encounter for RBT agents only. Moreover, as can be seen from ¯gure
7.12(b), the average utility of persuasive strategies is generally higher (i.e. 1.9/encounter
for PN only, 1.95/encounter for PN and RBT, and 2.03/encounter for RBT only) than
non-persuasive ones (i.e. 1.84/encounter).8 These results suggest that PNT agents per-
form very similarly to NT agents when they use rewards (though rewards reduce the
time to reach agreements and increase the probability of reaching an agreement). As
discussed earlier in this section, PNT agents usually generate o®ers ¯rst (starting from
high utility ones as for NT agents) and then calculate the rewards accordingly. Given
this, the agents tend to start by giving rewards and end up asking for rewards. As the
negotiation proceeds (if the o®ers are not accepted), the o®ers generally converge to a
point in the middle of the MMPD and rewards converge to a region around the centre of
the MMPD. This process results in a lower overall utility over the two games than if each
agent exploits the other on each game in turn. However, when PNT agents use rewards
they are able to reach agreements much earlier on during the negotiation so that the
outcome results a more e±cient partitioning of the resources and hence a higher utility
than NT agents. If rewards are selected in a more intelligent fashion, as in RBT, the
agents reach much higher overall utility in general. This is further demonstrated by the
results of the RBT agents which e±ciently select o®ers and rewards and therefore tend
to reach agreements that have high utility for both participating agents. Given this, we
can infer that the reward generation mechanism used together with normal strategies
which do not fully exploit the potential of rewards in reaching agreements allows agents
to reach better agreements to some extent and these agreements are reached much faster
and more often!
7Using ANOVA, it was found that for a sample size of 15 for each population of PNT, PNT and
RBT, and PNT only, with ® = 0:05, F = 8:8 > Fcrit = 3:15 and p = 4:41 £ 10
¡4. These results prove
that there is a signi¯cant di®erence between the means of PNT and the other strategies. The success
rate of NT agents were always lower than the other populations in all elements of the sample.
8These results were validated statistically using ANOVA, where it was found that F = 3971 > Fcrit =
2:73, and p = 7:36 £ 10
¡80, for a sample size of 15 per population and ® = 0:05. These results imply
that there is a signi¯cant di®erence between the means of the populations.198 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
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Figure 7.12: Expected utility, Average utility and success rate of agents using di®erent
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It can also be noticed that the performance of mixed populations of RBT and PN agents
performs less well than RBT agents and slightly better than a pure PN population (see
results above). This suggests that the RBT agents can ¯nd agreements that convince
their PNT opponent more quickly as they are able to propose better rewards and o®ers
than PNT agents. Moreover, it was noted that on average, both RBT and PN agents
obtained equal average utilities per agreement (i.e. 0.96/agreement)9 This also suggests
that RBT agents can avoid exploitation by any other PN-based agent. This is because
the hill-climbing mechanism of RBT agents calculates o®ers that can convince the oppo-
nent without reducing the utility of RBT (and PNT) agents signi¯cantly (i.e. in small
steps).
In general, through the above experiments we have empirically proven the usefulness of
rewards in bargaining. Thus, we have achieved our initial aim of using PN to enable
agents to achieve better agreements faster. In the following section, we further study
our RBT strategies to see how it is a®ected by di®erent conditions in the environment.
7.4.5 Evaluating the Reward Based Tactic
In this section we further explore the properties of RBT by studying its behaviour when
key attributes of the agents are varied. As can be deduced from section 7.3, there are
a large number of attributes that can a®ect the behaviour of RBT but here we will
focus on the following main ones which we believe have a sigini¯cant impact on both
our reward generation component and the behaviour of RBT. These attributes are:
1. L | the target determines the size of the reward that can be given to or asked for
as determined by vout in equation (7.4) and the procedure described in equation
7.3.4. Given this, varying L allows us to study the e®ectiveness of PN in general
as the possibility of asking for or giving a reward changes. Moreover, we aim to
study the e®ect of one agent having a lower or higher target than its opponent on
the outcomes of negotiations.
2. ² | the discount factor dictates the utility of o®ers as well as rewards. In par-
ticular, we aim to see how RBT and our reward generation mechanism can help
agents that have di®erent discount factors ¯nd good agreements.
3. µ | the delay before the second game is played determines the value of the reward.
Increasing this value can signi¯cantly reduce the value of a reward to an agent. By
varying µ we aim to see how it impacts on the use of rewards during negotiation
and how this a®ects the outcome of each game.
9We validated this result using ANOVA with a sample of size 15 per strategy and ® = 0:05. Thus it
was found that the null hypothesis (i.e. equal means for the two samples) was validated with F0:13 <
Fcrit = 4:10 and p = 0:71 > 0:05.200 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
First we investigate the impact of the negotiation target L on the outcome of negotia-
tions. In this context, L is used to decide whether a reward should be sent or not and
what the negotiation ranges of an agent should be in the second game (see section 7.3.4).
The higher the value of L, the less agents are likely to be able to construct arguments.
This is because, an agent may have to shrink the negotiation range in the second game
more in to achieve a higher L over the two games. Therefore, we expect the agents to
achieve fewer deals and have a corresponding lower overall expected utility. Moreover,
in the case where only one agent has a high L, then the opponent's rewards are less
likely to be accepted because these rewards are less likely to allow the agent to achieve
its target, and hence the agents are less likely to come to agreements or take more o®ers
to come to any agreement. In this case we would also expect the agent with the higher L
to negotiate more strongly and constrain the second game more such that it should get a
higher utility than its opponent. To investigate these intuitions, we will consider a pair
of agents ® and ¯ that use RBT and postulate the following experimental hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10. The higher the value of L® relative to L¯, the higher is the average utility
® compared to that of ¯.
To test hypothesis 10 we ran an experiment where the agents were made to negotiate
using similar settings as in the previous section except to the fact that the target of ®
was made to vary between 0 and 1.5 while ¯'s target was kept ¯xed at 0.5. The results
of the experiment are shown in ¯gures 7.13,7.14, and 7.15.
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Figure 7.13: Expected utility of ® and ¯ when L¯ = 0:5 and L® are varied.
As can be seen from ¯gure 7.13, the overall expected utility of both agents su®ers a
sharp drop after a peak at L® = 0:75 and there is a a sharp rise in the number of o®ers
exchanged between the two agents (in ¯gure 7.14). Moreover it was found that the
success rate of the agents did not signi¯cantly drop (decreasing from 1 when L® = 0:75
to around 0.99 till L® = 1:5). The main cause for the drop (and peak) in expectedChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 201
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Figure 7.14: Average number of o®ers between ® and ¯ when L® is varied.
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Figure 7.15: Average Utility of ® and ¯ when L¯ = 0:5 and L® is varied.
utility and rise in the average number of o®ers can be explained by the results shown
in ¯gure 7.15. As can be seen, as from L® = 0:75, ®'s utility gradually rises while ¯'s
utility sharply falls. This means that ® exploits ¯ on all the issues that are negotiated.
In more detail, in order to obtain L® = 0:75, ® would need to exploit ¯ in the ¯rst game
on all the issues it prefers more than ¯ or exploit ¯ on all issues (which it likes less or more
than ¯) in the second game. This can be deduced from the weights used in the utility
functions shown in table 7.1. Therefore, at this point, ® and ¯ are likely to exploit
each other maximally on the issues they prefer in each game. This results in a high
point in utility since it represents the cooperate-cooperate point in the MMPD (hence
the peak in ¯gure 7.13). When L® < 0:75, the agents can still ¯nd agreements without
completely exploiting their opponent on any issue and therefore agree to proposals and202 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
rewards that result in a lower overall utility since the outcome then lies further away
from the cooperate-cooperate point of the MMPD.
Beyond L® = 0:75, it becomes harder for ® to give or ask for any rewards. This is
because, as L® increases, the use of arguments decreases as the ®'s ability to concede in
either game decreases (since it nees to achieve a high target) and ® can only constrain
its negotiation ranges more and more in the second game in trying to get its target.
However, given that ¯ has a low target, it can still a®ord to be exploited by ® and still
manage to reach its target over the two games. Hence the success rate of the two agents
does not signi¯cantly decrease. However, given the more stringent demands of ®, the
agents are likely to exchange a large number of o®ers (i.e. ¯ conceding a signi¯cant
number of times) until an agreement is reached.
In general, these results validate hypothesis 10 and also con¯rm our intuition that ®'s
bargaining power should increase with respect to its target. Given these results, it can
be expected that if the second game were less discounted, ® could have started exloiting
¯ at a higher value than 0:75. We will therefore explore such discounting e®ects on the
negotiation and investigate the e®ect of increasing both agents' targets at the same time
to see the general behaviour of the system as the discounts and targets are varied.
Before doing so, however, we next study the e®ect of the discount factor ²® on the
outcome of the negotiation (keeping ²¯ = 0:5). In this case, a low value of ²® equates
to a low discounting e®ect on the outcome of the two games and conversely for a high
value of ²®. Therefore we can expect that as ² gets higher the agreements reached in the
two games would be much more discounted and hence result in a lower overall expected
utility. Moreover, with higher ² values, agents will ¯nd it harder to achieve their target
L as they will value both o®ers (and counter o®ers) and rewards less. Agents are then
likely to take more o®ers to reach an agreement and reach fewer agreements as well.
In the case where only ®'s discount factor ² is varied, we would expect that the agent
with the higher discount factor would be more likely to accept any o®er by its opponent
since counter-o®ering might take up time that discounts its own o®er more than the one
o®ered by the opponent. This means that the more patient agent is likely to get its
o®ers more easily accepted (i.e. take fewer numbers of o®ers on average) and exploit its
opponent more. Hence, as predicted by game theoretic models of bargaining (Muthoo,
1999), the more patient agent gets an increasingly higher average utility than its less
patient opponent as the di®erence between their discount factors increases. We therefore
postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 11. The higher the value of ²® relative to ²¯, the less agents are likely to
reach agreements and take more o®ers to reach an agreement.
To test this hypothesis, we ran a similar experiment as above apart from the fact that
we kept the target for both agents at L® = L¯ = 0:5 and we varied ²® between 0 and 3
(while keeping ²¯ = 0:5). In this context, it is obvious that the overall expected utility ofChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 203
the agents will decrease when ²® increases (and the utility ® gets decreases as a result of
the discounting e®ect). Given this we recorded the average utility of each agent and the
number of o®ers they take to reach an agreement. The results are shown in ¯gures 7.16
and 7.17. As can be seen from ¯gure 7.16, ¯'s utility gradually decreases as ²® rises.
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Figure 7.16: Average utility of ® and ¯ when ²® is varied.
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Figure 7.17: Average number of o®ers made by ® and ¯ as ²® is varied.
The number of o®ers used by the agents also rises signi¯cantly as ²® increases beyond
1.44. This is because, beyond ²® = 1:44, the discounting of the second game is such
that it is worth less than 0.5 (assuming ® exploits all issues in the second game). Thus,
it becomes impossible for ® to ask for rewards and it can only rely on giving rewards.
Moreover, as the discounting e®ect increases, it also becomes harder for ¯ to convince ®
with rewards. Eventually, as time passes, the agents can only rely on simple proposals
and ® constrains its negotiation ranges in the next game so as to achieve its target.204 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
Given this, negotiations take even more time in the second game (as in the previous
experiement). Therfore, the target reduces the advantage of ¯'s patience (i.e. in having
a lower discount factor) in this type of game. It was also found that the success rate of
the agents does not signi¯cantly decrease (from 1 to 0.98) after ²® = 1:44. This suggests
that ¯ concedes more than ® in the second game in order to come to an agreement.
This is also con¯rmed by the ¯'s decreasing average utility in ¯gure 7.16. These results
therefore validate hypothesis 11.
Given the above results, we can expect that the combined e®ect of an increasing target
and an increasing discount factor should signi¯cantly reduce the expected utility of both
agents and increase the number of o®ers they need to make to come to an agreement.
We therefore postulated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 12. The higher the value of L® and L¯, the lower expected utility of both
agents.
Hypothesis 13. The higher the value of ²® and ²¯, the less agents are likely to reach
agreements and take more o®ers to reach an agreement.
Therefore, we varied both agents' discount factors and targets to see which had a stronger
e®ect on the negotiation outcomes. The plot of the expected utility of the agents is shown
in ¯gure 7.18.
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Figure 7.18: Varying the target and discount factor of ® and ¯ and the resulting
expected utility.
As can be seen from ¯gure 7.18, the expected utility is more signi¯cantly a®ected by the
target of ® and ¯. The results con¯rm hypotheses 12 and 13. Indeed, the drop in utility
(as in the experiment for hypothesis 10) is noticed at particular values in the agents'
target, corresponding to points where the target can no longer be met easily as a result
of the second game not providing su±cient utility. Moreover, we notice that the point
at which expected utility drops relative to target values decreases in ². This con¯rmsChapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents 205
our initial intuition that the discount factor in°uences to some extent the e®ect of the
target on the expected utility.
We also recorded the average number of o®ers made by the agents to see the impact of
the target and discount factors on it. The results are shown in ¯gure 7.19. As can be
seen from ¯gure 7.19, the drop in expected utility is re°ected by the jump in the number
of o®ers made. The region where the peak occurs corresponds to values of the targets
and discount factors where the agents are still able to use rewards to persuade each
other and signi¯cantly shrink their negotiation ranges in the second game to reach their
target. Beyond this peak (i.e. for higher values of the targets in particular), the agents
can only ¯nd agreements in the ¯rst game and they do so according to the hill climbing
mechanism of RBT (which guarantees that they meet in a few number of steps). Note
that the plateau at low values of L is at a lower value than that at high values of L,
suggesting that rewards can signi¯cantly reduce the number of o®ers made to reach an
agreement compared to those that only make o®ers using the hill climbing method.
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Figure 7.19: Average number of o®ers when L and ² are varied.
Finally, given that higher values of ² on the o®ers and rewards decrease the probability
that agents reach an agreement and increase the number of o®ers exchanged, we expect
a similar e®ect for higher values of the delay. This is because a longer delay decreases
the value of rewards to both agents, and hence reduces the probability of reaching
each agent's target L. Therefore, we expect that the longer the delay µ, the lower the
success rate of the agents and the higher the average number of o®ers needed to reach
an agreement. Given this, we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 14. The higher the value of µ, the less likely it is that agents will reach
pro¯table agreements and the more o®ers they take to reach an agreement.
As for the above hypotheses, we ran a similar experiment keeping L® = L¯ = 0:5 and
²® = ²¯ = 0:5, varied µ between 0 and 10 seconds, and recorded the expected utility of
the agents. The success rate of the agents only decreased slightly from 1 to around 0:99
after µ > 5 while the number of o®ers signi¯cantly increased when µ increased beyond206 Chapter 7 Persuasive Negotiation for Autonomous Agents
3 seconds as shown on ¯gure 7.20. These results con¯rm hypothesis 14. The reason
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Figure 7.20: Average number of o®ers per encounter as µ is increased.
for the jump in the number of o®ers at µ = 3 has a similar explanation to that in the
previous experiment for ²® = 1:44. Indeed at µ = 3, the total value of the second game
decreases below 0.5 and decreases the value of rewards that can be given or asked for.
This results in the agents only being able to make o®ers without arguments and hence
increase the constraints on the second negotiation and increases the number of o®ers
needed to reach an agreement. To con¯rm these results, we also recorded the number of
agreements reached through the use of rewards. As shown in ¯gure 7.21, it was indeed
found that the number of agreements reached through the use of rewards decreases as µ
increases.
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7.5 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a comprehensive model of persuasive negotiation.
In particular, we have provided a novel protocol based on dynamic logic to specify
commitments that arise in persuasive negotiation based on the exchange of arguments
in the form of rewards (given or asked for). Given this, we speci¯ed a new decision
making model for agents to generate, select, and evaluate rewards that they exchange.
This mechanism allows agents to reduce the uncertainties about the action set and the
preferences of the agents (as per our objectives set in chapter 1). Thus, it is shown that
the use of rewards can result in agreements with higher expected utility than standard
negotiation tactics and that it can take less time in doing so. Moreover, we developed a
new negotiation tactic specially suited for persuasive negotiation and showed how it can
allow agents to reach better agreements than standard negotiation tactics augmented
with our reward generation mechanism.
Given this, we can broadly conclude that PN e®ectively enhances the search for agree-
ments in negotiation. Moreover, we have shown how PN can be e±ciently applied to
in°uence outcomes in repeated encounters. Given this, in the next chapter we show
how PN can be practically applied to allow agents to negotiate over repeated encounters
in a °exible manner through the use of rewards. Moreover, we aim to show, through
this application, how CREDIT can also be used alongside PN in such encounters in
order to reduce the uncertainty agents have about the honesty and reliability of their
counterparts.Chapter 8
Persuasive Negotiation in a
Pervasive Computing
Environment
Having developed CREDIT and our model of PN, we aim to show how these can be
integrated in a practical application as per our initial objectives stated in chapter 1.
In particular, we apply PN to the problem of managing the display of noti¯cations in
a pervasive computing environment. In this context, agents have di®erent (private)
preferences (built in by their human users) about the noti¯cations that are received at
di®erent points in time. Thus, while some messages might be preferred by the user
receiving the noti¯cation, it might be intrusive to the group activity the user is engaged
in, hence less preferred to the other group members. In other cases, however, the
message might be preferred by the group as well. Given this, agents are faced with
signi¯cant degrees of uncertainty about the preferences of their opponents (since these
are kept private) and noti¯cations that may arrive in at any given moment during the
group activity. Hence, the distributed and repeated nature of these interactions make it
suitable to apply CREDIT and PN to reduce these uncertainties (as per the attributes
of CREDIT and PN discussed in section 1.5). Using these models, we therefore show
how they can help sel¯sh agents to manage the intrusiveness of noti¯cations on their
human owners' group activities.
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following way. Section 8.2 describes the
notion of interruptions and de¯nes intrusiveness for pervasive environments. It also
describes the context of the meeting room scenario that we use to demonstrate our
solution. Section 8.3 provides an account of our agent-based solution, while section 8.4
describes a practical implementation of our solution. Finally, section 8.5 summarises the
main achievements of this chapter.
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8.1 Introduction
Pervasive computing artefacts such as laptops, smart whiteboards, video phones, and
pagers are becoming increasingly commonplace in our every day lives (Abowd and My-
natt, 2000; Chandy et al., 2002). Moreover, such devices are becoming increasingly
interconnected given advances in communication technology (e.g. 3G mobile phones,
bluetooth) and processing power (e.g. PDAs, Video telephony). Thus, users of such
devices can be contacted in very many ways and in most environments.
There are a number of advantages to this. First, users are able to receive information on
a variety of interactive media which a®ord di®erent types of interactions (e.g. responding
to an email, responding to a video call). Second, users can communicate information
through many di®erent light and portable devices that can be used anywhere with such
connectivity (e.g. GPRS palm, wireless laptop). Third, users can use these devices as
supports to their tasks (e.g. a stock trader using di®erent monitors to check stock prices,
while at the same time having a phone call with a broker, or a customer checking prices
of books online on a PDA while walking in a bookshop to check which books are better
deals). Thus, in general, such technology can increase the e±ciency and well-being of
its users.
However, the uses of such pervasive technology also have some downsides. First, noti-
¯cations or messages received on such devices disturb the users in their current focus
of activity which might warrant more attention than the message itself (e.g. a phone
call received while making a presentation or an instant messenger (IM) beeping while
having a discussion). Second, this shift of focus a®ects the other users with whom the
user is interacting (e.g. the attendees of the presentation lose track of what is being
presented or the discussion stops). Third, using current ¯ltering techniques (e.g. in in-
stant messengers or phones) it is not possible to distinguish between messages which are
completely irrelevant to either the current activity of the users (e.g spam mail, wrong
number phone call), as captured by their context, or their own interests (e.g. a sub-
scribed weekly electronic newsletter, or news °ash), and messages which are actually
relevant to the preferences of the users and/or help in the task at hand (e.g. an email
containing attachments that need to be used in a presentation, or a phone call from the
users' boss).
Given this background, there is a clear demand for middleware systems to manage the
intrusive nature of interactions in pervasive computing environments. Such systems
should nevertheless permit users to carry out their normal activities and e®ectively
interact with pervasive computing artefacts seamlessly without blocking incoming infor-
mation that might be important given the interests of the user and their context. In
more detail, these systems need to be dynamically con¯gurable so as to adapt to the cur-
rent context of the user and their interests. For example, the underlying system should
be able to react di®erently when the user is in a meeting (where noti¯cations should beChapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 211
relevant to the meeting or be important for the user) and where the user is alone and
browsing an email (when emails that are not very important can be viewed). Moreover,
in order for the system to be non-intrusive itself, it should be able to autonomously
decide on behalf of the user which is the best course of action, given the objectives of
the user and other users that may be in the same environment.
Given these desiderata, agent-based computing has been advocated as the natural com-
putation model for such systems (see chapter 1). More speci¯cally, pervasive computing
environments can be modelled as open MAS that are composed of autonomous software
agents that each represent their respective human owner and make decisions on their
behalf given their speci¯ed preferences. Thus, in our model, users relinquish the man-
agement of incoming messages to their software agent which decides when, how, and
where messages are to be displayed such that the noti¯cation delivered disturbs the user
on the right device, given the intrusive nature of the device and the level of intrusiveness
permitted by the user's context (e.g. an unimportant instant messenger chat window
may be hidden until the meeting is over, while an important email might be highlighted
in the list of received emails with a beep to warn the user). As part of this endeavour,
the agent may need to negotiate the display of noti¯cations (i.e. on which device and
at what point in time) with other software agents that represent other users in the en-
vironment in order to reconcile the preferences of the group, as opposed to those of the
user, when the latter is involved in a group activity.
In more detail, agents need to negotiate about each noti¯cation received since they
are uncertain about the preferences of other agents about the noti¯cations received
(since the other agents' preferences about the contents are kept private) and about new
noti¯cations they may receive as the meeting progresses (which may disturb the meeting
more if they occur too frequently). For example, if a video call expected by the group
is received on one user's laptop, other agents may negotiate to have it displayed on the
public display which can be viewed by all participants in the meeting. Conversely, if
no one is interested in an instant messenger message received by a participant, then
the other agents would negotiate to make sure that message could be redirected to
his email if it is not important or beeped to him if it is. Thus, through negotiations,
agents can discover that they have similar preferences about noti¯cations received or
can even persuade each other through the use of arguments (see chapters 2 and 7) to
accept noti¯cations. For example, one agent can accept a particular noti¯cation if the
proponent of a noti¯cation agrees to accept some future noti¯cations by the former
in future. In so doing, the agents can give rewards to each other by agreeing to the
display of future noti¯cations in exchange for displaying a particular noti¯cation in the
present encounter. Also, agents can also ask for rewards by asking opponents to agree
to display of future noti¯cations in exchange for agreeing to their noti¯cations in the
present encounter. Thus, agents can reduce the time they take to reach an agreement
the next time a noti¯cation is received since uncertainty about the space of o®ers is212 Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment
reduced in the next encounter.
Against this background, this work advances the state of the art in the following ways.
First, we de¯ne a typology of interruptions for pervasive computing environments using
notions of intrusiveness. Second, using our model of PN and CREDIT we develop a novel
agent-based solution to the problem of managing intrusiveness given the preferences of
the human users. Finally, we describe an implementation of our system in a meeting
room scenario using the Jabber platform as the underlying architecture of our solution.
8.2 Intrusiveness and Interruptions
McFarlane was the ¯rst to distinguish the notion of intrusiveness from that of inter-
ruption (McFarlane, 1999). He de¯nes the former as the degree of interference with the
realisation of the main task of a group caused by a number of intrusions. In turn, an
intrusion is de¯ned as an occurrence of a process or event that is not intimately related
to the current task of a group and that interferes with the realisation of that task. Note
that interruptions and intrusions are clearly distinct concepts: the latter cause errors
where people incorrectly perform actions in an interrupted task after task switching
(i.e. handling the interruption), while the former are general methods by which a per-
son shifts his focus of consciousness from one processing stream to another (McFarlane,
1997). Thus intrusions can be regarded as a subset of interruptions (see section 8.2.2
for more details).
8.2.1 Receiving and Managing Interruptions
Interruptions can happen in very many ways. Speci¯cally, in pervasive computing envi-
ronments, these interruptions generally take the form of noti¯cations that are received
on the various artefacts that a user may possess or perceive in his environment. To this
end, McFarlane identi¯es four main ways to disrupt someone (McFarlane, 1999) and we
identify examples where these apply in pervasive computing environments:
1. Immediate: require the attention of the user immediately without any other choice.
This might involve displaying a noti¯cation on a public display or popping up a
chat message in an instant messenger when a message is received.
2. Negotiated: allow the user to choose the moment when they will deal with the
interrupting activity that needs attention. A user may thus notice that an email
has arrived on his email client or that a message is °ashing on his instant messenger.
3. Mediated: alert the user on another device rather than the one on which it was
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standard. For example, an email client can redirect via SMS (Short Message
Service) to a phone or a phone call is re-routed to the voice mail of the user (which
he can access at a later time or listen to after the message is recorded).
4. Scheduled: come at prearranged intervals. For example, a user may have a pre-
arranged video-conference call or may schedule a periodic alarm on a PDA to alert
him to take his regular insuline dose.
Whatever the form in which a message is received, there are four possible responses to
it (Clark, 1996):
1. take-up with full compliance | handle the interruption immediately.
2. take up with alteration { acknowledge the interruption and agree to handle it later.
3. decline | explicitly refuse to handle the interruption.
4. withdraw | implicitly refuse to handle the interruption by ignoring it.
In each of the above responses, some degree of mental processing by the user is involved
in deciding what course of action to take. In most cases the answer depends on the
preferences of the user with respect to the information available about the content of
the noti¯cation. Typically, the information available from the noti¯cation (rather than
from the whole content of the message) is the name or identi¯cation number of the
message sender and a subject line brie°y describing the content of the message (mostly
in emails, IM messages, and sometimes on video conference calls as well). From this
information, the user can usually tell whether the message (for which the noti¯cation
has happened) is something that he asked for (e.g. information about his children's
health), or was sent to him to inform him of something important (e.g. an email about
his latest stock prices), or is relevant to his current context (e.g. an advertising SMS
received on his mobile phone about a shop in his surroundings). The device through
which the noti¯cation is conveyed determines the degree to which the user is disturbed
(e.g. a noti¯cation displayed on a public device on which a message is publicly visible
is almost certain to alert the user and other users present, while a message shown in
an email client without beeping or popping up an icon, is sure not to disturb the user).
Moreover, the device gives a level of guarantee that the noti¯cation will be seen by
the user (e.g. an IM beeping is sure to alert the user, while the user must be looking
at his laptop screen to see the heading of an email). Thus, the right device must be
chosen in the right context in order to balance the importance of the message with the
intrusive nature of the interaction with these devices (e.g. an IM must not beep when
the user is doing a presentation, while he can be beeped when he is not focussed on
any important task). In the next subsection we therefore consider the issues involved
in choosing devices that can be used to disseminate the information contained in the
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8.2.2 Typology of Interruptions
We can generally assume that interruptions de¯ne a means of disseminating informa-
tion1. Now, whether this information warrants the disturbance of the user is dependent
on the relevance of the information to the needs and preferences of the user or the user's
group. We therefore classify the information dissemination solutions as information
push, where information is not expected by the user, or pull, where the information is
expected.
Whenever messages are received, we will use the preferences of the users to de¯ne the
messages' pull or push nature. Thus, whenever preferences specify that a sender and
a particular subject is much liked, then the message concerned is considered to be
pulled, while if preferences do not specify the sender or the subject then that message is
considered to be pushed. Given this description, we can now further distinguish between
intrusive interruptions and non-intrusive ones.
Generally, we consider that the intrusiveness of a noti¯cation displayed on a particular
device depends on the preferences of the user and the context within which the noti¯ca-
tions are received. Those interruptions that help the user or the user's group with the
task at hand are not intrusions. Rather, they are task support information which we
interpret as \good" interruptions. We de¯ne task support information as: being related
to another task (i.e. handling the content of the message) concurrent to the one being
performed that will aid the latter's completion or enhance its e±ciency.
Thus, in information dissemination terms discussed above, we further classify intrusions
and task support information as follows:
² intrusions are unwanted (by the group or user) pushed information;
² task support information is pulled or useful pushed information (as determined by
the user(s)'s preferences).
Although some intrusive noti¯cations might be unwanted by the group, they might
nevertheless be considered important enough by the user receiving them for her to
switch to handling the noti¯cation (i.e. disturb the group) rather than stick to the
group task at hand (i.e. not disturb the group). This happens when there is a con°ict
of preferences between the group as a whole and the individual within the group. In
such cases, the users would need to discuss whether the intrusion should be allowed
or not. This would typically involve the users each stating their preferences regarding
the intrusion in the current context and thus deciding as a group whether to allow the
noti¯cation (i.e. whether they would mind the group being disturbed). However, if the
1We consider a speci¯c aspect of interruptions here. However, an interruption may also be a request
to take action on some issue. We will investigate this other aspect of interruptions in future work.Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 215
users do this themselves, the group task is necessarily disturbed. Moreover, the users
may not want to reveal their true preferences about the noti¯cations in case other users
may want to exploit these preferences to display more noti¯cations and therefore disrupt
the former's attention repeatedly during the meeting. In some cases, the users might
also want to delay the noti¯cation of messages of other users to a later point in time
when the attention level required in the group activity is lower. In yet other situations, a
user might allow other users to disturb the meeting if they agree to let the former receive
messages at a later point in time during the meeting. This may happen if the former is
expecting an important message or does not need to be particularly attentive later on
during the meeting (e.g. if she has presented her work earlier during the meeting).
Given the above desiderata, we require an additional interface, between the noti¯cation
controllers (i.e. the software that controls the noti¯cation devices) and the physical
world. This interface is responsible for managing these complex interactions and re-
solving the con°icts over the decision to display incoming noti¯cations. As discussed in
chapter 1, negotiation is the main way of resolving such con°icts and, to this end, in
section 8.3, we develop an agent-based mechanism that can °exibly negotiate the best
course of action on behalf of the users. Before doing so, however, we detail in the next
subsection the meeting room scenario.
8.2.3 Intrusiveness in the Meeting Room
The scenario involves a number of users meeting in a room that is ¯tted with pervasive
computing artefacts that are ¯xed in the room (e.g. a smart whiteboard or an audio
system capable of generating audio cues) or that are brought in by the users (e.g. laptops,
PDAs, mobile phones) as can be seen on ¯gure 8.1. The aim of the meeting is to discuss
a group project which has a speci¯c subject, and each user takes turns at voicing his
viewpoint on the subject. The meeting may also involve presentations by group members
on a particular issue of the project. Video calls are expected from other members who
were not able to physically attend the meeting.
There are di®erent ways a user in the meeting room can be disturbed. Here, we consider
the following as the most relevant types of noti¯cation delivery services:
1. An email client | this device simply shows a header containing the email sender
and subject (other details may be added but the content is not shown). This type of
noti¯cation is intrusive to the extent that it alerts the user of the meta-information
about the message rather than the content itself. This does not guarantee that the
user will entirely shift his focus of attention to reading the email unless he ¯nds
the subject very interesting (i.e. negotiated interruption).
2. An instant messenger | this pops up a window and beeps the user. This type of
noti¯cation gives the content of the message and disturbs the user's activity with216 Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment
Figure 8.1: Intrusiveness in the meeting room. Users might be checking their email
or sending SMS while attending a presentation, thus disturbing their colleagues.
the beep. This nearly always results in the user shifting his focus of attention (i.e.
scheduled or immediate interruption).
3. A public display | this is a whiteboard that simply shows messages that are sent
to it. This device is potentially the most intrusive since it disturbs the whole group
as everyone in the meeting room is able to see the message. Users may re-route
messages or video calls received on their laptops to this device whenever the mes-
sages are relevant to the whole group (i.e. scheduled or immediate interruption).
The participants of the meeting may reach di®erent states of focus at di®erent points in
time. For example, in a presentation most users are focussed on the presentation, while
if two users are in discussion, the others might lose focus altogether. In another context,
the meeting might even be silent if all users are reading an important document together.
The latter state would require a very high level of attention. At yet other times, the
group might be having a co®ee break which can allow intrusive noti¯cations.
Given that each of the devices involves a particular degree of interruption (e.g. imme-
diate as opposed to negotiated), it is possible to relate the preferences of users over a
received noti¯cation or message to a given device through its degree of interruption.
Thus, an important message to a particular user might be displayed on his IM, while
an important message to the group should be displayed on the public device. However,
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tion is needed. To this end, the next section details our multi-agent based solution to
negotiating and managing interruptions.
8.3 The Multi-Agent Solution
We have developed a multi-agent system for managing intrusiveness and have applied
this system to a real meeting room (at our university). This system defers the handling
of messages to software agents that each represent their owners. Speci¯cally, we assume
that users relinquish the decision about which device to use for a noti¯cation to their
agent (after negotiations with other agents). This may mean re-routing an IM message
to an email client or even being kept on an invisible queue for later (e.g. post-meeting)
delivery depending on the preferences of the user. This is a fundamental change to the
present situation in which the sender of the noti¯cation chooses the device on which his
message will appear. To capture the group's in°uence on the display of a noti¯cation,
we incorporate the use of a dial which can be turned up or down by the members of the
group (with all members' consent) to regulate the level of intrusiveness allowed. Thus,
at di®erent points in the meeting, the users might want their agents to know that they do
not want to be disturbed (except for very important messages) by turning the dial down.
During a co®ee break the dial can be turned up to signal to the agents that intrusions
are allowed.2 Here, we assume that the users have input their preferences into their
representative agent to allow the latter to know which messages are to be considered
important and which are not. Fundamentally, this involves assigning points (from 0 to
1 inclusive) to particular sender names and subjects that a noti¯cation could contain.
For example, a sender named Wendy gets 1 point since she is the project supervisor
and a subject such as `Project guidelines' gets 1 point as well since it is relevant to the
current meeting (about that project). On the other hand, sender names that are not
expected or not deemed very important will get less than 1 point (including 0 expressing
no interest in such noti¯cations being routed to their target user).
8.3.1 Formal De¯nitions
The meeting room contains human users h1;h2;:::;hn 2 H and devices d1;d2;:::;dn 2 D.
There also exist other users outside the meeting room noted as h0
1;h0
2:::;h0
n 2 H0. Devices
can have di®erent characteristics: private display (OD) (e.g. email client), public display
(PD) (e.g. the smart whiteboard) and part-private-part-public (POD) (e.g. IM) such
that POD[PD[OD = D. Devices are controlled indirectly by user agents ®;¯;::: 2 Ag.
2While the dial is a manual means of managing the level of intrusiveness, we aim in the longer term
to develop sensing devices to monitor the state of the meeting in order to adjust the level of intrusive-
ness automatically (e.g. by tracking the progress of the meeting through the agenda, by monitoring
movements of users through a video processing tool to detect how users are interacting, or by assessing
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By indirect control we mean that it is the system, a special user agent representing the
meeting room and the group of users, called SAgent, that handles the actual display
of messages, but it is the user agent that decides which device should be used. Thus,
SAgent carries out the display of noti¯cations when asked by another user agent if the
agent satis¯es certain conditions. In this way, the SAgent actually manages the group
preference on the level of intrusiveness allowed. The behaviour of the SAgent is regulated
through the dial (controlled by the group of human users) which indirectly scales the
level of intrusiveness of all devices in the meeting room by changing the conditions which
SAgent imposes on the display of noti¯cations. Figure 8.2 shows the °ow of messages
between agents (including SAgent) whenever a noti¯cation is received from outside the
meeting room. We generally capture the devices that are accessible by a user's agent
by the function G : H ! 2D. Each meeting room user can have a number of devices
used to display (noti¯cations of) messages. We use ®h1 to note an agent ® belonging
to user h1. Devices under the indirect control of an agent are noted as h®;hd1;d2;:::ii.
Messages received by users from outside the meeting are noted as m1;m2;:::;mn 2 M.
Each message has the following structure m = hh0;h;s;c;t;di, where h0 2 H0 is a sender
outside the meeting room, h 2 H is the recipient inside the meeting room, s is the
subject of the message, c is the content of the message, t 2 Time is the time at which
the message arrives, and d 2 G(h) is (are) the device(s) available for display for that
user. The meeting starts at time t = 0 and ends at a given time tend.
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Figure 8.2: Interactions between device and agents. Dotted lines represent interac-
tions after a message is received by user A's agent has negotiated with B's and C's
agent.
We consider the intrusiveness to be a cost to the group activity since it disturbs the
meeting; noti¯cations can be allowed into the meeting if and only if the gain of displaying
them matches the cost (or level of disturbance) to the group. The dial can be formalised
as a function that scales the acceptable level of intrusiveness K : 2D ! [0;1]. Assuming
each set of devices (i.e. POD, PD, OD) has a di®erent degree of intrusiveness Q 2 [0;1]
(and therefore cost) in the following order QOD > QPOD > QPD, then the actual
cost of a particular device d in a particular context (as set by the dial), is obtained
by the function Cd : [0;1] £ [0;1] ! [0;1] de¯ned as Cd = Qsd £ K(d), where sd 2Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 219
fPOD;PD;ODg. As can be seen in the function Cd, the dial scales the cost to display
a message on each set of devices (private display, public display, part private-part public
displays). We also assume the existence of an invisible queue that stores messages that
are not su±ciently important to be displayed at a particular time, but which might
become important enough later on. This device does not interrupt any user and is
therefore assigned a cost of zero.
Agents negotiate about the display of a noti¯cation of a given message on a particular
device. Also, agents negotiate about the particular point in time the noti¯cation is to
happen. In this context, the negotiating agents may have di®erent preferences about
the message m. For example, some senders or subjects might be more preferred by one
agent than another.3 Agents may also have di®erent preferences about the device chosen4
dchosen (e.g. a public device might be more preferred by an agent since it guarantees
the alert will be perceived by the user while an email which needs to be polled is more
preferred by the other agents since their owners are going to be less disturbed), and the
time at which it is displayed tdisplay (i.e. disturbing a user immediately may be preferred
by an agent while other agents may prefer it to be displayed much later on at the end
of the meeting). The content of the message is non-negotiable but the time of display
and device chosen can be negotiated. All these issues are captured in a contract O such
that fmreceived = m;tdisplay = t;dchosen = dg = O. For each of these issues, we assume
the pairs of negotiating agents have linear utility functions U for each issue that follow
the MMPD as described in chapter 4. The domain of values each issue takes is assumed
to be ¯nite (e.g. a ¯xed number of devices ranked in order of their level of guarantee
to alert a user while the domain of time points is constituted of a ¯xed number of time
points along the duration of the meeting).
The utility function applying over a contract O is then re¯ned to capture the points
assigned to a sender name and a subject, determine the utility of the device chosen
and the time of display minus the cost (intrusiveness) of using that particular device as
shown below:
U®(O) =
X
(x=v)2O
wx ¢ U®
x (v) ¡ Cd (8.1)
where
P
wx = 1. Thus, the utility function returns a points obtained for having a given
message displayed on a given device at a particular point in time. Whenever a message
is displayed on a particular device, the SAgent rewards the agent concerned (i.e. the
user agent which asked to display the message) with the number of points dictated by
its utility function. This reward represents the user's reward to its agent for satisfying
3The sender name and subject are considered to be only the necessary rather than su±cient features
of the utility function. The other elements of the message such as the content of the message (e.g. using
data-mining techniques where possible) and the time at which it is received may also allow for a more
comprehensive analysis of the utility of the message. We foresee doing so in future work.
4In contexts where agents cannot be trusted, the content might not be transmitted to the other agent
when given for evaluation or some form of cryptographic technique used to encode the message and the
utility function (see 3 for more details).220 Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment
his preferences. The more points it gets, the more the agent is able to pay for messages
that the user might like. Moreover, agents may also be allowed to exchange points they
receive if they need to collaborate to pay for the cost of a message (whenever they cannot
pay for a message on their own).
Messages from users, H, are received by the system agent SAgent which manages the
meeting room (i.e. devices forward incoming messages to the system agent and wait
for a decision to be made before displaying anything). We assume that devices forward
the messages they receive to the system to notify the user agent concerned. A message
is ¯rst analysed by the system to determine the recipient h. The system then contacts
the appropriate user agent ®h. The user agent then needs to make some decisions by
taking into account the cost Cd of displaying a message m on the targetted device d, the
time at which it wants the message displayed, and the utility of a message U®h(m) to
itself. We assume that all agents are initially assigned a budget B®h equal to the cost of
displaying a message for the most expensive set of devices (i.e. B®h = maxd2G(h)fCdg).
In this way, messages are ¯rst assessed using the preferences of the user and then the
decision is made whether to ask the system to display or not. There are 3 possible
courses of actions that a user agent can take:
1. Ask the system to queue the message, resulting in no cost.
2. Ask the system to display message by paying cost Cd with the budget B®h avail-
able. The more costly the device chosen is, the less will the budget of an agent be
after a message is displayed and agents might prefer to display high value messages
on the less costly devices to maintain a high budget. This is graphically shown in
¯gure 8.3.
3. Ask other agents to contribute to pay the cost of displaying the message.
The ¯rst two options are straightforward to carry out. The agent simply needs to analyse
the message and determine the payo®s. If the budget matches the cost of display and
the payo®s will replenish (partly or fully) the budget, then the message is displayed.
However, there might be cases where B®h < Cd and U®h(O) ¸ 0 meaning that the
agent would get a higher payo® than Cd if it had the additional funds to match Cd. To
be able to achieve this, an agent can therefore negotiate with other agents to get their
contribution to the pool of funds and get the message displayed. The display can be on
the users's private device or on other agents' devices (if they agree to this) or on a public
device depending on the importance of the message to the user and the group. The user
agent will therefore negotiate with other user agents for their investments to match the
cost of displaying the message. These other agents might have an interest in getting
the message displayed since they might also have a preference for the sender and the
subject. Agents may also have di®erent preferences about the time of display and theChapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 221
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Figure 8.3: The budget B resulting from displaying a message m on a device d for
di®erent costs and values of the message displayed
device chosen such that it is possible to propose alternative devices on which a message
can be displayed and times at which these events can happen. Moreover, since the agents
are assumed to be sel¯sh, we can expect that they might renege on their commitments
to display a message on a particular device in order to increase their utility. Given this,
in the next section, we describe the negotiation mechanism that aims to resolve the
agents' con°icting preferences while taking into account their trustworthiness.
8.3.2 Persuasive Negotiation
In order to allow agents to reach e±cient agreements quickly, we choose the persuasive
negotiation model described in chapter 7. We choose such an approach speci¯cally be-
cause it incorporates the use of promises of future rewards (i.e. trading points) together
with proposals exchanged (e.g. display on IM and promise to give 0.3 points in the next
encounter if the opponent agrees to 0.3 points now). Thus, not only can agents negotiate
about the type of device to display a message on, but they can also promise points to
each other in order to get their proposal accepted. Given that such promises are more
likely to persuade the opponent (since they obtain points in return or have committed
to give some) to agree to contribute to the payment than only proposing a device and
time of display, the negotiating agents are expected to ¯nd an agreement more quickly
than if they operated without such promises (as shown in chapter 7). Moreover, given
that the agents are likely to meet repeatedly during the meeting as noti¯cations are
received, the use of promises allows the system to °exibly deal with important messages
(to a user or the group) over time such that important messages are not rejected simply
because the user's budget size varies as his messages are noti¯ed.
We will also assume, in this scenario, that agents are sel¯sh as users might not want
to be disturbed by messages of other users. In this case, the agents might not want to222 Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment
give all the points they promise or display the noti¯cation on a chosen device (in order
to get more points). Given this, agents can use the CREDIT trust model to shrink or
expand their negotiation ranges over the time of display and the device chosen. For
example, as in CREDIT, a high level of trust would equate to agreeing to the proposed
device and time of display while a low level of trust would equate to negotiating for later
time of display and less intrusive device. Moreover, by using CREDIT, agents may also
modify the promises they make according to the trust they have in their opponent. A
high degree of trust would equate to a reasonable demand for extra points, while a low
degree would equate to a high amount of points demanded since the agent would be
expected to defect on the number of points provided.
Next we describe the algorithm used by the agents to perform negotiations with other
agents in their environmentand decide which device to choose for display.
8.3.3 The Negotiation Algorithm
The algorithm is described in ¯gure 8.4. Note that ¡h ´ H=h and Tell®!¯(x) (for ®
tells ¯ about x) is a message from ® to ¯ with the content x. From Steps 1 to 6 the agent
determines its utility for all possible o®ers that it can make, sends the di®erent proposals
and arguments with them according to its level of trust previously calculated (using a
trust model such as CREDIT). The type of argument (i.e. asked or given) and the
o®er is determined according to the RBT algorithm presented in section 7.3.5. In this
case, given that the proponent is involved in multi-party negotiations and might make
rewards or ask for rewards over multiple sequential negotiations with di®erent parties,
the value of the reward ®h can give or ask for in each encounter with other agents is at
most equal to:
maxf0;U®h(O) + B®h ¡
X
i¤
hg
where i¤
h represents the points promised or asked for the current o®er O by agents other
than ®¡h. In so doing, ®h makes a promise to ®¡h that it will be able to refund after it
can get its message displayed. In Step 5 each agent sends its potential investment i¡h
for the o®er given. Step 8 computes the pool of points available given the utility to be
obtained and the cost of the device. Then, in Step 9, ®h selects the device and the time
of display for which it gets the maximum investment and checks whether the points to
be obtained are greater than zero. If ®h does get some points, in Step 11 to 14 it noti¯es
all other agents about its decision so that they can update their commitments (i.e. keep
track of promises) and send their investments to SAgent which updates their budgets
(i.e. by deducting the promised i¡u for the current message), otherwise it queues the
message. In Step 16 ®h forwards the payment for the device to SAgent. In Step 17, the
SAgent pays ®h and Step 18 updates ®h's budget.Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 223
Require: Trust(®h;®¡h)
1: for all ®¡h do
2: use Trust(®h;®¡h) to adjust negotiation range in o®er O.
3: while ®¡h and ®h disagree do
4: Tell®h!®¡h(illoc(O;i¤
¡h)) where illoc 2 fpropose;reward;askrewardg % o®er
O and, if possible, argument i¤
¡h to other agents using RGM and CREDIT.
5: Tell®¡h!®h(i¡h;(O;i¤
¡h)) where i¡h · B®¡h and i¡h 2 [0;1] % agents return their
promise of contribution for the pair (O;i¤
¡h).
6: end while
7: end for
8: 8O 2 O calculate SumO
i =
©P
h2H i¡h
ª
% sum investments promised for each o®er.
9: Omax = argmaxO2O
©
U®u(O) + SumO
i
ª
% choose utility maximising o®er.
10: if B®h ¡ Cd + SumO
i > 0 then % if a device and time of display can indeed be chosen
11: for all ®¡h do
12: Tell®h!®¡h(Omax) % tell other agents the choice.
13: Tell®¡h!®h(i¡h;Omax) % agents reply to ®h with their investments. This is where agents
can defect on payments.
14: Update Trust(®h;®¡h) % update the trust model.
15: end for
16: ® calculates its own investment ih = minfB®h;Cd ¡ Sum
Omax
i g
17: Tell®h!SAgent(ih;Omax) % give investment and contract chosento SAgent.
18: Update trust of other agents % Using CREDIT here.
19: TellSAgent!®h(points = U®h(Omax) + Sum
Omax
i ) % SAgent gives points to ®h including
any extra points from investments.
20: B®h = U®h(Omax) + Sum
Omax
i + B®h ¡ ih % agent updates its budget with new points.
21: else
22: send to queue
23: end if
Figure 8.4: Algorithm to determine most appropriate device and time to display
message
8.4 Implementation
In order to evaluate the e±ciency and e®ectiveness of our algorithm we developed it
using the Jabber5 platform (a highly extensible instant messaging system). In more
detail, the Jabber platform incorporates devices and agents in the following ways:
1. Devices with various levels of intrusiveness are represented by a number of highly
con¯gurable instant messaging clients. Thus, Jabber clients (e.g. Psi) can be
con¯gured to simulate an email client by having messages sent to a client that
simply displays an icon when a message is received. The client then needs to be
checked (or polled) to view the message. An IM can instead be simulated by having
the client pop up a chat window and beeping at the same time. Thus the user is
alerted and the message can be viewed immediately. Other devices mentioned as
part of the meeting room, such as the public device and the invisible queue, can
be created by having a custom-made Jabber client that simply outputs messages
it receives to a window and an internal queue that is not visible respectively.
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2. Software agents as pictured in ¯gure 8.2 are made to interact on a server that
plugs into the Jabber system that is responsible for routing XML-based messages
which come from users outside the meeting room. In this way the negotiation is
performed in a single thread of control every time a message is received. Thus,
after negotiation, agents can provide the appropriate routing information to the
Jabber system (i.e. which device to be chosen for noti¯cation).
In the next section, we detail the operation of our system.
8.4.1 System Operation
Each user in the environment is assigned their own unique `Jabber ID'. Associated with
that identi¯er there are a number of resources, in the scenario's case there are two;
an e-mail `device' and one for instant messages. The other two candidate devices for
noti¯cation delivery are the invisible queue device, and the public whiteboard display
(a ¯rst class Jabber ID in its own right), shared amongst all of the users in the scenario.
The various components of our system are shown in ¯gure 8.5.
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Figure 8.5: The architecture used for the meeting room and negotiating agents.
The user agents were implemented within a Jabber server component (i.e the meeting
room server), representing a meeting room. The meeting room server maintains an
internal description of each user's preferences as part of the Jabber system's user pro¯le
(i.e. U®h). The user can view or change his preferences via dialogue (using an instant
messenger) with this component. This preference information is then used to initialize
the user's agent, which is created when the user ¯rst logs in to the system. As a userChapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment 225
adds further devices to the system, this agent is then informed of the new device, and
thus di®erent components become candidate targets for noti¯cations.
Messages that are sent from outside the meeting to a particular Jabber user go through
the Jabber server, which then re-routes them to the meeting room server (which repre-
sents the SAgent). The agent representing the recipient is then noti¯ed of the message
so that it may begin to negotiate for an appropriate display device. The meeting room
server receives the resulting choice of the agent and provides the Jabber server with the
appropriate routing information.
To illustrate the operation of our system, consider the following interaction episode.
We will assume that Nick, Gopal, and Dave are having a meeting. Each user has a
Psi-based email client and an IM client up and running on his laptop while the public
display client is connected to a smart whiteboard and the invisible queue is implemented
in the meeting room server. Before the users start the meeting, they log on to the Jabber
system which communicates their presents to the meeting room server. The latter then
queries the users for their preferences. The meeting topic is about \FEEL project" which
all users register in their preferences in their pro¯le (e.g. they each give 1 point to that
subject to indicate a high preference). Moreover, they each assign, possibly di®erent,
preferences for senders (e.g. Nick gives Wendy 1 since she is his boss while Dave gives
Wendy 0:5 since she is not involved with Dave on any projects at the moment) and other
subjects including the meeting subject. Duplicate entries are prevented by the system.
Let us assume in the following that a message (e.g. an email) is sent to Nick by Wendy
about the meeting subject in particular and that the dial is set to K(d) = 1 such that
a message to a public display would cost 2:5, an IM 2:2, an email client 1:0 and the
invisible queue 0, and that each agent is given an initial budget of B®h = 1:
1. The meeting room server (i.e. SAgent) intercepts a message `from'
wendy@scenario with subject FEEL project to recipient Jabber ID of Nick,
nick@agentbox.scenario.
2. The SAgent dispatches the message (including message metadata contained in
envelope) to the agent representing the interests of the target user (i.e. ®nick).
3. ®nick ¯rst calculates the utility of the message using equation 8.1 and then negoti-
ates with ®dave and ®gopal as per the algorithm described in ¯gure 8.4. As can be
deduced from our initial settings, ®nick can only a®ord an email or invisible queue
by itself but given investments of other agents, it could send the message to the
public device or the IM. Given that Gopal and Dave have a high preference for
the meeting room subject and that Dave also has a high preference for the sender
while Gopal has none (i.e. from equation 8.1, U®gopal > 0 and U®dave > 0), each
decides to invest di®erent amounts in the message for di®erent devices that could
be used for the noti¯cation. Let us assume (according to preset values of PD)226 Chapter 8 Persuasive Negotiation in a Pervasive Computing Environment
that the utility maximising device (without promises) for ®nick is the IM which
attracts an investment of igopal = 0:2 from Gopal and idave = 0:4 from Dave. In-
stead, with a promise of returning i¤
Gopal = 0:1 to Gopal and i¤
dave = 0:1 to Dave,
the utility maximising option for ®nick is when it uses a public device. Thus ®nick
can get igopal = 0:8 from Gopal and idave = 1:0 from Dave's agent for the public
display (for which they would invest more than the IM without the promises but
these investments would not be enough to satisfy the cost of the public device).
Nick's agent can thus display the message on the public display by investing only
inick = 0:9 and rewarding ®gopal and ®dave in future encounters.
4. ®nick sends the identi¯er of the chosen device to SAgent together with the invest-
ments of all agents.
5. The SAgent then sends the whole content of the XML-based message from Wendy
to the Jabber system with the appropriate routing information that selects the
public whiteboard.
6. The SAgent then rewards all the agents with the utility they gain from the display
of the message on the public device (i.e. 2 to ®nick, 1:5 to ®dave and 1 to ®gopal).
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an agent-based system to manage intrusiveness in
pervasive computing environments. The solution takes into account the preferences of
a user, and other users in his environment through our model of PN and CREDIT, in
deciding the intrusive level of a message. Moreover, we successfully implemented the
algorithm in Jabber and deployed it in a meeting room scenario. Thus we have achieved
our main objectives towards showing the applicability of our negotiation models to
solving con°icts prone to uncertainty in practical applications (see section 1.5).
In general, the main ¯ndings of this work were that the multi-agent negotiation algorithm
would always choose the most important incoming messages for display and, if too many
messages of medium importance are received, the agents gradually run out of budget and
cannot a®ord to display any further messages. This results from the relationship between
the budget and the value the agent obtains from the display of messages on certain
devices as shown in ¯gure 8.3. The more costly the device, the lower the resulting budget
after a noti¯cation, hence the potential of an agent to display noti¯cation next time
decreases. Moreover, the negotiation algorithm allows agents to adapt their behaviour
over time, through the use of arguments and trust, to permit important noti¯cations
when their budgets are low and reduce their contributions to untrustworthy agents
respectively.Chapter 9
Conclusions
The various models we have developed in this thesis are linked by the underlying theme of
attempting to reduce the uncertainty in negotiations in multi-agent systems. Therefore,
in this chapter we bring together the main achievements of these models and discuss
how they impact on the wider issues that pervade the ¯eld of multi-agent systems.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.1 summarises the main results
of this thesis, while Sections 9.2 and 9.3 discuss the theoretical and practical implications
of our work respectively. Finally, Section 9.4 discusses future lines of work concerned
with reducing uncertainty in multi-agent negotiations.
9.1 Summary of Results
Our main aim at the beginning of this thesis was to develop mechanisms that would
enable the resolution of con°icts under uncertainty. In particular, we set out to devise
techniques to reduce uncertainties about the agents' reliability, honesty, preferences, and
action sets, when agents are involved in negotiation. We applied our techniques to the
two main classes of negotiation mechanisms, namely mechanism design and bargaining.
In both cases, these techniques were based around the notions of trust and persuasive
negotiation.
Thus, using mechanism design principles, we developed the area of Trust-Based Mecha-
nism Design. This aims to produce e±cient solutions by reducing the uncertainty about
the agents' preferences through a protocol and uncertainty about their reliability through
the use of trust. Thus, our Trust-Based Mechanism is the ¯rst reputation mechanism
that is incentive compatible, individually rational, and e±cient. Moreover, it was shown
that our TBM can use any trust model to produce e±cient outcomes in the long run,
as the trustworthiness (reliability) of all agents are learnt over multiple interactions by
the trust model.
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In the area of bargaining, we aimed to reduce uncertainty about agents' honesty and
reliability through the use of a trust model that could accordingly adjust the agents'
negotiation stance. To this end, we developed the CREDIT trust model. This is the
¯rst such model that can reduce uncertainties in bargaining encounters. Speci¯cally, in
CREDIT we showed how trust, learnt over multiple interactions, could be used both
to constrain the domains of issues being negotiated and choose issues to be negotiated.
In so doing, CREDIT is able to avoid exploitation by unreliable and dishonest agents.
CREDIT was also shown to elicit pro¯table outcomes against agents that are reliable to
a certain degree.
Given that CREDIT only reduces uncertainty regarding the reliability and honesty of
agents, we developed a novel model of Persuasive Negotiation that reduces the uncer-
tainties about the agents' preferences and action sets in bargaining encounters. Thus,
we provided a new protocol for PN that takes into account rewards that can be asked
from or given to another agent. This protocol reduces the uncertainty about the type of
actions agents are allowed to perform. In so doing, we also provided the ¯rst protocol
that clearly speci¯es the main commitments agents make when engaging in persuasive
negotiation. Moreover, we provided a novel decision making model for agents engaging
in persuasive negotiation. Thus, we provided a mechanism that generated arguments in
the form of rewards that constrain the outcome of repeated encounters (i.e. that con-
strain the agents' action sets). These arguments try to give more value to an o®er (than
the o®er by itself) on the present encounter by providing guarantees on the outcome of
future encounters and therefore speed up the search for an agreement (without knowing
the opponents' speci¯c preferences). Thus, we showed that through persuasive negoti-
ation agents are able to reach agreements in less time than in the non-persuasive case
and obtain a higher overall utility. Furthermore, we developed a new strategy for per-
suasive negotiation that selects the o®ers and rewards that are most likely to persuade
an opponent and maximise the agents' utilities over repeated encounters.
Finally, we provided an example application of CREDIT and our model of PN through
the model developed to manage intrusiveness in pervasive computing environments.
Thus we showed how the intrusiveness of noti¯cations in a pervasive computing envi-
ronment could be reduced by allowing agents to negotiate, on behalf of their owners, the
display of these noti¯cations. In so doing, we provided the ¯rst practical application of
both PN and trust in multi-agent negotiation.
In short, the models we have described above form part of a wider initiative to solve
the problem of uncertainties in multi-agent interactions. In the next section we discuss
their theoretical implications for research in multi-agent systems in general.Chapter 9 Conclusions 229
9.2 Theoretical Implications
Con°ict resolution in multi-agent systems is a major issue that has always received a
signi¯cant degree of attention in the agent-based research community. In particular,
mechanism design and bargaining have been at the centre of this endeavour. This e®ort
has lead to a number of models that each aim to elicit predictable and e±cient outcomes
given certain constraints. In this context, the work presented in this thesis has tried
to reduce the constraints on these mechanisms so as to make the solutions more widely
applicable in realistic settings.
Against this background, CREDIT represents a ¯rst attempt at using trust in auto-
mated negotiation. In CREDIT, trust is used both to choose issues to be negotiated
and their corresponding negotiation ranges. These uses of trust borrow ideas from the
human negotiation literature such as Fisher and Ury (1983) and Rai®a (1982). Thus,
our work on CREDIT has showed that trust can make or break relationships between
agents as they do in the human domain (Gambetta, 1998). Speci¯cally, trust can either
widen negotiation ranges and allow for more pro¯table agreements in the long run or it
can shrink negotiation ranges so as to recover previous losses or reduce the risk of losing
utility in an encounter. In so doing, CREDIT's shrinkage of negotiation ranges is syn-
onymous to increasing an agent's bargaining power since this procedure results in higher
utility for the agent (than without the shrinkage) if an agreement is reached. Obviously,
reducing the negotiation ranges also reduces the probability of reaching an agreement
as the negotiation ranges of the agents may not intersect anymore (which happens when
interacting with nasty agents). Nevertheless, this reduction of negotiation ranges is
sometimes useful since it serves to avoid unreliable and dishonest agents.
In general, through CREDIT, we have provided the ¯rst insight into procedures that
allow agents to specify their negotiation ranges according to the known characteristics
of the opponent they encounter. Previously, this was not possible and heuristics for
negotiations relied on a rule of thumb to specify negotiation ranges for the agents as
in (Faratin et al., 1998; Fatima et al., 2001). Moreover, in CREDIT we have shown
how societal factors can impact on automated negotiation. By introducing aspects
such as institutions and norms that could impact on trust, CREDIT can adapt to the
context within which it is used (and therefore adapt the negotiation stance of an agent
accordingly). Up to now, negotiation models had hardly assessed the impact of such
societal factors on the outcome of negotiations.
The social aspect of interactions has also been neglected in mechanism design up to now.
Indeed, mechanism design relies on micro-economic principles that tend to boil all the
attributes of the agents down to what is termed their `type'. For example, the di®erent
degrees of reliability of an agent could be de¯ned according to di®erent types (Ely et al.,
2004) or the value an agent attributes to a particular good is also usually de¯ned by
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precise, it assumes that all possible types of agents are known apriori. However, this is
not the case in most realistic applications, where for example, a mechanic's reliability
is only known after a number of interactions with him or a buyer's valuation of some
goods may only be known (by herself) after analysing the quality of the goods or the
need for the goods. Our work in TBMD captures such aspects of agents which have been
usually avoided by game theoretic models. TBMD achieves this by separating the type
of an agent from the reliability other agents attribute to it through their trust model.
The latter relies on the agents' information gathering capability to output the believed
reliability of another agent. Therefore, as was shown in chapter 6, the mechanism
perfects its outcome as the agents re¯ne their measure of trust over repeated encounters.
Through TBMD, we provide the ¯rst mechanism that connects mechanism design to
the social aspects of an agent since the trust model (as was shown for CREDIT) can
capture many of the social attributes that impact on an agent's decision making. For
example, the reputation other agents have in the society or the agents' similarity in their
assessment of others may determine how an agent perceives the reliability of another
agent.
In general, TBMD di®erentiates itself from current mechanisms by the fact that it
generates the e±cient outcome (resulting in maximum pro¯t and choosing the most
reliable agents) after a number of encounters rather than in one shot. The repetitive
aspect of TBMD is needed in order to remove the assumption that all agents are believed
by other agents to be completely reliable. Thus, through TBMD as well as CREDIT, it is
expected that, in the long run, only the most reliable and trustworthy agents will survive
in a population as the unreliable ones are avoided and cannot make any pro¯t. In so
doing, these mechanisms may neglect the fact that agents may have varying reliabilities.
Thus, over time, agents could either get better or worse depending on circumstances
that may or may not be known a priori. For example, TBMD would avoid unreliable
agents and not select them in a future encounter where they could have been more
reliable. CREDIT reduces the possibility of overlooking a reliable agent by leaving the
negotiation mechanism to decide the fate of a previously unreliable agent. However, this
does not take into account the fact that an agent may know its opponent is going to
be more or less reliable in future. If it did, the agent could shrink negotiations in the
encounter where the agent is more reliable (and claim more utility) and expect lower
pro¯ts when the agent is less reliable (and hence negotiate with more relaxed ranges).
This could also help the agent make other parallel decisions more e±ciently. In general,
communicating information other than the costs and valuations of an agent to another
falls into the realm of ABN (as discussed in chapter 2). In this thesis we developed a
particular aspect of ABN through our PN model.
Using PN we have shown how agents can use arguments to in°uence repeated encounters
positively. As we highlighted in chapter 1, there are very few negotiation models that
allow agents to in°uence repeated encounters as we do in PN. Moreover, there are alsoChapter 9 Conclusions 231
very few ABN mechanisms that have been applied to solve the particular types of con°ict
that arise in multi-agent systems. Given this, we believe repeated bargaining encounters
could be used as a testbed for ABN mechanisms since they allow them to benchmark
their properties directly against other basic negotiation tactics as we have done in this
thesis (see chapter 7). ABN mechanisms may do so by specifying arguments in repeated
bargains which consider operations on the negotiation object that is negotiated over in
each encounter. As we have shown in this thesis it is then straightforward to specify
arguments that the agents can directly evaluate.
9.3 Practical Implications
Having discussed the theoretical implications of our models in the previous section, we
turn to their practical implications for multi-agent systems in general. Speci¯cally, as
we propose in chapter 3, we believe the semantic web provides agent researchers with
many possibilities for applying their work to practical applications. The Grid, peer-to-
peer systems, and pervasive computing environments, are yet further fertile areas that
share similar issues with the semantic web and therefore, we believe are likely to make
use of the variety of models developed for multi-agent systems. In all these domains,
we believe the management of resources will be handled by intelligent agents which can
autonomously choose their interaction partners and negotiate with them. These systems
are all prone to the uncertainties we have considered in this thesis (see chapter 1) which
make our models of trust and persuasion particularly suitable for them.
For example, the particular need for trust in such applications has been recognised by
the semantic web community which places trust at the top of the semantic web `layer
cake' (see ¯gure 9.1). The fact is, and this constitutes the thrust of this thesis, that
trust underlies all interactions prone to uncertainty and such uncertainty pervades all
interactions that are performed over unsupervised and open systems such as the semantic
web or the Grid. As a speci¯c example, it is possible to concretely apply TBMD in
running online auctions where buyers and sellers are allowed to state their trust in each
other when negotiating over resources that are available in the Grid or the semantic web
(see appendix B for a worked example). This has become possible thanks to the work by
Giovannucci et al. (Giovannucci et al., 2004) who have developed an agent-based online
(combinatorial) auction mechanism, iBundler, that is currently being integrated with
TBMD. This combination will allow auctions to be more °exible and adapt to richer
information (as opposed to the only use of cost and valuations) in making allocations.
This, we believe, will also bene¯t e-business (Sadeh, 2002) at large because it encourages
trustworthy behaviour in sellers and buyers who use the system to trade.
Where centralised systems such as TBMD cannot be applied, CREDIT could be used
to allow agents to negotiate resources without the need for a central auctioneer when232 Chapter 9 Conclusions
Figure 9.1: The semantic web layer cake proposed by Berners Lee (at www.w3.org
/2002/Talks/ 04-sweb/ slide12-0.html).
the agents' reliability and honesty are prone to uncertainty. Thus, for example, agents
that share ¯les in peer-to-peer systems could avoid agents that free-ride over their re-
sources by directly negotiating downloads with them according to their trustworthiness
in providing the ¯les they possess (Feldman et al., 2004) (i.e. taking into account the
quality or download speed for example). Combined with a reputation model (such as
REGRET or Yu et al.'s), agents using CREDIT could then spread the trustworthiness of
their counterparts throughout the network and prevent free-riders from exploiting other
agents.
The other potential application area of agent-based systems we have explored in this
thesis is that of pervasive computing environments. In this domain, the problem of
managing intrusiveness has largely been neglected by community. Rather researchers
have focused on using agents to perform identi¯cation, authentication, and perform
transactions or to transmit information (e.g. instant messengers, or chat room bots)
(Satyanarayanan, 2001; Schmeck et al., 2002). Moreover, most applications of pervasive
computing consider mostly cooperative settings (e.g., multi-sensor networks (Manyika
and Durrant-Whyte, 1997) or sharing information through smart phones (Islam, 2004)).
In contrast, our work presented in chapter 8 presents a novel way of developing per-
vasive computing applications in competitive settings by using agents to manage the
preferences of the users in a dynamic fashion through negotiation rather than through
constraints satisfaction algorithms used in the cooperative case. Also we highlight the
use of agents in group applications where the need for focus is important and this focus
needs to be adjusted according to the context and the con°icting preferences of the
users as individuals and the group as a whole. Speci¯cally, our persuasive negotiation
mechanism goes some way towards solving this competitive side of interactions in per-Chapter 9 Conclusions 233
vasive computing environments. Moreover, through our PN model, we have shown how
agents, using arguments, can partition resources more e±ciently over time by allowing
important messages to be displayed even if agents run out of budget.
Our PN mechanism could also be applied in peer-to-peer systems or Grid-based applica-
tions where agents need to repeatedly and autonomously negotiate over the partition of
resources such as computing power or storage space. Thus, through the use of rewards,
agents can avoid losing customers when they are heavily loaded (i.e. having many users
at the same time) by negotiating for a certain level of service commensurate with their
capability to deliver the service and promising rewards on future contracts that may be
made. Conversely, agents could ask for future rewards when accepting a lower level of
service from a particular agent. In this way, the resources distributed over the system
can be more e±ciently used over time. In so doing, the system of self-interested agents
can achieve a level of e±ciency close to that of a cooperative group of agents.
9.4 Open Challenges
The work presented in this thesis is a step towards engineering robust and e±cient
protocols and reasoning mechanisms for open multi-agent systems prone to uncertainty.
While we have considered issues that are prone to uncertainty which may a®ect the
outcome of negotiations such as the reliability, honesty, preferences, and action sets of
agents, there remains a number of other important challenges that need to be met for
automated negotiation to be more robust to uncertainty. In particular, the automated
negotiation mechanisms need to be able to handle uncertainty about the e±ciency of
the communication mechanism used and the computational capability of agents.
The e±ciency of communication mechanism is determined by, amongst other things (e.g.
by the noise in the information transmitted or by the size of bandwidth available), the
time lag it allows between o®ers that agents send to each other. If the communication
mechanism is not e±cient (i.e. there is a long time lag) and the agents' environment
is very dynamic (as we expect it to be in open distributed systems), the agents' pref-
erences may change when o®ers are delayed. Hence, the inferences of one agent about
its opponent's preferences may be completely wrong and reduce the attractiveness of
o®ers or rewards made using these inferences. Moreover, agents may also ¯nd o®ers
sent by their opponent less attractive than they were at the time they were originally
sent. In such cases, the agents may end up taking a long time to ¯nd an agreement
that is likely to be sub-optimal. Therefore, techniques must be devised to cope with the
dynamic nature of the agents' preferences in the negotiation to allow agents to come to
good agreements. This could be achieved by devising agents' strategies according to the
dynamic features their preferences and devising a negotiation protocol that takes such
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Another major factor in negotiations that is prone to uncertainty is the computational
capability of agents. The computational capability of an agent determines its ability
to compute good o®ers in a timely fashion. This ability may be limited to such an
extent that it is not possible to calculate the optimal o®ers within the time allowed by
the protocol. This is because agents are likely to have combinatorial valuations about
the issues being negotiated and may impose additional constraints on the values these
issues take, which make the generation or evaluation of o®ers computationally expensive
(Pekec and Rothkopf, 2003). Given this, agents may not be able to generate the most
preferable o®er (to them) or ¯nd an agreement that meets their opponents' constraints
and combinatorial preferences. Therefore, we believe that agents' strategies must be
designed to allow fast evaluation and generation of combinatorial o®ers and adapt to
an opponent's computational capability (e.g., by using arguments to show an opponent
that some constraints cannot be satis¯ed by the o®ers received from it). Also, protocols
could be engineered to reduce the computational complexity of evaluating such o®ers.
We also believe that our work opens up a number of further possibilities in the particular
areas of trust and ABN. We will ¯rst consider the challenges that still need to be met
in the area of trust:
Collusion Detection | very few existing reputation or interaction mechanisms can
prevent or deal with collusion (Sen and Sajja, 2002; Brandt, 2002). Moreover,
while we have shown how agents can learn to reciprocate good actions over time,
it has not been shown how they could learn to collude, which is equivalent to
reciprocating to only some agents and sharing false information about these ac-
complices to exploit others. There are clear bene¯ts to collusion as highlighted by
Conitzer and Sandholm (2004), and we can therefore expect agents to collude in
an open environment whenever this is possible. If the system is to be robust and
incentive compatible, collusion should be prevented either through the application
of a certain protocol (through mechanism design) or at the level of trust models
which try to recognise colluders. Otherwise, agents could end up wrongly trusting
others that are, in fact, exploiting them.
Social Networks | while most reputation models or security mechanisms (to some
extent) assume that there exists a social network, the connections between the
nodes in the network are rarely, if at all, given a meaning. That is, the semantics
of connections are not detailed. Connections have mostly been used to represent
past interactions among the agents in the community (i.e. a connection means
that an interaction has occurred between the two nodes at its ends) or are simply
given to the agents (Sabater and Sierra, 2002; Yu and Singh, 2002b; Schillo et al.,
2000). A clearer de¯nition of relationships (e.g. as collaborators, partnerships in
coalitions, or members of the same organisations), de¯ning the connections within
the network would be needed in order to make trust models practically applicable.Chapter 9 Conclusions 235
In the area of ABN the following issues still need to be addressed:
Engineering E±cient Protocols | there are a number of protocols, including the
one presented in chapter 7, which aim to precisely determine the commitments
resulting from the illocutions made and the participation rules of the negotiation.
While most of these protocols have been engineered to ensure termination of the
negotiation dialogue or dictate the exact allowable moves of the participants, they
have rarely been engineered to ensure speci¯c outcomes. Moreover, most game the-
oretic models of bargaining only analyse existing protocols of bargaining (Muthoo,
1999) rather than trying to develop new protocols that ensure that the strategies
available to the agents will result in an outcome close or equal to the e±cient par-
titioning of resources. It would therefore be a signi¯cant step forward if bargaining
protocols were developed to allow agents to negotiate in a distributed fashion and
ensure e±cient outcomes are selected.
Preferences | as shown in chapter 2, ABN aims to provide a mechanism to change
preferences of agents during negotiations by providing justi¯cations. In collabora-
tive settings this is easier since the agents can totally trust each other and assess
the information given to make further decisions. However, when agents are sel¯sh,
the information and justi¯cations they give may only be such that they result in
a higher utility for the agent sending them. In such settings, agents may need to
verify the information transmitted or rely on their trust in their opponent to accept
such information. Moreover, if agents can autonomously change their preferences
according to new information received from other agents, their human owners may
not obtain what they speci¯ed as their preferences to their agent. Therefore, more
work needs to be done to ensure that agents can indeed exchange arguments that
can convince other self-interested agents to change their preferences during nego-
tiation and make sure that these changes are still agreeable to the agents' owners.
This will ensure the predictability and robustness of the system.
The advent of such technologies as the Grid, semantic web, and pervasive computing,
has widened the scope of potential applications of MAS, as well as the range of issues
MAS researchers have to consider in developing their systems. It is therefore crucial that
the challenges we have identi¯ed here be met to ensure that MAS are secure, e±cient,
and result in pro¯table outcomes for their users so as to be applicable in a wide variety
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Trust in Practice
We choose the semantic web to illustrate the practical applications of trust for open
multi-agent systems. This is because, while potential applications of agent based sys-
tems such as ubiquitous computing and pervasive computing applications are still in
their infancy, the semantic web is building upon the considerable success of the world
wide web and technologies associated with it. Moreover, the semantic web is strongly
motivated by concepts in multi-agent systems (e.g. reasoning under uncertainty, on-
tologies, communication languages). It can therefore be considered that the semantic
web will provide the testbed for the ¯rst large scale application of agent-based systems
in every day life. For these reasons, we provide the following vision of the semantic
web (adapted from (Berners-Lee et al., 2001)) and detail the roles of trust models and
interaction mechanisms within it.
Lucy and Peter have to organise a series of appointments to take their mother to the
doctor for a series of physical therapy sessions. (We identify the need for trust at each
step of the scenario in italics).
At the doctor's o±ce, Lucy instructed her Semantic Web agent through her handheld Web
browser. The agent promptly retrieved information about Mom's prescribed treatment from
the doctor's agent, looked up several lists of providers, and checked for the ones in-plan for
Mom's insurance within a 20-mile radius of her home and with a rating of excellent or very
good on trusted rating services.
The ¯rst interaction between Lucy's agent and the doctor's agent should
involve a secure authentication protocol (see section 3.2.3) that would ensure
that Lucy's agent is allowed to handle her mom's data. This protocol would
¯rst verify the true identity of Lucy's agent and assign to it the proper
rights to handle the data. Also, the trusted rating services could be based on
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reputation mechanisms (see section 3.2.2). These reputation mechanisms
could publish the ratings of health care providers and reward agents which
return ratings with discounts on treatment costs to be paid to the advertised
providers. This would make the mechanism incentive-compatible. Also,
di®erent providers could bid, via a trusted mechanism such as a secure
Vickrey auction, to provide the requested service to Lucy's agent (see
section 3.2.1). Provider agents would need to bid their true valuation of the
treatment plan requested to win the bid whereas Lucy's agent would act as
the auctioneer in this case.
Lucy's agent then began trying to ¯nd a match between available appointment times
(supplied by the agents of individual providers through their Web sites) and Pete's and
Lucy's busy schedules. In a few minutes the agent presented them with a plan. Pete
didn't like it: University Hospital was all the way across town from Mom's place, and he
would be driving back in the middle of rush hour. He set his own agent to redo the search
with stricter preferences about location and time. Lucy's agent, having complete trust in
Pete's agent in the context of the present task, automatically assisted by supplying access
certi¯cates and shortcuts to the data it had already sorted through.
The interaction between individual providers and the user agents (Lucy's and
Pete's) needs a secure mechanism that ensures messages transmitted between
all parties are not manipulated. Pete's agent could enhance the search for
trustworthy potential providers by looking at its past interaction history
with them (see section 3.1.1) rather than looking at only the reputed ones
(see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2). It could also use referrals of other agents in
the network to get in touch with a trustworthy agent it does not directly know.
Almost instantly the new plan was presented: a much closer clinic and earlier times but
there were two warning notes. First, Pete would have to reschedule a couple of his less
important appointments. He checked that they were not a problem. The other was
something about the insurance company's list failing to include this provider under physical
therapists: "Service type and insurance plan status securely veri¯ed by other means," the
agent reassured him. "(Details?)" .
Here the issue of reputation and distributed security is again raised (sections
3.1.2 and 3.2.3). The `other means' that have helped to check the validity
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provided that linked it to trusted sources. These certi¯cates could provide
evidence of the provider's compliance with laws and regulations of the
country or certain quality standards that are equivalent to those needed by
the insurance company.
Lucy registered her assent at about the same moment Pete was muttering, "Spare me the
details," and it was all set. (Of course, Pete couldn't resist the details and later that night
had his agent explain how it had found that provider even though it was not on the proper
list.)
Here, the need for an agent to demonstrate how it could °exibly deal with
di®erent beliefs it acquired in the environment about potential interaction
partners is highlighted (see section 3.1.3). This implies a higher level rea-
soning ability than just an evaluation reputation of providers for example.
The agent should also be able to reason about the selected provider's location
and treatment facilities to decide on whether to trust that provider in being
able to supply the required services.Appendix B
Using CREDIT in a Bandwidth
Trading Scenario
We consider an SU agent ® trying to ¯nd a reliable SP agent in its environment in order
to get a good internet connection to perform voice over IP and access web services for
a reasonable price. Figure B.1 graphically summarises the di®erent steps involved in
using CREDIT during the interaction between ® and a given SP agent. Thus, agent
® ¯rst selects the issues it intends to contract an SP agent for (see block 1 in ¯gure
B.1) and then queries other agents in the environment, asking them how they rate the
available SP agents (see block 2). We assume agent ® has also interacted with some of
these SP agents in the past and has built up a history of interactions with them. From
this history it has built up con¯dence values in each of the issues it wants to contract,
given the context, as shown in section 5.2.3.2.
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Figure B.1: Using and updating CREDIT in interactions.
The reputation values for each SP agent are fed into CREDIT and combined with any
available con¯dence values in order to compute the overall trust of each SP agent for
each of the issues ® wants to negotiate (using equations 5.4, 5.6 and 5.8). The fuzzy sets
used to characterise performance of an agent per issue were those shown in ¯gure 5.1
and these are transfered to the domain space of each issue using the procedure outlined
in equation 5.7. Thus, assume four SP agents are found with the following overall
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trust ratings (see block 2), using equation 5.10, T(®;¯1;X(O)) = 0:8;T(®;¯2;X(O)) =
0:4;T(®;¯3;X(O)) = 0:6, and T(®;¯4;X(O)) = 0:1. From these measures, ® therefore
decides to choose ¯1 as the interaction partner since it is the most trusted of all SP
agents (given the issues ® wants to contract and the weights these issues take in its
utility function).
Having decided to choose agent ¯1, ® checks if the SU's rule in table 5.4 applies and how
far ¯ can be trusted on the premises of the rule (see block 3 in ¯gure B.1). Having found
that ¯ is highly trustworthy on price and size (e.g. T(®;¯1;c) > 0:9 and T(®;¯1;s) >
0:95) ® decides not to include the qos in the set of issues to be negotiated as discussed
in section 5.3.2.2. Agent ® then contacts ¯1 to engage into negotiations.
Prior to negotiations, ¯1, which is also using CREDIT in this case, checks if its trust
in ® is high enough to interact with it instead of other agents. Finding that ® has a
relatively high trust with respect to other agents (e.g. T(®;X(O)) = 0:8), ¯1 decides to
interact with ® but includes the usage issue in the number of issues to be contracted
since ® is not trusted on tc and l (i.e. T(¯;®;tc) < 0:85 and T(¯;®;l) > 0:9).
Thus the ¯nal set of issues to be negotiated by the two agents are: price, size, time of
payment, security level, and usage. Given ¯1's low con¯dence in ® with respect to tc
and l, ¯1 will shrink its negotiation range (see block 4), using the procedure described
in section 5.3.2.1, from [10;20] days to [10;15] days for time of payment and shrink
the negotiation range for the security requirement from [5;10] to [7;10]. Similarly ®'s
reduced con¯dence in ¯1 on the issue of price will cause it to shrink its negotiation range
on price from [30;80] to [30;40].
Having thus de¯ned their negotiation ranges, the two agents will negotiate using their
own negotiation strategies (see block 4). Thus, the two agents come to an agreed contract
O = fc = 35;s = 3Mbits=s;l = 5;usage = 70;tc = 14daysg. While ¯1 can defect from
the agreement by demanding a higher price at a later time, and reducing the bandwidth
allowed, ® can defect by paying later than agreed and using the connection more than
agreed (e.g. by sending spam, or using peer to peer programs). However, the SP agent,
¯1, decides to play a P strategy at execution time in order to keep its reputation in the
society high, while ® decides to be N since it can ¯nd other suppliers if ¯1 does not
want to interact with it in the future (see block 5).
Therefore, ¯1 achieves what has been agreed in the contract while ® defects on all the
issues that it controls. This means that ® will pay the latest it can (i.e. 30 days instead
of 14), defects from the level of security agreed by using unwarranted software (i.e. l = 1
instead of l = 5), and exceeds the number of connections allowed per second by using a
peer-to-peer program (i.e. usage = 100 instead of usage = 70).
Once the bandwidth has been paid for and used by ®, the two agents then analyse each
other's performance of the agreed contract and update their trust in their counterpartsAppendix B Using CREDIT in a Bandwidth Trading Scenario 259
(see block 6). Thus, ® senses no utility loss on the part of ¯1 on those issues which
are not regimented by any institutional norms. Therefore ® senses a lower probability
of utility loss on these issues and this increases its con¯dence. Hence its trust in ¯1
increases over each issue it handled correctly (given the procedure described in section
5.2.3.2). As a result ® increases its overall trust in ¯1 (e.g. say from T(®;¯1) = 0:88 to
T(®;¯1) = 0:90). On the other hand, ¯1 ¯nds that it has incurred substantial utility loss
on all issues that ® handled in the contract. Using the procedure described in section
5.2.3.2, ¯1 therefore decreases its con¯dence on all issues ® handled and as a result
reduces its overall trust in ® (e.g. from T(¯1;®) = 0:8 to T(¯1;®) = 0:70).
The next time ¯1 is contacted by ®, ¯1 might refuse any contract with it or else shrink
its negotiation ranges so as to demand higher-valued contracts (for ¯1) in order to
compensate its past utility loss.